At first glance, Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Mahmoud Abbas’s first trip to Lebanon in seven years suggests a joint effort between the PA and the Lebanese government to stabilize the security situation in refugee camps and reinforce the authority of the Lebanese state. Additionally, it aims to facilitate a limited easing of labor laws that have historically prevented Palestinians from working in 95 professions outside the designated areas of the refugee camps. However, this visit should be viewed not just through a local geopolitical lens but also within the broader context of significant changes in the Middle East.
These changes include the defeat of Hizbullah in Lebanon, the ongoing struggle against a weakened Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the downfall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria, renewed negotiations between Iran and the United States regarding a nuclear deal, the rising influence of Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, and the increasing involvement of Turkey in the region. Moreover, the first administration under U.S. President Donald Trump pursued the expansion of the Abraham Accords, creating a pro-American axis that contrasts with the one established by Iran.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Abbas both understand the reason behind being left aside during Trump’s visit to the region, despite the news that Arab media had predicted a potential summit with the U.S. president. Both Palestinian and Lebanese leaders holding talks about disarming the Palestinian factions in Lebanon were signaling to the United States that they were doing their best to comply with the demands formulated by the Trump administration envoys.
Abbas wants to be part of any settlement concerning the future of the Gaza Strip. He understands that Gaza’s future is deeply linked with the concept that would be applied by the United States, backed by its Arab allies in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. His visit to Lebanon serves to present himself as a viable statesman responsible for the fate of the Palestinian people (denying Hamas any legitimacy) and who, on the one hand, shows readiness to assist Lebanon in its new “era” and, by the same token, to achieve improvements in the draconic laws that exist in Lebanon relating to the participation of Palestinians in its labor force. As of 2025, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon continue to face significant restrictions in the labor market despite some reforms aimed at easing these limitations. While certain professions have been opened to Palestinians under specific conditions, many remain effectively inaccessible due to legal, bureaucratic, and institutional barriers.
While the topic of employment restrictions for Palestinian refugees was not explicitly highlighted in public statements, reports indicate that broader social and humanitarian concerns were part of the dialogue. Notably, before Abbas’s visit, Palestinian intelligence chief Majed Faraj held meetings with Lebanese officials to discuss joint plans concerning Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. These discussions included proposals for the PA to oversee security within the camps and to liaise with Lebanese authorities on various issues affecting refugees. As part of this arrangement, a set of social and humanitarian policy decisions concerning Palestinians in the refugee camps was to be drafted for approval by Lebanon’s Cabinet. The inclusion of social and humanitarian policy discussions suggests that the challenges faced by Palestinian refugees, including employment restrictions, were acknowledged. However, no specific agreements or policy changes regarding labor rights were announced during this visit.
As for Lebanon, the United States is asking it to act against Hizbullah and force it to surrender its arsenal to the state, and dismantle the Hizbullah money laundering machine “Al Qard al Hassan,” a bank created by Hizbullah in 1982 as a non-profit charitable organization that operates outside the Lebanese banking system. The United States also wants the Lebanese government and Hizbullah to fully apply UN Security Council Resolution 1701 before discussing any Israeli withdrawal from the five strategic outposts it established along the border with Lebanon and resolving the territorial issues between the two countries. The United States, as well as its European and Arab allies (Saudi Arabia and the Emirates), indicated to the Lebanese government that there would be no financial assistance and reconstruction without Hizbullah’s disarmament and not before the dismantlement of Hizbullah’s financial institutions.
Acknowledging its inability and incapacity to deal with Hizbullah, the Lebanese government tried first to divert American pressure by claiming that only a total Israeli withdrawal would allow it to confront Hizbullah and force it to disarm. Hizbullah immediately adopted the same stance, creating common interest with the government and declaring that absent Israel’s withdrawal, there would always be a need for “resistance” against the occupier. Therefore, Hizbullah will not give up its arsenal. Facing growing American discontent (Deputy United States Special Envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus was called “the ugly American” by Former Member of the Parliament of Lebanon Walid Jumblatt), the Lebanese government turned to another avenue that seemed more straightforward to deal with and to show the Americans that it meant business: the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon.
This is how Abbas’s “historic visit” was born; necessity is the mother of invention.
Indeed, the Lebanese government took a significant step toward curbing Hamas’s activities within its borders. On May 2, Lebanon’s Supreme Defense Council issued a stern warning to Hamas and other non-state armed groups, cautioning them against launching attacks from Lebanese territory that could compromise Lebanon’s security and sovereignty. The Council emphasized that any violations would be met with the “harshest measures” to uphold Lebanon’s stability, including immediate deportation from the country. In response to the government’s warning, Hamas expressed its commitment to the ceasefire and cooperation with Lebanese authorities. The group stated that the April rocket attacks were unauthorized actions by individuals and that it had handed over three suspects to Lebanese security forces, with efforts ongoing to locate a fourth.
Notably, between 220,000 to 235,000 registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are located in 12 camps spread across the country from north to south, in addition to 57 other areas.
The “weaponization” of the Palestinian refugee camps dates to the 1969 Cairo Agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanese government. The agreement allowed Palestinians to establish military bases in southern Lebanon and engage in political activity within the camps. This gave legitimacy to Palestinian activism within the country and the possession of weapons within the camps before former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel officially annulled the agreement in 1987. Weapons are found unevenly among the camps, except for the Nahr al-Bared camp in the north, which is entirely devoid of weapons. It has been under Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) control since 2007, following more than three months of violent street battles between the LAF and the Islamist Fatah al-Islam group.
Before the Nahr al-Bared camp battle, Lebanese political leaders had agreed to disarm Palestinians outside the camps within six months. This was followed by the 2008 Doha Agreement, which defined its objectives as a defensive strategy and Palestinian weapons inside and outside the camps. However, none of those decisions were implemented, and they remained on paper. As the years passed, the camps witnessed sessions of violence between Palestinian factions themselves, as well as participation in confrontations with Israel, with the latest taking place during the “support front” initiated by Hizbullah against Israel.
Unlike in the past, the Lebanese authorities claim to have put in place steps to begin withdrawing weapons from Palestinian camps, with the process expected to start in mid-June. Last December, LAF units seized for the first time camps and headquarters in the western and central Bekaa Valley and Mount Lebanon belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada, all of which lie outside the refugee camps scattered throughout the south, north, and Bekaa. The army confiscated their equipment and ammunition. These were, in fact, “easy prey” since they were isolated and considered dissident to the mainstream, mainly affiliated to Syria.
Dealing with the eleven remaining refugee camps is another issue. Of the 11, three respond to the direct authority of Fatah, and there will be no problem in dealing with those camps. The others are well-entrenched militias, opposition factions, and Islamists that do not recognize Abbas’s authority, which means that unless a deal is reached, the issue of disarmament could become an open conflict between the different factions. As a result, it could spill over into a conflict against Lebanon’s authority.
As mentioned earlier, the LAF and Lebanese General Security are supposed to start collecting weapons from Palestinian camps in mid-June. The first phase will begin from the camps in the capital, Beirut, namely Burj al-Barajneh, Shatila, and Mar Elias; all three respond to the authority of Fatah, thus the PA. At the beginning of July, the demilitarization of the Bekaa and the north-Beddawi camps will commence, followed by the southern camps, located within the southern Litani area, specifically the Rashidieh camps (the largest), Al-Burj al-Shamali, and the Bass.
In the Ein al-Hilweh camp, which is the most challenging, the LAF will have to contend with several rival groups that divide control of the camp among themselves: the PLO, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and radical Islamists. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions will be informed of the content of the disarmament agreement between the Palestinian and Lebanese sides, as well as the dates for the implementation of the plan, which does not imply immediate acceptance of the disarmament procedure.
In an attempt to influence both Palestinian and Lebanese public opinion, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam (nicknamed by his opponents “the Zionist”) stressed that the weapons inside the Palestinian refugee camps are no longer weapons that contribute to the fulfillment of the rights of the Palestinian people. Still, rather the danger lies in the fact that they may turn into a weapon of Palestinian or Palestinian-Lebanese strife. According to the speech given by Salam to Abbas, the strength of the Palestinian cause today is not in the weapons in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon but in the increasing number of countries that recognize the “State of Palestine” and in the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators around the world in support of Palestine and Gaza, as it also lies in the decisions of the international legitimacy and the rulings of international courts.
From its perspective, Hamas claims that the issue will not be resolved by the push of a button between Abbas and Lebanon but rather through a Palestinian dialogue to develop a strategy for disarming and organizing alternatives within the camps, from community policing to granting civil rights.
In other words, the mechanism for disarming Palestinian factions in Lebanon is not yet mature, not only because Abbas has no authority over Hamas but also because of the lack of Lebanon’s resolve.
In summary, Abbas’s visit to Lebanon was intended by himself and Aoun to throw sand in the United States’ eyes, making it believe it was gold.
