On Wednesday, June 18, 2025, Iranian state television aired a recorded message from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — only the second such message since the onset of direct hostilities between Iran and Israel. The novelty lay not in the content of his remarks, but in the manner of their delivery: there was no live appearance, no speech before an audience, not even a real-time broadcast.
First, a transcript of his comments was released. Only about half an hour later did the video recording follow — lacking the usual polish characteristic of Iran’s tightly controlled propaganda machine. The production deviated sharply from the regime’s rigid protocols, which normally ensure full narrative and visual control.
On screen appeared a weary figure, dressed plainly, with tense body language. His very presence seemed designed to send a single message: I am still alive. The words themselves were a familiar litany of empty threats. Yet the substance of what he said — claims about “the weakness of the Zionist regime” requiring American support, and appeals for global protests in solidarity with Iran (perhaps aimed at university students in the United States) — only underscored the glaring disconnect between his rhetoric and reality.
This was not a speech meant to project strength, but to conceal vulnerability. It offered no new message, only an attempt to maintain the illusion of stability — an image that has visibly fractured. Khamenei appeared to be staging a “business as usual” façade at a time when Israeli forces were not only striking critical infrastructure and command centers, but also openly calling for the regime’s collapse. The IDF spokesperson even directed volunteers to the Mossad website to support this mission and pursue additional objectives.
Meanwhile, Prince Reza Pahlavi “warms up on the sidelines.” Despite the regime’s longstanding propaganda campaign against him, Khamenei likely views him as a growing threat. Pahlavi continues to gain traction both inside and outside Iran — especially as the regime teeters, and Khamenei finds himself increasingly isolated, without his trusted advisors or the veteran power structure that once sustained him.
Khamenei: Power Versus Shame
For the first time, Khamenei finds himself on the receiving end of manipulation — a mirror image of the tactics he once used — by setting impossible preconditions in negotiations. In past nuclear talks, it was the Iranians who insisted on retaining enriched uranium, preserving sensitive facilities, and lifting sanctions. Now, it is Trump who sets the tone with a demand for “unconditional surrender,” declaring, “I’m not in the mood to negotiate.”
While Khamenei recognizes this as a negotiating tactic, he is unsure of its limits. What is clear to him, however, is that — for now — he has lost control over the nuclear program. Whether the Americans bomb Fordow or defeat him through a new agreement, the outcome is the same. His overriding objective is to preserve his rule at any cost. The challenge troubling him is how to return to the negotiating table before it’s too late — before he loses power — and how to do so with minimal damage to his image, to his authority, and ideally, with some elements of the nuclear program still intact.
Persian culture places deep value on personal and familial honor, where public humiliation is seen as one of the gravest indignities. The historical memory of shame tied to the Arab conquest remains etched in the collective Persian psyche. So when Trump contemptuously suggests that Khamenei himself is a target — writing on Truth Social, “we know exactly where the so-called ‘Supreme Leader’ is hiding” and demanding “unconditional surrender” — he strikes at the most sensitive nerve of Iranian identity: collective honor. Agreeing to these terms, even if it ensures regime survival, would be perceived as total humiliation.
And yet, paradoxically, this may be the only way to break Khamenei. Humiliation is the only way to act against one who fears humiliation. Trump, with his characteristic style and temperament, understands this and acts accordingly. While Khamenei may find a way to justify any eventual concessions through his loyal media — his “trumpeters” — the humiliation remains the core pressure tactic.
Khamenei knows he must eventually come to terms with Trump — but cannot appear to be pleading. According to reports, he has already tried to do so discreetly. President Pezeshkian conveyed a message via Qatar to the U.S. expressing interest in renewed talks. But Trump, true to form, publicly exposed the outreach: “They even offered to come to the White House,” placing Khamenei in an awkward and compromising position. Tehran’s official media quickly denied it, stating that “no Iranian official has ever asked to crawl through the gates of the White House.” This only deepened the trap: if Iran agrees to a deal, it will appear as surrender. If it doesn’t, escalation becomes inevitable.
Nonetheless, Khamenei’s strategic assessment is that to save himself — and more importantly, the regime — he must endure the shame of an agreement. He may even need to help Trump appear as the dominant leader in the Middle East, not by verbal submission, but through visible, practical concessions.
First, he genuinely believes that the threat to his life is real — though it still hinges on Trump’s final approval. In response, Khamenei has sought to position himself through various proxies, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq, not just as a political leader but as a religious figure, appealing to the sanctity of religious leaders and calling for a prohibition against harming them.
Second, he is working — both directly and indirectly — to create the most favorable conditions possible for negotiations. This includes upcoming nuclear discussions between the Iranian Foreign Minister and his counterparts from France, Germany, and Britain in Geneva. As long as dialogue continues, the regime maintains a veneer of legitimacy through official representation. By signaling openness to talks, Khamenei hopes Araghchi, Iran’s seasoned negotiator, will persuade the Europeans to press the U.S. to pause attacks and engage diplomatically — with a clear price in mind: the nuclear program in exchange for regime survival.
He also understands the necessity of securing support from Russia or China. Should either power request a deal, it could provide him with the political cover needed to preserve his rule — while allowing Trump to be framed as a leader who stood strong and compelled concessions from Iran, even if through multilateral pressure.
But above all, Khamenei knows this: Trump is the sole decision-maker, and he craves the image of unilateral victory. The best course for Iran, then, is to let Trump win — to engineer an outcome where Trump can claim a triumph over Iran without firing a single shot. The pressure, the rhetoric, and the threats have already done the heavy lifting.
This is a major achievement for Trump — a rare combination of force and diplomacy. It delivers a serious blow not only to Iran but also to its strategic allies, Russia and China. At the same time, it offers Khamenei a path to preserving his regime. The United States will refrain from targeting him personally and will restrain Israel from further strikes on the regime during the negotiation period.
Israel, for its part, must act swiftly while time remains — accelerating its strikes on nuclear and missile targets before the window closes and American pressure brings them to a halt. Even if a new agreement is eventually signed — and it almost certainly will be — Israel must understand it as a continuation of Iranian deception. In the Iranian view, deceiving the infidel to advance Islam is permitted. The ultimate goal remains unchanged: the destruction of Israel. Therefore, Iran will never truly abandon its nuclear ambitions — only delay, disguise, or reposition them.
