This article was originally published in Maariv on June 17, 2025 in Hebrew.
Four days into the war, and Tehran, according to The Wall Street Journal, is sending messages through Arab mediators to end the confrontation. The Iranians signaled that they are ready to return to the negotiating table, provided the United States does not join the attack. Reuters also reported from sources in Tehran: “We have requested an immediate ceasefire – in exchange for flexibility in nuclear negotiations.”
There is no doubt that Israel has created an entirely new reality. For the first time in history, Israeli aircraft are flying from north to south across Iran without resistance. Senior Iranian regime officials are hiding in bunkers and know their lives depend on Israeli decisions.
The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. As long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes – a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.
The Dangerous Illusion: The Agreement as a Solution
The fundamental question is: Can an agreement with Iran truly prevent the nuclear threat? Iran’s nuclear strategy has historically been characterized by obfuscation and procrastination, prolonging discussions without substantial progress and buying time while advancing toward nuclear enrichment.
Like a chess master, Iran always arrives with extreme demands and expertise in negotiations that feed the process – causing delays, time-wasting, creating opening conditions that make bridging difficult and necessitate additional talks. This was also the case in the round that took place before the war when it was led by the Iranian Foreign Minister with negotiation experience. He was responsible for the previous talks in 2015, starting with extreme demands to maintain significant quantities of highly enriched uranium, continuing the operation of the most sensitive enrichment facilities, complete and immediate removal of sanctions, and non-interference in regional proxy activities.
Evidence from the Past: Iran’s Record of Compliance with Agreements
Iran has proven that it does not honor its commitments even when it is a signatory to international agreements. During the three years when the P5+1 and Iran were parties to the JCPOA (2015-2018), Iran violated the agreement on several occasions and routinely exceeded the limits on the number of advanced centrifuges and the amount of heavy water it was allowed to keep.
Simultaneously, while the agreement was in effect, Iran continued secret efforts and made attempts to acquire prohibited materials. This is the tactic of delay and deception at its finest.
The Ideological Foundation: Everything is Permitted
This strategy is based on clear theological and security foundations. Iran’s leaders and Revolutionary Guard commanders have declared loudly that “Israel must disappear.” This is not empty rhetoric.
Shiite Islam provides fertile ground for justifying any move to destroy Israel by using deception or “flexing” fatwas that reassure the West prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nephew warned former U.S. President Barack Obama in a 2015 letter that the Ayatollah “lies in negotiations, practices the Shia doctrine of Taqiyya, in which Muslims are permitted to lie to infidels for the advancement of Islam.”
Researchers warn that “Khamenei may change his fatwa prohibiting the development of nuclear weapons under critical circumstances, as his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, did on several civilian and political issues.”
This flexibility is not theoretical. In 2021, Iran’s intelligence minister said the country might change its position if “pushed in that direction,” and Khamenei’s senior advisor said in March 2025 that “Iran will have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons if attacked by the United States or its allies.”
Therefore, it is clear that the Iranians use negotiations as a tool of delay and deception – certainly now, on the eve of partial destruction of the nuclear facilities and remaining infrastructure. This is tantamount to freezing the situation so as not to start the race to acquire nuclear weapons under worse opening conditions.
The Need for Independent Israeli Action
Iran held in June 2025 a stockpile of enriched uranium sufficient for nine nuclear bombs, with the capability to enrich to weapons-grade within 2-3 days and assemble a crude bomb within 3-5 weeks. Adapting a sophisticated warhead to a ballistic missile from the inventory of over 3,000 missiles would likely require a few months.
There are American force movements in the region, raising the question of whether the American military is required for the “finishing blow” mission – B-2 bombers with all the bunker-busting bombs to destroy the Fordow facility 40 meters underground.
From a military perspective, it would have been preferable if the United States had joined the fighting from a position of military superiority, but this is America’s choice and especially President Trump’s, and one can understand the internal pressures from his voters and those influencing public opinion opposed to escalation and the creation of an option for escalation and deterioration into a superpower war.
Furthermore, even if they join, this will not fundamentally change Iran’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons. It is clear to all of us that it is possible to destroy the facility, but not the knowledge and desire to arm with a nuclear bomb. Some argue that the attack will accelerate bomb development or that Iran will return to where it stood on the eve of the war within a year.
Israel chose to enter alone and needs to know how to finish alone according to military planning. It operated in coordination with the United States, using American aircraft, equipment, and armaments, knowing that Israeli operational and technological audacity and creativity prove that operational gaps can be covered if the United States does not join, although this would be a different kind of operational effort.
But this is not the case on the political front. Military achievement must lead to political achievement, and there we need Trump, and perhaps he wants to be the peacemaker. For both sides, a situation where Israel does the hard work and he reaps the credit for the final agreement – this is the ideal scenario. He has already declared: “Iran and Israel must reach an agreement.”
The Required Israeli Strategy
What is the ideal end point for Israel in this campaign?
Militarily: Israel needs to define the war objectives as destroying nuclear facilities and ballistic missile systems and their launch capabilities, and declare that when these are completed, it will exit unilaterally. The effort toward these goals must be accelerated as much as possible, according to the exhaustion of capabilities, because the hourglass from the moment of discussion about negotiations is limited, and any expanding definition distances from completion.
Politically: First, vis-à-vis the Americans, the achievements must be leveraged for diplomatic gain. Israel’s exit will be coordinated by the Americans and mediators as part of the discussion with Iran. This will help Israel reach its goal and help the Americans reach an agreement with the Iranians, while the Iranians’ advantage as masters of lies and deception is significantly reduced.
Second, vis-à-vis European countries, Israel must act diplomatically toward Germany, France, England, and G7 countries, and leverage the support to practically anchor the declarations that Iran will not have nuclear weapons, while clarifying that Iran is going to rush toward such weapons immediately after the war ends and now is the time to turn declarations into actions.
Where is the Iranian Opposition?
Despite what appears to be veiled statements from our side about overthrowing the regime, this should not come from the assumption that there is alternative leadership to replace the Ayatollahs. For years, supporters of the Shah’s regime and other opponents have waited for this possibility of internal disagreements about the leadership. The disagreements among Iran’s minorities create the impression that the exiled opposition is perhaps missing this unique opportunity, when the regime is weakened, to rise up and rebel.
For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that despite Israeli hints, the task of uniting and organizing the Iranian opposition as a replacement for the regime is theirs alone. If they so desire, they can exploit the historic opportunity – that Israel created – of the regime’s vulnerability and weakness, to build consensus and discuss disagreements in the “day after” stage. Israel does not crown kings or stand at the head of the camp, but there is no doubt that it will support such a move.
