Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA)

The political environment in Washington has changed dramatically in the opening months of 2025, reflecting the concerns and ambitions of Israel and its Arab neighbors under the pressure of ongoing Iranian regime-driven escalation across the Middle East. As the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA) team witnessed in recent meetings with high-profile policy formulators in Washington, D.C., the Islamic regime in Iran and its extended militia network is an arch enemy not only to Israel and Arab states, but also to the United States and the West.

To confront the Iranian threat, ensure Israel’s security and Arab prosperity, and bring long-term stability to the Middle East, a new coordination framework is being fostered between U.S. President Donald Trump and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS). The “Trump-MBS mandate for the Middle East,” as we would like to coin it, appears promising, given the two leaders’ pragmatic approaches to the region’s chronic geopolitical and ideological challenges.

Security of the State of Israel

Under the first term of the Trump administration (2017-2021), U.S.-Israel relations saw unprecedented alignment as Washington policymakers emphasized an ironclad commitment to the security of the State of Israel. The first step towards this goal was the successful push to integrate Israel into the regional, political, and security ecosystem as an indigenous member of the Arab Muslim majority Middle East. The historic signing of the Abraham Accords (2020) between Israel and Arab Gulf countries UAE and Bahrain was a game changer. It showed that Arabs and Israel could work together and has removed the “imperialist West agent” label wrongly stamped by Arab communist and Islamist ideologues on the forehead of the Jewish democratic state since its establishment in 1948.¹ For the first time, in 2021, Israel was moved from the operation zone of the U.S. Army’s European Command to its natural place in the U.S. Army’s Central Command alongside its Arab neighbors.²

Trump’s second term has come at a highly challenging time for Israel, which has yet to recover from the aftermath of Hamas’s October 7, 2023, invasion-massacre-kidnapping while engaging seven fronts of various forms of warfare against diverse enemies. On the domestic front, Israel has been involved in a grinding war against local terrorist organizations like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank for more than seventeen months. At the borders, Israel has been fighting Iran’s most powerful militias, Hizbullah and the Houthis, and their widely spread factions in the Levant. Israel has not only been fighting for its own survival, but it is also exerting a tremendous effort to protect the Druze and Christian minorities on its borders with Syria against the rise of Salafi-Jihadist groups following the fall of the Assad regime. The 8th front – the disinformation war Israel has been fighting in media, social networks, and international arenas – is no less challenging.

Nevertheless, the Trump Administration is still interested in keeping the Abraham Accords train moving forward as a guarantee of Israel’s security in the long term.³ The end of terrorism and creating stability in the Middle East region is pivotal for U.S. geo-strategic and economic interests. In this regard, Israel’s normalization with Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, respectively, are open folders on Trump’s desk.

The potential for Israel’s normalization with Lebanon has captured the interest of American and Middle Eastern media over the past few months, following Israel’s astonishing success in neutralizing more than ten thousand Hizbullah operatives and the consequent installation of a relatively friendly government in Beirut. Yet, it is difficult to predict that Israel-Lebanon normalization could happen in the near future. Hizbullah is weakened but not entirely annihilated. The ideological and political impact of the strongest Iran-sponsored militia on the Lebanese Shiite population, who comprise almost one-third of the population, is consequential.⁴ Despite financial constraints due to U.S.-imposed sanctions on Iranian oil exports, Iran is still pouring money into southern Lebanon in the hope of reviving Hizbullah.⁵

On the other side, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is divided internally on an ideological basis between the Maronites, the Sunni Muslims, and the Shiite Muslims, who are equally represented in its command structure. The ideological backgrounds of LAF commanders have complicated the decisions on LAF operations, especially when it comes to cooperation with Israel vs. cooperation with Hizbullah.⁶ In addition, the LAF has not fully taken control of the southern territories, where Hizbullah still has a stronghold.

Therefore, Israel’s best strategy regarding Lebanon for the time being, which enjoys U.S. support, is to expand its defensible borders with Lebanon well beyond the withdrawal line (the blue line) demarcated by the United Nations between Lebanon and Israel in the summer of 2000.⁷ Currently, the buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon is barely one kilometer. It must extend to an area similar to the 15-kilometer buffer zone that Israel recently secured on its borders with Syria to guard against any potential attacks from the recently installed Jihadist-led government.

In a broader context, normalization agreements between Israel and Arab Gulf states have been proven to be the most effective cornerstone of Trump’s strategy for a stable and productive Middle East. Unlike Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, which are still overwhelmed with the barren communist and damaging Islamist ideologies that have complicated their relationship with Israel for decades, Arab Gulf states are more forward-thinking and mostly pragmatic when it comes to cooperation with Israel and the United States. In that context, the potential of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia seems to be more attainable than we think.

The Trump Administration’s close coordination with Saudi Arabia on regional issues, such as the conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and the U.S. empowering Saudi Arabia to influence international matters – like its role in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine – represent a significant first step towards encouraging Saudi Arabia to overcome ideological prejudices and historical Arab biases against Israel. This could prime Saudi Arabia to lead the Middle East region into a new era where Israel and Arab nations coexist as normal neighbors.

The Levant and the Red Sea are two clear and immediate manifestations of the Trump-MBS mandate. Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in facilitating U.S. efforts to stabilize Syria amid horrific reports of genocidal attacks on Alawites and Christians in western Syria. Accelerating the negotiation between the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian jihadist-led government was crucial in that regard.⁸ While the Saudis worked with the new Syrian leadership to accelerate the deal, our Kurdish intelligence sources reveal that SDF leader Mazloum Abdi was flown to Damascus in an American helicopter to sign the agreement with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Americans’ deep interest in stabilizing Syria and the Saudis’ impressive coordination with the United States in this regard demonstrate a calculated approach to weakening Iran’s grip on Syria and the Levant region.

In the Red Sea, Saudi-American cooperation is degrading the Houthis militia in Yemen, another strong arm of the Islamic Regime in Iran. In early 2024 and into 2025, the U.S. Central Command conducted targeted strikes against the Houthis in response to their aggression on American and European trade vessels passing through the Red Sea. In recent weeks, President Trump intensified the attacks on the Houthis as part of his strategy and pledge to provide Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf states with the security they need to resume their economic endeavors, which directly pours into U.S. economic interests. For decades, the Houthis directly threatened the national security of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt.⁹ By taking action in Yemen, the Trump Administration not only reinforced its commitment to regional stability but also sent a clear message to Tehran that Iranian-backed threats would not be overlooked anymore.¹⁰

Beyond military cooperation, U.S.-Saudi relations have been profoundly shaped by economic factors. Historically, Saudi Arabia has invested billions into the U.S. economy, particularly in energy, technology, and infrastructure, via the Kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF). In 2017, during Trump’s first visit to Riyadh, the Saudi leadership earmarked investments of $110 billion in arms deals and about $350 billion in civilian sectors.¹¹ During a call with President Trump in January 2025, MBS declared Saudi’s intention to invest $600 billion in the United States over the next four years of Trump’s Administration.¹² Additionally, in what appears to be a gesture of appreciation for Trump’s dedication to Middle East stability and security, the UAE pledged $1.4 trillion in investments in the United States’ technology sectors in mid-March.¹³

As the geopolitical landscape continues to evolve, the Trump-MBS strategy’s long-term effectiveness remains to be seen. However, its immediate impact is clear: Iran is facing unprecedented pressure, Saudi Arabia is securing its regional interests, Israel is given the space and support needed to proceed with its multi-front war, and U.S. influence in the Middle East remains strong. Whether this strategy will lead to lasting peace or simply manage ongoing conflict is a question that will shape the region’s future for years to come.

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