This article originally appeared in the Jerusalem Post on November 17, 2024.
In Tehran, some had favored attacking Israel before the elections, claiming that America’s focus on them reduced the likelihood of a full-scale war.
In the past few weeks, the leader of the axis of evil, the Islamic Republic of Iran, has faced a dilemma regarding the timing of its response to Israel’s October 26 counterstrike in light of the US elections and their outcome.
In Tehran, some had favored attacking Israel before the elections, claiming that America’s focus on them reduced the likelihood of a full-scale war. However, a decisive counterargument held that a preelection strike might increase President-elect Donald Trump’s chances of winning.
The election results have clearly unsettled the regime in Iran, which apparently relied on polls predicting Vice President Kamala Harris’s victory. Some averred that Trump’s victory demonstrated, once again, the need for caution about polls, even from sources such as The New York Times. Trump, it is claimed, having learned from his first term, is now much more dangerous for Iran. This raises the question of whether the regime will respond differently, indicating that it too has learned from Trump’s previous term.
According to various reports in Iran after the US elections, regime supporters maintain that Trump has learned lessons over the past four years. They say he has strengthened his political base, eliminated domestic enemies and rivals, and is now in an especially strong position with both the Senate and the House of Representatives under his party’s control.
It appears that the charges against him are close to being dropped. Certain Tehran commentators also believe the assassination attempts during the campaign, which some analysts attribute to Iran, will be a factor in his decision-making.
Trump’s previous term was marked by tough measures against Iran: the withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, and the sanctions on oil sales, which hit Iran’s economy particularly hard. Trump’s moves reflected his negotiation strategy of striking first and then forcing concessions from the other side, a strategy that, Iranian commentators say, sharply escalated US-Iranian tensions.
Promote the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor
Trump returns to the White House, they point out further, with Iran weaker and more vulnerable in economic, social, and security terms than it was in 2016. This is primarily due to the sanctions Trump imposed in his first term and the resulting social crises but is also the outcome of the October 7 War, which has undone decades of Iran’s buildup of its proxies and its military, including massive military purchases (such as the S-300 air-defense system).
In his new term, some expect Trump to pursue a similar strategy: aggressive actions, economic pressure on oil revenues, and efforts to further reduce Tehran’s revenues in general. He is expected to promote the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project and support Azerbaijan regarding the Zangezur Corridor, aiming to restrict Iran’s access to Europe. Experts argue that, in light of the damage these policies may cause China, Iran’s only hope is a sharp US-China confrontation that could draw Beijing closer to Tehran.
Trump’s statements about “ending the war” echo president Harry Truman’s policy when he brought an end to World War II. Analysts believe Trump would similarly enable Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to effectuate the total collapse of Hamas in Gaza and offer him freedom of action against Iran, weakening Iran economically and regionally and threatening the regime’s stability.
Trump is unpredictable. Nevertheless, four factors clearly drive his Middle East policy: his unique personality; his close aides, including his vice president J. D. Vance; pro-Israel evangelical Christians; and his close ties with regional actors such as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and Netanyahu.
Tehran, therefore, is reconsidering its steps. The fear is that a further provocation of Trump might trigger the influence of those four components, creating a Trump even more dangerous than the one four years ago. Hence, the regime believes that in the new situation, it must conduct itself differently.
Some seek to establish a communication channel for negotiations, similar to those held with the Biden administration, hoping to reach a “good deal” with businessman Trump that would be an achievement for his new administration compared to the previous one. The Iranian regime is also working to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia, believing that a reconciliation, even if only for appearance’s sake, would diminish Riyadh’s lobbying power against Tehran.
These Iranian moves, alongside the hope that Trump will honor his promise to his Muslim voters to end the wars in Gaza and Lebanon and prioritize economic recovery, could act as a brake on an aggressive Middle East policy.
Taking this Iranian outlook into account, Israel should pursue two main objectives: first, joint diplomatic activity with the new-old administration to enable strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, rolling back the dangerous arms race by years, followed by a nuclear agreement and supervision, once the regional threat has been neutralized. And second, Israel should seek US mediation for an Israeli-Saudi peace agreement as part of the Abraham Accords that would foster regional peace and quiet – and which the new administration seeks as a legacy achievement for Trump.
* The author thanks Avraham M. of the Iran Desk at the Jerusalem Center for his assistance with this article.
