Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA)

There seems to be no end to the ongoing warfare between Israel and Hizbullah. Battles have been waged daily on Israel’s northern front since October 8, 2023, the day after Hamas perpetrated its genocidal massacre against the Israeli settlements bordering the Gaza Strip.

From that day on, the clashes between Israel and Hizbullah have intensified, reaching exchanges of fire never witnessed in the past 20 years that have caused devastation and destruction on both sides of the border in an almost mirror-like situation: Israel has ordered the evacuation of nearly 60,000 citizens living along the border with Lebanon, and almost 100,000 Lebanese have fled Lebanon’s southern villages, flocking to areas untouched by the exchange of fire. Most of the Israeli settlements along the border have seen significant destruction, while according to Lebanese statistics, almost 10,000 houses have been destroyed by Israel. Wildfires have burned on both sides. Thousands of acres of forestry and natural reserves have been destroyed, and until now, there is no projection as to when the dwellers of these areas will be able to return to their homes.

The armed conflict between Israel and Hizbullah has caused human losses on both sides: Israel has lost 32 soldiers and civilians, while Hizbullah’s losses are beyond 400 of its combatants.

In the ensuing battles, each party used new weaponry that practically had no counterweapon. Hizbullah has used intensely its heavy rockets (Falaq, Burkan, and its new Jihad Mughniyah rocket), its sophisticated anti-tank missiles (Russian Kornet and Spike reverse engineered Israeli anti-tank missiles), and Iranian-supplied kamikaze and surveillance drones to which Israel has experienced difficulties in intercepting and overcoming this threat. Hizbullah bragged about its capabilities of overflying Israel with spy drones (the Hudhud – Arabic for the hoopoe) that took pictures of sensitive facilities and hit strategic targets such as the vast surveillance balloon located east of Tiberias far beyond the five kilometers zone evacuated by Israel.

Israel, for its part, has been using extensively its air force in targeting Hizbullah’s military chiefs, Hizbullah’s air defense positions, its airstrips, and its drone installations. The Israeli air force chief declared that Israel was using barely five percent of its airpower against Hizbullah.

Entering the tenth month of the war with Hamas, the question lies ahead: how will the conflict between Israel and Hizbullah develop?

Naim Qassem, deputy secretary-general of the Lebanese Hizbullah, declared on July 3, 2024, that the only sure way to stop the war on the Lebanese-Israeli border is a complete ceasefire in Gaza. Qassem said in an interview with the Associated Press that if there were a ceasefire in Gaza, Hizbullah would stop bombing Israel without any discussion. He added that Hizbullah’s participation in the war between Israel and Hamas was a “support front” for its Hamas ally and that if the war stopped, this military support would no longer be needed.

However, Qassem said that if Israel scaled back its military operations without reaching a formal ceasefire agreement and a complete withdrawal from Gaza, the implications for the border conflict between Lebanon and Israel would be less clear.

Qassem stated, “If what is happening in Gaza becomes a mixture of a ceasefire and no ceasefire, of war and no war, we cannot know how Hizbullah will react because we do not know the form of this situation, its results, or its effects.”¹

Qassem reflected on Nasrallah’s analysis of the situation between Hizbullah and Israel. In a speech on July 11, 2024, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah stressed that “the southern Lebanon front is bearing fruit due to the military, economic, security, and social losses it is inflicting on the Israeli enemy.” He pointed out that “everyone in the world now knows that stopping operations in the north of the entity [Israel] requires stopping the aggression on Gaza,” and he stressed that “whatever Hamas is satisfied with, we are all satisfied with regarding the negotiations on the impact of the Zionist aggression on the Gaza Strip.” Nasrallah declared, “The enemy cannot end the operations in Rafah and achieve any gains. Can it invade north of the border to the Litani River?” Nasrallah continued: “For ten months, we have been carrying out operations and striking sites, settlements, the depth, the Golan Heights, the north, and the entire region is threatened. Do we hear the enemy speak of eliminating Hizbullah?” He stressed, “We must remain cautious and prepared for the worst possibilities. He stressed that “if Netanyahu insists on this war, he will take his entity to its end.”²

Who Wants What?

Analyzing the positions of the U.S. administration, Iran, Hizbullah, and Israel, none of the parties is interested in a regional war. Israeli officials said again and again that their preference is to reach a diplomatic solution to the standoff and hope to avoid war. At the same time, they warned that the scenes of destruction witnessed in Gaza would be repeated in Lebanon if war broke out.

However, the main question remains unanswered: It is unclear what Hizbullah’s position will be if a ceasefire is not reached in Gaza. Instead of an ongoing battle, a low-intensity conflict replaces the tactics of the IDF, meaning that the war with Hamas will not end until Hamas is dismantled.

Another question deals with the possibility of reaching a ceasefire with Hamas, which would stop Hizbullah’s attacks on Israel. Bearing in mind that the Israeli evacuees have declared that they would not return to their homes if Hizbullah does not withdraw from south Lebanon till the Litani river, would Israel and Hamas accept to negotiate a diplomatic arrangement that might take months to mature, if at all, or would the all-out war would be the remaining option?

Nasrallah’s deputy said in the same interview that he did not believe Israel had the capacity or had decided to wage war at present. He warned that even if Israel intended to launch a limited operation in Lebanon, it would fall short of a full-scale war; no one should expect the fighting to remain limited.

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Notes