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The Taylor Force Act, the October 7 Massacre and the PA’s “Pay-For-Slay” Terror Reward Policy

 
Filed under: Israel, Operation Swords of Iron, Palestinians, U.S. Policy

The Taylor Force Act, the October 7 Massacre and the PA’s “Pay-For-Slay” Terror Reward Policy
U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken meets with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah on January 31, 2023. (State Department/Ron Przysucha)

In March 2018, enjoying bi-partisan support, the United States Congress enacted the Taylor Force Act (TFA). Taylor Force was a West Point graduate and veteran of tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was murdered on March 8, 2016, by a Palestinian terrorist while walking along the promenade in Tel Aviv as part of a Vanderbilt University MBA study group trip examining global entrepreneurship.

Israeli forces killed the terrorist.

When Taylor’s family and friends found out that the Palestinian Authority (PA) would pay a financial reward to the family of the terrorist, they lobbied Congress to adopt legislation that would sanction the PA.

After undergoing extensive discussion and consideration, the TFA sought to comprehensively address the phenomenon commonly known as the PA’s “Pay-for-Slay” policy.

The PLO-PA “Pay-for-Slay” Policy

As part of the policy, the PA pays cash rewards to terrorists arrested by Israel for participating in terror, terrorists who have been released from prison, injured terrorists, and the families of dead terrorists.

The PA payments to the imprisoned terrorists and released prisoners are entrenched in the 2004 PA Law of Prisoners and Released Prisoners. The PA law defines the prisoners and released prisoners as the “fighting sector and integral part of the fabric of Arab Palestinian society.”

According to the law, while in prison, the terrorists are guaranteed a monthly salary and other financial benefits, as if they are employees of the PA. The law further provides that salaries are paid to all terrorists, irrespective of their organizational terror affiliation.

Thus, terrorists from Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and others are all adopted by the PA and paid salaries. Released terrorists are guaranteed a regular salary or a paid position in the PA.

The PA payments to the injured terrorists and the families of dead terrorists are governed by internal regulations of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Similar to the salaries paid to the imprisoned and released prisoners, these payments are also guaranteed to all terrorists, regardless of their terror affiliations.

TFA and the PA Response

Recognizing the inherent nature of the payments, Congress concluded in the TFA that “The Palestinian Authority’s practice of paying salaries to terrorists serving in Israeli prisons, as well as to the families of deceased terrorists, is an incentive to commit acts of terror.”

The TFA’s operative clauses, inter alia, conditioned all U.S. Economic Support Funds (ESF)—the bulk of U.S. aid—that directly benefits the PA on the complete abolition of the policy, including revoking “any law, decree, regulation, or document authorizing or implementing” the policy.

Automatically rejecting the call of Congress, Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas immediately responded, saying that even if the PA is left with just one penny in its coffers, it would be paid first to the terrorists.1

Quantifying the PA Terror-Payments

While analysts estimate that the full extent of the PA-PLO payments to terrorists exceeds a billion shekels per year, quantifying the exact amount would require access to hidden PA and PLO sources.

Soon after the passage of the TFA, the Israeli Knesset also adopted legislation to penalize the PA for its policy and payments. In July 2018, it adopted the Freeze Law, which guaranteed to “freeze money that the Palestinian Authority has paid in connection with terrorism from the money transferred to it by the government of Israel.”

According to the Freeze Law, at the end of every year, the Israeli Minister of Defense is required to submit a report quantifying the PA-PLO payments to the terrorists in the year that passed. Once the report is confirmed, the sum designated by the minister is deducted from the taxes Israel collects and transfers to the PA under the Oslo Accords.2 [1]

The findings of these reports are presented in the following chart:

  Payments to imprisoned and released terrorists (Shekels) Payments to the families of dead terrorists (Shekels) Total
(Shekels)
2018 502,697,0003 148,905,5074 651,602,507
20195 460,701,282 148,905,507 609,606,789
20206 448,804,361 148,905,507 597,709,868
20217 461,891,000 148,905,507 610,796,507
20228 476,190,000 144,369,290 620,559,290
20239 480,000,000 150,795,561 630,795,561

The difference between the estimates of the analysts and the sums designated by the Minister of Defense is partially explained in the reports of the Minister that indicated the inability to quantify the full extent of the additional benefits paid to the injured terrorists and the families of the dead terrorists. An additional limitation is the result of some of the released terrorists being employed by the different ministries of the PA and not through the PLO Commission of Prisoners.

Based on these reports, the PA terror reward payments totaled 3,721,070,522 shekels, or over a billion dollars, from 2018 through 2023.

Quantifying the PA’s 2024 Payments to Terrorists

Following the October 7, 2023, massacre, Israel arrested thousands of Palestinian terrorists, and thousands more were killed. Intuitively, one might thus surmise that the PA payments to terrorists in 2024 would increase substantially.

While the PA laws and practice to date might support this conclusion, the Minister of Defense’s report for 2024, which has not yet been published, may actually reflect a reduction in the payments.

This counter-intuitive conclusion is based on several potentially cumulative factors.

Part of the PA process for paying the imprisoned terrorists relies on the active participation and cooperation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),10 whose members meet with the prisoners and have them sign Powers of Attorney and appoint the recipients of their payments. However, since the massacre and the start of the Swords of Iron War, Israel has prevented the ICRC representatives from meeting with the arrested terrorists. This decision could have disrupted the process and resulted in the PA’s inability to make the payments.

A second reason that could indicate a reduction in payments is the PA financial crisis. In addition to the general reduction in the PA revenue caused by the war, following the massacre, Israel also decided to deduct from the tax income it collected and transfer to the PA the estimated sum that the PA used to transfer to Gaza. As a result, since November 2023, Israel has deducted a sum ranging from 235 to 275 million shekels per month.

While prior to the massacre, the PA used to transfer a sum greater than this to Gaza,11 the PA is claiming that as a result of the decision, the PA has suffered an ever-growing financial crisis. As a result, the PA has cut the salaries it pays all its employees, paying them only 60 to 70 percent of their dues. During previous bouts of financial crisis, the PA also cut the salaries it pays its employees but stressed that the payments to the terrorists would be made in full. This time, the PA decided to apply the pay cut to all salaries, including those of the imprisoned terrorists. This PA decision alone could result in a commensurate reduction in the PA payments to the terrorist prisoners and released prisoners of between 30 and 40 percent.

A third factor that must be taken into account is the war in Gaza, which has caused a substantial disruption in many Gazan services, including internet and financial services. While the PA is happy to promote the unverified and false Hamas-reported death tolls in the conflict as a means to vilify Israel, in practice, the families of the arrested and dead are unable to provide the necessary documentation, such as death certificates required by the PA as a condition for payment. Regular payments to recipients in the Gaza Strip have also been affected by the disruption in financial services.

Given these considerations, it is important to stress that the Minister of Defense’s report reflects payments made by the PA, rather than a commitment to pay or a right to receive the payments based on the PA law and the PLO regulations. Accordingly, if the payments were substantially disrupted due to the war and its ensuing consequences, it would not be entirely unreasonable to conclude that the sum designated in the report of the Minister of Defense for 2024 will reflect a reduction in the PA payments to terrorists.

Should this prove to be accurate, it is equally important to stress that the reduction would not be the result of the PA’s favorable decision to scale down or reform its “Pay-for-Slay” policy but rather a reflection of a temporary disruption caused by external decisions and factors that also inadvertently affected the PA terror rewards.

However much the PA-PLO paid terrorists in 2024, one thing must be clear: Any entity that pays huge sums to terrorists as a reward for their participation in terror cannot be seen as a partner for peace. Rather, that body should be recognized for what it is – a sponsor of terror.

Notes

  1. https://palwatch.org/page/34982↩︎

  2. https://jcpa.org/article/palestinian-misrepresentation-and-falsification-of-the-oslo-accords-tax-provisions/↩︎

  3. https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/Announcements/Documents/%d7%91%d7%9c%d7%9e%d7%a1%20%d7%9c%d7%94%d7%a4%d7%a6%d7%94%20-%20%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%9c%d7%a4%d7%99%20%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94%20%d7%9c%d7%a9%d7%a0%d7%aa%20%202018_2.6.21.pdf↩︎

  4. https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/Announcements/Documents/%d7%91%d7%9c%d7%9e%d7%a1%20%d7%9c%d7%94%d7%a4%d7%a6%d7%94%20-%20%d7%aa%d7%95%d7%a1%d7%a4%d7%aa%20%d7%9c%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%9c%d7%a4%d7%99%20%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94%20%d7%9c%d7%a9%d7%a0%d7%aa%202018_3.6.21.pdf↩︎

  5. https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/PropertyPerceptions/Documents/%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%a9%d7%a8%20%d7%94%d7%91%d7%99%d7%98%d7%97%d7%95%d7%9f%20%d7%91%d7%94%d7%aa%d7%90%d7%9d%20%d7%9c%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94.pdf↩︎

  6. https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/PropertyPerceptions/Documents/%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%9c%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94%202020_20.70.21.pdf↩︎

  7. https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/PropertyPerceptions/Documents/%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%9c%d7%94%d7%a4%d7%a6%d7%94%20%d7%9c%d7%a4%d7%99%20%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94%20%d7%9c%d7%a9%d7%a0%d7%aa%202021.pdf↩︎

  8. https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/PropertyPerceptions/Documents/%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%91%d7%9c%d7%aa%d7%99%20%d7%9e%d7%a1%d7%95%d7%95%d7%92%20%d7%9c%d7%a4%d7%99%20%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94%20%d7%9c%d7%a9%d7%a0%d7%aa%202022.pdf↩︎

  9. https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/Announcements/Documents/%d7%93%d7%95%d7%97%20%d7%91%d7%9c%d7%9e%d7%a1%20%d7%9c%d7%a4%d7%a8%d7%a1%d7%95%d7%9d%20-%20%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a7%20%d7%94%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%a4%d7%90%d7%94%202023.pdf↩︎

  10. https://palwatch.org/page/12515↩︎

  11. https://palwatch.org/page/34893↩︎