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What Israel Has Learned about Security:
Nine IDF Officers Discuss Israel’s Security Challenges

 
Filed under: Israeli Security
Publication: eBook Library

Topics covered in this volume include Israel’s experience in counterinsurgency warfare, the effectiveness of security barriers, predicting the rise of Hamas, lessons of the Second Lebanon War of 2006, and the possibility of security arrangements for Israel in the Golan Heights.

Contributors include Maj.-Gen. Doron Almog, Maj.-Gen. Yaakov Amidror, Maj.-Gen. Uzi Dayan, Maj.-Gen. Giora Eiland, Brig.-Gen. Shalom Harari, Col. Danny Tirza, Maj.-Gen. Rephael Vardi, Col. Yehuda Wegmen, and Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin.

This volume serves as a companion to the Jerusalem Center eBook – Israel’s Critical Security Requirements for Defensible Borders – which includes assessments by five leading Israeli generals.

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About the Authors

  • Maj.-Gen. (res.) Doron Almog is the former Commander of the IDF’s Southern Command (2000-2003). Throughout his military career and during the course of four wars, Gen. Almog has gained extensive experience in combat and special clandestine operations in the ongoing war against terrorism. He participated in the Tripoli raid that targeted key terrorist leaders in February 1973, and in the Entebbe rescue operation in 1976. On October 4, 2003, Gen. Almog lost five members of his family in a Palestinian suicide bombing at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa. This chapter is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on November 29, 2004.

  • Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror is former head of the IDF Intelligence Research and Assessment Division, with special responsibility for preparing the National Intelligence Assessment. In addition, he served as military secretary to the Minister of Defense. Amidror was asked by the Israel Defense Forces to analyze the intelligence leading up to and during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. He is the author of Thoughts about Security and Military Affairs (Israel National Security College, 2002); and Intelligence: Theory and Practice (Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 2006). His chapters in this volume were all written prior to his appointment in 2011 as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. His chapter “Misreading the Second Lebanon War” is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on September 6, 2006.

  • Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan served as Head of the Planning Branch of the IDF General Staff and headed the Israeli security committee to peace negotiations with the Jordanians, Palestinians, and Syrians. He later served as head of the Central Command and as Deputy Chief of the General Staff. He also served as Chairman of Israel’s National Security Council and was the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister. This chapter is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on December 7, 2006. 

  • Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland chaired Israel’s National Security Council from 2004 to 2006. Prior to that he served as head of the IDF’s Operations Branch and its Planning Directorate, where he was responsible for designing and implementing the IDF’s operational and strategic policies. Gen. Eiland retired from active duty in January 2004. His chapter “The Future of the Two-State Solution” is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on November 17, 2008.

  • Brig.-Gen. (res.) Shalom Harari served in the territories for twenty years as a senior advisor on Palestinian affairs for Israel’s Defense Ministry, retiring in 1997. He is a senior research scholar with the Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, and is associated with the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) in Jerusalem. This chapter is based on his presentation to the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on October 11, 2005.

  • Col. (res.) Danny Tirza was in charge of planning the security fence between the West Bank and Israel, Israel’s largest infrastructure project. Since 1994, Col. Tirza has headed a special staff in the IDF Central Command in charge of regional strategic planning. He has taken part in formulating Israel’s security positions in negotiations with the Palestinians and has participated in various stages of the negotiations. Col. Tirza specializes in the geography of Judea and Samaria, the Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem. The chapter “The Strategic Logic of Israel’s Security Barrier” is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on January 26, 2006.

  • Maj.-Gen. Rephael Vardi was the principal figure in the government of Judea, Samaria and Gaza in the decade after the 1967 war. This chapter is based on his presentation at the Jerusalem Center Fellows Forum in 1989.

  • Col. (res.) Yehuda Wegmen served for over a decade as a senior instructor of fighting doctrine at the IDF Command and General Staff College. During the Yom Kippur War he served as an officer in the first reservist battalion to reach the Golan Heights. Today he develops military instructional methods and writes on military and security matters. An earlier version of this chapter appeared in the IDF journal Marachot 385 (July 2002) (Hebrew).

  • Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amos Yadlin served as head of Military Intelligence and as Israel’s military attache in Washington. Formerly head of the IDF National Defense College and deputy commander of the Israel Air Force, he participated in the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Gen. Yadlin headed the IDF team that outlined the principles of the war against terror. This chapter is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on June 23, 2004.

Contents

Foreword

Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

Israel’s Security Doctrine and the Trap of “Limited Conflict”
Col. (res.) Yehuda Wegman

Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank
Maj. Gen. (res.) Doron Almog

The Strategic Logic of Israel’s Security Barrier
Col. (res.) Danny Tirza

The Influence of Christian Interests in Setting the Route of the Security Fence in
Jerusalem
Col. (res.) Danny Tirza

Predicting the Rise of Hamas: The Democracy of the Rifles
Brig. Gen. (res.) Shalom Harari

Misreading the Second Lebanon War
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

Strategic Lessons of the Winograd Commission Report on the Second Lebanon
War
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

Israel’s Deterrence after the Second Lebanon War
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan

Defensible Borders on the Golan Heights
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland

The Future of the Two-State Solution
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland

The Geneva Accord: A Strategic Assessment
Maj. Gen. (res) Yaakov Amidror

The Beginning of Israeli Rule in Judea and Samaria
Maj.-Gen. Rephael Vardi

Ethical Dilemmas in Fighting Terrorism
Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin

Notes

About the Author

About the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs