

What Israel Has Learned about Security: Nine IDF Officers Discuss Israel's Security Challenges

A Jerusalem Center Anthology

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Cover photo: IDF soldier passes through wall to avoid booby-trapped doorway during the Gaza Operation on January 15, 2009. (IDF Spokesperson)

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Foreword

The security of the Jewish nation is the full-time focus of the officer corps of the

Israel Defense Forces. In recent years the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs has provided a unique public forum for presenting the views of some of Israel's top military leaders on a myriad of issues – in English. This volume brings together fourteen studies and essays by nine leading IDF officers who have shared from their rich experience. It serves as a companion to another recent Jerusalem Center eBook – *Israel's Critical Security Requirements for Defensible Borders* – which includes assessments by five leading Israeli generals.

In recent decades, Israel has served as a laboratory for counterinsurgency war, one of the new faces of modern warfare. In "Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience," **Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror**, who was appointed in 2011 as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and previously served as head of the IDF Intelligence Research and Assessment Division, discusses in detail how, contrary to popular belief, conventional armies can indeed defeat terrorist insurgencies. He focuses particularly on Israel's success in defeating the suicide terrorist onslaught known as the Second Intifada, which began in 2000.

Col. (res.) Yehuda Wegman also writes based on the IDF's experiences in the Second Intifada. In "Israel's Security Doctrine and the Trap of 'Limited Conflict'," an earlier version of which appeared in the IDF journal *Marachot* in Hebrew, he points out that suicide terrorists, though presented as insurmountable weapons, are really products of a system whose leaders value their lives. Accordingly, it is the heads of the terrorist organizations who should be the main targets of Israel's response.

A key element in Israel's success in defeating the challenges of the Second Intifada was the construction of a security barrier to separate Israel's population centers from terrorists based in the West Bank. In "Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank," **Maj.-Gen. (res.) Doron Almog**, head of the IDF's Southern Command in 2000-2003, describes how a security fence coupled with a buffer zone prevented terrorists from leaving Gaza. Instead they changed tactics and developed rockets, and warned that they could do so as well from the West Bank.

Col. (res.) Danny Tirza, the IDF's chief architect for the West Bank security fence, discusses "The Strategic Logic of Israel's Security Barrier," explaining why the fence wasn't built along the "green line" – the 1949 ceasefire line. From a security perspective, mountains dominate valleys. To provide security, Israel must control the high ground in order to dominate the area and not have others dominate it. Col. Tirza then follows with a fascinating account of "The Influence of Christian Interests in Setting the Route of the Security Fence in Jerusalem."

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Shalom Harari served in the territories for twenty years as a senior advisor on Palestinian affairs for Israel's Defense Ministry. Speaking at the Jerusalem Center in October 2005, he predicted the rise of Hamas in Gaza. In "Predicting the Rise of Hamas: The Democracy of the Rifles," he pointed out that while Fatah forces in Gaza at the time outnumbered Hamas by four to one, every Hamas and Islamic Jihad member was worth five or six Fatah members because

they were much more committed and fanatical and had more self-discipline. Hamas won the Palestinian elections three months later, and took over all of Gaza from Fatah in June 2007 after a brief fight.

The Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006 saw over a million residents of northern Israel subject to Hizbullah rocket bombardments that continued up until the end of the 34-day conflict. Critical voices immediately began to ask why Israel had not vanquished a numerically inferior enemy. **Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror** warns against "Misreading the Second Lebanon War," noting that Hizbullah's casualties in the war were greater than all the casualties Hizbullah had suffered during the previous twenty years. He also noted that the determination of Israel's government to respond and to retaliate was a very important factor in restoring deterrence. Finally, Gen. Amidror looks at some of the "Strategic Lessons of the Winograd Commission Report on the Lebanon War" – the commission that investigated Israel's conduct during the war.

Reviewing "Israel's Deterrence after the Second Lebanon War," **Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan**, former chairman of Israel's National Security Council and National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister, warns that hardly anybody in Israel thinks that if we give territories now, we will get peace in return – after Israel experienced massive rocket fire following its withdrawal from Gaza and southern Lebanon. He notes that Israel is not suicidal and is unlikely to try this strategy again in another place.

In 1999-2000, Israeli-Syrian negotiations discussed security arrangements intended to compensate Israel for the loss of the Golan Heights. When indirect Israeli-Syrian negotiations were renewed in 2008 under Turkish auspices, they were conducted under the assumption that there was a military solution that would compensate Israel for the loss of the Golan. As **Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland**, former chairman of Israel's National Security Council, demonstrates in his analysis, "Defensible Borders on the Golan Heights," Israel does not possess a plausible solution to its security needs without the Golan Heights. Not only was the "solution" proposed in 2000 implausible at the time, but changing circumstances have rendered Israel's forfeiture of the Golan today an even more reckless act.

Gen. Eiland then views "The Future of the Two-State Solution," noting that the maximum that any government of Israel will be ready to offer the Palestinians and still survive politically is much less than the minimum that any Palestinian leader can accept. Eiland proposes a series of multilateral land swaps involving Egypt which would double or triple the current size of Gaza in order to make it economically viable, while retaining 600 sq. km. in the West Bank to solve Israeli security needs.

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror looks at the proposed "Geneva Accord," a draft peace agreement negotiated by a self-appointed group of Israelis and Palestinians in 2003. In "The Geneva Accord: A Strategic Assessment," Gen. Amidror notes that the document concedes almost all the security arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza sought by past Israeli governments and leaves

Israel with no safety net in the event that the agreement is violated by the Palestinian side.

Offering a rare first-hand perspective on events immediately following the Six-Day War, former West Bank military governor **Maj.-Gen. Rephael Vardi** describes "The Beginning of Israeli Rule in Judea and Samaria." Vardi notes that the IDF did not believe Israeli rule in the territories would last more than a few months following the experience after the Sinai Campaign in 1956 when Israel was compelled to withdraw from the whole of Sinai. He describes how during the first two years following the war the local leadership of the Arab population was ready to take its fate in its own hands and try to negotiate a settlement with Israel. Israel's government at the time was ready to negotiate with the local leadership, but in the end it was the West Bank leaders who hesitated and withdrew even when there were good prospects to succeed.

To conclude, **Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin**, who headed the IDF team that outlined the principles of the war against terror, presents "Ethical Dilemmas in Fighting Terrorism." He describes how in August 2002, Israel knew when all the leaders of Hamas were in one room. A 2,000-pound bomb was needed to eliminate all of them, but its use was not approved. Israel used a much smaller bomb – and all the terrorists got up and ran away. When asked if collateral damage was producing future terrorists, Yadlin replied that because of the level of incitement, collateral damage only raised public support for terror from 95 to 96 percent.

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Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience (2008)

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

Summary

Contrary to popular belief, conventional armies can indeed defeat terrorist insurgencies. This study will detail the six basic conditions which, if met, enable an army to fight and win the war against terrorism, among which are control of the ground where the insurgency is being waged, acquiring relevant intelligence for operations against the terrorists themselves, and isolating the insurgency from cross-border reinforcement with manpower or material. It will also examine the factors that can help drive a wedge between the local population and the insurgent forces seeking its support. The principles of war will also be analyzed in terms of their applicability to asymmetric warfare to show how they still serve as a vital guide for armies in vanquishing terror. Finally, the study warns that if the U.S., Israel, or their Western allies incorrectly conclude that they have no real

military option against terrorist insurgencies – out of a fear that these conflicts inevitably result in an unwinnable quagmire – then the war on terrorism will be lost even before it is fully waged.

Part I: Can a Conventional Army Vanquish a Terrorist Insurgency?

The urgency of designing a winning strategy for waging counterinsurgency warfare has clearly arisen in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War and with the post-9/11 War on Terrorism, more generally. These low-intensity conflicts are not new in the history of warfare. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* reminds its readers that "insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself." (1) One author dates the first guerrilla campaign from the Spanish rebellion in 1808 against Napoleon's French forces. (2)

But today, these smaller wars have suddenly become more prominent, especially after the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the huge Soviet conventional armored threat to Central Europe. The approach of the Western alliance toward limited counterinsurgency wars has been, on the whole, very negative. This might be due to the experience of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Decisive victories, like the Second World War, seem harder to achieve, despite the enormous firepower the U.S. could employ in such conflicts. Western withdrawals from Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993) in the face of terrorist attacks only reinforced this perception.

Consequently, the term "unwinnable war" became increasingly associated with a variety of counterinsurgency campaigns. In 1992, Bush administration [41] officials pursued a hands-off policy on Bosnia, describing it as "an unwinnable situation for the military." (3) After 9/11, even the former commander of NATO Forces in Europe, General Wesley Clark, told the *Daily Telegraph* that America, Britain, and their allies could become embroiled in an unwinnable guerrilla war in Afghanistan. (4) Underlying all these analyses is the assumption that counterinsurgency campaigns necessarily turn into protracted conflicts that will inevitably lose political support.

More recently in 2005, *Foreign Affairs* carried an article by a Rand analyst who called the Iraq War "unwinnable" and suggested that the U.S. eliminate its military presence, and rally Iran and the Europeans to help. The "Iraq Study Group," chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton, did not go this far, though it suggested in 2006 that the situation in Iraq was "grave and deteriorating" and hence looked to pull U.S. military involvement back to a "supporting" role alone for the Iraq Army. (5) If Western policy-makers conclude as a result of U.S. military engagements in Afghanistan and in Iraq that the U.S. and its allies have no military option against worldwide insurgencies launched by international terrorist groups, then the War on Terrorism will be lost even before it is fully waged.

Recent military progress by U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq have begun to

counter much of the previous analyses that view counterinsurgency warfare as an inevitably hopeless quagmire that will bog down any Western army which engages in such a mission. During October 2007, the new commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, an authority on counterinsurgency warfare, managed to cut monthly U.S. fatalities to a third of what they were a year earlier. Attacks in the Sunni-dominated Anbar Province fell from around 1,300 a month in October 2006 to under 100 in November 2007.(6) There were over two hundred fatalities per month from car bomb attacks alone in the Baghdad area in early 2007, yet by November and December that number fell dramatically to around a dozen fatalities per month.(7) These results did not constitute a decisive military victory, for U.S. commanders were the first to admit that al-Qaeda had not been defeated.(8) But the results certainly indicated that a counterinsurgency campaign was not a hopeless undertaking.

This monograph demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, military forces can indeed defeat terrorism by adopting an alternative concept of victory, called "sufficient victory."The Economist tried to develop a similar concept of its own in this regard: "'Victory' for the West is not going in either place [Afghanistan and Iraq] to entail a surrender ceremony and a parade."(9) At best, the *Economist* suggests that the West can look forward to "a tapering off of violence."(10) As such, terror is not completely destroyed but is contained at a minimal level, with constant investment of energy in order to prevent its eruption.

This analysis will first define key terms: insurgency, terror, and various types of victory. It will then detail the six basic conditions which, if met, enable an army to fight and win the war against terrorism:

- The decision of the political echelon to defeat terrorism and to bear the political cost of an offensive.
- Control of the territory from which the terrorists operate.
- Relevant intelligence.
- Isolating the territory within which counterterrorist operations are taking place.
- Multi-dimensional cooperation between intelligence and operations.
- Separating the civilian population that has no connection with terrorism from the terrorist entities.

As several of these conditions indicate, counterinsurgency strategies already have a strong political dimension, for they involve the loyalties and well-being of the civilian population where the war is being conducted. But as the analysis will explain, the preferences of the civilian population will be primarily affected by conditions on the ground where they live and not by political arrangements negotiated between diplomats in distant capitals, far from the battlefield. The U.S. *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* also concludes that "citizens seek to ally with groups that can guarantee their safety."(11) This can be achieved when the political leadership in the insurgency area is willing to take responsibility and

stand up to the pressures of the terrorist organizations and even fight them.

Indeed, Gen. Petraeus' breakthrough in Anbar Province came about because of the decisions of local Sunni tribal leaders in western Iraq about how to best protect their security and not through the detailed efforts to work out a more perfect Iraqi constitution in Baghdad, which had been the focus of coalition political efforts previously. Indeed, this lesson is applicable to other conflict zones, particularly where the central government's authority is weak and lacks the capacity to substantially change the security situation on the ground, as in southern Lebanon or even among the Palestinians, as well.

Finally, the monograph analyzes the principles of war in terms of their applicability to asymmetric warfare – essentially the war against terrorist and guerrilla organizations – and shows how these principles still serve as a vital guide for armies in vanquishing terror.

The adoption of two erroneous assumptions – that terror is more determined and resilient than the democratic state and that victory is always a matter of the mind and not a product of coercive physical measures – has induced many to believe that there is no military method to cope with terror in order to vanquish it. These kinds of assertions have become more common in much of the discourse concerning Israel's war with Hizbullah in 2006 and the war of the U.S.-led coalition against insurgent forces in Iraq. History – even the history of the State of Israel – proves that this contention is seriously mistaken.

The Military's Mistake

I would not be writing this article had I not heard from a student at the Israel Defense Forces Staff and Command College that some of the lecturers who speak before Israeli officers have asserted that "an army cannot vanquish terror" and that "only a political process can bring about a cessation of terror." The student's understanding was that since it was axiomatic that a conventional army could never win a guerrilla war, therefore in every possible encounter between an army and a terrorist organization, the army could not hope to achieve victory. The student clearly applied this principle to the struggle between the IDF and Palestinian terror.

It seemed that in their classes these students had not heard from their lecturers the historical cases in which Western armies had actually defeated insurgent forces in difficult guerrilla campaigns. The U.S. Army was twice involved in successful counterinsurgency campaigns in the Philippines (from 1899 to 1902, and between 1946 and 1954). Additionally, the British Army won a tough counterinsurgency war in Malaya between 1952 and 1957. In the Middle East, the British also waged successful counterinsurgency campaigns during the 1930s in British Mandatory Palestine and decades later in the 1970s in Dhofar Province in Oman. I cannot help but imagine that some of these very same lecturers are cloaking their lack of understanding for the sphere of war in general, and the war against terror in particular, with mellifluous words and pseudoscientific arguments. Theirs is an argument that historical experience clearly refutes!

An army can emerge victorious over terror – on condition that it is made clear what exactly is meant by "victory" and the practical results that can be expected from the army in the context of such a victory.

The "inability" argument is frequently put forward in unprofessional language that creates a new terminology, unintelligible to everybody. This, in turn, facilitates the avoidance of genuine clarification of that which is being discussed and of the actual situation.(12) When did this tainted phenomenon mature in our midst, giving rise to a situation in which some military men prefer to evade their obligation and responsibility to vanquish terror, passing the buck to the statesmen? This is not purely a question of abstract philosophy, but one that carries great practical significance. In its light, elected officials, who are left without any military option against terror, must either flee a confrontation with terror or submit to its demands. If this should become the case, then Israel's security would likely slowly deteriorate, exactly as those who pursue terror expect. Here I will seek to elucidate that an army can emerge victorious over terror – on condition that it is made clear what exactly is meant by "victory" and the practical results that can be expected from the army in the context of such a victory.

In order to conduct a fruitful discussion, it is necessary to accurately define all the components of the problem, namely: what is an "army" in the context of fighting terror, what precisely does the term "victory" mean, and what sort of "terror" are we dealing with?

Defining the Essential Terms

Army

An "army," in this case, is not merely the "armed forces." In addition to the security organizations, it also comprises especially the intelligence community in its broader sense. In the particular case of the State of Israel, the question is not whether the IDF can vanquish terror, but whether the general array of the IDF, the Israel Security Agency (ISA), the Mossad, the police, and the national economic and financial bodies that function together in a well-coordinated effort can vanquish terror. Thus, anybody examining whether the IDF, which is the only body defined as an "army," can, by itself, vanquish terror will have to respond in the negative.

Insurgency and Terror

Insurgency is the general term for many types of asymmetric warfare, including terrorism. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* uses the definition of an insurgency as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict." It is a "politico-military" struggle, according to the *Field Manual*, "designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government,

occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control."

There clearly have been many types of insurgencies in world history with a wide variety of politico-military goals, including independence movements against colonial powers and Marxist revolutionary movements against nationalist regimes. The Arab Revolt was an insurgency against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War and provided another example of a nationalist insurgency which encouraged the breakup of a multinational empire. Today, there is a rising threat of Islamist insurgencies that have adopted the tactics of "terror," as described below. The current Islamist insurgencies have far-reaching politico-military goals of eliminating Israel, toppling pro-Western Arab regimes, and spreading radical Islam worldwide in order to re-establish the Caliphate.

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"Terror" is thus a subset of insurgency warfare. The concept "terror" encompasses four types of terror, but all employ deliberate violence against civilians in order to obtain political, religious, national, or ideological objectives:

- Internal terror of the anarchistic variant that operates against an existing regime.
- Cross-border terror of the type waged from Jordan by the PLO against the IDF in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) during the 1960s; the war waged by Hizbullah from southern Lebanon and presently by the Palestinians from the Gaza Strip against Israel.
- International terror of the al-Qaeda variant, which found expression in the attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the attacks in London, the firing of an anti-aircraft missile at an El Al airplane in Kenya, and the attacks in Istanbul. Hizbullah also engaged in international terrorism at least twice in Argentina and in Thailand.
- Terror waged by someone who contends to be fighting against an occupier, such as the Palestinian terror in the West Bank or that of the Iraqis against the Americans in Iraq; namely, terror that is carried out against a state whose military forces are situated in the area where the terror is perpetrated.

This discussion deals exclusively with the question of the feasibility of vanquishing terror that is operating in an area that is at least nominally controlled by the military forces of the state combating the terror – the fourth type. However, in many cases, the various types of terror intermingle. Some of the conclusions are applicable to combating other types, especially that of cross-border terror.

Victory

What type of victory is to be achieved? The answer to this question should serve

as the focus of discussion regarding the army's mission and its part in annihilating terror. The military concept of "victory" is more familiar from the realm of conventional warfare, where the enemy is defeated, destroyed, or deprived of its ability to continue the war, even if it should so desire.

Military victory can frequently also influence the will of the state whose army has been defeated, causing it to cease thinking in terms of the resumed use of military force. However, this objective is not a prerequisite for the current definition. During the latter half of the twentieth century the "total victory" model of the Second World War was assimilated as part of military doctrine. What characterized the close of that war was that, following the destruction of the German army and the military conquest of Germany, and following Japan's surrender and conquest after the U.S. dropped atomic bombs, the Allies controlled both countries. During the years of the U.S. presence in Berlin and Tokyo, it erected new regimes that were totally different from the predecessor regimes in both countries. This was total victory, based on military victory, which transformed two fanatic and militaristic countries into avowedly peace-loving regimes.

This is not the sole model of victory recognized by history. For example, the defeat of Germany in the First World War was completely different. As proof of the matter, Germany embarked on another great war twenty-one years later. Such was also the case of the defeat of Egypt and Syria in the Six-Day War. Six years after that victory the two again attacked Israel. These precedents will better enable us to define the military victory required against terror and in guerrilla warfare.

One can speak of three levels of victory:

Total Victory – Total victory eliminates the terrorist organizations and guerrilla groups and their demands from the political and global map, and no one except those victimized by the terror recalls that it was ever part of reality. Such, for example, occurred in the defeat of Communist guerrillas in Greece after the Second World War. Paying a bloody price, the Greek army, aided by the British, managed to liquidate the terror movement. Once that war was concluded, Greece no longer faced a Communist threat. The result of the fighting against rebels in Oman during the Dhofar rebellion between 1965 and 1975 was similar: the Sultan, whose son today rules that Persian Gulf country, managed with British aid to liquidate the rebels, who received assistance from neighboring countries. If a revolt were to take place in the sultanate, it would not be related to the terror movements, which were totally destroyed more than thirty years ago. The Palestinian terror against the British and the Jews in 1936, as well as the Palestinian terror in Jordan in 1970, were both completely uprooted by force and did not return to threaten the British Mandatory government in Palestine or the Hashemite regime in Jordan.

Temporary Victory – This was the case in the victory over Palestinian terror in Gaza in the beginning of the 1970s, when Ariel Sharon was commander of the IDF Southern Command. After the dismantling of the terror in Gaza, the IDF

reduced the size of the forces that controlled the Gaza Strip to isolated units, and Israelis could circulate there almost without trepidation. The terror did indeed return to Gaza, but it was after fifteen years of quiet, with the new terror essentially different from its predecessor.

Sufficient Victory – This is a victory that does not produce many years of tranquility, but rather achieves only a "repressed quiet," requiring the investment of continuous effort to preserve it. The terror is not destroyed but is contained at a minimal level, with constant efforts to prevent its eruption. For many years, this was the achievement of the British in Northern Ireland and the Spanish against the Basques. This was also the achievement of Israel in the West Bank in the aftermath of the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield.

Temporary victory and sufficient victory do not provide a solution to the ideological conflict that forms the basis of the armed struggle and terror. As long as any reason whatsoever exists – political, national, ethnic, economic, religious, ideological, or an amalgam of all these – that facilitates the recruitment of people to the terror movements, and as long as there is an active hardcore that has an interest in prolonging terror, one must expect terror to continue or to be renewed. A military effort cannot be expected to solve a problem of historical dimensions. As long as some of the terror bodies have escaped liquidation, then a complete and total solution to such a conflict can in principle be provided solely by a political solution. Nonetheless, one must reemphasize: a political solution is not the affair of the army, and efforts to obtain it cannot be divorced from the obligation to fight determinedly against *any* attempt by the enemy to secure achievements through violence, as in the case of the present attempt by the Palestinians to make political gains through terror.

The distinction between these two levels of addressing a problem must be clear: a solution to the conflict lies in the hands of the statesmen. However, the army – and only the army – is the relevant party as long as there is no such solution, and it bears responsibility to check the violent aspect of the conflict.

Part of the widespread misinterpretation in certain circles is caused by confusion between terror and ideological conflict. Since the army does not possess the tools to contend with *the latter*, people draw the conclusion that "there is no military solution." In general, as stated, the army is expected to address only the violent aspect of the conflict, which is terror, and is not expected to discover a solution or to fight in order to find an exit strategy from the conflict in toto. It would be preferable if the army would not term the fight against terror a "limited conflict," but rather employ its proper name, "war on terrorism," in the literal sense. The semantic change would perhaps help the army comprehend that it is obligated to combat terrorism without any excuses, and not engage in the political dimensions of a conflict which should be left to the civilian echelon.

Of course, in the general framework of such fighting, one must address aspects of psychological warfare, contend with the financing of terror, and incorporate other non-violent aspects that supplement military activities. However, these supplementary activities are performed with the goal of impairing the ability of the

terror bodies to carry out their plans and not within the political dimension of solving the dispute in general.

It clearly emerges from the foregoing that as long as the conflict that led to the eruption of terror is still in full force, the army's fundamental objective is *to destroy the capability* of the other side to employ terror, irrespective of whether this takes a one-time effort or whether it will require continued activity over the course of years. This objective is crystal clear and is of a military nature by any professional yardstick. However, it cannot be obtained if those who are expected to execute the task are using vague concepts such as "attrition," "cognition," "effects," and other terms that permit one to argue that terror cannot be destroyed.

"Sufficient victory," namely, that which can contain and check terror a moment before it strikes, becomes more significant if, due to continuous frustration by the army of the terror organizations' efforts to attack, the terrorists decide – consciously or otherwise – to reduce the number of their terror attempts. This situation would mean "victory" on a much higher plane, because it signifies that not only has the terrorists' implementation capability been impaired, but also their ability to pass from intention to action. Such an achievement is possible, for example, when the terror bodies are too busy protecting their own lives to plan terror and carry it out or when internal opinion turns against them and prevents them – directly or indirectly – from carrying out their intentions.

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Defense measures that interdict terror, including the securing of possible targets, can seriously handicap the terrorists' ability to carry out their intention. However, only by attacking the terror organizations in their lairs and mobilization points, before they set out to implement their plans, can one cause a decline in their operational ability.⁽¹³⁾ The implementation of a terror attack is a complicated process involving the participation of many bodies, beginning with the preachers and recruiters and ending with those who press the trigger or the detonator switch on explosive belts. Striking any one of these factors – as early as possible – yields not only an increase in the number of interdictions, but also a reduction in the number of attempts by the terror organizations. Such a triumph, while it does not incorporate a crushing and rapid victory, still constitutes an achievement and should be defined as such.

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A military victory is measured in the classic wars of maneuver, *inter alia*, by the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy in manpower and equipment. In the war on terrorism, by contrast, the IDF's achievement is measured by criteria that are not clearly military, such as the degree of security and tranquility. This

tranquility finds expression in civilian measures as well, such as indices of economic growth.

A study of the strategy that was intended to subdue Israel, authored and openly disseminated by the terror perpetrators, informs us that the bulk of their efforts, which are indeed heinous but limited in comparison to a general war, are devoted to crippling the morale of Israel's citizens. The plan is for this type of blow to constrict immigration, arrest tourism, cut foreign investment to a trickle, and cause capital flight abroad. All this would result in negative economic growth, mass despair, and emigration until Israel disintegrates from within.

An examination of these indices in March 2002 demonstrates that some of these objectives were indeed realized in practice, and the terror perpetrators were on the brink of attainment with regard to the others. Did this represent a professional failure on the part of military men, who did not comprehend their mission and did not properly evaluate the situation, or was it a failure of the political echelon that refrained from using the army? It would be wise to investigate and understand this issue. However, what is important is the outcome that emerges from repeated historical lessons: an army, if it acts properly, can prevent terror and win the war against it.

Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002)

The situation that prevailed in the West Bank after Operation "Defensive Shield" (April 2002) is an excellent example of how terror can be vanquished with military force – at least at the third level of victory, namely, to destroy the enemy's capabilities through a continuous effort and without solving the conflict. Israel went to war after it counted 132 dead, all of them civilians, in the preceding month (meaning the equivalent of more than 1,500 deaths a year). In a continuous and uninterrupted effort following that campaign, Israel's terror casualty rate declined to 11 civilians for all of 2006, which mathematically speaking was less than 1 percent of the 2002 figure. In 2007, Israeli civilian casualties from terrorism originating in the West Bank fell even further. In practical terms, Israel was clearly victorious in repressing terrorism. This is true even if the Palestinians' effort to renew their terrorist attacks and their dream of killing Jews inside Israeli territory remained as strong as ever. It was an outstanding victory – the type of victory over terror that one can demand of the army.

Of course, from the army's standpoint, even 11 people murdered annually by terror constitutes an unacceptable number, and the utmost must be done to reduce it to zero. Yet there is no doubt that such a figure, and the commensurate relative tranquility and prosperity it affords Israel, represents a genuine failure for terrorism. Indeed, we see that those who pressed to allow the IDF military freedom of action at a time when its hands were tied, and who penned the slogan "Let the IDF Win," were correct. When the government allowed the IDF to act, it actually did win.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt that a decision on the battlefield does not reflect the entire picture. The story is told of the American officer who met a North Vietnamese general and told him: "You know, we examined all our battles in Vietnam and it turned out that we subdued the South Vietnamese guerrilla movement and we liquidated all the guerrilla forces that had penetrated from the North." The North Vietnamese responded to him: "That is correct, but why is it relevant?"

An important truth is concealed in this response, pertinent to relations between the political and military echelons. The outcome on the battlefield should lead the political bodies to understand that the situation permits them to withstand the demands of the terror organizations. If they still elect for one reason or another to compromise, surrender, withdraw, or concede, then all the work invested by the military echelon is in vain. In other words, it is possible that a victory over terror may not lead to an improved political situation. This is one area where classic warfare, on the model of the Second World War, differs from the type of warfare we are discussing. Therefore, the burden imposed on civilian decision-makers in this type of war is more onerous.

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Precisely because of this, civilian directives to the military must be precise and detailed in order to serve the political objective more accurately. This political objective must also be stated as clearly as possible by the political echelon. Israel learned this again from its experience in the Second Lebanon War.

Regardless, the political echelon's difficulty in exploiting a victory over terror cannot serve as an excuse for the military to abandon the quest for military victory.

Determination

The late Colonel Shmuel Nir (Samu), who served as divisional intelligence officer in the Northern Command at the time I was intelligence officer for the command, wrote an article that laid the basis for the concept of "attrition" instead of "victory." While meritorious in some ways, his argument contains a serious, fundamental flaw. Samu analyzes the components of power wielded by our antagonists in the conflict and determines, correctly, that we are dealing not only with physical power, but with the reciprocal relations between resources, capabilities, and determination. In his discussion of determination, he contends – without proving his argument – that "the principal advantage of the inferior side is in the determination component, which expresses itself in a national power of perseverance and an ability to absorb punishment in the face of foreseeable or possible losses and destruction." (14)

The facts demonstrate otherwise. It has never been proven that terror organizations possess greater resilience than the community of democratic peoples; it has never been proven that terror organizations are prepared to sacrifice more than are their victims; and it has never been proven that the society from which terror emanates is prepared to absorb greater anticipated destruction than those fighting terror. It was bin Laden who proposed a cease-fire to the United States, rather than the United States to bin Laden. So who has greater resilience? Did not Israeli society demonstrate as much resilience as its enemies during the course of the terror war that took place between November 1947 and May 1948, in which Israel absorbed 1,200 dead, or in the war beginning in September 2000, in which Israel sustained 1,400 killed? Since a state that is fighting terror generally employs greater resources and capabilities than the terror organization it is confronting, and since the state is not inferior to the terror organization in resilience, Samu's argument regarding the advantage of terror in the general correlation of forces stands refuted.

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Samu also presents the idea that "victory is a matter of society's cognizance." Thus, it is argued that Israel did not depart Lebanon because the IDF was defeated in the fighting, but because the cognizance of Israeli society had shifted due to guerrilla pressure and the cost in blood, which appeared excessive (in the last 17 months of Israel's presence in southern Lebanon, Israel suffered 21 dead).

Success on the battlefield led to the destruction of Communist terror's capability in Greece without a change in anyone's cognizance. The same applies to the present situation in the West Bank. The current tranquility was achieved not because someone changed his cognition about the other side, but because the IDF and the Israel Security Agency almost completely liquidated the terror organizations' capacity for action. Quite a few surveys, as well as the Palestinian elections, point to the fact that nothing has changed in Palestinian cognizance, but the statistics demonstrate that terror has been greatly reduced there.

The fact that Israel did not withdraw from Gaza under the pressure of terror did not change a thing. When we are dealing with cognizance and image, reality is not the determining factor. What matters is the way Israel's actions are perceived by the Palestinians.

True, this is a "third-level victory," namely, the type that requires constant effort to preserve the achievement, and it is also true that sometimes the terror

organizations manage to act and kill. Nonetheless, given the assumption that the IDF will continue to bring down the level of terror, it is clear that from the perspective of terror and its objective to undermine the Israeli way of life, terror has been a total failure. It is possible that if Israel had not withdrawn from Gaza, thus allowing the terror organizations to claim "victory," then the result of the war on terrorism would have been even clearer. The fact that Israel did not withdraw from Gaza under the pressure of terror did not change a thing. When we are dealing with cognizance and image, reality is not the determining factor. What matters is the way Israel's actions are perceived by the Palestinians. When Israel kills or arrests the terror perpetrators (and from a professional standpoint, it is preferable to arrest), this is not a "victory of cognizance," but a small step on a long road to victory in practice in a real physical sense. When the age of the terror operatives drops from the late 20s to the late teens, it appears that we are dealing with a "bottomless pit," while the truth is that we have a real, concrete achievement. The replacement generation is younger, with less experience than its predecessor, and it does not have the same ability to direct, recruit, and lead. This is compounded by a sense of persecution stemming from the arrest and destruction of their predecessors and from the clear awareness that their lives are similarly at risk, with only a matter of time until they become a target. The new generation is also more cautious and preoccupied with escape, and hence produces less terror and definitely less qualitative and dangerous terror.

The adoption of these two mistaken assumptions – that terrorists are more determined and resilient than democratic states and that victory is always a matter of cognizance rather than the outcome of physical and coercive measures – has induced many to believe that there is no military approach for contending with terror in order to defeat it. This confusion could have been prevented had it been understood that no one expects a military body to solve an ideological conflict and that even military "victory" signifies various levels of achievement, where the first requirement of victory is to check terror in a physical manner and not to alter the enemy's political perceptions. In the long run, the military failure of terrorist organizations might lead them to alter their ideology, but that cannot be the mission of the military that should be focused on the capabilities of its adversary and *not* its intentions.

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Part II: The Conditions Necessary for Winning the War Against Terrorism

Six Basic Conditions

An examination of many terrorist events throughout the world (but especially the Israeli experience in fighting Palestinian and Hizbullah terrorism) shows that six basic conditions can be defined which, if met, provide the foundation for defeating terrorism:

Six basic conditions can be defined which, if met, provide the foundation for defeating terrorism. They do not ensure victory over terrorism, but without them victory is impossible.

- A political decision to defeat terrorism, stated explicitly and clearly to the security forces, and the willingness to bear the political cost of an offensive.
- Acquiring control of the territory in and from which the terrorists operate.
- Relevant intelligence.
- Isolating the territory within which the counterterrorist fighting takes place.
- Multi-dimensional cooperation between intelligence and operations.
- Separating the civilian population from the terrorists.

These conditions are necessary but insufficient; they do not ensure victory over terrorism, but without them victory is impossible.

Clausewitz was right when he said that "war has its own grammar." Even the most chaotic human situation, which seems to be an endless collection of individual, illogical, unconnected incidents – namely, war – has basic rules. A country can decide against going to war, but if it chooses warfare, it must act according to war's basic principles. Ignoring them will prove futile; unless they are genuinely addressed, that war cannot be won. The war on terrorism is a particular case, thus all the "grammar rules" of ordinary war influence it in their own particular way, at varying degrees of intensity, and with emphases different from those of classic war. However, they all do have influence. Furthermore, the war on terrorism utilizes additional principles that complement those of ordinary war rather than negate them. This section will attempt to reveal these principles as necessary but insufficient preconditions for defeating terrorism.

By "victory" we refer to the third type mentioned above, namely, "sufficient victory," which does not lead to many years of quiet but rather results in smothering the flames of the insurgency; it is maintained only at the cost of continual effort. Terrorist groups are not destroyed but become unable to act, and continuous counterterrorist measures have to be undertaken to prevent the renewal of attacks. A condition for coping with terrorism is understanding that the battle is long and that, even after success, continuing to suppress it demands ongoing, long-term effort, a great deal of hard work, the lives of soldiers, and patience. The basis for every political or military decision (important for every state that decides to fight terrorism and not to surrender to it) is the understanding that there are no easy solutions. No solution is absolute, and no success sufficient to say "finis" to terrorism. The steadfastness of the populace

fighting terrorism is no less important than the success of the army sent to do combat.

The Conditions and Their Importance

1. A Clear Political Decision by the political echelon to defeat terrorism and the willingness to bear the political cost of an offensive military policy.

Since in many cases terrorism seems unbearable and extremely difficult to overcome, political leaders and even military commanders hesitate to define the objective of the war on terrorism as "defeating and ending terrorism." Many prefer to define the objective as "reducing terrorism," "preventing terrorism," or "forestalling terrorism," or to use indirect expressions such as "reducing it to a level that enables the population to lead a normal life," or "containing it so that it will not rend the fabric of life." Such murky definitions lead to a kind of laxity that avoids the decisive use of force and makes it possible to cover up the failure of the war on terrorism. "Reduction" and even "forestalling" are terms that are both unclear and cannot be measured, to say nothing of definitions relating to indirect results given in completely undefined social terms.

The "defeat" demanded by the politicians can be reduced to a sufficient victory, as explained above, but from a military point of view the objective is perfectly clear: to prevent terrorist operatives from bringing their plans to fruition, despite their unrelenting desire and continued efforts to do so. Thus it is clear that every terrorist event is a failure for the army, which is not true regarding terrorism's political and public successes, which are not the army's business and with which it has to cope only marginally.

Every civilian leadership that has not resolutely defined the objective is directly responsible for the failure of the war on terrorism. It is clear, however, that a precise definition demands a focused force, and therefore precise military definitions of the force's objectives are the responsibility of the senior military command, authorized at the political level. Implementation must be based on the understanding that military measures (and paramilitary ones, such as confiscating funds and blocking financial conduits) are meant to influence the operational aspect of terrorism, that is, the use of force. At the same time, the political level should deal with the other aspects, such as the political isolation of a terrorist organization or ensuring that proper international legislation is passed legitimizing the war on terrorism.

There must be a clear political decision by the political echelon to defeat terrorism and the willingness to bear the political cost of an offensive military policy.

A more salient example of the failure caused by incorrectly defining an objective occurred in Lebanon between 1985 and 2000. During those years the government did not instruct the army to destroy Hizbullah's ability to attack Israel and the IDF. When, in the middle of 1986, General Yossi Peled arrived at the Northern Command, he found no objective had been set that could be translated

into a clear military mission, so he defined one himself as "quiet for the civilians in the north." At the time it seemed an excellent definition to this writer as well, who served as intelligence officer for the Northern Command between 1986 and 1989. In retrospect, I think it was incorrect. It never related to the proper objective, i.e., destroying Hizbullah's ability to attack Israel and the IDF. If there is no well-defined objective, the army cannot strike terrorism a mortal blow. Worse, every action was measured by the wrong standard: did it provide more or less "quiet for the civilians in the north?" The correct question should have been, "Did it bring us closer to the genuine objective of destroying Hizbullah's capabilities?" If the answer was affirmative, the action should have been carried out while looking for ways to reduce attacks on the civilians in the north. We turned the secondary factor, reduction, into the objective and by so doing crippled our ability to wage war against Hizbullah correctly until we withdrew in 2000.

It is the military's responsibility to make it absolutely clear to the politicians that it is impossible to defeat terrorism solely by defensive methods, and the politicians must completely understand that the war on terrorism has a political price. Experience has shown that the international community is not always prepared to legitimize an attack – and that is the nature of fighting terrorism – in the presence of civilians who are not terrorists and who run a high risk of being harmed. Whoever is unwilling to pay the price would do better not to think about achieving the aforementioned objective because, as noted, defensive measures are insufficient. The question of dividing energy between offense and defense will arise during the war on terrorism, but victory will be possible only if (and sometime primarily because) a policy of assault is pursued.

Defining the objective and understanding that it will be necessary to attack and thus endanger the lives of innocent civilians are both essential for the success of every action soldiers take against terrorist and guerrilla forces.

Military forces must be located in areas where terrorism is active, for example, where intelligence terrorists are organizing.

2. Controlling the Territory. The practical importance of control is first clearly functional and is manifested by the ability to operate in the relevant territory with small forces and heeding strictly military considerations without political limitations. In practical terms, this means that when it is necessary, military forces must be located in areas where terrorism is active, for example, where intelligence information indicates terrorists are organizing. If the commander in the field can make a decision based on his own considerations, without needing to pursue a (usually lengthy) process of obtaining political authorization to respond, the important advantage of controlling the territory can be seen in the context of fighting terrorism. The objective is for a small force (squad or company) commanded by a junior officer and without armored vehicles (APCs or tanks) to arrive quickly at any location to utilize the information, detain suspects, or destroy weapons or infrastructure. To achieve that end, the territory must first be subjugated and then controlled. This requires the use of a large force to locate, detain, and destroy the terrorist apparatus and its personnel, so that no

terrorists or guerrillas can threaten the force operating there. Achieving control is a long process that can last days and, in difficult situations, even months.

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The second factor defining control of a territory is the ability to check the movement of the populace from which the terrorists emerge to attack and into which they subsequently disappear. Checking the movement of the populace denotes that the force fighting terrorism deploys roadblocks through which the populace and their possessions pass for inspection. These can be permanent or temporary, depending on the security situation and intelligence information as evaluated by the commander in charge, whose main considerations are security and the requirements of fighting terrorism.

Two aspects of the classic control of a territory are not relevant here. It is not necessary to deploy on relatively high ground in enemy territory, but rather, after a determined and sometimes long war, to be able to clear the territory of "serious" terrorist elements and activists until there is no threat to the force fighting terrorism. Second, once the territory is under control, there is no need for forces to be permanently deployed within urban or densely populated areas. The forces fighting terrorism can be deployed along access roads and on the outskirts of inhabited areas, so as to allow for a rapid response inside the territory or the immediate sealing of roads, in accordance with the special needs of fighting within a specific location.

Over the past years in Israel we have experienced all the stages of fighting terrorism in an abridged but clear way: until the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987, Israel controlled the territories with minimal forces. Israeli civilians and a minimum number of soldiers could be found at any time in territories where Palestinians were concentrated, with almost no fear and certainly with no need of roadblocks and the daily use of force. The intifada tested Israel's ability to withstand terrorism. Since control of the territory was almost complete, the IDF stopped terrorism almost completely (but found it hard to deal with mass demonstrations). However, after the violence began, it was only then that the army entered population centers and only when they were protected.

Only recapturing the territory in Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) and its subsequent control (which continued for several months) could lay the foundation and provide the necessary conditions for a successful campaign against terrorism.

After the Oslo Accords (1993), the IDF withdrew from populated areas (1994-1995), and large areas became off-limits for the IDF for more than five years. Therefore, it is not surprising that when the State of Israel found itself besieged by suicide bombing and other forms of terrorist attacks (2000-2002), it did not

have a military solution, the use of tanks, APCs, planes, and helicopters notwithstanding. The awful truth was that there could be no military solution because the IDF lost control of the territory after Oslo. Only recapturing the territory in Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) and its subsequent control (which continued for several months) could lay the foundation and provide the necessary conditions for a successful campaign against terrorism. Therefore, only then could the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (ISA) achieve today's situation, before the completion of the security fence, in which the percentage of terrorist attack preventions grew and the number of attempted terrorist attacks decreased. After only a few years, terrorism dropped to about a half percent of what it was at its height.

It is important to share an observation about the difference in conditions between Israel and almost anywhere else in the world. Israel does not take responsibility for the civilian government of the territories, nor for their civilian policing. This is because the Palestinian Authority regards itself as sovereign in those areas – with a tremendous amount of Israeli support but without Israeli authority. In any other location, control of the territory would also mean taking responsibility for the civilian government, that is, a genuine military administration. That is the crux of the non-military control of a territory and is essential for effective military measures.

It is perfectly clear that there can be no control of the territory without more friction with both the civilian and terrorist populations. At first glance that would seem to contradict both natural instinct and the many who say "more friction, more losses; less friction, fewer losses." The situation on the ground proves that such an approach is invalid and that friction, which is part of controlling the territory, is necessary in order to achieve the freedom of movement necessary to operate. Friction makes it possible to obtain more intelligence, hampers the terrorist who wants to plan an attack without interference, and allows the army to sense which way the wind is blowing. Only then is it possible to react quickly and efficiently to both intelligence and events.

History has shown that an attempt to achieve quiet by reducing friction will fail in the long run, even if in the very short run it provides a pleasant, intoxicating serenity. In some instances, quiet is preserved because the other side needs it to reorganize before renewing its terrorist attacks (for example, Arafat after he returned to the Palestinian Authority in 1994). It is indeed often in the terrorists' interest to postpone the renewal of attacks (for example, Hizbullah after the IDF withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, for reasons related to Syria and Iran). Whenever those fighting terrorism lost control of the territory, terrorism came back and struck them ten times harder, with forces that had become reorganized and stronger. The terrorists waited until they felt that they could advance their interests through the use of force. This dynamic is precisely what happened in Southern Lebanon on the eve of the 2006 Second Lebanon War and in the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the 2005 Disengagement.

That is the essence of the tahdiya (period of calm) proposed by Hamas, for there is no doubt that under the aegis of a ceasefire it will gain strength and then use

force against us. Terrorist organizations stock up on weapons by exploiting their control of the territory and reduced friction with the IDF (for example, after the IDF withdrew from the Gaza Strip and abandoned the Philadelphi route). For Israel to be able to provide the proper response, the IDF will have to take the following steps: conquer the territory, control it, remove most of the terrorist organizations' operational force, and deploy an effective intelligence system. Every step is difficult, demanding, time consuming, and carries a price in human life. There is no substitute for controlling the territory for anyone whose mission is to fight terrorism successfully.

Controlling the territory allows the possibility of obtaining relevant intelligence, without which terrorism cannot be fought.

3. Relevant Intelligence. Controlling the territory allows the possibility of obtaining relevant intelligence, without which terrorism cannot be fought. Relevance is made up of three factors: precision, quality, and timing. A close relation exists between controlling the territory and intelligence. Without control, there is usually little real chance of enlisting agents from within the populace where the terrorists are active or from within the terrorist organizations themselves. Accumulated experience shows that human intelligence is at the heart of fighting terrorism and, for that reason, control of the territory has an important influence on intelligence capabilities. Moreover, since detentions are the basis for good intelligence obtained by interrogation, and wide-scale detentions can only be carried out when there is genuine control of the territory, only such control will provide the flexibility to activate complete networks to follow up partial information from a lead that is not totally clear.

Needless to say, good intelligence also makes control easier by preventing terrorist attacks. It is also clear that the more precise the intelligence, the more it enables focused action to be taken against terrorists without collateral harm. In this way it is possible to remove one of the worst obstacles to effective control, namely despair and useless injury among the local population, which lead many of them to join the terrorists. Separating terrorist elements from the innocent population is an ongoing, essential effort that must be supported by intelligence. For that reason, intelligence must be precise. In addition, it must arrive in time to be efficiently utilized to enable counterterrorist activities to be carried out and terrorist operatives to be attacked. Indeed, the shelf life of intelligence information is crucial; reports must be acted upon while they are still of value (e.g., while the enemy remains at a particular location).

Fighting terrorism requires a special quality of intelligence. It must determine routines, so that every anomaly will be noticeable, and it must enable identification in a timely fashion of every stage of preparation of an attack. To do both, two efforts need to be made. First, networks must be created to provide permanent, fundamental cover of the entire territory in detailing the enemy's normal behavior. Second, one way or another, intelligence must infiltrate the terrorist organizations' chain of command, regardless of how loosely organized it might be, to find out what it is planning, and when and where it intends to act.

Such intelligence is focused on a specific person or place. Only the combination of both factors will permit military efforts to be directed at fighting terrorism.

Beyond the intelligence necessary to fight terrorism directly, it is important to legitimize the fight. Today it is clear that both internal and external legitimization is necessary, and this is more evident when the country fighting terrorism is a democracy. Acquiring the sympathy and favorable public opinion of the international community is vital to the long-term fight against terrorism, which tries to present its murderers as "freedom fighters." Intelligence plays an important role in the struggle for legitimization and sympathy by exposing the lies and cruelty of terrorism in a way that enables the civilians of the country and the entire world to understand the policy of fighting terrorism. Insofar as is possible, intelligence has to support the battle for the hearts and minds of the world without losing its professional credibility. This is not easy. It is a new challenge, still in need of significant clarification, whose importance is nevertheless clear. It bears the danger, however, that it could deflect intelligence efforts from carrying out their main and vital task.

4. Isolating the Territory Within Which the Insurgency Takes Place.

Terrorists cannot operate unless they have freedom of action in the territory around them, from which they need:

- A safe-haven country, where they can find shelter when pursued, and where they can train and acquire the knowledge needed to improve their capabilities.
- Weapons, assuming they cannot buy or manufacture arms of sufficient quality and quantity.
- Financial backing, which enables them to support sympathizers, maintain terrorist deployment, purchase weapons, and take care of the families of operatives who were killed or detained.
- Two types of reinforcements: experts in certain types of warfare and "ordinary" fighters, who allow them to fill the ranks when the war against terrorism is successful.

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If the military force does not seal the border, efforts to wipe out terrorist elements are useless. This is because the terrorists will replenish their storehouses and refill their ranks with operatives from beyond the border, and it will be impossible to stop them. A truly bottomless pit will exist, and pressuring terrorists will be ineffective, because they will be able to acquire what they need from outside the territory in which they operate regardless of the pressure. It is vital to close borders on two sides, both preventing support from reaching the terrorists and preventing terrorists from entering Israel.

To illustrate, the United States' failure to seal the Iraqi-Syrian and Iraqi-Iranian borders is one of the main reasons for its failure to stop terrorist attacks directed

against its soldiers in Iraq during the early years of the insurgency. Ninety-five percent of foreign fighters in Iraq who provide the bulk of suicide bombers came through Syria alone.(15) And the U.S. Department of Defense was reporting as late as December 2007 that the Iraqi security forces were still in the process of constructing border forts to encircle Iraq.(16) Thus, during most of the Iraqi insurgency, terrorists have received support, reinforcements, knowledge, and weapons from two sovereign countries.

This failure to isolate the Iraqi insurgency from reinforcement made struggling against it a Sisyphean task from a military point of view. No matter how much damage the Americans caused to the terrorists, their links with countries beyond the region in which the war was being waged enabled them to close gaps and become stronger. A similar challenge was posed to the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan because the Taliban established sanctuaries over its eastern border inside Pakistan. It is extremely difficult to attack sources of arms, money, and men when they are far away, and ten times harder when they are sovereign countries and members of the UN.

One of the reasons for the IDF's failure during the years it was in Lebanon fighting Hizbullah in a secure territory that bordered the State of Israel (1985-2000) was its inability to seal off the security zone in Southern Lebanon from the territory to the north. Thus Hizbullah could wage a guerrilla war without endangering its operatives when they attacked within the security zone. The overwhelming majority of guerrilla attacks were carried out by forces that infiltrated from without and only the tiniest fraction were carried out by residents of the security zone. Hizbullah was conspicuously unsuccessful in its efforts to establish its power inside the region, but the IDF's inability to seal and isolate the region allowed the organization to wage a continual war while relying on the support of the populace beyond the region controlled by the IDF. The IDF did succeed, to a great extent, in controlling the territory and deploying an effective intelligence network, especially following the support it managed to enlist from the populace of the security zone, regardless of ethnic affiliation. However, its failure to isolate the region in which the fighting took place was critical.

In the Second Lebanon War as well, the IDF preferred to launch its attack without first isolating the area of Southern Lebanon at the line of the Litani River. This turned out to be one of the IDF's main mistakes and one of the principal reasons that the war ended without a clear Israeli success. Although the IDF had total air superiority, Hizbullah continued to stream fresh operatives and weapons systems into the area. No less important was the fact that the Hizbullah forces in the front lines did not feel cut off and, hence, did not perceive that they were threatened. As a result, they continued to fight against the IDF and did not collapse.

The same considerations apply to the Palestinian theater as well. Israel decided to forfeit control of the perimeter of the Gaza Strip when it withdrew its forces from the Philadelphi route separating Egyptian Sinai from Gaza. The scale of smuggling increased so that Katyusha rockets and SA-7 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles entered the Palestinian arsenals. In contrast, no such weaponry entered the West Bank, precisely because Israel firmly controlled its perimeter

from the Jordan Valley. By its control of the ground, Israel has also been able to thwart the production and deployment of domestically produced rockets that have been launched in massive numbers from the Gaza area. In short, Israel has paid a price for losing control of Gaza's perimeter in its counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamist groups, like Hamas, as well as Fatah affiliates, that continued to assault Israeli civilians with rockets even after Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip.

Other countries that fought terrorist and guerrilla forces have made the same mistake. For example, the United States did not employ ground forces in Laos to prevent fighters and weapons from entering South Vietnam from North Vietnam. The reason was political: the United States had signed an agreement not to violate Laotian neutrality, and the American State Department managed to convince the various presidents to adhere to this agreement, despite the fact that both North Vietnam and China were uninhibited in violating it. Military personnel failed to convince the decision-makers that it was absolutely vital to block the bypasses through countries that were officially neutral. That was apparently the main cause of the American military's failure after the Tet offensive, which was a military disaster for the Vietcong, to prevent regular North Vietnamese forces from using a well-known trail to enter the south. It was those forces that in the end made the difference.(17)

The isolation required in fighting terrorist organizations also includes non-geographical aspects. For example, an effort should be made to create economic isolation, which means preventing the entrance of funds from outside the territory, whether through bank transfers, money changers, or in the suitcases of messengers. Isolation of information is also extremely important, especially in the more professional realms, such as preparing modern explosive devices. In addition, attempts to transfer information, such as bringing in experts who acquired knowledge elsewhere or CDs with professional information to improve fighting ability, must be prevented.

5. Multi-Dimensional Cooperation Between Intelligence and Operations. The previous conditions analyzed here have won universal recognition and relate to defined military missions. The next condition – novel to a certain extent, at least for Israel's defense establishment – deals with relations within the campaign against terrorism. This issue is discussed in British literature, especially in relation to the suppression of Communist terrorism in Malaya, as well as in relation to Vietnam(18) – the first pointing to success and the second to the lessons learned from failure. The emphasis is different for Israel, because the issues are more military than civilian.(19) Determining the proper solution for Israel began with a long process of trial and error, especially after the second intifada began (September 2000), in view of the terrible price in blood that made a combination of capabilities necessary to eradicate terrorism. Let us illustrate with a situation that could possibly take place today: an action might be carried out in Judea and Samaria in which the operative force is the special forces unit of the police; intelligence is gathered by the Mossad and Military Intelligence but processed by the Israel Security Agency (ISA); the action and reserves are

commanded by the territorial brigade, which is subordinate to the Judea and Samaria division; the force will have close support provided by unmanned aircraft and attack helicopters operated by the Air Force, with aid from Territorial Command Intelligence supported by the Chief of Staff's mapping unit. The operation itself can be put into action within a few hours of receipt of the relevant information from the intelligence community, whether it came from an agent abroad or the observations of a special force in the casbah of a specific city.

Understanding that the reaction time and cooperation of the various elements – intelligence community, army, and police forces – is critical to the war on terrorism led to two important changes in the methods and general organization of those fighting terrorism:

A great deal of authority was delegated to the lowest ranks, those in contact with the enemy and in the field. Today the freedom of action of a brigade commander in the field and an ISA coordinator in his area is ten times greater than during a lull in the fighting. This is an essential element of the system, and therefore any attempt to reduce this authority, or to demand authorization beforehand from the higher levels of administration, will cause the security systems to lose an important aspect of their ability to fight terrorism.

The elements that make intelligence and operational missions effective – such as interrogators, translators, control of unmanned aircraft, etc. – which, for economic reasons and for supervision purposes, had been centralized in headquarters, have been decentralized to lower levels. This was done so that the forces in the field could gather intelligence quickly, understand it immediately, and respond rapidly. The response may be manifested by gathering information, activating an operational force, or having an interrogator arrive at the place of a suspect's detention to ensure immediate action. The objective is to respond with zero delay to an event, information, or intelligence. As a result, research capabilities and the authority to produce information and evaluate a situation also have to take place at ground level. Understanding this necessity is basic for every action.

Only someone who has overcome the bureaucratic obstacles that exist in every organization and who has combined the various advantages that every organization or branch has to offer, while ignoring the obstructions in accordance with the various cultures of command and work, can achieve the capabilities necessary for fighting terrorism. This is without a doubt the Israeli security forces' most important achievement. Room for improvement still remains in several areas, but we have clearly come a long way. Realizing that people make mistakes, because mistakes are unavoidable in cases of actions undertaken rapidly and under pressure, is at the foundation of every theory of fighting terrorism. Israeli cooperation between its fighting branches and intelligence community can be (and indeed is) a good example for other countries struggling with the same problems and challenges. Moreover, since this method necessitates delegating authority to the forces in the field, the principle of backup must be developed and accompanied by a level of freedom of action usually seen at much higher echelons. To a certain extent, this awareness relates to the best action in classic warfare as well, called "mission command." In the specific

case of the war on terrorism, it is the only alternative that will produce results.

6. Separating the Civilian Population from the Terrorist Entities. There is a vital need in counterinsurgency operations against terrorist groups to drive a wedge between the civilian population that has nothing to do with terrorism and the terrorist entities against which a military campaign must be conducted. Lt. Col. David Kilcullen, the former Australian officer who now serves as an advisor on counterinsurgency to General David Petraeus in Iraq, has indeed noted: "The enemy needs the people to act in certain ways (sympathy, acquiescence, silence, reaction to provocation) in order to survive and further his strategy. Unless the population acts in these ways, both insurgents and terrorists will wither."⁽²⁰⁾ It is important to stress that this separation can only be accomplished if the second condition for success in counterinsurgency is met: namely, control of the territory in which the military struggle with the terrorist operatives is being waged.

There is a vital need in counterinsurgency operations against terrorist groups to drive a wedge between the civilian population that has nothing to do with terrorism and the terrorist entities against which a military campaign must be conducted.

Three levels of separation can be distinguished: Separation can result simply by a military force taking the necessary precautions not to injure innocent civilians who have nothing whatsoever to do with the terrorist groups who are active. This includes preventing collateral damage when using force in order to arrest or eliminate terrorist operatives. It is critical for an armed force to avoid adopting procedures that harm civilians or their freedom of movement when such measures are employed against terrorist operatives through roadblocks or closures. It is extremely difficult to avoid causing any harm to every single innocent civilian, despite all the precautions a security force might put in place, when measures are adopted in a civilian environment in which terrorist operatives are active. Nonetheless, everything must be done to avoid such situations that can bring harm to the innocent or cause sweeping damage to the civilian population as a whole.

The IDF's record could include an enormous accomplishment that was achieved in the Second Lebanon War when it emerged that only Shiites affiliated with Hizbullah were attacked by the Israeli Air Force in Beirut, while in other parts of Lebanon's capital, the IDF command was careful to minimize any harm that it caused. Lebanese Shiites, Christians, and Sunnis sat in Beirut cafes just a few hundred meters from Hizbullah's Dahiya Quarter that was almost completely destroyed. The rest of the Lebanese populace knew that Hizbullah's headquarters were located only in Dahiya, and therefore that would be the only section of Beirut that would be harmed. The carefulness and precision of the Israeli air operation enhanced the prestige of the IDF and averted a situation in which many Lebanese would be motivated to join Hizbullah.

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few hundred meters from Hizbullah's Dahiya Quarter that was almost completely destroyed. The rest of the Lebanese populace knew that Hizbullah's headquarters were located only in Dahiya, and therefore that would be the only section of Beirut that would be harmed.

A second level of separation between civilians and terrorist groups can be achieved when it becomes possible to drive a clear wedge, and even a conflict of interest, between the civilian population and the terrorist insurgents. An example of this success was Israel's control of Southern Lebanon prior to its withdrawal from the area in May 2000. During the period in which Israel maintained a south Lebanon security zone, Hizbullah did not succeed in recruiting cells of activists in the area. There were two reasons why this situation developed. First, Israeli intelligence units were able to thwart most recruitment efforts within the local population. Second, this was clearly assisted by the fact that within the south Lebanon security zone a strong economic interest emerged among its residents to preserve the continuation of quiet and to benefit from life under Israeli control, along with the maintenance of their ties as Lebanese citizens to the Lebanese state. It should be added that the standard of living in Southern Lebanon was higher than in many parts of Lebanon and, as a result, most of the southern Lebanese population did not want to give up this advantage.

The third and highest level of separation is one in which the local population actually enters into active combat against terrorist organizations. If this can be achieved, then the chances of defeating a terrorist insurgency increase sharply. If the previous two levels are achieved, then the terrorist insurgency cannot gain strength, but if the third level is implemented, then the conditions are put in place for an active struggle against it. That was the situation in Southern Lebanon, where most of the Christian and Druze residents feared the price they would have to pay if Hizbullah ruled in this region. In order to avert Hizbullah's success, the civilian population in Southern Lebanon actively assisted the IDF.

It appeared in early 2008 that the U.S. had achieved this level of separation of the Sunni civilian population of al-Anbar Province in Western Iraq from al-Qaeda and that this is part of the explanation for the success achieved by the U.S. with the implementation of its 2007 "surge strategy" under General David Petraeus. Even the Sunni Arab population, which had previously fought U.S. efforts to facilitate the emergence of a democratic (and Shiite-dominated) regime in Baghdad, understood the damage that would be caused with a takeover of Iraq by al-Qaeda affiliates. As a result, the Sunni Arabs have been prepared to fight for the stability of their sectors and to prevent the infiltration of extremist elements from abroad.

Any state fighting terrorists should seek to reach the third level of separation, but at least it should be sure that the first level is secured. The success of Israel against Palestinian terrorism that began in the spring of 2002 emanated from the fact that the IDF understood how to keep to an absolute minimum the losses to Palestinian civilians who had no connections with terrorist groups. Yet there

were clear limits to the effort of the Israeli success. The longer a civilian population, like the Palestinians, is exposed to a sustained campaign of incitement by the insurgent forces, by the Palestinian Authority itself, the more difficult it will be to achieve a high level of separation of the population from the insurgency.

Israel's failure to entirely eliminate Palestinian terrorist capabilities requires that it be satisfied with the lowest level of decisiveness in this struggle. For example, Israel has been unable to motivate the civilian Palestinian population to reject terrorism and to wage an armed struggle against Hamas and other militant Islamist groups that lead large parts of Palestinian society.

An interesting question is that of priorities, specifically, what is the correct order for fulfilling the aforementioned conditions? It seems to be genuinely necessary to put political decisions first. Whether it is best to begin with the process of isolating the fighting territory or controlling it is an open question. Isolation should be pursued as the first stage, if possible. (In Iraq, for example, it was necessary to start with "conquest." However, the Americans did not prepare for control and sanitizing its huge territory.) The intelligence effort can begin seriously after occupation, without dependence on isolation and even before control. The organizational system should be prepared in advance, but experience has shown that it changes during war, and a price is paid until it stabilizes correctly according to time, place, and challenge. What could be done against the Palestinians in 1936 by the British Army cannot be done today, even though the territory is identical.

Part III: The Principles of War in an Asymmetric Confrontation

What Is Asymmetric Warfare?

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and especially since the events of September 2001, much has been said and written about the nature of future wars and how those of the present day are different from those of the past. In this context, the term "asymmetric" emerges to describe an important type of warfare. "Asymmetric warfare" seems to mean a war in which the opposing sides, both of which use force to achieve their ends, are not equal in military strength.(21)

In Israel, the term is used to refer to the war between the IDF and organizations or armies that do their best not to look like armies. They are not armies, in that it is difficult to locate them in the field, to attack concentrations of their forces, to identify the command and control chain, and to hamper their ability to fight. The enemy is evasive, less hierarchical, can fade into the background, and has no grandiose plans that can be foiled. In essence, if one side is modern and industrially advanced with a professional army and the other side is not, then it can be said that they are fighting an asymmetric war.

Asymmetry has another important component, namely, the way that decision-makers on both sides relate to the losses they sustain and the injury inflicted

upon the opposing civilian population. Generally speaking, and certainly in our part of the world, it is easier for the side that is not a modern country to make decisions leading to the death and injury of enemy civilians. Indeed, we have seen that civilians are the main target for such organizations. The decisions of the modern country, on the other hand, are greatly influenced by the desire to have as few military casualties as possible and usually no less by its sensitivity to the legal and moral aspects of harming civilians. The asymmetry in the way terrorist and guerrilla forces relate to the enemy's civilians, and their willingness to suffer and even exploit the deaths of their own civilians, is no less critical than the differences in military strength, and perhaps even more so.

The definition proposed here for "asymmetric warfare" is "a war between the regular army of a state and an organization using terrorism or guerrilla tactics from within areas under the control of the regular army or crossing the borders of those areas, while receiving support (active or passive) from the civilian population from within which it operates." This definition does not include global *jihad* or terrorist cells in London that plot to attack civilians, or the struggle waged by MI5 against such cells, or the counterterrorist activities undertaken in an Arab village in Israel. It does not include ground-to-ground missiles fired by the Iranians, Syrian gas attacks, or the war against anti-aircraft missiles in Syria. From the Israeli point of view, it covers the war against the terrorism emanating from beyond its borders since 1965 (the first Fatah attack); the war against terrorism originating in Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and Judea and Samaria since the late 1960s; and Israel's wars in Lebanon.

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What Are the Principles of War?

According to the *IDF Dictionary of Terms*:

The principles of war are the principles expressing the rules of military thought and action that serve as the permanent basis for combat doctrine....Applying the principles of war differs at different levels and for different operations....Their relative importance can be expected to vary from event to event....The list of principles is a methodological tool that differs from army to army and from era to era.(22)

The dictionary emphasizes that while the principles remain the same, the list morphs according to time and place, with application always dependent on context.

According to the introduction to the British doctrine of warfare, issued in 1996, (23) many countries have adopted a list of war principles, concentrating on those

that are most important and have proven themselves in the long run as applicable to waging wars. The principles are not a checklist ensuring success, but, used with judgment, they will serve as a guide to planning and carrying out military operations at all levels, as well as the criteria for examining possible directions for action. Ignoring the principles increases the chance of failure in battle.

It should be noted that the principles serve the purpose of planning and commanding military campaigns on the battlefield, and do not serve the purpose of resolving the conflicts at the root of the military struggle. Perhaps instead of "principles of war" they should be called "principles of fighting," to clarify their limits and non-applications. For example, they do not relate to the important broader issues of war, such as social, religious, political, economic, territorial, and cultural factors, without which conflicts and wars between nations or groups cannot be understood.

The British list features ten principles:

1. Selection and maintenance of aim
2. Maintenance of morale
3. Security
4. Surprise
5. Offensive action
6. Concentration of force
7. Economy of effort
8. Flexibility
9. Cooperation
10. Sustainability/administration.

The Americans list the following nine:

1. Objective
2. Offensive
3. Mass
4. Economy of force
5. Maneuver
6. Unity of command
7. Security
8. Surprise
9. Simplicity.

Where the British list "flexibility," "cooperation," "maintenance of morale," and "administration," the Americans have "unity of command," "maneuver," and "simplicity." The only change the British have made to their list was in the order in which their principles appear. The Americans have recently added three additional principles to the official literature under the heading "Other Principles." They are:

1. Restraint
2. Perseverance

3. Legitimacy.

The IDF's list of principles, defined in 1998, features ten entries(24) (parenthetical explanations are the author's):

1. Mission and Aim – Adherence to the mission by being guided by the aim (understanding the force's mission within the framework of the aim – and acting accordingly)
2. Optimal utilization of forces (achieving the maximum with what is available while correctly combining capabilities)
3. Initiative and offensive (the commander in the field determines action; he must aim for contact and engagement with the enemy)
4. Stratagem (achieving surprise, but more importantly, identifying, targeting, and exploiting weak points of the enemy)
5. Concentration of efforts (every effort, action, and effect are made to attain the principal mission and aim)
6. Continuity of action (unswerving pressure to prevent the enemy from reorganizing; exploiting our forces' successes)
7. Depth and reserves (to distance threats in order to enable continuity of action in crises)
8. Security (to avoid exposure of the flanks and weakness following a concerted effort)
9. Maintenance of morale and fighting spirit (impels the soldier forward and preserves the unit's vitality under pressure; essential for a small army to compensate for its materiel weakness)
10. Simplicity (each element of the stratagem must be simple to execute even if the broader plan and mission are complicated).

The principle of administration (which is not in either the American or IDF list of principles), beyond the understanding that an army marches on its stomach, is extremely important and is the basis for concentrating efforts and forces at the operative level and certainly at the strategic level; neglecting it will keep the army from victory. In a country fighting with a small army within interior lines of operation (the permanent condition in Israel), shifting the strategic effort is critical and depends on administration.

The IDF list of principles of war is slightly different from the British and the American. It does not include "unity of command," perhaps because the IDF's chain of command is structured differently, nor does it feature "maneuver." (After the Second Lebanon War, perhaps its inclusion on the list should be considered. It was once thought so obvious that there was no need to mention it.) On the other hand, the IDF includes "continuity of action" (which the Americans have only recently added), replacing "maneuver," as well as maintenance of morale (which the British include as well). "Depth and reserves" is a principle exclusive to the IDF, apparently because defense is extremely important in view of the inequalities between Israel and its neighbors: numerical, demographic and geographic.

Applying the Principles of War to Asymmetric Warfare

Unfortunately, for many years Israel has been fighting a war that fulfills all the criteria of an asymmetric war against various guerrilla forces: Hizbullah in Lebanon; Hamas in Gaza; and Palestinian terrorism from Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. We are not alone. Many other countries have a great deal of experience in fighting terrorism and various types of guerrilla aggression, from the jungles of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaya to the deserts of Oman, the hills of Greece, Algeria, and Afghanistan, and the alleys of Beirut, Amman, Bint Jbeil, Gaza City, Nablus, and Baghdad.

Sufficient empirical evidence is available to state that armies can successfully fight terrorism and guerrilla organizations, destroying their operative capabilities, even if the conflict remains active in other areas. As was previously demonstrated, ample experience similarly enables us to examine whether or not there is genuine need to change the principles of war. What follows relates to the experience accumulated by the IDF in fighting terrorism under the special conditions prevalent in Israel and in light of the list of principles accepted by the IDF, although it might seem that they are applicable to most armies across the globe, with changes particular to each army and case.

Unfortunately, for many years Israel has been fighting a war that fulfills all the criteria of an asymmetric war against various guerrilla forces: Hizbullah in Lebanon; Hamas in Gaza; and Palestinian terrorism from Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip.

1. Mission and Aim: This principle is critical for every military move. It calls for both the mission and the aim to be clarified, and it ensures that achieving the mission does in fact serve the aim. Experience shows that every time a mission was not completely clear, for example, in the Second Lebanon War, Israel paid a high price. The principle requires of every commander to use the force he commands to carry out the mission he was given, with the mission serving the aim as defined. The aim always has first priority, serving as a kind of beacon illuminating the mission. At any level of the military hierarchy, the aim is the mission of the superior level. It can be concluded that in some extreme situations, not carrying out the mission can better serve the aim and, in such a situation, the aim always has priority. At the tactical level, for example, if terrorists have left a house in which they were hiding, it is preferable to attack them rather than the house, which had been defined as the mission.

If the last war in Lebanon had clear aims, such as "to destroy Hizbullah's fighting capabilities as a guerrilla organization operating against Israel in south Lebanon in order to allow the Lebanese government to realize its sovereignty in south Lebanon," and the Northern Command's mission had been defined as "to prevent Katyusha rockets from being fired into Israel," there is no doubt that the fighting forces would have been given a clear order that could have been followed. The operative translation of the aim and mission to the command would have meant that there was no alternative but to instruct the ground forces to occupy south Lebanon, destroy Hizbullah's entire infrastructure, and neutralize its Katyusha-launching capabilities. That would have been a clear, legitimate military mission.

At the same time it would have been clear that the mission to conquer Bint Jbeil, because it symbolized Hizbullah success, had no foundation and related neither to the mission nor the aim, meaning there was no point in carrying it out.

Wiping out terrorism in Judea and Samaria after April 2002, when we could extrapolate Israeli casualties to about 1,600 murdered civilians annually, was possible because a clear mission was defined as (if not in these exact words) "the army has to stop terrorism (the aim) to enable Israelis to live normal lives," and the result was Operation Defensive Shield.

2. Optimal Utilization of Forces: This principle may seem at first glance to be less necessary for fighting terrorism, but that is not the case. One of the main challenges in fighting a guerrilla or terrorist force is that a combination of many capabilities is necessary for success. If intelligence, special forces, the air force, the army deployed in the field, and the police are not effectively utilized, each in its particular area, terrorism cannot be overcome. One of the most outstanding successes of the Israeli defense system is its ability to wring the utmost out of every element. In 2002, the combination of high-class intelligence from the Israel Security Agency and Military Intelligence, the pinpoint striking capabilities of the Israeli Air Force, and the incredible professionalism of the forces brought about a unified, coordinated operation within Palestinian territory. It was efficient, effective, avoided collateral damage, and was the secret of the security forces' success in fighting terrorism in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. It was a classic example of the "full utilization of forces," in which each component brings its unique capabilities to the battlefield and, combining them, leads to a synergetic result that is far more than the sum of its parts.

This principle is manifested in another important way. The IDF faces several challenges at once: the confrontations in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon as well as preparing for coming wars. If the principle of the full utilization of forces is neglected, and the greatest benefit is not derived from each of the units deployed in the various sectors to deal with the various tasks, the IDF will not be able to meet the challenge. This principle demands that the force fighting terrorism exploit the special nature of each unit to prepare for the war and demands that those responsible for preparation think about how to enable the units to operate well when called upon to fight. Observing the "full utilization" principle is of supreme importance in both operating and building a force to facilitate allocation of tasks between the regular army and the reserves. Those in charge of dispensing resources will agree that, in the long run, at the General Staff level, a most important goal is to carry out the various tasks at a reasonable economic price.

3. Initiative and Offensive: After the success of "initiative and offensive" in Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002 (as opposed to the defensive failure of the year and a half that preceded it), and the realization that lack of initiative and offensive were the two main weak points of the fighting of some IDF units in the Second Lebanon War, it is clear today that without both it is impossible to fight terrorism and guerrilla organizations. Because the enemy is elusive, this principle is more important in asymmetric warfare than in regular warfare, in which large

units operate and there is not always room for uncoordinated local initiative. Every junior officer must understand that the outcome of such a war, in which small forces are put into operation against terrorist and guerrilla organizations, depends on him and what he does, in seeking out and engaging the enemy whenever and wherever possible. This is the key to fighting in the small and sometimes isolated frameworks of asymmetric warfare.

4. Stratagem: Israeli terminology differs from the British and American, both of whom refer to "surprise." In Israeli terminology, surprise is an important and perhaps necessary component of stratagem, but not its essence. What is crucial is exploiting surprise to be able to strike the enemy's weakest point and shatter his center of gravity. Surprise is never the last step but rather the first; the aim is to strike the decisive blow. The objectives of stratagem and exploiting surprise are both important and bring added benefits. During the last war the army did not internalize the principle of stratagem; it made do with surprising Nasrallah only and did not exploit the surprise to win. Adopting stratagem in every move must be at the heart of military thought. If in a regular war there is no choice, and stratagem can be replaced by greater force or firepower, in asymmetric warfare there is no replacement because in many instances too much force or firepower will do more harm than good.

Compared to the principle of the "full utilization of forces," the following three - "concentration of efforts," "continuity of action," and "depth and reserves" - seem at first glance to be less critical for fighting terrorism. However, they are indeed important and necessary.

In Israeli terminology, surprise is an important and perhaps necessary component of stratagem, but not its essence. What is crucial is exploiting surprise to be able to strike the enemy's weakest point and shatter his center of gravity.

5. Concentration of Efforts: This was lacking in the Second Lebanon War. The IDF did not fully concentrate its ground power in any location, nor did it have a central goal in south Lebanon in which to engage its forces throughout the front. For a long time there had been no main thrust in fighting terrorism in Judea, Samaria, or the Gaza Strip. This changed when the mission was defined as the detention or destruction of whoever enabled terrorist operatives to carry out their attacks, from the head of Hamas to the technician who attached the explosives to the body of the suicide bomber. All were the main thrust. Only after it became clear that most of the IDF's existing capabilities had to be concentrated on locating and detaining or destroying the personnel in the chain of terror did the IDF manage to lower the level of terrorism.

In many instances in the war against terrorism, the focus of the main thrust is not a physical location but rather a specific process or individuals. Thus, proper planning in asymmetric warfare would be to examine the definition of the main thrust necessary to keep the terrorists from bringing their schemes to fruition. This is the center of gravity of every terrorist organization. When this becomes

the only criterion for a military action, then all systems participating in the effort will know where to place their focus and how to prioritize their efforts.

6. Continuity of Action: At every stage in Israel's war against terrorist and guerrilla forces, the enemy was able to rest, redeploy, and later carry out more terrorist attacks until we brought the principle of continuity of action into play. Only when the IDF understood this concept and decided to tenaciously use what it called "the lawnmower tactic" – killing or detaining everyone who appeared on the terrorist chain – did it overcome terrorism. In an attempt to stop the continuity of IDF actions that kept it from building up its strength, Hamas suggested a tahdiya, a mutual period of no attacks. Since the Hamas objective was to gain breathing space to reorganize and build up its forces, it was indeed beneficial that the State of Israel did not agree to this.

At the strategic level, not implementing the principle of continuity will lead to the strengthening of terrorism, which will be difficult for us to deal with in the future.

At the strategic level, not implementing the principle of continuity (for example, withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon plus subsequent desisting from the fight against terrorism there) led to and will lead to the strengthening of terrorism, which will be difficult for us to deal with in the future. Even those who claim that such steps are politically justified cannot ignore their military significance. This again shows that the principles of war are important at all levels and that it is not more important to chase an anonymous terrorist in order to detain him than it is to prevent the enemy from organizing and improving his capabilities. In the war against terrorism, continuity – while often challenging to carry out – is one of the more important principles, especially because of the almost total dependence on continuous intelligence, which is not always available.

7. Depth and Reserves: The following three examples show the importance of depth: Israel has learned the hard way that depth is critical when the enemy possesses rockets and missiles. Kassam rockets falling in Ashkelon and Katyushas in Haifa have illustrated the importance of ten theoretically insignificant kilometers. For example, if Israel had controlled a ten-kilometer strip in south Lebanon, most of the missiles that hit Haifa would not have done so. By the same token, with five additional kilometers of Israeli control in the northern Gaza Strip, Ashkelon and Sderot would have been beyond Kassam range.

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In the fight against terrorism in Judea and Samaria, a simple fence with room to maneuver behind it raises the level of security. When there is no depth on the other side of the fence, and it is defended only from the Israeli side, the result is abduction of soldiers to the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. Thus, nothing can replace depth, even in the case of a fence.

The situation in south Lebanon before the IDF withdrew was different from what it became after the withdrawal. Losing the slim depth Israel had had in the north led to a concentration of Hizbullah activity penetrating into the State of Israel, without the terrorists having to waste time and energy on their way to the fence. Today the presence of UNIFIL is meant to generate a kind of depth, but, in my opinion, that effort will not bear fruit in the long run, and we will again lose our depth.

The part played by "reserves" should also not be neglected, both in their strategic and operative aspects: they are less salient for fighting terrorism but critical for fighting guerrilla forces. If in the Second Lebanon War, the Northern Command had had genuine reserves and had sent a large force to occupy the surrounding area after the first success in the region of Bint Jbeil, this would have bisected Hizbullah's ground deployment and perhaps even led to its partial destruction in places where the IDF could have threatened Hizbullah's rear. The fact that efforts were made along the entire front instead of using reserves did not enable genuine achievements to be made.

The four principles of "optimal utilization of forces," "concentration of efforts," "continuity of action," and "depth and reserves" would seem to illustrate the advantages a regular army has over guerrilla and terrorist forces in a war – if it utilizes these advantages correctly. For example, the principle of "full utilization of forces" can genuinely express the technological superiority a country usually has over a terrorist or guerrilla organization. If the army knows how to fully exploit technological capabilities and integrate them correctly and intensively into the war effort, it will have a tremendous advantage. In fighting terrorism in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria since September 2000, one of the IDF's secret weapons has been its success in employing its technological capabilities. In the Second Lebanon War, the IDF successfully applied technology to destroy Hizbullah's heavy long-range rocket launchers. On the other hand, in Israel's attempts to destroy the host of small rocket launchers from which most of the rockets were fired, the limitations of technology were made evident, as was the danger of becoming a slave to it.

The principles of "concentration of efforts" and "continuity of action" are effective in the arsenal of a regular army because it can generally rely on them more than the smaller terrorist and guerrilla organizations can. Differences in size make the terrorist and guerrilla groups weaker, and their concerted efforts usually do not go beyond the operational level. It is therefore clear why continuous military pressure can hamper terrorists' efforts to exert pressure on an army or on the civilians of the enemy country, with the exception of pinpoint locations, such as the concentrated Kassam attacks on Sderot. When an army does not make the most of its advantages and allows the enemy to rest, redeploy, and plan, the results are liable to be problematic. That was made conspicuously clear between September 2000 and March 2002: the IDF responded to individual cases of Palestinian terrorism, among other reasons, because the political level did not allow it to operate continuously in Judea and Samaria. The result was a drastic rise in the number of terrorist attacks and casualties, especially among civilians.

The change in perception and the implementation of the two aforementioned principles, among others, brought about a drastic and immediate reduction in the number of attacks and casualties. The principle of "continuity of action" has been scrupulously preserved in Judea and Samaria because its indispensable nature has been recognized.

Generally speaking, "depth and reserves" are the privilege of states rather than organizations, and their utilization will afford a state's army great advantage. In a state applying this principle, its army can push the enemy into smaller or isolated areas, enabling it to use its larger space to operate from all directions at the same time. Terrorist organizations and guerrilla forces, which are usually small, find depth relatively unattainable. Terrorists generally have no reserves, and guerrilla groups have to be extremely advanced to transform themselves into the kind of army which has significant reserves during fighting.

Thus it can be seen that the principles of "optimal utilization of forces," "concentration of efforts," "continuity of action," and "depth and reserves," which are sometimes regarded as proof of the irrelevance of the principles of war in asymmetric warfare, are actually at the core of the advantage that regular state armies have over irregular forces.

8. Security is essential for fighting terrorism; it complements "initiative and offensive." Because of its importance, one of the most problematic uncertainties for decision-makers in the realm of fighting terrorism concerns the amount of resources to devote to "security." Assuming that resources are limited, how much should be taken from the main thrust of attacking terrorist and guerrilla forces to secure fighting forces on the base and during the fighting itself? How many of the total forces should be allocated to securing the rear and the civilian population? Another aspect of "security" is the plan to conceal the activities of forces so that the enemy does not discover them. This was another factor that we apparently did not completely understand in Lebanon, and Hizbullah showed that it knew how to use this weakness of ours to its own benefit.

9. Maintenance of Moral and Fighting Spirit: This principle is at the core of every commander's concern, especially in the case of warfare using small groups or even individuals against the terrorist. On most occasions, such operations cannot be supported by artillery, air support, or by the momentum of broader military units that surround them. In a war against terrorist or guerrilla organizations, the fighting spirit of the individual soldier and small group is supremely important, especially when they are far away from superior command and have to decide for themselves how to act. Morale and fighting spirit are particularly tested in asymmetric warfare because it is a long-term battle with no end in sight, rather than a one-time effort, no matter how difficult, such as the wars that the IDF was accustomed to fight in the past. By the nature of asymmetric warfare, not only do soldiers have a great many dull, exhausting, frustrating missions to carry out – and they have to be carried out extremely well – but regular units sometimes carry out missions that seem more appropriate for special units. Both demands test morale and fighting spirit as well as the discipline and professionalism of the soldiers and their commanders. The need to

confront civilians in securing roadblocks, for instance, or aggressive operations in densely populated areas, make the issue of morale and discipline even more complex. Thus, the principle of maintaining morale and fighting spirit is even more important in all forms of the war against terrorist and guerrilla forces.

10. Simplicity: While this principle is generally important on the battlefield, it is ten times more important in fighting terrorism. This is mainly because counterterrorism is by nature complicated by its need to operate among the civilian population. Complex actions usually increase danger to forces due to involvement with the surroundings. Therefore simplicity is important in the field, at the operative level as well as the tactical. Indeed, it seems to be more important operationally than tactically: the army is clearly interested in every unit being able to operate against terrorism and thus reduce dependence on special units, which always operate intensively. Beyond the desire to obviate a dependence that would limit them, many actions have to be carried out on short notice (often to preserve the principle of continuity of action). Without simplicity, there would be too few operations, and some would be undertaken too late because of the time necessary to complete preparations. When opposing an elusive enemy, simplicity is almost a sine qua non in creating long-term pressure.

The above analysis makes it clear that when the IDF's principles of war are examined in light of the needs of asymmetric warfare, none of them is extraneous, irrelevant, or even unimportant. However, it is clear that applying these principles demands deliberation and professional skill. No two operational events or wars are similar, and the way in which the principles are integrated into a plan or carried out needs to change each time. Moreover, at the appearance of a contradiction between principles, a commander's merit is judged by how well he prioritizes and applies them. With the exception of the first principle, "aim and mission," everything depends on the commander and his assessment of the situation.

The question now is whether a principle is lacking, without which it would be difficult to fight terrorist and guerrilla forces, and which, if added, would make for better planning and a significantly easier fight. In my view, the most important difference between classic warfare and asymmetric warfare is the involvement of civilians as active or passive partners on one of the fighting sides. This difference is part of the essence of asymmetric warfare, and its dimensions are determined by the irregular side, which uses terrorist and guerrilla tactics from within and alongside the civilian population.

Regarding other conditions that have changed a great deal recently, it seems that media exposure has caused a change, for two reasons:

The public at large is partially but immediately exposed to the events and situation on the battlefield. When this is done imperfectly, there is no possibility of halting the correspondents and cameramen who are on the scene or of preventing them from transmitting their pictures to the outside world. Decision-makers are exposed to continuous, uncontrolled media reports during events, and they must respond to them immediately.

For that reason, external pressures can interfere with the running of a small country such as Israel, which is very sensitive to international public opinion. As a result, Israel sometimes acts according to interests opposed to its own.

An intensive study of asymmetric warfare shows two innovations: civilians are part of the terrorist organizations' strength and capabilities, and therefore friction with them cannot be avoided; and the media expose counterterrorist activities in a way which is liable to influence the way decision-makers respond, with little connection between the truth and what is reported. These two innovations taken together demand that a new principle be added to the IDF's list of war principles: "image and legitimization," whose purpose is to make commanders of all ranks relate to both in planning the fighting and its execution. This means that at every level, whoever plans and carries out an action in war has to consider how it will be presented and appear in the media. He should, by commission or omission in planning and execution, reinforce both internal (inside the State of Israel) and external (by the world in general) legitimization for Israel's actions in the war. Military planners have to be aware of the issue of involvement of civilians: on the one hand, some of them may have to be harmed when there is no choice, and on the other, there must be untiring effort to prevent them from being injured, insofar as this is possible. All this must be done while paying the greatest possible attention to the need to explain to the Israeli public, and to the world, every action carried out, including failures.

As opposed to the Americans, it is not necessary for Israel to add "restraint" in the use of force as a principle of war. For Israel that would be a grave error. Sometimes the need might arise, but generally speaking, a small country like Israel can deal with terrorism and guerrilla organizations only if its response is not proportional and is carried out in such a way as to convince the other side that it too has something to lose. A proportional response will drag Israel into a war of attrition whose rules will be determined by the terrorists, and which it will lose. A country like Israel can successfully cope with terrorism and guerrilla tactics only if it retains the ability to respond disproportionately; otherwise, it will find itself fighting according to the enemy's rules.

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I have given a great deal of thought as to whether the principle of "intelligence" should be added, without which it is impossible to fight terrorism, and have decided that adding it would go beyond accepted principles of war. In an article in *Maarachot*,⁽²⁵⁾ I defined the necessary conditions for fighting terrorism, one of which is intelligence. However, it is a condition and not a principle of war. In addition, I found that the British apparently also had their doubts as to whether it

was a principle or a condition, and they too came to the conclusion that it was the latter.

Conclusions

The discussion above has shown that one can essentially vanquish terror, even if it is a victory that only prevents terror from successfully implementing its plans, while it does not influence the terrorists' intentions. Victory of this type requires constant and determined effort from the moment that it is attained, for if not, conditions will revert to their former sorry state as soon as the terror organizations deem themselves strong enough.

An evaluation of the war on terrorism must address the question of the level of victory over terror that can be obtained under conditions of the battle theater – total victory, temporary victory, or sufficient victory – and how one can improve the level of victory over time. It is clear that such a discussion is relevant only if one embraces the contention that the democratic state is essentially capable of subduing the terror that menaces it.

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Six conditions have been set forth without which no military force can fight terrorism. After these conditions have been met, which is admittedly not easy, the difficult, complex, crushing, dull war, without flags and trumpets, begins: fitting together bits of intelligence information, drawing conclusions, putting into operation small forces under difficult conditions within a mixed populace of terrorists and innocent civilians in a densely-populated urban center or isolated village, and small tactical victories. The war itself must be focused on prevention, and that includes detentions and attacking the terrorist operatives who put terrorism in motion and who are the critical resource of the terrorist organizations. It is a long war with no success promised, but based on preconditions it is possible to wage it and, in the conditions of the State of Israel, absolutely necessary. The history of our success in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) since the spring of 2002 illustrates that clearly.

An examination of the IDF's principles of war in light of the needs of planning and fighting terrorist and guerrilla forces (i.e., asymmetric warfare) clearly indicates that each of the principles taken individually and as a group are vital guides to fighting this type of war.

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Israel's Security Doctrine and the Trap of "Limited Conflict" (2004)

Col. (res.) Yehuda Wegman

- The many classic examples of low-intensity conflict – in Indo-China, Malaya, Algeria, Cuba, and Northern Ireland – are irrelevant to the case of Israel. Not a single citizen in Britain, France, or the United States had his daily routine in his native country disrupted as a result of the low-intensity combat conducted by his country's army on a foreign battlefield.
- The guerilla and terror actions in Vietnam, Algeria, Ireland, Rhodesia, and other places were not directed against the very existence of the rival nation and its army.
- Something about the Western response to a strike on its population centers can be learned from the American reaction to 9/11, with its military operation directed at the heart of Afghanistan as the sender of terror. In this case, the doctrine of limited conflict was cast aside, as the "strong" side under attack undertook to summarily obliterate the "weak" attacker in accordance with the laws of war.
- In the mid-1950s, Israel was also subjected to a terrorist onslaught. The IDF's reaction was dictated by a security doctrine that led to the 1956 Sinai Campaign, a war intended to defeat the terrorist entity that had emerged in the Gaza Strip under Egyptian auspices. When it became clear to Israel's leadership that acts of retaliation were unable to halt the terror, they reached the inevitable conclusion that the only solution was a rapid military victory by conquering the territory and eliminating the instigators of the terror and their hosts.
- Suicide terrorists, though presented as ultimately insurmountable weapons, are really products of a system whose leaders value their lives, property, and reputation. Accordingly, it is the heads of the terrorist organizations who should be the main targets of attack, and not only the end products, the suicide terrorists.
- The halt in attacks by Hamas from September 2003 to January 2004 was the direct result of the threat to the lives of the group's leadership after an unceasing series of air attacks. This proved once again the validity of Israel's traditional security doctrine, that requires those in charge to apply force – the IDF – to provide defense together with achieving a decision as rapidly as possible against any type of war that may be waged against the State of Israel.

A Doctrine Inappropriate to the Israeli-Palestinian Setting

In *Jerusalem Viewpoints* #486, "Understanding the Breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations" (originally published in the IDF journal *Marachot* 383,

May 2002), Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi argues that the political process and the armed conflict being waged against Israel by the Palestinians are in effect different paths in service of the same goal: "the destruction of the Zionist enterprise." If we accept Halevi's well-reasoned assumption regarding the strategic goal of the Palestinian Authority under its current leadership, then Israel's attitude and actions against it should be entirely different from the conception currently formulated in the instruction manual *The Limited Conflict* on the subject of confronting Palestinian terror.(1) Halevi notes in his assessment that "Israel conducted the political process with the Palestinians on the basis of the conception that its dispute with them is essentially a political one."(2) This fundamental assumption has also penetrated the IDF, and led to the new doctrine known as "limited conflict."

The central problem with this doctrine is its basis in a reality and thought processes reflecting other settings, entirely dissimilar to the Israeli-Palestinian setting. Edward Luttwak, a foremost strategist of the West, stated that "in war as in peace, different national styles come to the fore...accordingly, any attempt to graft one national fighting style upon an armed conflict with another nation, with different conventions of power, weaknesses and other societal relations – usually results in failure."(3) The logic of this statement explains the serious mistakes that have plagued both the interpretation given to the objectives of the terror, and the nature of the Israeli response. The objectives of Palestinian terror have been interpreted in accordance with a system of concepts imported from settings fundamentally different from the local one, and which have inevitably created an inappropriate basis for professional thinking. The intention here is to offer a critical look at this new military doctrine and to present a few areas in which it has already failed, in the hope of stimulating a discussion of the degree of its suitability for Israel's confrontation with the Palestinians.

The Assumption that Terror Does Not Threaten Israel's Existence

The mistake in the conduct of the war against terror began when the protagonists of the political process with the PLO adopted the view that, since the Palestinians do not and will not possess tank divisions, therefore, terror does not threaten Israel's existence. According to this claim, even if the Palestinian Authority fails to alter its modes of operation and, despite the Oslo Agreements, it continues to be a terrorist entity, this does not constitute a significant danger to the State of Israel. Yet this claim is premised upon a disregard for the fact that terror is a form of war, and one that seeks to achieve a decisive outcome by using alternative tactics.

Those who are accustomed to thinking in terms of a conclusive outcome achieved by maneuvering divisions alone, have failed to understand that terrorism achieves its objectives by maneuvering public opinion into a situation where it despairs of its ability to emerge victorious. The potential damage assessments that initially dictated Israel's evaluation of the effects of terror were

minimalist underestimates. However, it is now clear that in the long term the perpetration of Palestinian terror has wrought immense cumulative damage in the social, economic, and political spheres, and that the response to terror – based on attrition – has proven to be woefully inadequate.

A more sober view of terror surfaced in a June 2000 interview in Bamahane with Maj. Gen. Amos Gilad, then Coordinator of Operations in the Territories, who stated that the purpose of the IDF's campaign was "to reduce the level of terror, which in the scope and depth of its damage has become a strategic threat, with the first signs of threatening our existence in terms of quality of life."⁽⁴⁾ This represented the first occasion in which a senior IDF officer officially conceded that Palestinian terror threatens the existence of the State of Israel. If this is indeed the nature of Palestinian terror, then continued adherence to the "limited conflict" doctrine is mistaken. As will be demonstrated, this doctrine was never intended as an answer to mortal threats. In other words, the inner logic of Halevi's analysis leads to the conclusion that as a fighting doctrine, the concept of "limited conflict" is not relevant to the conflict raging between the State of Israel and the Palestinians, and to the declared strategic aims of the Palestinian Authority.

Loss of Belief in the Ability to Win

The most disturbing phenomenon produced by the concept of a limited, low intensity conflict is expressed in the emergence of a generation characterized by pessimism regarding its ability to win. This is occasionally followed by a loss of faith in the justness of Israel's cause, self-reproach regarding what our enemies are doing to us, a loss of sensitivity to human life, and the blurring of the demand upon the state to discharge its most basic duty of protecting the lives of its citizens. All of these may be seen in the evaluations of "experts" who contend that terror cannot be overcome - a determination which means reconciliation with terror as a permanent way of life, and its conception as a natural phenomenon.

The permanent humiliation suffered by the terror victim becomes the prevailing mood, engendering more humiliation, until at the end of the process, not a single value will remain that is worth endangering one's life.⁽⁵⁾ The way becomes open to a loss of belief in the imperative of living in this particular location. From the terrorist's perspective, this is the precise mind-set which he seeks to instill in the victims of terror. Thus, in this respect, too, terror threatens the life of the State of Israel.

Limited Conflict in Other Locations

While we are often presented with comparisons between the events in Israel and the experience of other countries in similar situations, there are two central dimensions that distinguish the case of Israel from other cases, rendering these comparisons irrelevant. The differences involve the location of terrorist operations in relation to the critical assets of the state whose representatives

they target, and the overt, declared objective of the terrorists in relation to the national entity against whose control they operate.

The 1996 IDF publication *Tatzpit* deals entirely with "Low Intensity Conflict."⁽⁶⁾ This publication, together with its follow-up, "Fighting on the Lebanese Front as a Conflict between Unequal Forces,"⁽⁷⁾ figured importantly in the formulation of the doctrinal guideline known as the "Limited Conflict," issued in 2001. The *Tatzpit* issue included a number of articles and sample doctrinal guidelines, collected and translated from the professional guidelines and articles of foreign armies, reflecting those armies' experience in confronting low-intensity fighting. But none of the settings presented as reference models for the IDF bear any similarity to the setting in Israel.

For example, an article entitled "Principles of Combating Uprisings," based on the British experience, contains no references to the British response to organizations which every other week explode buses full of passengers in the center of London, leading to the total disruption of everyday life - the reality experienced by the State of Israel. The contexts are entirely different, focusing on the uprisings in Indo-China, Malaya, Algeria, Cuba, and Northern Ireland. Yet for all of these examples, there is not a single citizen in Britain, France, or the United States whose daily routine in his native country was disrupted as a result of the "low intensity" combat conducted by his country's army on a foreign battlefield. Yet they form the basis for the adoption of the limited conflict doctrine.

The Israeli case is fundamentally different from the others, given the proximity of the instigators of terror to Israel's population centers and infrastructure, as opposed to the oceans that separated the national infrastructures of France, Britain, and the United States from the fronts at which their soldiers fought. There is a world of difference between the protracted combat against guerilla forces in Vietnam or Algeria, the kind conducted by thousands of American and French soldiers while life in Washington and Paris went on as usual, and the urban terror in Israel which occasionally paralyzes entire population centers and causes immense damage to the economy and to morale.

Something about the Western response to a strike on its population centers can be learned from the American reaction to 9/11, with its military operation directed at the heart of Afghanistan as the sender of terror. In this case, the doctrine of limited conflict was cast aside, as the "strong" side under attack undertook to summarily obliterate the "weak" attacker in accordance with the laws of war. The fighting tactics used by the Americans are not those of limited conflict. The doctrine of "attrition" is a luxury that even the huge United States does not accept for its citizenry.

Israel Faces a Different Kind of Threat

Unlike the case of Israel, the guerilla and terror actions in Vietnam, Algeria, Ireland, Rhodesia, and other places were not directed against the very existence of the rival nation and its army. For example, the National Liberation Front (FLN),

which began operating in 1954 for the liberation of Algeria from French occupation, never called for the destruction of France as a national entity. The opposite is the case, with the FLN defining its objectives to include: "external contacts between France and Algeria...defined in an agreement between the two states on the basis of equality and mutual respect."(8)

In the Vietnam War, Marshall Lin Piao, who was the Chinese Minister of Defense at the time and subsequently Mao Tse-Tung's successor, indicated that he did not see his goal as destroying the United States. He said in 1965, "the members of a nation subjected to aggression are not confronting United States' imperialism in Washington and New York, in Honolulu or Florida, but are fighting for independence and freedom on their own soil."(9)

The declared aim of the communist underground active in Malaya against the British in 1948 was nothing more than to install a communist government on the peninsula, including Singapore, while "unifying the citizenry at all levels: the castes, the nationalities, the political parties, the mass organizations...against the imperialism of the United States and its lackeys."(10) Here, too, there is no trace of any opposition to the actual existence of the British people in its homeland.

The Palestinian Charter

In contrast with the goals of the struggles of the Algerians, the Vietnamese, and the Malaysians, the Palestinian Charter states quite clearly that Palestinian independence can only be attained through the destruction of the State of Israel. The Charter remains the constitutive document of the Palestinian Authority, and attests to the strategic goal of the Palestinians, which has not changed until today, despite the agreements that the PA has signed with the State of Israel. (11)

- Section 6 of the Charter: "The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians." Accordingly, all traces of independent Jewish existence are to be eliminated, not just in the territories but throughout "Palestine."
- Section 9: "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase." "Peace" is thus a tactic in the service of the realization of the overall strategy: just as in organized combat, attacks may be interspersed with periods of strategic ceasefires, intended to solidify gains and prepare for the next stage.
- Section 19: "The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the State of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time." While the United Nations is an extremely important institution for the Palestinians, its 1947 decision to establish Israel is deemed irrelevant.
- Section 22: "Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature,

aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods....The liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence...in the Middle East." Thus, the State of Israel is to be absolutely eradicated.

While a Palestinian commitment was given to change the sections of the Charter calling for Israel's destruction, the Charter still has not been changed, and adherence to it still characterizes both the Palestinian public and its leadership. According to a survey by the Palestinian Center for Journalism and Media, most Palestinians believe that the purpose of the latest uprising is not only to terminate the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza but also to destroy the State of Israel."⁽¹²⁾ The FLN, too, was characterized by fanatic loyalty to its fundamental principles,⁽¹³⁾ but, as noted, these did not include the destruction of France.

The general picture is clear: Forty years have elapsed since the formulation and drafting of principles of the Palestinian Charter, but they are still alive and intact. Apart from the policy of destruction of the Jews as a people declared by the Nazi leadership, history has yet to witness an organization like the PLO that openly declares that its national goal is the destruction of a neighboring people. These goals cannot be compared with the goals that animated other restricted conflicts, in which remote colonies attempted to shake off the yoke of their colonial rulers. The "political horizon" offered by the Palestinian Charter is positioned at precisely the same place as the horizon of the Mediterranean Sea.

Disregard for Basic Facts

Human beings are frequently disposed to ignore facts that threaten their basic assumptions. But those among us who may belittle the power of spoken and written words and their practical significance should recall the period preceding the Yom Kippur War when Sadat, the Egyptian president, declared that he was prepared to sacrifice an enormous number of soldiers for the liberation of Sinai. In Israel, his words were received with absolute disparagement.⁽¹⁴⁾ This could only have happened because our Jewish-democratic value system was and remains absolutely different from that of leaders of Sadat's ilk and his contemporaries, especially in the context of goals that justify the sacrifice of human life. Sadat intended his words to be understood literally, yet in Israel they were understood rather generously: "he doesn't really mean it," "it is impossible for a leader to act in that way," "it was a statement intended for internal consumption," etc. The results of Israel's contempt are well known, but the lesson was not learned, and we continue to understand the words of Arab leaders in accordance with a value system which is irrelevant to the subject of our interpretation.

Yehoshafat Harkabi diagnosed the situation in which "the goal of destroying a state and the purging of a national existence as a political agenda...may appear as an unreal exaggeration....Political scientists steeped in the doctrines of international relations and international law...are liable to display internal opposition to the concept that this is the objective and goal of the conflict, and

would be highly skeptical regarding the authenticity of Arab declarations expressing those goals....Similar expressions of incredulity and disregard of the goals of elimination were also very prevalent in the past in Israel."(15)

Two comments must be made regarding Harkabi's remarks. First, the writer fails to underscore the fact that the same parties who were accessories in the realization of the plan to eliminate European Jewry, or who were at least witnesses to the realization of these intentions, are now disregarding the identical intentions of the Palestinian leadership. Second, contrary to Harkabi's view, the tendency to ignore declarations of destruction made by the Palestinians is still alive and well among many Israelis.

The Limited Conflict from the Perspective of Israel's Security Doctrine

It is particularly difficult to actualize a fighting doctrine that does not derive its logic from the security doctrine of which it is a part.

While the terrorists do not use tanks and jets, the negative effect of their actions on public morale is more damaging than the aggregate effect of all the past wars. We must, therefore, relate to their actions as a war for all intents and purposes. Once the other side understood its general weakness in a full-scale war, it changed the character of the fighting, conferring it the character of a limited, protracted and draining military confrontation, hoping to achieve his objective which had remained unchanged: the destruction of the entire Zionist enterprise.

Terror, by definition, does not attempt to engage an entire army. Its objective is attained when the terrorist outflanks the security forces and spears the soft spot of public morale among the civilian population. As opposed to other kinds of war, the collapse preceding the realization of its objective does not begin at the battlefield, progressing backwards into the civilian hinterland. Its source is the home front, in the citizens who have lost their confidence in the ability of the army, which they have come to view as a body incapable of providing them with personal security.

For the State of Israel to be capable of dealing with intensive, prolonged fighting of the kind dictated by the doctrine of limited conflict, there must be a fundamental change in its basic assumptions - those which produced its traditional security doctrine, the main thrust of which was to avoid a protracted war. Now, according to the basic conceptions of its local perpetrators, terror is a tool utilized in a full-scale war; it is, therefore, a mistake of major dimensions to continue to treat terror as something "non-war" and, as a result, to relate to it in terms that make no mention of a rapid decision.

The doctrine of the limited conflict states that, unlike the wars of the past, this time Israel is fated to wage a protracted war, as if it was a superpower like the United States, Britain, or France, that waged remote, protracted, conventional wars that invariably ended with their withdrawal from the battlefield. This kind of fighting is referred to as a war of attrition, and is the ideological backbone of the

limited conflict doctrine. However, this concept absolutely contradicts the basic assumptions of the traditional Israeli security doctrine, which eschews any possibility of prolonged fighting due to Israel's endemic shortage of resources, both human and material. Adoption of the attrition doctrine means shelving Israel's traditional security doctrine.

A rapid decision not only prevents loss of life, it also forestalls the severe economic impact of a protracted war.(16) Since the outbreak of the current fighting, at the end of September 2000, the Israeli economy has paid a heavy price. Instead of an annual growth rate of 4 percent, the economy contracted at a rate of 1 percent per year, a loss valued at about 45 billion shekels in the first two years alone.

The historical connection between a war's battlefield and its economic cost was researched by the economist Bryan Caplan, who concluded that a "local" war causes significant economic damage to the state involved, while a "distant" war usually stimulates economic growth of the state whose soldiers are fighting abroad.(17) Thus, the immediate conclusion of Israel's "local" war is imperative as well because of the serious economic and social implications of the continued confrontation.

In the mid-1950s, Israel was also subjected to a terrorist onslaught. The IDF's reaction was dictated by a security doctrine that led to the 1956 Sinai Campaign, a war intended to defeat the terrorist entity that had emerged in the Gaza Strip under Egyptian auspices. When it became clear to Israel's leadership that acts of retaliation were unable to halt the terror, they reached the inevitable conclusion that the only solution was a rapid military victory by conquering the territory and eliminating the instigators of the terror and their hosts.

A Politician Who is a Terrorist and the Reverse

The division of Palestinians between "political" and "military" wings is another perspective totally divorced from the conceptual world of the subjects of such an interpretation. It has produced a situation in which the first group enjoys immunity from harm, because they are not perceived as instigators of violence. Yet an examination of the structure and organization of underground movements like the PLO, which since its very inception has been run along the lines of a communist resistance movement, indicates that the violence is orchestrated by both the political and military wings. According to Robert Thompson, those belonging to the political wing are responsible for terror and sabotage, whereas the military wing oversees guerilla activities, such as ambushes and attacks.(18) It is not by chance that the head of the political wing of the Palestinian Authority continues to wear his military uniform, and it is similarly not surprising that many of those who instigate terror have never worn battle fatigues.(19)

A Military Solution

It is more than disturbing that a military doctrine has been created which is based primarily on confrontational conceptions that are convenient exclusively for the other side. The doctrine of limited conflict creates precisely the combat reality that the enemy expects and desires as a means for our defeat. For this reason, it involves - though obviously not intentionally - elements that strengthen the enemy.

As noted, according to the doctrine of limited conflict, a decision is achieved through "protracted attrition."⁽²⁰⁾ This doctrine further states that "limited conflict is political in terms of the nature of its means and not only in terms of its objectives and constraints, and that as a result, the form of military action will be dictated directly by the political consideration." From the moment that the State of Israel and the IDF determine that the aim is a political victory, while the enemy keeps striving for a victory based on brute force, we have become the victims of conceptual confusion, one which harnesses and adjusts the use of force in accordance with political restrictions and considerations that make military victory impossible.

A similar situation emerged during the period between November 29, 1947 - after the adoption of the UN Partition Resolution - and March 1948, when political considerations prevented the Hagana, which was numerically and qualitatively superior to the combined Arab forces in Mandatory Palestine, from attacking areas that were under Arab control. Instead, the Hagana was only able to attempt to open roads to besieged Israeli towns and villages. In this "Battle for the Roads," political constraints forced the Hagana to operate along a battlefield about as broad as the front bumper of an armored car. By March 1948 this crisis had culminated in the loss of 1,200 lives, Arab bands were in control of all major arteries of transportation, and remote Jewish settlement blocs were cut off and isolated.

In a practical expression of the final disenchantment with diplomacy's ability to resolve the conflict through superpower intervention and the forced implementation of a political solution, Operations Head Yigal Yadin wrote to David Ben-Gurion in 1948, under the heading, "Summary of the Combat Situation": "It must be determined that all the stages of the fighting until now have been dictated to us by the enemy, and we have not been able to influence the strategic-operative course of the fighting, which has been characterized by its development from an uprising into a war between two semi-regular forces. The only solution is for us to take the operative initiative in an attempt to defeat the enemy militarily."⁽²¹⁾ To Ben-Gurion's credit, it must be said that even though he had long adhered to the doctrine of a political solution, and there are those who claim that in doing so he prevented preparations for an overall conscription of forces with a view toward a military victory, he nonetheless reassessed the situation and changed his conception, thus paving the way for the change which began with Operation Nachshon against the Arab forces controlling the road to Jerusalem.

As opposed to the example of 1948, today the IDF is contributing to the entrenchment of the political approach. The establishment of a new fighting principle in the image of "protracted attrition" is the antithesis of Israel's overall security doctrine, given that it is premised on the absence of any resolution of the war. It also ignores the fact that the Palestinian strategy of terror is intended to bring about Israel's total defeat. Have the policymakers once again fallen prey to the hubris of underestimating the enemy, as occurred in the Yom Kippur War?

The idea of the impossibility of a rapid decision seeks to base itself on the distinction between "war" and "limited conflict."⁽²²⁾ In assuming the existence of such a distinction, it ignores the fact that reaching a decision, as in any war, is also the prime motivation of terror, especially as implemented by the Palestinians. Believing that "the terror is not a threat to our existence" leads to: "the terror is not bent on victory," which subsequently translates into: "terror is not war." As a result, the attitude to terror differs from that adopted with respect to war, in which, according to Israel's traditional security doctrine, a rapid decision is required.

The desire for a decision is generally confronted by deterrence; in other words, the side intending to attack and force a decision does not actualize his intentions due to his recognition of the damage his side will incur should he attack. Suicide terrorists, though presented as ultimately insurmountable weapons, are really products of a system whose leaders value their lives, property, and reputation. Accordingly, it is the heads of the terrorist organizations who should be the main targets of attack, and not only the end products, the suicide terrorists. The defeat of terror would become possible by physically eliminating its ability to finance, enlist, organize, and transport terrorists. In other words, instead of operating according to the principle of "attrition," operations should be conducted in accordance with the old principles of initiative and aggressiveness, which will lead to full and ongoing control of the territory. Only the implementation of these principles will enable the identification and elimination of the organization and its leaders, producers of terror, including those masquerading as "statesmen."

In his book *Government and Rebellion*, Robert Thompson discusses the concept of "quashing rebellion." The expression implies that the initiative is exclusively in the hands of the enemy and that the government's role is only to respond to it and frustrate its continuation.⁽²³⁾

All of the facts indicate that the doctrine of limited conflict is particularly convenient for the enemy, but it is not appropriate for the State of Israel. The concept of "protracted attrition" will enter the history books together with the conception of "stopping the enemy on the ceasefire lines" prior to 1973.⁽²⁴⁾ The claim that "there is no solution to terror," which is the basis for the current, prolonged, decisionless attrition, endangers the continued existence of the State of Israel. The doctrine of limited conflict draws its concepts from places in which the nation in control of distant foreign territory could consider whether to retain its control, and when the damage liable to be caused as a result of its forfeiture of control was negligible. However, as opposed to other places and cases, the terror launched against the State of Israel entails that it be treated like any other

war, which requires a quick decision.

According to my understanding, there is no problem that a particular group of people created, which cannot be solved by another group of people. The only difference is in the level of determination, cunning, and strength one is prepared to enlist. The Palestinians, Hizballah, and others have understood that when the State of Israel decides to engage in a war of higher intensity, even without utilizing its total capacity, then terror - wherever it reigns, however strong it is - cannot stand up to the strength of the IDF.(25) After more than three years of combat following the doctrine of limited conflict, it has been proven that a "high intensity" response is the answer to terror.

According to the principles outlined in Israel's "Battle Doctrine," the first rule of war is aggressiveness. The initiative must be taken away from the unorganized force, which must be forced to go on the defensive and must be relentlessly pursued. The fundamental principle in fighting against irregular forces is to strike at them and eliminate them before they go into action.(26)

Steps Toward the Return of Israel's Traditional Security Doctrine

Unlike the senior IDF commanders, who at the instruction of the political echelon dealt primarily with "easing the conflict" and the search for a return to negotiations, it was the brigade commanders who proved that it was possible to achieve a military decision in those places that were thought to require a heavy price in blood. The conquest of the Balata refugee camp near Nablus by the Paratroop brigade in February 2002 and the capture of the Jenin refugee camp two days later by the Golani brigade, both with minimal losses, brought about the beginning of a change in the concept created by the idea of "limited conflict" and the ability to subdue terror militarily.

These successes paved the way for Operation Defensive Shield that began a week later in the wake of the terrorist attack on a Passover Seder at the Park Hotel in Netanya. During the first year and a half after the outbreak of terrorist violence in September 2000, the IDF did not deal with the possibility of subduing terror, as required of a military organization. The "professional" explanation was the concept of a "limited conflict" that in its essence was not to lead to a military decision.

However, the takeover of refugee camps and partial control of the Mukata compound in Ramallah were only the first barriers to be overcome. The next barrier was the concept that saw a separation between the political echelon – those who produced the terror – who were not to be hurt, in the interest of seeking negotiations at any price, and the operational echelon, that provided a very limited target. This barrier was only crossed in June 2003, when a missile was fired unsuccessfully at Hamas spokesman Rantisi. After a brief pause in attacks by the group, Hamas returned to the attack after the military pressure against its leaders eased.

At this point the connection between the threat to the head of the snake and its

body became clear even to previous skeptics. This recognition led in September 2003 to a temporary shaking off of the rules of attrition, with an unceasing series of additional air attacks on Hamas, including the bombing of a building in which the group's leadership were meeting, and bombings within Syria of a terrorist training base. The result was that the Hamas leadership went underground and their attacks ended.

In mid-November 2003, Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad, then a senior advisor to Israel's minister of defense, warned that "Hamas is under pressure since we attacked its leadership, that for a long time was mistakenly thought to be political, though it is known that there is no difference." (27) However, the pressure was again eased, and three months later, a Hamas spokesman told a mass open meeting in the presence of all its leaders – clearly an ideal target – that he intended to renew attacks of mass murder. (28) Not surprisingly, the lack of continued pressure on the Hamas leadership resulted in the bombing of a Jerusalem bus in January 2004.

It seems that the passion of those who send terror bombers off to their deaths disappears when the subject becomes their own lives. The gains that resulted from the air attacks on the Hamas leadership proved, once again, that under conditions of war it is necessary to act according to the principles of war, such as "concentration of effort" with "repetition and continuation," together with "actions aimed at a clear target."

The development of a new attitude by an organization that has chosen violence as its sole method of operation cannot come about through political negotiations with it, accompanied by "signals" that largely involve blowing up empty houses, imposing closures, and closing border crossings. All these actions are of little benefit because they present no threat to the center of gravity of the terror – the leadership.

The halt in attacks by Hamas from September 2003 to January 2004 was the direct result of the threat to the lives of its leadership, together with the construction of a defensible physical barrier in the form of the security fence. This situation stood in direct contradiction to the concept of attrition, which had guided the thought and actions of the heads of the security services and the IDF up to that point.

This situation is bitter proof once again of the validity of Israel's traditional security doctrine, that requires those in charge to apply force – the IDF – to provide defense together with achieving a decision as rapidly as possible against any type of war that may be waged against the State of Israel. True, the methods of action are different, and the restrictions, such as fighting in a civilian area full of media and everything that results from this, are more serious. But the necessity of having the IDF able to bring about a military decision in every type of war remains as valid as ever.

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Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank (2004)

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Doron Almog

- As part of the implementation of Oslo, Israel gave up 80 percent of Gaza on May 18, 1994. When we talk about disengagement from Gaza, this means withdrawal from the remaining 20 percent of the area.
- During my time as Commander of Southern Command in the years 2000-2003, there were more than 400 attempts by Palestinians to cross into Israel, all of which failed.
- Together with rebuilding the fence, a key security element was the creation of a one-kilometer security buffer zone. In addition, we constructed high technology observation posts that enabled soldiers to monitor about six kilometers - day and night, and we provided the troops with new rules of engagement regarding anyone approaching this area.
- We have stopped about 30 percent of hostile actions near the fence and 70 percent inside the territory through offensive actions. In addition to the fence, we must continue to gather intelligence throughout the territories in order to be able to intercept Palestinian terrorists.
- As the fence prevented terrorists from leaving Gaza, they decided to change tactics – developing rockets and initiating focused attacks on Israeli settlements. When we finish the fence around the West Bank, the Palestinian terrorism model may change there as well and follow the same pattern.

A War that Targets Israel's Cities

Since September 2000, Israel has lost 1,020 people in the war against Palestinian terrorism. This is the first war where the price in civilian life is so high, and where most of those killed have been in our cities, in the heartland of Israel. The decision to build a security fence in the West Bank is, first of all, a security statement, a statement that the Israeli government will do all that is necessary in order to protect human life in Israel.

As a Gaza Strip division commander between 1994 and 1996, I was involved in building the fence separating Gaza from Israel. I was also present at the start of the implementation of the Oslo peace accords, and was the first Israeli commander to welcome Arafat on July 1, 1994, when he came to Gaza from Egypt.

As part of the implementation of Oslo, Israel gave up 80 percent of the Gaza Strip. Since May 18, 1994, a little before Arafat's arrival, Israeli troops have been

deployed in only 20 percent of the Gaza Strip. So when we talk about disengagement from Gaza, this does not mean from the whole of the Gaza Strip, but only from the remaining 20 percent of the area.

Palestinians Dismantle the Fence

Israel built a 60-kilometer fence around the Gaza Strip shortly after the implementation of Oslo, and we lost most of it at the beginning of the latest intifada. The intifada began on September 28, 2000. By December, during my first tour of Gaza as Commander of Southern Command, I found that Palestinians had dismantled most of the fence. At the same time, the IDF was receiving between 10 and 30 intelligence alerts a day about terrorists seeking to cross into Israel in order to attack and murder Israelis, at first by planting detonation charges and later using suicide bombers.

During my time as Commander of Southern Command in the years 2000-2003, there were more than 400 attempts by Palestinians to cross the boundaries of the Gaza Strip, all of which failed. There are a number of key reasons for this:

- Our first move was to rebuild the fence, which took six months from December 2000 to June 2001.
- Together with the fence, a key security element was the creation of a one-kilometer security buffer zone. Sometimes there were orchards that allowed the terrorists to get within 50 meters of the fence without being spotted. The only way to face our intelligence alerts effectively was to remove the trees to allow clearer observation.
- In addition, we constructed high technology observation posts that enabled soldiers to monitor about six kilometers - day and night, and we provided the troops with new rules of engagement regarding anyone approaching this area.

The experience gained by the IDF's Southern Command in the Gaza Strip is the basis for our efforts to implement the new fence in the West Bank. Geographically, the West Bank is different from the Gaza Strip, but from a professional perspective it presents the same problem, even though the West Bank is hilly and is ten times larger than Gaza.

We have stopped about 30 percent of hostile actions near the fence and 70 percent inside the territory through offensive actions. We await the formation of a strong Palestinian Authority that is willing to fight terrorism and dismantle the terrorist organizations inside the territories.

Rafiah on the Egyptian border is distinguished by tunneling. When I was Commander of Southern Command, the IDF destroyed more than 100 tunnels along the 4 kilometers of Rafiah. The smuggling phenomenon started with the implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord. One of the conditions set by President Sadat was cutting the town of Rafiah into two so that part of it would stay Egyptian and part would be under Israeli control. Since the border corridor

there is extremely narrow, the reaction time for Israeli troops is very short. We use advanced technology to find and destroy the tunnels, but the problem still continues.

The establishment of a fence and the new technology around the Gaza Strip has also allowed us to monitor and photograph incidents, allowing the IDF to do what is known as an After-Action Review, to enable us to ask ourselves tough questions about the behavior of the soldiers and the commanders in the field.

Changing Terrorist Tactics

As the fence prevented terrorists from leaving Gaza, they decided to change tactics - developing rockets and the use of huge explosive charges inside the Gaza Strip. They also initiated focused attacks on Israeli settlements. When we finish building the fence around the West Bank, the Palestinian terrorism model may change there as well and follow the same pattern.

What we have learned from our experience in the Gaza Strip is that it is necessary to continue building the fence around the West Bank. In the first eleven months of 2004, there has been a sharp decline in terrorist successes, but not because they are not trying. Every month there are between five and thirty attempts to launch suicide bombers at the heart of Israel.

It is important that we also create a security buffer zone. If we allow the Palestinians to cultivate land up to the fence without such a buffer zone, we allow the terrorists a place from which they can launch future attacks. Finally, in addition to constructing the fence, we must continue to gather intelligence throughout the territories in order to be better able to intercept Palestinian terrorists attempting to kill Israelis.

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The Strategic Logic of Israel's Security Barrier (2006)

Col. (Res.) Danny Tirza

The IDF's Chief Architect for the Security Fence

- The main reason for the delay in building the security fence was because the line of the fence was a major issue of political debate inside Israel. The government didn't want to build it, out of concern that any line on the ground would have a political meaning in future negotiations. In all government decisions it was emphasized that the line the army was building was only a *security line* and it would not be the line for future negotiations.

- We had to consider Israel's security needs, and also the rights of the people who live in the area in order to minimize the disruption of their lives. Israel's Supreme Court said we had to give greater weight to the daily life of the Palestinians, so we changed the route in some places, and in other places we changed the procedures that enable people to cross from one side of the fence to the other.
- Ben-Gurion International Airport is only eleven kilometers from the "green line," and Israel has real concerns over the potential threat of missiles launched against aircraft. Al-Qaeda tried to shoot down an Israeli Arkia aircraft with a missile in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 and it was a miracle that nobody was killed at that time.
- Due to weather conditions, there are seventy days a year when aircraft flying in and out of Israel must fly above the West Bank. We wanted to build a double fence in the area near the airport in order to secure it from missiles, but there are 19,000 Palestinians living in this area and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Israel could not leave people to live in enclaves.
- Why wasn't the fence built on the "green line" - the 1949 ceasefire line? From a security perspective, mountains dominate valleys. To provide security, Israel must control the high ground in order to dominate the area and not have others dominate us. The "green line" leaves Israel in a fragile security situation.

The Debate Over Where to Build the Fence

The government of Israel took a decision to build a fence between the West Bank and Israel in 1996, but its construction was delayed, first of all, because of the costs involved. At the time, the project was expected to cost about 2 billion shekels; today we know that it will cost about 10 billion shekels - about \$2 billion.

But the main reason for the delay involved the political implications of the route of the fence. Some Israelis believe that the fence should be built along the Jordan River between Jordan and Israel. Others believe that the fence should be built along the "green line" - what had been the border between Israel and Jordan between 1949 and 1967. Still others believe the fence should run inside Israel and separate Israeli Arabs who live near the fence from Israel. There are also those who believe it should run deep inside the West Bank and include most of the settlements. There is a big debate going on about where the line should be, and initially the government took no decision, trying to stay away from the debate.

At the end of September 2000, the Palestinians started a campaign of violence against Israel that resulted in the murder of 1,148 people, most of them civilians, in acts of terror committed inside Israel. It was very easy for terrorists to pass from the West Bank to Israel because there were no natural or man-made obstacles to stop them. The terror acts mounted until Israel saw 139 people

murdered in one month, in March 2002. The public pressed the government to build a barrier between Israelis and Palestinians, and although the government didn't want to do it, out of concern that any line on the ground would have a political meaning in future negotiations, it was forced by public opinion to build the fence.

The government ordered the army to find a route for the fence between Israel and the West Bank that would stop the terror but would not be a political border. In all the government decisions it was emphasized that the line the army was building was only a security line and it would not be the line for future negotiations. The line of the fence is not going to set the borders of Israel. We understand that at the end of the day the only line will be the one agreed upon by the two sides.

Major Concerns to Protect Palestinian Rights

In drawing the line of the fence, we had to consider Israel's security needs, and also the rights of the people who live in the area in order to minimize the disruption of their lives. We did not just draw lines on a map. We went out with the commanders and the village heads to find the right line on the ground.

After we had built 145 kilometers of fence, Israel's Supreme Court instructed us to give greater weight to the daily life of the Palestinians. So we changed the route of the fence in some places, and in other places we changed the procedures that enable people to cross from one side of the fence to the other. The Supreme Court ruled that Israel has the right to build a fence to defend its population, but we cannot take all the land that we want for the sake of security. There has to be a balance of security and humanitarian concerns, taking into account the needs of those most affected by the fence.

In urban areas where there is not enough space, we are building a concrete wall, but the wall is only 5 percent of the total project, which will be about 726 kilometers long. We also understand that we have to take the needs of people into consideration, and we sometimes have to build new roads for the villagers. At the end of the project there will be fewer than 7,000 people with Palestinian IDs on the Israeli side of the fence, but there will be a lot of Israelis living east of the fence.

The army is seizing the land for the fence only temporarily. The owners will receive compensation annually for the use of the land, and we try to build on public land wherever possible. We have also replanted more than 90,000 trees in the area to try to minimize the damage to local farmers. Israel is not fighting against the Palestinian people; we are fighting the terror organizations.

Protecting Jerusalem

In Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, 423 people were killed and about 6,000 were wounded in terror acts. The line of the fence in Jerusalem follows largely the

municipal boundaries. It will have eleven terminals for people to cross. One terminal is already working between Bethlehem and Jerusalem. It looks like an airport terminal and people can cross from one side to the other in minutes.

We have also provided services for people living east of the fence. In one place we gave land for a school so pupils won't have to cross a checkpoint every day. In other places we have to build clinics so the population won't have to cross into Jerusalem. We deal with these questions every day, everywhere along the fence.

Protecting Israel's International Airport

Ben-Gurion International Airport is only eleven kilometers from the "green line," and Israel has real concerns over the potential threat of missiles launched against aircraft. Al-Qaeda tried to shoot down an Israeli Arkia aircraft with a missile in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 and they missed. It was a miracle that nobody was killed at that time.

In Israel, all the aircraft come from the west and land from west to east, then take off from east to west over the Mediterranean Sea. But due to weather conditions, there are seventy days a year when the aircraft must fly in the opposite direction, above the West Bank. We wanted to build a double fence in the area near the airport in order to secure it from missiles, but there are 19,000 Palestinians living in this area. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice saw the maps and said Israel could not cause people to live in enclaves, so the government decided not to build a double fence in this area at this time.

Route 443 is the only alternative road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, in addition to Route 1 - the main road. But we had to consider the 47,000 Palestinians living west of the road, and we will have to find ways to defend this road without creating an enclave.

Some Israeli political leaders wanted to build an additional security fence to the east, between the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, because we believe the Jordan Valley is a strategic area that Israel needs to control. But the way to accomplish this is not by building a fence. The fence is solely a defensive issue and is not a way to claim land.

Israel is building a security fence in order to defend itself. Its route reflects a balance between security and humanitarian considerations. We look forward to a future when there will be no need for such measures. We will be glad to tear down the fences and live in peace with our neighbors. But until that time comes, we are determined to carry through with this defensive project.

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The Influence of Christian Interests in Setting the Route of the

Security Fence in Jerusalem

(2008)

Col. (res.) Danny Tirza

- In September 2000, the Palestinian leadership initiated a terror campaign against the Israeli civilian population. From September 2000 to March 2005, 99 suicide bombings were perpetrated against Israel, in which 1,804 Israelis were killed. In Jerusalem, 30 suicide attacks killed 378 Israelis and wounded 1,600. Since that time, no Palestinian Authority force has dismantled the operational capabilities of the terrorist organizations.
- In March 2002, after the mass murder of civilians gathered for the Passover Seder meal at a Netanya hotel, the government of Israel decided to take control over the West Bank as well as taking a defensive measure to block terrorists from reaching Israeli population centers. This meant establishing a physical obstacle and transit points that would permit proper security checks for those passing through. Even Israel's worst enemies confessed that the security fence saved Israeli lives.
- Jerusalem's sanctity for Christianity and its historic and religious sites bring to the city hundreds of thousands of Christian pilgrims every year. The Christian communities residing in the city have established communal centers, educational institutions, hospitals, and guesthouses. Aside from monasteries and holy places, scores of Christian institutions that operate in Jerusalem have come to assist the local Muslim community in the context of their charitable work.
- Great efforts were invested and solutions were provided to meet the unique needs of the Christian churches in the region to guarantee freedom of religion and religious observance, and free access to holy places. For institutions located on the seam line, decisions were necessary regarding the exact line of the fence and suitable passage arrangements. Thus, for example, the Rosary Sisters school in the Dachyat El Barid neighborhood north of Jerusalem, that serves 1,200 students from Jerusalem, was included on the Israeli side of the fence, in light of requests from the Mother Superior of the order, despite the vast attendant security difficulties.
- With the intensification of Palestinian terror attacks against Israel and the weakening of central Palestinian rule, extreme Muslim forces have gathered strength and violence towards Christian communities has intensified within the Palestinian Authority in Bethlehem, Beit Jalla, Beit Sahur, and Azariya. The result is that an appreciable portion of the Christian population has abandoned the region and taken up residence abroad. Harassment of Christians has also taken the form of land and property seizures and even damage to churches and holy sites.
- The establishment of the security fence was a vital measure for the security of Israel's citizens and those members of all faiths visiting Israel.

Only when visitors to Jerusalem enjoy a sense of security can there be normal life, religious observance, and pilgrimage to the holy sites.

The war that the Palestinian terrorist organizations imposed on Israel in the year 2000 claimed hundreds of dead and thousands of wounded in Israeli population centers. As part of the measures that the government of Israel adopted in order to check the terror waves, it was decided in June 2002 to establish a security fence between the West Bank and Israel. Together with guaranteeing the fence's security effectiveness, the fence's planners were called upon to provide a response to a series of challenges that emanated from the potential impact of the fence on the everyday lives of the Palestinian civilian population. This required the design of the fence to provide a response to the unique needs of Christian churches and individuals.

In this document the person who headed the military administration that planned the fence describes the challenges, the process and response to the needs of Christian institutions in Jerusalem.

Prologue

In June 2000 a peace conference convened at Camp David, Maryland, with the declared objective of achieving an historic peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. After sixteen days of dramatic deliberations, it became clear that the conference was a failure; President Bill Clinton accused Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat of inflexibility and an unwillingness to reach an agreement.

The Palestinian leadership, having understood that it would be impossible to achieve its political goals via diplomacy, elected to initiate a terror campaign against the Israeli civilian population with a view toward pressuring the Israeli government and attaining additional gains.

From September 2000 to March 2005, hundreds of terror attacks against Israel were perpetrated, including 99 suicide bombings in which 1,804 Israelis were killed. In Jerusalem, 30 suicide attacks were carried out in which 378 Israelis were killed and about 1,600 were wounded.⁽¹⁾ Free access to Israel from the West Bank allowed the terror organizations, headed by the Tanzim organization of the ruling Fatah party and the military wing of the extreme Islamic organization Hamas, to dispatch scores of suicide bombers to the heart of Israel's civilian population.

For its part, the Israeli government adopted a series of military actions to check the Palestinian terror wave by locating, striking, and neutralizing the terror infrastructure in the Palestinian cities, hampering terrorist movement from the Palestinian cities to Israeli civilian centers, and guarding population centers. This was alongside repeated attempts at diplomatic measures via American mediation to halt the murderous terror activities.

In March 2002 alone, 139 Israelis were murdered in a series of terrorist attacks whose nadir was a mass murder of civilians gathered for the Passover Seder meal at a Netanya hotel.

Under heavy public pressure, the government of Israel decided to take control over the area of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and assume security responsibility for the entire area as well as taking a defensive measure to block terrorists from reaching Israeli population centers. This meant establishing a physical obstacle and transit points that would permit proper security checks for those passing through the transit points.

In its desire to refrain from setting a line that would constitute a precedent for a boundary in future political arrangements and seeking to limit the political debate over the suitable line, the government decided to charge the security bodies with delineating the line of the fence employing purely security considerations. The government declared that the fence to be erected would be a temporary fence.

In September 2002 following a suicide bombing attack on a student bus in Jerusalem, the government decided to establish a security fence around Jerusalem as well.

The first 130 kilometers of the security fence were completed in August 2003 in the northern West Bank. From September 2000 through July 2003, there were 73 major Palestinian terror operations involving suicide attacks or car bombs launched from Samaria, the region of the West Bank north of Jerusalem. These attacks led to the deaths of 293 Israelis and the injury of 1,950.

But in this same sector, after the security fence was completed, there were only five major Palestinian terror attacks, leading to the killing of 28 Israelis and the injuring of 31, during the following year. This fence unquestionably demonstrated that it could produce a sharp reduction in the number of Israeli fatalities, even though it was only partly erected.(2) Moreover, the leadership of Hamas has admitted that Israel's security fence makes suicide bombings more difficult to carry out. Mousa Abu Marzouq, deputy chairman of Hamas' Political Bureau, made this admission on the Muslim Brotherhood website on June 2, 2007.(3) The leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Ramadan Shalah, made the same admission in a Qatari newspaper on March 23, 2008.(4) Thus, even Israel's worst enemies confessed that the security fence saved Israeli lives.

Setting the Contours of the Fence in Jerusalem

The city of Jerusalem, the historic capital of the Jewish people and the object of their religious and national aspirations for 3,000 years, also encompasses religious sites sacred to Christianity and Islam and stands at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, any change in the status quo within the city touches off international reverberations as well as protests among the Palestinians and in the Arab world that escape all proportion. Since Jerusalem is at the heart of the conflict, any changes require extraordinary sensitivity.

The terror organizations exploit the physical proximity between the Palestinian villages in the West Bank that surround the city and the Arab neighborhoods within the city that form a single urban continuum with the Jewish neighborhoods, to infiltrate terrorists via Jerusalem into Israel.

Attempts to close off this "security loophole" without establishing a physical barrier failed, despite the stationing of large military and police forces and the use of sophisticated technological equipment.

The planners of the security barrier confronted three alternatives:

1. Separation between the Jewish and Arab neighborhoods in the city. This line was ruled out for both security and diplomatic considerations. In addition, the democratic character of the state would not allow a division between residents on the basis of ethnicity.
2. Following Jerusalem's municipal boundary. This alternative was ruled out both due to security considerations as well as considerations involving the texture of life, since the line would bisect houses, neighborhoods, and traffic arteries.
3. Deploying obstacles and security arrangements along a line accompanying the municipal boundary, while providing adjustments in accordance with topography, security considerations, and the texture of the population's life, while limiting the damage to privately-owned land.

A team headed by the author, together with representatives from the various security bodies, the Civil Administration, the Jerusalem municipality, and other experts, engaged in the complex planning of the barrier route. At the same time, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon entrusted then-Trade and Industry Minister Ehud Olmert with coordinating an inter-ministerial team of agency directors-general to study and solve the civilian problems stemming from the establishment of the fence and the security separation.

Christian Interests in the "Jerusalem Perimeter"

The State of Israel - as a democratic state and the state of the Jewish people, who have suffered during the course of history from persecutions and restrictions on religious observance - is especially sensitive to freedom of religious observance for members of all faiths.

Jerusalem's sanctity for Christianity and its historic and religious sites bring to the city hundreds of thousands of Christian pilgrims every year. Beyond the boundaries of the "Old City" are scores of holy sites attached to churches and various religious orders. Certain churches have property and lands that they have retained for many years. The Christian communities residing in the city are concentrated in specific areas and have established communal centers, educational institutions, hospitals, and guesthouses. Most of these communities have close connections the religious and administrative centers in the heart of the Old City.

Aside from monasteries and holy places, scores of Christian institutions that operate in Jerusalem have come to assist the local Muslim community in the context of their charitable work.

With the intensification of Palestinian terror attacks against Israel and the weakening of central Palestinian rule, extreme Muslim forces have gathered strength and violence towards Christian communities has intensified within the Palestinian Authority in Bethlehem, Beit Jalla, Beit Sahur, and Azariya. The result is that an appreciable portion of the Christian population has abandoned the region and taken up residence abroad. Harassment of Christians has also taken the form of land and property seizures and even damage to churches and holy sites.

Christian interests in Jerusalem include access to and from Bethlehem and other sites, freedom of religious observance at the various sites, the option of staging parades and religious ceremonies, the personal security of clergy and visitors, preservation of church property, and maintenance of ties with the Christian population and the target populations of their institutions.

Planning also had to take additional considerations into account. The State of Israel and the Vatican have signed a convention to preserve freedom of religious observance and the property of churches affiliated with the Vatican. The planning of the route for the security barrier obligated the planners to strike a balance between security considerations and other needs and the rights of local residents. Finally, given the democratic norm of equality before the law, one could not extend rights and preferences to the Christian population over the Muslim population on a religious basis.

The Apparatus of Israeli-Christian Contacts

Israeli Civil Administration personnel in the field are in charge of contacts with local church bodies in the West Bank. The adviser on Christianity to Jerusalem's mayor is in direct contact with the churches and the various religious streams within the city's municipal boundaries. The Department for Religions in the Foreign Ministry is in charge of ties with church organizations in Israel and worldwide. Each of the churches has liaison with foreign countries and these countries' representatives make applications in their name to Israel via the Foreign Ministry. There is no overarching body that coordinates and organizes the various Christian bodies.

During our work we became aware of the need to handle three strata in each and every institution: the local stratum - clergymen living in the area and operating the various sites; the regional stratum - the organizational body in Israel; and the international stratum - the parent church body or the country that extends its aegis over the church.

The various strata broadcast differing and sometimes even contradictory interests. For example, while clergymen who live in the immediate area emphasize the connection to the community, the heads of the organization in Israel emphasize their apprehension over damage to property, and the heads of the organization and countries extending protection emphasize freedom of access and worship.

A special factor of utmost importance in preserving the interests of the church in various communities was the former Papal Nuncio, Pietro Sambri, who served as the Vatican ambassador to Israel and as the official in charge of Catholic Church property. Despite his opposition in principle to the security fence, he established direct contact with the head of the fence administration and with the Foreign Ministry, facilitated locating the responsible and authoritative elements in each of the churches, and helped us understand their unique needs and problems.

Israel's predominant interest was to block the path of suicide terrorists as speedily as possible, while doing minimal injury to local residents, their property, and their way of life. This occurred at a time that the terror organizations were using every means in order to strike at innocent Israelis. In April 2002, a group of Palestinian terrorists from the Fatah organization barricaded themselves in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, profaning this most holy Christian site, humiliating the clergy who resided there, and desecrating its sacred vessels. Israel refrained from entering the site and, following forty days of negotiations, permitted the terrorists to leave Israel for exile abroad.

The Tie between Jerusalem and Bethlehem

Many Christians reside in the West Bank towns of Bethlehem, Beit Jalla, and Beit Sahur, whose residents and clergymen had enjoyed daily contact with nearby Jerusalem. These towns were transferred to the full responsibility of the Palestinian Authority in accordance with the interim agreements signed between Israel and the PLO in September 1995 under the sponsorship of the United States.

With the opening of the terror war there was an urgent need to block free passage from the West Bank to Jerusalem. Nevertheless, despite the severe security situation, Israel issued periodic passage permits to Christian clergy, Muslim workers in the churches, and to church-affiliated medical staff. On Christian holidays, entry permits to Israel were issued to entire communities.

A suggestion to leave the Christian towns on the Israeli side of the security fence proved extremely impractical, as it would have meant incorporating within Israel tens of thousands of Muslim Palestinians living in these towns and adjacent areas, some of whom were hostile to Israel.

In order to facilitate the continued rapid passage, amidst security checks, of believers, pilgrims, and clergymen between the Bethlehem area and Jerusalem, a modern passenger terminal was erected to respond to civilian needs day and night at a very high standard of service and security. The site was planned to allow an increased traffic flow during the Christian holidays and on the days that the various Christian communities mark Christmas. The maximum waiting time for travelers during peak hours does not exceed thirty minutes. Israel Police, Civil Administration, and Ministry of Tourism representatives are present in the terminal to ease passage and provide answers to exceptional problems.

In general, passage between Jerusalem and Bethlehem is free, while maintaining

suitable security checks. This passage is closed to traffic only for brief and rare periods as a result of terror attacks or when a severe security alert is issued that such attacks are imminent.

Freedom of Religious Observance and Freedom of Access to the Holy Places

The planning team for the security fence viewed religious observance and freedom of access to the holy places as an overriding principle, and made an effort to preserve ties with clergymen and provide a rapid response to any problem.

Freedom of religious observance in each of the sites was guaranteed without disturbance and without exception. Access to each of the sites was guaranteed both to those arriving from Israeli territory to sites within the Palestinian Authority, as well as from the West Bank to sites within Israel, with the exception of special security situations, such as the takeover at the Church of the Nativity.

East of Jerusalem near the Tomb of Lazarus, a special gate was erected for the use of clergymen and pilgrims visiting sites that were left on the Palestinian side of the fence. Special gates were also installed in the security fence to accommodate the traditional parades that take place annually during the Christmas ceremonies of the Catholic, Orthodox and Armenian communities, as well as the Easter procession from the grave of Lazarus in Azariya via Bethphage and the Mount of Olives to Jerusalem. A special access route was also made to the Monastery of the Emmanuel Sisters north of Bethlehem, paved by the Defense Ministry to the satisfaction of the monastery's sisters.

Preserving Ties with the Community

Various mission institutions located in Jerusalem and its vicinity were built by various Christian orders with the view of serving both the Christian and Muslim communities. The establishment of the security fence created a conflict of interest among some of the mission institutions that wanted to preserve the security of the staff and church property while continuing to serve the Muslim community in the West Bank. A daily reality of total freedom of movement changed totally. There was a need to define the passage arrangements which would enable the continuation of ties to the community.

There were institutions located in the heart of Jerusalem, such as the Lutheran Hospital or Augusta Victoria Hospital, that provide free medical services to the Palestinian refugee population in the West Bank. Here the solution focused on providing passage permits, and providing aid and assistance to strengthening the medical infirmaries in the West Bank. Another example is the Lutheran school Talitha Kumi near Beit Jalla, where a special access road was built for those arriving from Jerusalem.

For institutions located on the seam line, decisions were necessary regarding the

exact line of the fence and suitable passage arrangements. Thus, for example, the Rosary Sisters school in the Dachyat El Barid neighborhood north of Jerusalem, that serves 1,200 students from Jerusalem, was included on the Israeli side of the fence, in light of requests from the Mother Superior of the order, despite the vast attendant security difficulties.

This action exemplified Israel's overall policy in designing the route of the security fence in the Jerusalem area. Several Christian institutions expressed concern over being cut off from Jerusalem, despite the many crossing-points in the fence. Taking these requests into account, the Israeli defense establishment managed to include nineteen out of twenty-two Christian sites in Jerusalem's environs within the fence. Many of these institutions clearly preferred to be located on the Israeli side. More could not be included without moving the line of the fence deep into the West Bank and compromising Muslim property rights.

The Preservation of Church Property

Extensive areas in Jerusalem and the surrounding area, and especially along the seam line, are owned by the large churches. The establishment of the security fence obligated the security bodies to seize strips of land of varying widths (from 45 to 100 meters) for limited periods. This did not involve expropriation or assuming ownership of the land from its legal owners. In exchange for use of the land, the state offered the landowners compensation for damage as well as annual usage fees. The extent of compensation is set by a government assessor and his decisions may be appealed via an orderly process.

The establishment of the security fence aroused apprehension on the part of various churches that the seizure of the land would turn into expropriation. There were also concerns that, due to the contours of the fence, lands remaining on the Palestinian side would be abandoned without supervision and that Palestinians would infiltrate them.

In this sphere, a major effort at dialogue was mounted to limit the damage. It was clear from the outset that one could not shift the route of the fence from lands under Christian ownership to land owned by Muslims, because this consideration did not meet the test of plausibility and equality before the law.

In order to limit damages, the territorial interests of each and every church were mapped out and a joint effort was made to have the fence go along the margins of the plot, in an extremely complex engineering, security, and legal effort. Thus, for example, in erecting the fence around the Franciscan plot in Azariya, and in order to leave the entire area on the Israeli side as the church requested, the route of the fence was significantly lengthened, bends in the road were added, and a protective fence was built to preserve an area of a few dozen square meters that remained beyond the fence.

In a number of areas, disputes remained between church representatives and the security and defense establishment regarding the extent of damage, which were referred to the relevant courts.

The Personal Security of the Clergy

Christian clergymen who live in a combat zone as a matter of religious faith are unarmed and find it difficult to protect their personal security. Israel works assiduously to preserve the neutrality of the churches and their independence, and to prevent injury to the clergymen, their property, and their dignity. On the other hand, some Palestinians exploit Israeli sensitivity and pass through church courtyards for purposes of infiltration into Israel to promote terror. In their passage, the infiltrators have inflicted heavy damage on church property, and have deliberately destroyed ornamental gardens and stone walls hundreds of years old.

The priests, who try to avoid taking a stand in the conflict, remain exposed to repeated injury and breaking and entering on the part of the infiltrators, and find themselves in a difficult predicament where they have no physical protector. Attempts by the monks to talk with the Palestinians have on a few occasions provoked physical violence and threats against them. In their travails, the monks have been compelled to turn to the Israeli authorities. In the first stage, Israeli security personnel reinforced the ancient walls around the churches and raised them. When these actions proved of no avail, special police units were stationed to prevent the infiltrations and preserve the security of the priests.

Conflict Resolution

The setting of the fence route produced a substantial change in daily life in the area from what everyone had become accustomed to since June 1967. The need to erect an obstacle along the entire length of the seam line between the West Bank and Israel to prevent the passage of terrorists obligated defense planners to resolve many complex issues and decide between conflicting interests.

Thus, for example, the guesthouse and regional center of the Franciscan order "Kamboni Negrachia Sisters" is located in Azariya and borders an ancient Muslim cemetery. In order to include the church on the Israeli side of the fence and leave the Muslim cemetery on the Palestinian side, it was necessary to build an especially thin, yet strong, wall on top of the ancient wall between them in a complex feat of engineering.

In the Greek Orthodox Church, a bitter debate took place between Patriarch Ireneos I, who was deposed by the Synod Council, and the new archbishop, Theophilos Giannopoulos, who was appointed without Israeli consent. While the government of Israel does not recognize the deposing of the former, de facto the latter controls the apparatus and the church properties. Therefore, defense planners had no option but to discuss the matter with both parties, each one separately, and try to reach agreements without entering into the struggle for control.

Setting the fence route in Azariya initially left a series of Christian sites on the Palestinian side of the fence. An urgent appeal by the churches led defense

planners to plunge into the thorny thicket of conflicting interests, not only between Muslims and Christians but between the churches themselves, as each church tried to limit the damage to its property and attempted to push the fence over to the land of the other. After a prolonged effort, with the assistance of go-betweens, attorneys, influentials, the Foreign Ministry, and the Vatican Ambassador, we managed to convene the church leaders for a joint meeting in Jerusalem and arrive at an agreed-upon solution. Even after the basic route was finalized, each of the churches added harsh reservations that forced us to update and modify the route, add security devices and access routes, and compromise on security demands.

Upon the conclusion of planning and after protracted negotiations with the Vatican Ambassador and representatives of the various churches, this writer visited the Vatican and met with the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Holy See, with the participation of the resident Israeli ambassador, to present the complex solutions to the problems that surfaced in the area. The Deputy Foreign Minister emphasized the Vatican's reservations over the establishment of the fence and the various needs of the churches. Nevertheless, he did so with an understanding for the security situation that had befallen Israel and in the realization that the fence would be established in any case. He ratified the understandings with the churches as "the minimal damage."

Contacts were carried out relating to the other churches and concluded with agreements that allowed the establishment of the security fence with maximal consideration for the unique needs of the churches and the various Christian communities.

Postscript

Under duress, the State of Israel became involved in a Palestinian terror offensive that obligated it to adopt defensive measures including the establishment of a physical fence to halt the passage of suicide terrorists. Critics of Israel have taken up the cause of the security fence. Even former U.S. President Jimmy Carter has joined the anti-fence chorus, noting in his book: "The wall ravages many places along its devious route that are important to Christians."(5)

Despite the constraints of time and the pressing security needs, many efforts were invested and solutions were provided to meet the unique needs of the Christian churches in the region to guarantee the fundamental values of Western democracy - freedom of religion and religious observance, and free access to holy places, while at the same time limiting damage to property and preserving the churches' ties with their target communities. All this occurred while conducting a thorough study of needs and engaging in direct dialogue.

The establishment of the security fence was a vital measure for the security of Israel's citizens and those visiting Israel. Only when visitors to Jerusalem enjoy a sense of security can there be normal life, religious observance, and pilgrimage

to the holy sites. The planning team spared no effort to reach this objective in a suitable legal and humanitarian manner to the maximum extent possible, under the difficult circumstances of a terror war.

Clergymen and pilgrims in Israel enjoy a sense of security which has allowed hundreds of thousands of Christians to visit Jerusalem in recent years. They can reach the holy sites with confidence and realize their religious aspirations.

Let me conclude with the hope that the day will arrive when a way to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians will be discovered; it will be a peace with security that will eradicate the threat of terror and remove divisions between peoples.

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Predicting the Rise of Hamas: The Democracy of the Rifles (2005)

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Shalom Harari

- Arafat was the cement that held all the Palestinian factions together including, unofficially, the Muslim factions. This cement has now disappeared. All the divisions that we see in Palestinian society today, that have been there all along, have reemerged. He was able to control both the Fatah outsiders who came from Tunis, and those who were in the territories during the first intifada.
- Around 200,000 people came in from outside after Oslo, including a great many PLO activists. The main power of this group derived from the fact that they were close to the "old man." But the old man is gone and all the outsiders are in a much more problematic position today.
- Palestinians today are primarily concerned with the loss of control in their society - in dimensions and to depths never seen before. Civilians have their own weapons, and the weapons of the security forces are barely under the control of any central authority. When Arafat was operating from Lebanon, he would speak about "the democracy of the rifles." Today, the Palestinians are indeed living with the democracy of the rifles.
- Who is stronger: Hamas or Fatah? Some Israeli intelligence officials say the ratio of armed forces is 22,000 for the PA and 6,000 for Hamas - a four-to-one ratio - which is enough for the PA to overcome Hamas. But every Hamas and Jihad member is worth four or five or six Fatah members because he's much more committed and fanatical and has more self-discipline.

The Impact of Arafat's Death

Yasser Arafat was the cement that held all the Palestinian factions together, including the Muslim factions which were not under the PLO umbrella. This cement has now simply disappeared. Suddenly, all of the problems that had been pushed aside by Arafat or because of the existence of Arafat have reemerged. All the divisions that we see in Palestinian society today have been there all along under the surface.

Today the Palestinians are trying to advance the idea that Arafat was poisoned. Why? Because he was a legend, and a legend cannot die in such a humiliating way as the world saw on television, including the embarrassing scandal that his wife made. The fact remains that he died outside of the Palestinian territories, not in Ramallah or Jerusalem. So it is important to show that he was killed by the Israeli Mossad, or the British secret service. He had to have been killed by some enemy because this is a much more dignified way to go. The Palestinian government nominated a committee a year ago to review all the documents and decide the cause of Arafat's death, but I don't believe the committee will ever issue a report because the real circumstances surrounding his death do not match the image of the major Palestinian leader of the last forty years.

Who is the "Sole Legitimate Representative of the Palestinian People"?

In the last ten years Israelis have almost forgotten the name "PLO." They talk about the Palestinian Authority. Arafat succeeded in convincing most of the world – including Israel - that as head of the PLO he was the sole legitimate representative of all the Palestinian people. Every time I met with a PLO official, they always insisted on saying: "the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." Why was it so important for them to remind us of this fact? Because there were others who hold a different view – those in the Islamic camp who were not part of the PLO.

What is today called Hamas is actually the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood has operated here since the 1940s and both Hamas and Islamic Jihad developed from it. Only in 1987, at the beginning of the first intifada, did they declare themselves Hamas, which in the beginning referred only to the fighting arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. Later the name "Hamas" was used for the entire "*daawa*" system, including the social and welfare infrastructure.

At the end of the 1980s, even before Arafat came to the territories from Tunis, he held secret conversations with the Hamas leadership, which demanded 40 percent representation in the PLO institutions. But Arafat turned them down. Today we are witnessing a major struggle in the municipal elections and the elections for the parliament, in which Hamas is seeking to establish its claim for significant representation within the governing institutions.

However, if the Muslim movements enter the PLO, they will try to impose their

Islamist agenda which is based on the laws of *sharia*. For example, in Kalkilya, where the municipality was taken over by Hamas, the annual "Palestine Festival" was cancelled this year to avoid mixed seating of men and women. But this was not as surprising as it seemed, since before 1967, according to the archives of Jordanian intelligence, Kalkilya was the cradle of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank.

The "Old Man" Who Protected the Outsiders from Tunis Is Gone

In addition to the Islamists, Arafat was able to control both the Fatah outsiders who came from Tunis and those who were in the territories during the first intifada (1987-1991). Arafat was a symbol for all the Palestinian people, but he was mainly the symbol of the outside. In 1994 and 1995 he brought with him all these outsiders who had lived for 30-40 years outside the territories in Tunis, Yemen, and other places.

The Palestinians call this "the small return." Around 200,000 people came in from outside after Oslo, including a great many PLO activists. The splits in Fatah that we see today originated back then. The main power of this group derived from the fact that they were close to the action, to the "old man." But the old man is gone and all the outsiders are in a much more problematic position today in relation to the younger generation who grew up inside the territories.

Major Palestinian Concerns Today

Palestinians today are primarily concerned with the loss of control in their society - in dimensions and to depths never seen before. Civilians have their own weapons, and the weapons of the security forces are not under the full control of any central authority. When Arafat was operating from Lebanon, he would speak about "the democracy of the rifles." Today, the Palestinians are indeed living with the democracy of the rifles.

When Palestinians talk about corruption, they refer also to the management of the PA, which started badly from the beginning and became worse, but this had nothing to do with the "occupation." The situation in the Palestinian courts also has nothing to do with the "occupation." The courts are inside the cities and no "occupier" enters the courts when they are in operation. However, since 1996 there has been shooting inside the courts in the West Bank and Gaza, sometimes in front of the judge, because some of the families were not satisfied with the judge's decision and they would shoot the accused in the middle of the courtroom. Judges were also threatened at home.

Since the first intifada, ten to twenty different gangs have arisen, which are found in every city: the "Black Panthers," "Red Eagles," PFLP, DFLP, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the Fatah-Tanzim, with further divisions such as Tanzim Balata, Tanzim Askar, and the like. There are also pressure groups that come from inside the Palestinian security services, whose involvement in the economy is

part of Arafat's legacy. Arafat may be dead, but most of the systems he created are still here. Only the names have changed.

Under the system that Arafat built, the Palestinian Education Ministry has 28 directors-general. Arafat's system of governance was the system of families, of the *hamullah*. For example, he would give the first director-general position to the Abdulhabi family in Jenin. Then members of another tribe or family would ask, "What about us?" So he would give them a position as director-general too, in the same ministry, which means one cellular phone, a car, and a job paying \$500-600 a month.

The anarchy in Palestinian society reaches into every corner of everyday life, including the hospitals. After the disengagement there were major clashes between Hamas and the PA in Gaza, with three policemen killed and more than 100 injured. Officers from the PA intelligence service brought injured relatives to the hospital, entered the operating room, and threatened to shoot the doctors if they did not operate on their family member immediately. Incidents like this have triggered strikes of doctors almost every month in Gaza. The same thing has occurred in Nablus in the West Bank. Unfortunately, such stories do not reach the local and foreign media.

The Missing Factor

Israel is trying to help Abbas, and the Americans are trying as well, but it's not enough. What is really needed is the crystallizing of a movement inside the Palestinian people to come and change things. The pressures are there but they are not gathering a critical mass in order to be translated into real power in the streets.

Who Would Win a Hamas-Fatah Confrontation?

Who is stronger: Hamas or Fatah? If Abbas makes a decision – which he never made before – to confront Hamas, who would win? Some Israeli intelligence officials say the ratio of forces is 22,000 for the PA and 6,000 for Hamas – a four-to-one ratio – which is enough for the PA to overcome Hamas. But I believe they are mistaken.

In 1980, the head of Israeli military intelligence was asked who was going to win the Iran-Iraq War. He predicted the Iraqi side would win because it possessed four times the number of tanks and planes as Iran. What happened in the end was that after ten years of war, the Iranians were very close to winning. He failed to make the correct assessment because there was something that he couldn't assess because he didn't have the tools. He didn't have the ability to assess the motivation of the forces.

It's the same story here. Every Hamas and Jihad member is worth four or five or six Fatah members because he's much more committed and fanatical and has more self-discipline. In my opinion, the PA is not at one minute before midnight

but twenty minutes after midnight. Mohammed Dahlan told Arafat during his last year, "If you don't do the confrontation now, it will be too late." And he was right.

Hamas Participation in PA Elections

I personally very much support the participation of Hamas in the elections. Hamas, or the Muslim Brotherhood, had told Arafat: "You may be legitimate but you're not the sole representative. We are here too." Israel signed the Oslo agreements with only half of the Palestinians. Some Israelis say that now that Abbas is PA Chairman, Israel has an address to deal with. But he represents only half of an address, without the Islamic movement. Every paper that Israel signs with Abbas before the Palestinian elections is worthless because he doesn't represent the whole system. He represents perhaps 20 percent of it, if that, and that is the key problem.

Hamas should take part in the elections, and then Israel can condition its dealing with a united Palestinian government on eliminating all the uncontrolled weapons and disavowing the idea of destroying Israel.

Even if Abu Mazen wins the elections in January, he will not disarm Hamas after the elections. I foresee the situation continuing to deteriorate, and the PA is going to fail at the end of the day.

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Misreading the Second Lebanon War

(2007)

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

- Hizballah casualties were not less than 500 and may have reached 700 - a figure greater than all the casualties Hizballah has suffered during the last twenty years. It will take Hizballah at least two years to rebuild its capabilities and to recruit and train new people.
- Israel also developed a system which made Hizballah's long-range rocket launchers good for one use only. Within less than five minutes of launch they were destroyed by Israel's air force, an unprecedented achievement in modern warfare.
- The determination of Israel's government to respond and to retaliate is a very important factor in restoring deterrence. Now those around Israel understand that Israel has certain red lines, and that if these lines are crossed, Israel's retaliation will be intentionally disproportionate. As a small country, we cannot allow ourselves the luxury of reacting proportionally.

- Middle East leaders understand that Israel is prepared to use military force, and that in the future we are not going to be as tolerant of attempts to act against us.
- Nasrallah said at the beginning of the war that there would be no international forces and no Lebanese army in south Lebanon. The entry of these forces is, from the Israeli point of view, the greatest success of the war.
- What is the real mood of the Israeli people after the war? It is that we are not suckers and we are not going to make the same mistake again. We are not going to put ourselves in danger if it is not necessary. We unilaterally retreated from Lebanon and didn't retaliate for six years, and in the end we found Hizballah in a stronger position to fight against us. When Israel retreated from Gaza what was the result? More Kassam rockets on Sderot and Ashkelon.



Entrance to underground Hizballah warehouse (IDF Spokesperson)

Why Hizballah Is Keeping the Cease-Fire

It is not easy to judge the war in Lebanon because it was not between two states. This war was very unique because it involved a guerilla organization that is an extension of two sovereign states: Iran and Syria.

Hizballah is still functioning and was functioning during the entire war. We have identified by name and address 440 members of Hizballah who were killed during

the war. From my experience, this figure is between half and two-thirds of the actual casualties, which were not less than 500 and may have reached 700 – a figure greater than all the casualties Hizballah has suffered during the last twenty years. It will take Hizballah at least two years to rebuild its capabilities and to recruit and train new people. This is why Hizballah is keeping the cease-fire.

Hizballah succeeded in launching 4,000 short-range Katyushas into Israel and Israel didn't stop them. At the same time, Israel hit more than 150 rocket launchers. Almost a third of these, including most of Hizballah's long-range missiles, were hit in a preventive air strike during the first night. Israel also developed a system which made the long-range rocket launchers good for one use only. Within less than five minutes of launch they were destroyed by Israel's air force, an unprecedented achievement in modern warfare.

Hizballah also sent three armed aerial drones toward Israel with a payload of 45 kilograms of TNT. One had technical problems and fell into the sea, while the other two were destroyed by Israel's air force. This was the surprise that Hizballah hoped to use against Tel Aviv, but they didn't succeed.

From a military point of view, when Israel deployed its ground forces, they fulfilled every mission according to schedule. There is not one example in which Hizballah succeeded in stopping the IDF when it had a clear mission. One of the problems was that in some areas the mission was a bit blurred.

The fact that the war was ended before Israel got back the kidnapped soldiers is a great mistake. I believe that if Israel would have said it was not going to fulfill the cease-fire without the kidnapped soldiers being transferred to the Lebanese government, we might have achieved the return of the soldiers.

The Question of Deterrence

Deterrence includes two elements: the first is the determination to use your capability and the second is to have this capability. I think it was very important that Israel made the decision to go to war and sustained the war for more than a month, despite extensive Hizballah rocket attacks across northern Israel.

The determination of Israel's government to respond and to retaliate is a very important factor in restoring deterrence. Now those around Israel understand that Israel has certain red lines, and that if these lines are crossed by the Syrians, the Palestinians, or the Lebanese, Israel's retaliation will be intentionally disproportionate. As a small country, we cannot allow ourselves the luxury of reacting proportionally. Israel's military action sent a very important message to the people around us.

Middle East leaders understand that Israel is prepared to use military force, and that in the future we are not going to be as tolerant of attempts to act against us. We understand that it was a mistake not to respond to Hizballah for six years.

Israel is returning to its previous policy of preemptive action against its enemies when necessary. This determination by the Israeli government is very important

and will be part of the new way that Israel will act and react towards any threat in the future.

We believe Hizballah fired some 1,000 anti-tank missiles at Israeli tanks, hitting around 50 tanks and penetrating half of them. In terms of other recent wars, this was not such a great success. Israelis want to believe that our tanks are impenetrable, but such a tank does not exist in physics. While this upsets many Israelis, in terms of warfare, the new missiles were nothing to write home about, and this is before we factor in new defensive systems which have been developed in Israel. Perhaps some leaders in the Middle East will make the mistake of believing that Israel's military forces do not have the capability to deal with such threats as anti-tank missiles and Katyushas, which would also be a factor affecting deterrence.

When Nasrallah himself said on August 27 that if he knew his July 12 attack would lead to this kind of war, he wouldn't have ordered the operation, this sums up in one sentence what we can understand from this war. Israel made many mistakes. But in the end, from Hizballah's point of view, their whole July 12 operation was a mistake.

The Political Process

It was understood from the beginning of the fighting that there was a need for a political process as an extension of the military operation. Here, I think that the achievements are more than many Israelis expected. Even after the Lebanese had finally pushed out the Syrians, the international community made no moves to implement the other parts of UN Resolution 1559 that clearly said all the militias in Lebanon should be disarmed and the Lebanese government should take responsibility in south Lebanon. Hizballah leader Nasrallah said at the beginning of the war that there would be no international forces and no Lebanese army in south Lebanon. The entry of these forces is, from the Israeli point of view, the greatest success of the war.

The international community understands that the responsibility for south Lebanon is not in the hands of the Israelis. It is in the hands of the international community and the Lebanese. With more than 50 Islamic states, Israel stands alone at the UN with America and Micronesia. But the UN presence in south Lebanon is not connected only to Israel. This is a chance for Lebanon to again be a sovereign, free country without Hizballah's state within a state. For the UN, this is an historic opportunity to rebuild its reputation as an organization that now has the tools to implement a UN resolution with ten thousand soldiers from Europe in south Lebanon.

Yet based on our experience, we don't trust the United Nations. Under its umbrella, Hizballah could do whatever it wanted and the UN stopped Israel from retaliating or preventing Hizballah from acting against us.

This war clearly exposed the relationship between terror organizations and sovereign states in the world. Syria and Iran built up Hizballah. The Iranians

invested between one and two billion dollars in the last ten years to finance, train, and arm this organization. Some 80 percent of the rockets that hit Israel came from Syria. The most advanced missiles in the Russian arsenal were sent by Syria to Hizballah, after Israel had warned the Russians not to sell them to Syria. Hizballah is not a guerilla organization, it is an extension of Iran and Syria.

Iran Lost the War

From the point of view of Iran, this war was a great failure. What was the whole purpose of the \$2 billion that Iran invested in Hizballah? It was the matchbox that Iran hoped to ignite to achieve something or to prevent something with regard to Israel in the future. They used it and they achieved nothing. It cannot be used again. We know how to deal with this threat, and next time we will deal with it in a better way. We have to prepare the civil defense systems in the north and use the ground forces in other ways, but if this is the threat, it's not a strategic threat to Israel. We can cope with it.

The Iranians did not even improve their reputation in this war. What did the Iranians do to help Hizballah, their ally and their extension in south Lebanon? What was Nasrallah saying to himself sitting in a bunker somewhere - maybe under the Iranian embassy? The Iranians were the big losers in this war.

Israel Investigates the War

Israel is now investigating the mistakes of the war in Lebanon. We will not let it go without an investigation. Were the mistakes at the political level – we didn't let the military act? Was it inside the military, which was not determined enough or clear enough about the goals and the missions? The main reason to investigate the war is to understand why we did not use our potential, because we had the potential to do better.

One mission which was not fulfilled was to stop the Katyushas. Some 95 percent of the rockets were launched from an area in south Lebanon bordered by the Litani River on the west and the Nabatiya area in the east. Geography remains the name of the game. When you don't have control on the ground in the areas which are important to defend yourself, and to prevent the other side from having its capabilities, you're not in a good position.

The Impact of the War on the Palestinians

I expect Hizballah to invest more energy in the Palestinian territories now that it has lost its capability to use its forces in south Lebanon. Hizballah finances Fatah-Tanzim cells in the West Bank, especially in the northern part, in Samaria. They are also very involved in Gaza where they help Hamas very much. In the past they sent some weapons ships to Gaza.

The Iranians may also decide that perhaps they can achieve more by supporting

Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Tanzim than they can through another round by Hizballah. We can see the beginning of this in stepped-up efforts to smuggle weapons into Gaza.

What lessons will the Palestinians draw from this war? Hamas and Islamic Jihad will try to strengthen their capabilities in all the areas that seem to be weak points for the Israeli military. For example, they will seek to smuggle in more anti-tank missiles. They also understand that our air force is a main element in our capabilities, and will seek to acquire more anti-aircraft missiles as well.

The Palestinians know that the fact that the Israelis are very bitter about the consequences of the war does not mean that we didn't succeed. They know that this is an Israeli habit, not to be satisfied with anything. I believe that the leadership of the Palestinians will understand that Israel, after the war, is a state that is not going to give up even one square kilometer if that will harm its security.

What is the real mood of the Israeli people after the war? It is that we are not suckers and we are not going to make the same mistake again. We are not going to put ourselves in danger if it is not necessary. We unilaterally retreated from Lebanon and didn't retaliate for six years, and in the end we found Hizballah in a stronger position to fight against us. When Israel retreated from Gaza what was the result? More Kassam rockets on Sderot and Ashkelon. We are not going to be the suckers of the Middle East. This is the deepest understanding of most Israelis, and the Palestinians are in a better position to understand this.

There will be a huge gap between the Palestinian extremists who say, "Let's become stronger, we will show them as Hizballah did. We will be the next Hizballah in Gaza.," and the deeper understanding of the leadership that Israel is not going to give up, even in minor events.

Shi'ites and Sunnis

This the first time in history in which the Shi'ites are becoming a leading force in the Muslim world. Of the 1.2 billion Muslims, only 15 percent are Shi'ites and they live mainly in three countries – Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. From the Sunni point of view, this appears as an arc from Teheran through Baghdad to Beirut. The Sunnis understand better than us what it would mean if the Shi'ites became the leading force in the Middle East, and this upsets many people in the Sunni world.

Another version of the sectarian tension may be seen with the ruling Alawites in Syria. The Alawites today comprise 10 percent of the population. The other 90 percent are Sunni. The Alawites understand that the minute the Sunnis will take control of Syria, within two months the Alawites will become only 5 percent as some will flee for their lives and others will be killed by the Sunnis. The bad blood between the Alawites and the Sunnis in Syria is worse than between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites in Iraq.

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Strategic Lessons of the Winograd Commission Report on the Second Lebanon War

(2007)

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

In general terms, the Winograd Commission Report dealt mostly with the flaws in the decision-making process in Israel. However, the report contains important insights into the strategic thinking that was predominant in the Israeli political-military leadership from the time of Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon until the outbreak of hostilities in July 2006, with the advent of the Second Lebanon War:

- Israel completed its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000. It was hoped that the withdrawal would erode the legitimacy of any continuing military activity by Hizbullah, especially in Lebanon's internal politics. At that time the Israeli government declared that any violation of Israeli sovereignty would bring about a harsh and immediate Israeli response.
- These declarations stipulated that in the event of any assault on Israeli soldiers or civilians, all of Lebanon, Syria, and Hizbullah would be affected. The purpose of these statements was to build up Israeli deterrence in the aftermath of the withdrawal. Effective deterrence of this sort was critical for Israel, the Winograd Commission Report explains, for a number of reasons: after the Israeli pullout from Lebanon there was a lack of "elementary depth," there were many points of friction with Hizbullah, and finally there were multiple Israeli targets - both civilian and military - adjacent to the new Israeli-Lebanese border. At the same time, within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the view developed that if need be, Israel could use "levers of influence" to restrain Hizbullah, such as attacks on Lebanese infrastructure and Syrian targets, as well.
- Despite these strong declarations, Israel only responded locally to the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in October 2000. The Winograd Commission Report presents the assessment of Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh that the Israeli government at the time did not respond more forcefully because it did not want to show that its Lebanon withdrawal had actually produced an escalatory effect. Moreover, the Second Intifada had erupted and the Israeli government was concerned about having to wage a two-front war. This policy of restraint continued through March 2002, when Hizbullah attacked inside Israel near the town of Shlomi.
- As a result, another view became deeply rooted in the Israeli national security establishment that Hizbullah's military buildup after Israel's Lebanon pullout was not so terrible as long as relative quiet along the

border was preserved. Israel knew that Hizbullah was gaining strength and acquiring weaponry, but it preferred to turn a blind eye. As a result, Israel did not prepare for war with an enemy that was far more powerful than what it was familiar with in the past.

Implications for the Gaza Strip

In the Gaza Strip, a similar process is underway. Hamas is getting stronger as it organizes itself, digs fortifications underground, and builds up its military capabilities. Israel will have to ask itself whether it is preferable to delay the confrontation with Hamas, because meanwhile there is quiet or a temporary truce or some other illusory understanding. We are likely to find ourselves in exactly the same position in Gaza that we created with respect to Lebanon.

The Winograd Commission Report, which does not deal with the Gaza problem, describes Israeli policy toward Lebanon during 2000-2006 as a policy of "containment." Strictly speaking there is a problem with this terminology for what Israel pursued in Lebanon during this period, was not a pure policy of containment, which by definition implies preventing an adversary from reinforcing its capabilities.

What Israel is doing today in the Gaza Strip is not containment either, but rather a case of ignoring reality completely. It is an extremely costly policy. Few have any idea what price Israel will have to pay if it moves into Gaza in two or three years, when Hamas feels strengthened and has the capability to launch 122mm Katyusha rockets -which Hizbullah possessed in the thousands - as far as Ashdod and Kiryat Gat. Israeli decision-makers will have to take into account that inaction has a price, as well.

Anyone who has dealt with military affairs knows that it is impossible to thwart the firing of Katyusha or Qassam rockets by means of artillery fire, or by means of any land-based or air-based firepower. The Winograd Commission Report details, nonetheless, how many of Israel's operational plans for Lebanon during 2002-2004 did not require the use of maneuver units on the ground.

It is now clear that the only way to thwart rocket attacks is by controlling the situation on the ground. Qassam rockets are today landing in Sderot and Ashkelon - and not in Kfar Saba - because Israel does not control the situation on the ground in Gaza, whereas it has control of the ground around Qalqilya.

For political reasons, the IDF was not permitted by the political echelon to cross the Israeli-Lebanese border from 2000 to 2006. This allowed Hizbullah to conduct exercises day and night and to attack at will, while Israel was unable to stop any of its preparations. The only way to deal with such a situation in the long term is to allow the IDF to cross the border and halt such offensive preparations. As long as no responsible government is preventing attacks against Israeli territory, the IDF will have to adopt such an approach both with respect to its northern border with Lebanon and its southern border with the Gaza Strip.

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Israel's Deterrence after the Second Lebanon War

(2007)

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan

- The Islamic fundamentalist war against Israeli and Jewish existence in the Middle East – which is being waged by both Hizbullah and Hamas – did not begin in 1967, and it is not going to end even if Israel redeploys along the 1967 lines.
- Hardly anybody in Israel thinks that if we give territories now, we will get peace in return. We left Lebanon and Hizbullah grew stronger, ending in a war. We left Gaza and received a stronger Hamas and Kassam rockets. Israeli is not suicidal and we are unlikely to try this strategy again in another place.
- If we do not respond to the Kassam rockets, we cannot provide even basic security to the Israeli population. If the current ceasefire collapses, Israel might decide to regain its deterrence and prevent Hamas from becoming Hizbullah No. 2 by returning to the Israeli-Egyptian border and by reoccupying some areas in the Gaza Strip.
- If Iran achieves a nuclear weapons capability, it will proliferate very quickly to terror organizations, which is reason enough for Israel to defeat both Hizbullah and Hamas. Even if Hizbullah does not have nuclear weapons itself, it will be operating under an Iranian nuclear umbrella, which could affect Israel's ability to respond effectively to attacks.
- Israel should tell the countries that are going to give hundreds of millions of dollars to the reconstruction of Lebanon that the money will be transferred only after we have a sign of life from Israel's kidnapped soldiers and they are released as stated in UN Resolution 1701.
- Signing an agreement with Syria will not change the situation, except to make Syria stronger in Lebanon. Talking with Syria does not start with the Golan Heights. It starts with terrorism, and the role that the Syrians play between Iran and Hizbullah in Lebanon.

Two Different Conflicts in the Same Region

There are two different conflicts occurring in our region at the same time. One is the Palestinian struggle for an independent state. The other is the Islamic fundamentalist war against Israeli and Jewish existence in the Middle East – which is being waged by both Hizbullah and Hamas. This war did not begin in 1967, and it is not going to end even if Israel redeploys along the 1967 lines.

These two conflicts sometimes intermingle because they have joint interests, but it is not the same war.

The Collapse of Deterrence

Israel lost much of its deterrence in the summer 2006 war in Lebanon. In most cases, the fact that there was a war is proof of the collapse of deterrence. Now Israel must rebuild its deterrent capability.

There used to be a mutual balance of fear between Israel and Hizbullah. For many years we have known that once a conflict began, Hizbullah could launch rockets at the northern third of Israel and civilians would be in shelters for up to several weeks. On the other hand, Hizbullah knew that Israel could actually destroy Lebanon, while it could not destroy Israel. The prevailing conception was of a kind of a balance that ensured a calm situation. This worked for six years.



Israeli vehicle in Haifa damaged by shrapnel from Hizbullah rocket, July 17, 2006 (IDF Spokesperson)

The Outcome of the War

The goal of the summer 2006 war should have been not only to defeat Hizbullah, but also to prevent it from regaining its strategic capability by destroying the arms

route from Iran and Syria. In order to win such a war Israel had to defeat Hizbullah to such a degree that the other forces in Lebanon would complete the task and eventually destroy it, and then act as a barrier to isolate Lebanon from Syria, but this was not done. After the end of the war, Hizbullah was still strong enough to continue to launch its rockets.

UN Resolution 1701 is problematic for Israel because it does not give Israel the tools to prevent Hizbullah from regaining its strategic capabilities. Nor does it give Israel a way to obtain the release of its kidnapped soldiers. It was within Israel's capabilities to achieve its military goals, but we did not do so, and Resolution 1701 prevents us from doing so after the war.

Resolution 1701 only mentioned Israel's kidnapped soldiers in the preamble, with no linkage and no sanctions. Israel should have demanded that the agreement be linked to a sign of life from the soldiers or having them handed over to the Lebanese authorities. Also, the Israeli naval blockade of Lebanon should have been lifted only after there was a solution for the kidnapped soldiers.

Israel should tell the countries that are going to give hundreds of millions of dollars to the reconstruction of Lebanon that the money will be transferred only after we have a sign of life from Israel's kidnapped soldiers and they are released as stated in UN Resolution 1701.

Hizbullah was hurt, but not to such a degree that it cannot regain its power, including its supply of money and arms. Politically, they have become even stronger in Lebanon.

Once a war ends in the Middle East and there is another war on the horizon, there is no deterrence. Actually, it is the opposite of deterrence if a war ends with everyone talking about the next one.

The Collapse of the Land for Peace Idea

The land for peace idea has now collapsed. Hardly anybody in Israel really thinks that if we give territories, we will get peace. We left Lebanon and Hizbullah grew stronger, with the situation ending in a war. We left Gaza and received a stronger Hamas and Kassam rockets. Israeli is not suicidal and we are unlikely to try this strategy again in another place. We have to find another way, and a new concept is urgently needed, taking into account how to regain deterrence.

Gaza

There is a connection between what happened in Lebanon and the way we left Gaza. We have to find a way to leave areas so that they will not become a threat, as happened in Gaza. Hamas is becoming like Hizbullah because we left the Gaza-Egypt border.

We have this strange ceasefire in Gaza. We cease and the Palestinians fire, and after awhile, everything collapses because it has no real basis. If the current

ceasefire collapses, Israel will have to make a very tough decision. The Israeli decision might be to regain its deterrence and prevent Hamas from becoming Hizbullah No. 2 by returning to the Israeli-Egyptian border and by reoccupying some areas in the Gaza Strip. If we do not respond to the Kassam rockets, we cannot provide even basic security to the Israeli population. I hope we won't arrive at this point, but a lot depends on the leadership on the other side of the security fence, among the Palestinians.



Iranian missiles captured from Hizbullah (IDF Spokesperson)

Iran

Israel cannot deter Iran just by being strong. We are vulnerable because our country is so small and would be particularly endangered if the Iranians achieve a nuclear weapons capability. In addition, if Iran achieves such capability, it will proliferate very quickly to terror organizations, which is reason enough for Israel to defeat both Hizbullah and Hamas. Even if Hizbullah does not have nuclear weapons itself, it will be operating under an Iranian nuclear umbrella, which could affect Israel's ability to respond to attacks.

Finally, a nuclear Iran is not only an Israeli problem. If, in another ten years, there are a dozen nuclear states including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, this is an inherently unstable situation.

Syria

From the point of view of a national security strategy, Syria must be isolated immediately. Signing an agreement with Syria will not change the situation, except to make Syria stronger in Lebanon. Talking with Syria does not start with the Golan Heights. It starts with terrorism, and the role that the Syrians play between Iran and Hizbullah in Lebanon.

My philosophy is all-inclusive. Use force, if needed, but this does not mean that we do not have to talk to people. We can negotiate and use force at the same time. In the end, we are trying to achieve coexistence as a basis for full agreements and a lasting peace with our neighbors.

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Defensible Borders on the Golan Heights (2009)

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland

- In the years 1999-2000, Israeli-Syrian negotiations reached the stage of discussion over details that included security arrangements intended to compensate Israel for the loss of the Golan Heights. When indirect Israeli-Syrian negotiations were renewed in 2008 under Turkish auspices, they were conducted under the assumption that there was a military solution that would compensate Israel for the loss of the Golan.
- The idea of security arrangements was intended to bridge the gap between conceding the Golan and creating a situation that would guarantee that in case of war, IDF forces could return to the place where they are currently stationed. The idea was based on the Golan being totally demilitarized, with the Syrian divisions moved back eastward to the region of Damascus and even further.
- This analysis demonstrates that Israel does not possess a plausible solution to its security needs without the Golan Heights. Not only was the "solution" proposed in the year 2000 implausible at the time, but changing circumstances, both strategic and operative, have rendered Israel's forfeiture of the Golan today an even more reckless act.



A view of the Galilee from the Golan Heights (Tamas Berzi)

Introduction

For most of the period since the June 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria, Israel has viewed this strategic region as the front line of its defense in the north. Prior to 1967, Syrian armor and artillery on the Golan posed a constant threat to Israeli farms and villages in the Galilee below. However, in the years that followed, with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positioned on the Golan, Israel acquired an optimal line of defense to enable its quantitatively inferior standing army to hold back a Syrian ground attack and provide Israel with the time it needed to mobilize its reserves and neutralize any aggression against it.

Despite these military considerations, since the early 1990s, both direct and indirect contacts have taken place between Israel and Syria to examine the possibility of arriving at a peace agreement. In most cases the contacts did not mature into genuine and open negotiations with the intent of arriving at a detailed agreement. The one exception was the effort initiated by Prime Minister Ehud Barak in the years 1999-2000. The negotiations at that time reached the stage of discussion over details that included security arrangements intended to compensate Israel for the loss of the Golan Heights. The talks at that time did not lead to the signing of a peace agreement, but the reason behind the failure to reach an agreement did not stem from an appreciable gap on the security issue. On the security issue, both sides appeared to reach almost total agreement.

Given that background, when indirect Israeli-Syrian negotiations were renewed

again in 2008 under Turkish auspices, they were conducted under the assumption that there was a military solution that would compensate Israel for the loss of the Golan and that such a solution was acceptable to the Syrians.

The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that Israel does not possess a plausible solution to its security needs without the Golan Heights. Not only was the "solution" proposed in the year 2000 implausible at the time, but changing circumstances, both strategic and operative, have rendered Israel's forfeiture of the Golan today an even more reckless act.

This analysis is composed of seven sections:

- Geography and History of the Golan Heights
- A Peace Agreement with Syria – Truth and Illusion
- Israel's Current Security Concept
- The Importance of Strategic Depth
- Security Arrangements Discussed in 1999-2000
- Changed Circumstances Since 2000
- Diplomatic and Military Implications of a Golan Withdrawal

Geography and History of the Golan Heights

The Geographic Structure of the Golan

The entire area of the Golan Heights is 1,800 km²; the size of that part of the region under Israeli control is 1,200 km². The Golan Heights is bounded on the north by Mt. Hermon (that is partially in Israeli hands), on the west by the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee, and on the south by the Yarmouk River. Its length is 62 km. and its width varies from 26 km. in the Mt. Phares area to 12 km. in the area of Majdal Shams.


The maximum altitude of Mt. Hermon in the area controlled by Syria is 2,814 meters (9,230 feet), while the highest area in Israeli hands is the "Snow Observation Post" at 2,224 meters (7,300 feet). The average altitude in the northern Golan Heights is 1,000-1,200 meters, while in its southern part the Golan Heights is about 250 meters above sea level (about 450 meters above the Sea of Galilee). At the western edge of the Golan Heights are rock cliffs that drop 500 meters (1,700 feet) to the Jordan River Valley and the Sea of Galilee below.

The eastern portion of the Golan Heights is the watershed line and control of the hills in this region gives the IDF a distinct topographical advantage in the event of a Syrian attack. For example, one of those hills, Mt. Avital, which is under IDF control, is 1,204 meters above sea level, while the opposite area inside Syria is roughly 700-800 meters above sea level. Thus, control of this line is extremely important for Israel's ground forces.

The Golan is a relatively narrow territory, without the kind of depth from which

Israel benefited in the Sinai Peninsula (280 kilometers or 120 miles). Yet this territory provides Israel with invaluable defensive advantages because of its unique terrain conditions and topography. On the one hand, these conditions provide fire and observation control over an area extending scores of kilometers into Syria, while on the other hand the bulk of Israeli territory on the Golan descends in the west, and is protected from Syrian surveillance capability and flat trajectory fire. Additionally, the majority of the eastern hill line is impassible to tank movement, thus obligating enemy armor to move through low-lying areas that are under IDF surveillance and control.

Israel's Forward Defense Line on the Golan Heights: a Cross-Section at Mt. Avital



As long as the outcome of wars is ultimately decided by the movement of ground forces, these considerations of terrain and topography will remain critical for the defense of Israel, notwithstanding the growing prevalence of ballistic missiles and rockets in the Middle Eastern battlefield.

A History of the Golan

Jewish settlement in the Golan began during the era of King Herod (23 BCE), and the Jews established scores of communities in the southern and central Heights. To this day, remnants of synagogues and other buildings are preserved

in the vicinity of the town of Katzrin. The Jewish community in the Golan was destroyed by the Romans as part of their repression of the Great Revolt. The conquest of the town of Gamla and the killing of its inhabitants in 66 CE were particularly notable.


Following the First World War, the British and French partitioned the Middle East between them (the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement). The border between their two empires was delineated in 1923, with France receiving Syria and Lebanon, which became a League of Nations mandate, and Britain receiving the Land of Israel (British Mandatory Palestine). The boundaries between the empires awarded Britain a clear advantage in everything pertaining to water. It was determined that the border with French-controlled territory would pass east of the Banias Springs, 50 meters east of the Jordan River and 10 meters east of the Sea of Galilee, in order to remove any doubt that Britain would enjoy exclusive control over the water sources.

The Syrians controlled the Golan Heights from the time they received independence in 1946 until 1967, when Israel captured the territory during the Six-Day War. Initially, Israel also controlled an additional area in the central Golan that included the town of Kuneitra. During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Syrians conquered Mt. Hermon and in the southern Golan Heights they breached the Israeli defense line that was based on the eastern ridge line. In the northern Golan Heights, despite their numerical advantage, the Syrians were checked before this line. In a counterattack, the IDF restored its control of the area and also captured additional territory within Syria, known as the "Syrian enclave."

According to the armistice agreement of April 1974, Israel agreed to return to Syria both the "enclave" and the town of Kuneitra. Despite severe diplomatic pressure by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Israel refused to withdraw from the eastern ridge line, insisting that the "Kuneitra hills" (Hermonit, Avital, and Bental) remain in Israeli hands.

Today 40,000 people, half of them Jews, live on the Golan Heights. The remainder include 17,000 Druze who live in four communities in the northeastern part of the Golan, and about 3,000 Alawites in Ghajar, a village on the old border between Israel, Syria and Lebanon.

Israeli-Syrian Balance of Forces on the Golan Heights on the Eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War



A Peace Agreement with Syria – Truth and Illusion

A formal peace agreement between Israel and Syria is believed to be in the realm of the possible if Israel agrees to withdraw from the Golan to the June 4, 1967, line that puts the Syrians on the shores of the Sea of Galilee. It is plausible that given additional conditions (U.S. support), the Syrians would be genuinely interested in such an agreement. Such a peace agreement would include four components:

1. The transfer of the entire Golan Heights to Syrian sovereignty.
2. The maintenance of diplomatic relations between Syria and Israel.
3. A resolution of the water issue.
4. The maintenance of security arrangements that are intended to compensate Israel for the loss of the area.

However, irrespective of how advisable such an agreement may be from Israel's perspective, and without relation to future security arrangements (which is the major purpose of this analysis), a dangerous tendency has been created in recent years by fostering the belief that a peace agreement with Syria would have positive repercussions in seven additional areas.

Unfortunately, it would be a dangerous illusion to believe that these seven contentions would become assured byproducts of an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement.

1. "An Israeli-Syrian peace agreement will drive a wedge between Syria and Iran."

Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that Iranian-Syrian relations might be damaged as a result of a peace agreement with Israel (which is far from guaranteed since the Syrians officially insist that this will not happen, whereas Iran is not opposed to such agreements with Israel as long as they result in Israeli territorial concessions), this issue is totally unrelated to the major problem that Iran poses – its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. Syria perhaps currently needs Iran, but Iran doesn't need Syria. The greatest strategic threat to Israel is posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran. The continued existence of such a threat will not be influenced at all by whether there will be a peace agreement between Israel and Syria.

2. "A peace agreement between Syria and Israel will weaken Hizbullah."

At the time of the 1999-2000 negotiations, the Syrians ruled Lebanon both *de facto* and in a semiformal fashion. During that time Damascus could not evade responsibility for what was occurring in Lebanon and therefore it was compelled to agree that a peace agreement between Israel and Syria also meant a full peace agreement with Lebanon. A peace agreement with Lebanon accordingly obligated the Syrians to guarantee the dismantling of Hizbullah as a fighting force.

Today this situation has been altered. Under international pressure, Syria was

compelled in 2005 to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and presently it is not responsible for that state. Since Syria can evade responsibility for what happens in Lebanon, and given that its continued interest is to reinforce Hizbullah even in the event of a peace agreement between Syria and Israel, it is clear that Hizbullah will continue to constitute a threat to Israel from Lebanon. It should be remembered that a close Syrian relationship with Hizbullah is critical for Syria in order for Damascus to safeguard its interests in Lebanon, which have always been a paramount consideration for the Syrian regime.

3. "An Israeli-Syrian peace agreement will prevent Hizbullah from arming."

Hizbullah receives its primary assistance (political, economic, and military) from Iran. Iran can transfer arms to Hizbullah via Syria but also via other routes. Since the Syrian interest to continue buttressing Hizbullah will exist even after the signing of a peace agreement with Israel, it may be expected that the weapons flow from Syria to Hizbullah will persist, even if the methods become more clandestine. It is worth recalling that Egypt encountered difficulties in preventing weapons smuggling from its territory to Gaza, despite the fact that the Egypt-Gaza border is only 12 km. long across a flat terrain. Syria's border with Lebanon extends hundreds of kilometers, most of it over mountainous terrain with bountiful cover. As long as the will to maintain the weapons flow continues to exist on both sides, the flow may be expected to continue.

4. "A peace agreement with Syria will assist the Israeli-Palestinian track."

One can assume that the reverse will be the case. Given the assumption that it will be difficult for Israel to manage both the Syrian and Palestinian tracks in tandem, the Palestinians are likely to feel that they are being reduced to a lower priority. It is plausible that this will engender frustration and that such frustration could possibly lead to the outbreak of a "third intifada."

5. "A peace agreement between Syria and Israel will compel Syria to banish Hamas headquarters from Damascus."

This may possibly occur, but why is it important where Khaled Mashaal, the exiled leader of Hamas' political wing, resides? Furthermore, should a peace agreement exist between Israel and Syria, it may actually be preferable that Hamas headquarters be located in Damascus (which might be able to exert influence) rather than in Yemen, Sudan, or Somalia.

6. "The agreement will improve Israel's relations with the Arab world."

The Arab world is committed to the Palestinian issue, but not to the Syrian issue to the same extent. Just as the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement and subsequently the Israeli-Jordanian agreement did not change the attitude of other Arab states toward Israel, an agreement with Syria may not make much difference. Moreover, the Arab world is divided between a pro-Iranian axis including Syria, Qatar, Hizbullah, and Hamas, on the one hand, and an anti-Iranian axis based on Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other states, on the other hand. Under present conditions, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are actually interested in isolating the Syrian regime today and would not respond well to any

diplomatic move that gave Bashir Assad more international legitimacy.

7. "The peace agreement with Syria would enhance international support for Israel."

The world is angry with Israel because of its "occupation" over the Palestinians and would like to see this problem solved. The influence of a peace agreement with Syria on Israel's legitimacy would be negligible. To sum up, there are those who contend that conceding the Golan is a worthwhile strategic risk for Israel, given the major political advantages that a peace agreement with Syria would provide. Yet in fact, such strategic advantages are slim and far from guaranteed.

Changes in the Balance of Power

Since the Yom Kippur War, the balance of power between Israel and Syria has been altered substantially. In the classic, conventional realm, the Syrian quantitative advantage has been offset by Israel's qualitative military improvements. Today, the gap in favor of Israel has increased in almost every dimension. The danger of an invasion by Syrian armored divisions, a tangible threat in 1973, has diminished appreciably due to the vast enhancement of Israel's ability to destroy armored combat vehicles both from the air and from the ground.

The relative advantages of the Israeli Air Force and Israeli Navy over their Syrian counterparts have also markedly increased. The Syrian Air Force is at a very low state of technical and operational readiness. The air defense system that was a Syrian strong point continues to present a challenge but has improved only a little when compared to the Israel Air Force's capabilities to contend with it.

Faced with the clear enhancement of Israel's advantages in these areas, the Syrians have developed three capabilities that are intended to offset Israel's capabilities. The first is the capability for "close-range fighting," infantry capabilities (without armored combat vehicles) replete with the most advanced anti-tank missiles and night vision gear. Over the last forty years, improvements in anti-tank weaponry (effective range, penetrating power, mobility, night-fighting capability) have grown faster than the advantages in tank capabilities, creating a situation in which the effectiveness of infantry and commando forces operating against armored forces in built-up areas or areas rich in cover has improved markedly.

The second significant Syrian capability is in the realm of surface-to-surface missiles. In addition to the deployment of heavy missiles capable of reaching any target in Israel, the Syrians have equipped themselves with a huge quantity of rockets with an effective range of between a few scores of kilometers to 200 km. This network is more problematic from Israel's standpoint than the heavy surface-to-surface missiles, since it involves much greater quantities, superior concealment capabilities, and greater accuracy.

The third Syrian capability involves its arsenal of chemical weaponry, capable of being launched both by missiles and other means.

Israel's Current Security Concept

In its concept of combat with Syria, the IDF attempts to maximize its relative advantages, predicated on seven principles:

1. Given the assumption that war with Syria also means war with Lebanon (Hizbullah), defeating Syria will be accorded priority.
2. The existing defense line on the Golan Heights is the nearly optimal line. It allows Israel to defend the Golan Heights with a relatively small force, while moving to an offensive posture under comfortable conditions. Additionally, the conditions of the terrain that are suitable for defense allow Israel to allocate the bulk of its air force at the outset of the fighting to secure the objective of achieving air superiority rather than providing air support for the ground battle. Achieving air superiority at the outset is a necessary condition for countering Syrian ground-to-ground missiles, as well as for supporting ground combat and inflicting severe damage on infrastructure targets.
3. Victory over Syria will be obtained first and foremost due to Israel's capability to destroy substantial parts of the Syrian forces on the ground, in the air, and at sea.
4. A rapid victory requires the capability of maneuver that can create a ground threat to the Damascus region within a few days.
5. Israel must prevent Syrian use of chemical weaponry either by striking it or by creating deterrence.
6. Without reference to the size of Israel's territorial successes within Syria, Israel must prevent any Syrian territorial achievements on Israeli soil at the end of the war.
7. Israel is incapable of preventing the massive firing of ground-to-ground missiles and rockets at Israel, including Syrian fire toward Israel's strategic rear area. By allocating vast resources, Israel can significantly reduce the quantity of fire directed at the Israeli rear, but the most useful response to the Syrian threat is to achieve a rapid victory. Victory will be obtained by neutralizing the bulk of the Syrian military force while preserving favorable attrition ratios, damaging the interests of the Syrian regime (destroying "strategic" objectives), and creating a ground threat to the Syrian capital.

The Importance of Strategic Depth

Geostrategic characteristics remain a key factor in determining a country's ability to defend itself. England was never conquered not because its army is strong but because it is surrounded by the sea. Russia was not defeated by Napoleon nor by Germany due to its size and strategic depth. The Soviet Union during the 1980s and the United States currently find it difficult to control Afghanistan both due to its size and its topographical features. Israel is threatened by Hizbullah from Lebanon and by Hamas from Gaza not because of their strength but

because geography allows them to strike deep into Israel with primitive weapons. If Hizbullah, for example, with the very same arsenal, was located 200 km. from the Israeli border, it would not be defined as a threat at all.

While the Egyptian army is inordinately superior to the Syrian army, we assume that even if a regime change were to occur in Egypt and the new regime was oriented toward war, Israel possesses a plausible capability to cope with this. The principal reason is the 280 kilometers (120 miles) distance between the Suez Canal (with the Egyptian army located only on the western side) and the Israeli border.

The principal advantage of the attacker over the defender is his ability to mass his forces and concentrate his military effort. While the defender must be deployed along the entire breadth of the theater (because he doesn't know where the attack will occur), the attacker, as the initiator, can choose a narrow theater, concentrate his efforts on this theater, and obtain decisive superiority at the location of his choosing. How can one defend oneself? The primary principle of defense is "depth and reserves." According to this principle the defender forwardly deploys only a small segment of his strength. When the attack has begun, and when he has correctly identified where the attacker is making his principal effort, the defender can put the bulk of his forces located in the rear into play, both in order to reinforce his forces located in the theater under attack and to launch a counterattack.

For the defender to deploy his forces efficiently, he requires depth. One must be in a situation where even if the attacker scores successes at the outset of the attack and he manages to conquer a certain area, the situation remains reversible. The situation is reversible as long as the attacker does not threaten by his very presence the area of the defender's strategic rear, and as long as he is not positioned in a location that will prevent the reserve forces of the defender from efficiently performing the counteraction. The ability of the defender to perform efficiently is contingent on the existence of depth – the distance between the front line and the rear – and the nature of the terrain.

On the Golan Heights, the distance from the front line to the rear is minimal. More importantly, due to the structure of the terrain, any westward movement of the contact line from its present location would significantly degrade the ability to defend the territory.

Nevertheless, one can delineate two hypothetical border lines west of the current defense line. The first line could rest on the "rear ridge line" – located 3-5 km. west of the present border. It begins in the north at Jebel Keta (south of Majdal Shams) and continues southward to Tel Shiban, Mt. Shifon, Tel Fazra and Givat Bezek. There is little diplomatic logic to this line, but it would permit the transfer of three of the four Druze villages to Syria (not including Ein Kinya).

The second line is the "cliff line" 2-5 km. from the Jordan River. This is the last high area before the steep westward descent towards the Jordan, the Hula Valley, and the Sea of Galilee. From a diplomatic standpoint, an Israeli withdrawal to this line means forfeiting the entire Golan, including almost all the

Jewish communities there.

From a military standpoint, there is some advantage in a stance on this line as opposed to a full withdrawal to the western side of the Jordan River. Continued Israeli control of both sides of the Jordan would increase the likelihood that the passage of forces to the Golan could be performed more expeditiously. In addition, Israeli possession of this line would diminish the exposure of Israeli force concentrations in the Hula Valley and the vicinity of the Sea of Galilee to flat trajectory Syrian fire.

To sum up, the present border line is the only one affording plausible defense for the State of Israel. It creates strategic depth, albeit minimal, and, in addition, this line exerts eastward control deep into Syrian territory. Any movement westward by Israel would create a considerable depreciation of Israel's defensive capability, owing to the nature of the terrain that descends from east to west. The two other possible defense lines mentioned here (the "rear ridge line" and the "cliff line") are far worse, but they are still preferable to a border line located west of the Jordan River.



Security Arrangements Discussed in 1999-2000

The Idea of Security Arrangements

When the issue of a possible Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights was raised in the 1990s, the first question discussed by the Israeli defense establishment was: Can Israel begin its defensive battle in the Hula Valley? The answer was negative. There was a unanimity backed by the political echelon, led by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, that in order to defend itself, Israel had to begin its defensive battle at the line where it was presently stationed.

How could this conclusion be reconciled with the understanding that a peace agreement with Syria mandated a concession of the entire Golan Heights? The response was based on security arrangements that were intended to bridge the gap between conceding the Golan and creating a situation that would guarantee that in case of war, IDF forces could return to the place where they are currently stationed. This was an attempt to "do without but feel satiated."

The idea was based on two components:

1. Israel would indeed concede the Golan and its most forward forces would take up positions below the Heights, but the territory itself would be totally demilitarized and the Syrian divisions would be moved back, eastward to the region of Damascus and even further.
2. Israel would retain an early warning intelligence base on Mt. Hermon and in this manner could identify any serious violation of the agreement.

On the basis of this security concept, as soon as the IDF would comprehend that Syria intended to go to war, or the moment that the movement of Syrian forces westward was identified, IDF forces could move rapidly eastward onto the demilitarized Golan Heights.

Since IDF forces would be stationed in the Hula Valley (and south of the Sea of Galilee), about 20 km. from the current border, whereas the Syrian forces would be at a distance of 60-80 km. from that line, the IDF was expected to reach its optimal defensive line before the Syrians arrived. In such a manner, the encounter between IDF forces and Syrian forces would take place in the region of the present border, at the "eastern ridge line."

Weaknesses of the Security Arrangements

The security arrangements proposed in the 1990s was flawed in a number of ways. First, it relied on five dangerous assumptions, discussed below. Second, it addressed the single threat posed by mechanized Syrian divisions, while ignoring other threats whose gravity is increasing.

Five Problematic Assumptions

- 1. "When the war erupts, it will begin with a situation in which both sides are located where they are obligated to be."**

Israel's experience with Egypt at the time of the 1973 Yom Kippur War

demonstrates that this assumption is unrealistic. It is plausible to assume that over the years an erosion will ensue in terms of compliance with the agreement, both with regard to the clandestine introduction of prohibited armaments into the demilitarized area as well as in the disposition of forces. As opposed to tanks and artillery, whose location is easily verified, it is almost impossible to verify the location of anti-tank missiles, certain types of anti-aircraft missiles, and small rockets.

2. "The warning will be issued in real time."

This assumption is based on the estimate that if Israel has an early warning intelligence station on Mt. Hermon, then it will always be possible to identify the movement of Syrian forces in real time, in order to permit the launching of an effective response. This assumption is based on a further assumption that since Israel currently has good intelligence on what is taking place in Syria, it can preserve that same capability after descending from the Golan. Today, Israel's intelligence capabilities are based on a number of components with a large degree of redundancy and with broad backup. This redundancy is a result of the large number of intelligence bases present on the Golan Heights.

According to what was discussed in the year 2000, there was to be one warning station on Mt. Hermon. Currently, Israel has two large stations on Mt. Hermon that provide backup and an additional three stations along the entire length of the Golan Heights. There is no possibility that one station on Mt. Hermon will provide sufficient intelligence coverage. Additionally, it is clear that even with the station on Mt. Hermon manned by Israelis, there will always be various sorts of limitations on their number and their freedom of action.

3. "A correct interpretation will be made with regard to any Syrian violation."

Even if Israeli intelligence correctly identified any deviant movement on the Syrian side, there is no guarantee that the interpretation will be accurate. History provides countless examples of situations where an enemy action was correctly identified by intelligence, but the attacked side did not undertake the proper reaction because it granted a lenient interpretation to enemy activity. The most relevant example is from the Yom Kippur War. The Egyptian military concentration in the vicinity of the Suez Canal was correctly identified by Israeli intelligence, but the intelligence system concluded that it was only a military exercise. In a situation where on the front opposite the Syrian divisions there is sovereign Syrian territory extending over scores of kilometers, this provides the Syrians with a vast range of opportunities to create subterfuge. For example, the Syrians could dispatch the army under the pretext of responding to riots by Syrian citizens on the Golan Heights, but in reality this could enable Syrian combat forces to arrive at battle stations against Israel.

4. "The Israeli government will react speedily and vigorously to any serious violation."

Ron Tira in his book *Shaping Israeli Policy toward Syria* calls a concept based

on these assumptions "the trip wire concept." According to this explanation, any Syrian violation will cause Israel to respond automatically, rapidly and effectively in real time.

Yet even if from an intelligence standpoint a warning in real time is provided, and even if it is correctly interpreted, the Israeli government will still be called upon to decide whether to order the introduction of Israeli forces into the Golan Heights before the arrival of Syrian forces in the area. This decision will have to be taken in a matter of hours. The difficulty in making it derives from the asymmetric situation that will be created. The movement of Syrian forces toward the border is indeed a violation of the agreement, but since it would occur within sovereign Syrian territory, it will be hard to determine definitively that this is a *casus belli*. By contrast, the movement of IDF forces toward the same region means crossing an international border and entering the sovereign territory of another state. From an international standpoint, it is Israel that has initiated a war against a country with which it shares a peace agreement. Furthermore, it is difficult to assume that in any situation the government of Israel will speedily adopt the harsher interpretation concerning the movement of Syrian forces and decide within a matter of hours to go to war.

5. "The IDF will fulfill its plan by outracing the Syrian force and arriving at its positions on the "ridge line."

Even if Israel successfully met all of these challenges, the IDF would still have to reach its optimal position on the "eastern ridge line" quickly and without significant attrition of its forces. However, there are three factors that will encumber any such maneuver:

1. Following an agreement, the area will not necessarily resemble the current Golan Heights. The Syrians may be expected to build cities and towns around the principal transportation arteries. It is plausible that the Syrians will also build anti-tank obstacles under the guise of irrigation canals and in this manner could hamper the movement of Israeli forces.
2. The Syrians will also most likely choose a time when weather conditions are forbidding, making ground movement extremely arduous.
3. Finally, Israel's need to make rapid land movements in order to capture the high ground before the Syrians get there makes the launch of a ground operation incumbent as Israel's first move, but in doing so Israel will be compelled to forego preparatory air activity.

Responding to Changing Threats

Three additional problems remain for which the security arrangements idea formulated in 2000 provided no answers.

1. The Increased Effectiveness of Advanced Anti-Tank and Anti-Aircraft Missiles

Both of these weapons can be carried and operated by a single soldier or by a pair of infantrymen. The relative improvement in these two types of weaponry is

greater than the improvements in the capacity of tanks or airplanes, and especially helicopters or UAVs, to contend with them.

Beyond the tactical advantages that these weapons confer, they have a decisive advantage in that no supervisory apparatus exists to control their stationing in the Golan. While an effective supervisory apparatus can identify the prohibited presence of tanks or artillery, it cannot identify a truck loaded with vegetable crates that also contains Kornet anti-tank missiles or SA-18 anti-aircraft missiles.

2. The Expected Urbanization of the Golan Heights

Israel must assume that the Syrians will build cities and towns on the "liberated" Golan Heights along transportation arteries that will constitute compulsory passageways for the entering Israeli forces, and along the cliff line commanding the Hula Valley.

There will be many "policemen" in these cities who during the day will circulate armed only with pistols, but when the time arrives they can, together with many other "civilians," operate thousands of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles that will be stored in those cities. This combination of a densely built-up area together with infantry fighters operating advanced anti-tank weaponry could slow the movement of Israeli forces and result in vast attrition.

Even if Israeli forces are finally able to reach the eastern ridge line, this may not necessarily occur before the Syrian forces have arrived there.

3. The Syrian Strategic Threat

With all due respect to the importance of Syrian ground forces, the major Syrian threat is predicated on two other components: ground-to-ground missiles and large quantities of chemical weapons. In discussions that took place in 1999-2000, no attempt was made to reduce the presence of these two capabilities. It is possible that this approach was foredoomed, but it is still important to realize that in return for a concession on a strategic asset of the first order – the Golan Heights – no reciprocal concession was made in terms of a reduction in Syrian strategic capabilities.

Changed Circumstances Since 2000

Changes in Syrian Military Capabilities

Many changes have occurred in the relation of forces between Israel and Syria since the previous round of discussions on security arrangements for the Golan Heights. Not only have these changes not reduced the importance of strategic depth, but they have even increased its importance.

Syria has developed a growing advantage in its inventory of high trajectory weapons, from mortars and artillery to ground-to-ground missiles. Quite naturally, as the range needed for the weapons diminishes, the number of effective firing pieces that the enemy possesses increases. The Syrian army has thousands of mortars and hundreds of artillery pieces, as well as hundreds of rockets (with a

range surpassing 30 km.) and scores of ground-to-ground missiles. If war was to erupt today, Syrian mortars could only hit advanced IDF outposts (that are properly fortified). Syrian artillery could reach the heart of the Golan Heights, but all the IDF's logistic concentrations, assembly points for reserve forces (a particularly vulnerable target), command headquarters, and air force bases are beyond artillery range and are only within the effective range of rockets and ground-to-ground missiles. These types of weapons are relatively small in number and their vulnerability to attack by Israeli aircraft is high.

A forfeiture of the Golan Heights would create a situation where the IDF's assembly areas in the Hula Valley would be within the effective range of Syrian mortars and artillery. The structure of the terrain also ensures that these areas would also be within the effective range of Syrian anti-tank missiles. We are no longer dealing with the Sagger missiles of Yom Kippur War vintage, but with advanced missiles with an effective range of 5 km., both day and night. Additionally, improvements in anti-aircraft missiles and especially the existence of advanced shoulder-launched missiles will allow the Syrians to conceal them in built-up areas prior to the war and launch them from the most forward line at the beginning of the war.

On the other hand, the Israeli advantage lies with its modern air force and its capability of precision target destruction from the land and from the air. However, the IDF's superior ground capabilities may not find expression because their operation requires preparatory activity and deployment from areas that are not subjected to intense enemy fire.

Furthermore, the air force is liable to suffer from two difficulties:

1. The immediate Syrian missile threat to Israel's strategic rear will compel the Israel Air Force to fight both in support of ground troops as well as to suppress Syrian rocket and missile fire at an early stage. This stands in sharp contrast to the current security concept positing that Israeli ground forces can get along almost on their own during the first days of the fighting while the air force achieves air superiority. Air superiority at an early stage is not only a prerequisite for victory, but also a condition for minimizing attrition at the front, limiting damage from missiles to the rear, and abbreviating the duration of the fighting.
2. As the Syrian anti-aircraft missile threat is based closer to Israel's heartland, it will cover a larger portion of the country's north and will severely hamper efficient action by the air force.

The Lebanese Theater

The negotiations that took place between Israel and Syria in 1999-2000 were intended to lead to a general peace agreement between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. An inseparable part of that agreement mandated the complete dismantling of Hizbullah's military forces. In 2005 the Syrians were compelled under international pressure to withdraw their forces from Lebanon. From that stage onward, the Syrians contend, and quite rightly, that they cannot speak in the name of the Lebanese government, and definitely they cannot guarantee the

dismantling of Hizbullah.

The result is that Israel can reach a full peace agreement with Syria that will mandate a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights, but Hizbullah will continue to exist at its full strength. Furthermore, any security arrangements that were agreed upon assumed that no tangible threat existed from the area of Lebanon. It is clear that a forfeiture of the Golan without totally guaranteeing the Lebanese flank would be an act of national irresponsibility.

The New Economic Reality

In the previous round of negotiations, in return for conceding the Golan Heights, Israel was slated to receive lavish economic compensation from the United States. The sum of money discussed at the time was \$17 billion, an amount which would have led to a tangible upgrade in IDF capabilities. It is clear that today, in the midst of a major economic crisis, the U.S. is in no position to offer any such economic compensation in the amount that was proposed at that time.

In other words, in return for the danger and the weakness that will result from conceding the Golan Heights, Israel will not be fully or even partially compensated with an improvement in its other capabilities.

Diplomatic and Military Implications of a Golan Withdrawal

In the foreseeable future, the sole possible peace agreement between Syria and Israel mandates an Israeli concession of the entire Golan Heights. It is possible that Israel would not be in such a predicament had Israeli prime ministers, from Rabin onward, not agreed explicitly or implicitly to such an arrangement. Theoretically, other solutions are possible (leasing the Golan Heights, joint sovereignty, a regional territorial agreement, etc.), but today it will prove almost impossible to induce the Syrians to consider any other idea aside from the full transfer of the Golan Heights to their sovereignty.

Such an agreement is possible, and it is a plausible assumption that the entire world will support its attainment. Contrary to its image, Iran would support such an agreement. Iran supported and will continue to support any arrangement that transfers areas from Israel to the Arabs. Since Syria will insist that the peace agreement with Israel has no bearing on the relationship between Damascus and other countries, this agreement will not weaken Syrian-Iranian ties. Neither would a peace agreement between Syria and Israel significantly curtail Hizbullah's military and political power, since Hizbullah relies more on Iran and the support of the Shiite community in Lebanon. Public Syrian support is much less important to Hizbullah, and Syrian assistance in weaponry is guaranteed even following any peace agreement (even if Syria should pledge otherwise).

An Israeli-Syrian peace agreement would mandate Israel's total withdrawal from the Golan Heights. The only room for negotiations would be in relation to two narrow strips of land, the first northeast of the Sea of Galilee and the second in the area of Hamat Gader. These areas stem from the gap between the 1923 international boundary (the Israeli position) and the 1967 line (the Syrian

position) that included Syrian encroachments on Israeli territory between 1949 and 1967. The possibility that Syria will consent to continued Israeli sovereignty in even part of the Golan (the cliff line) appears very slim.

In return for an Israeli descent from the Golan, full relations of peace are to exist between the two countries, and there will be arrangements on the water issue as well as security provisions.

The security provisions will focus on three topics: demilitarization, the maintenance of intelligence warning stations, and the existence of an international supervisory apparatus. With all the importance of these matters, they cannot guarantee Israel a sufficient military response should the Syrians decide for any reason whatsoever to violate the agreement.

It is plausible that if such an agreement is signed, it will be honored by the present Syrian regime, but Assad's continued rule is far from guaranteed. Hafiz al-Assad and his son Bashar have predicated their rule on the support of the Alawite community that constitutes only 14 percent of the Syrian population. The Sunni majority (80 percent) despises them, defines their rule as illegitimate, and is awaiting the moment to exact vengeance for the severe repression that they have suffered. The Sunnis view the Alawites as an inferior community whose religion is closer to idolatry than to Islam.

Should a Sunni revolution occur in Syria, particularly if it is carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood, it is totally unclear that the new regime will honor any agreement that was made by the "apostate" Bashar al-Assad.

Indeed, a peace agreement with Israel could serve as a catalyst for this revolution. Hafiz al-Assad and Bashar rule Syria with the aid of emergency security laws whose existence is justified by the "Israeli aggression." If peace was made with Israel, this excuse would disappear and it would be hard for the regime to continue to repress the Sunnis in the same manner.

The Israeli-Syrian conflict, as opposed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is a territorial conflict between two sovereign states. It resembles scores of conflicts throughout the world, some of them soluble and some of them not. The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is an example of the insoluble category. In this situation it is preferable to continue managing the conflict rather than trying to solve it at an exorbitant price and risk. Should it ever be possible to reach another solution, then this can be re-examined.

Other solutions could involve a long-term lease on the Golan Heights (for a hundred years), a solution predicated on joint sovereignty in the Golan, or a regional solution under which Syria will receive only part of the Golan Heights from Israel. In this last scenario, Syria would receive in compensation an area of comparable size from Jordan, which in turn would receive a similar slice from Israel in the Arava region. Since at the moment none of these solutions appears to have matured, and the options are "all or nothing," "nothing" remains the preferred option.

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The Future of the Two-State Solution

(2009)

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- While the outlines of a two-state solution are generally known, the maximum that any government of Israel will be ready to offer the Palestinians and still survive politically is much less than the minimum that any Palestinian leader can accept. The real gap between both sides is much greater than what is perceived, and that gap is growing.
- The level of trust between both sides has changed. There are fewer Israelis who believe that the real intention of the Palestinians is to have only a small Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, there is less trust in the Palestinians' abilities to keep their commitments, even if they undertake the right commitments.
- In Gaza today there is, for all practical purposes, an independent state led by Hamas. It is not part of the Palestinian Authority because that is what the Palestinians decided. If there is an accountable state in Gaza, although it is an enemy state, Israel has a degree of deterrence because there is another party that has something to lose. Current Israeli policy claims that Israel's goal is to bring about the collapse of the Hamas government in Gaza, but that is not going to happen.
- If we make Gaza double or triple its current size by adding an additional 600 sq. km. of territory from Egyptian Sinai, this could give Gaza the space it needs. Suddenly Gaza would have the space to build a new city of a million people, along with a real seaport and airport, and to create the conditions that would make economic expansion possible.
- At the same time, Israel needs 600 sq. km. in the West Bank because the 1967 line is unacceptable from a security point of view. In return, Israel could give to Egypt 600 sq. km. in the Negev in southern Israel. At the end of the day no one loses land, while multilateral swaps enable us to solve the currently intractable problem of Gaza and solve Israeli needs in the West Bank.
- Egypt can gain significant benefits from this arrangement. The new seaport and airport next to Egypt can become major economic connections between the Gulf and Europe. Furthermore, Egypt could get a land corridor to enable movement from Egypt to the rest of the Middle East without the need to cross Israel.

The Gaps Are Growing

When we talk about the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we see a paradox. On one hand, there is a real need to solve this conflict. Yet while the outlines of a two-state solution are generally known, the maximum that any government of Israel will be ready to offer the Palestinians and still survive politically is much less than the minimum that any Palestinian leader can accept. In other words, the real gap between both sides is much greater than what is perceived, and that gap is growing rather than becoming smaller. While everyone expresses their commitment to the two-state solution because it has become politically correct to do so, this doesn't mean that the political leadership can reach any such agreement since the political risks they face are far greater than the prospects of success. They are not motivated to take such huge risks when the probability of success is so low.

Indeed, in the eight years since the failure of the Clinton-sponsored talks at Camp David, most of the variables have changed for the worse. First of all, eight years ago we had three leaders who could deliver. President Clinton was deeply involved in this process; he knew the details and invested all his political influence. I'm not sure there will be any other American president in the future who will be ready to exert so much effort on this specific issue.

The Israeli leader at that time, Ehud Barak, enjoyed the support of Israeli public opinion in the summer of 2000, a short time after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. He was perceived to be a leader who could make hard decisions and could implement them. Yasser Arafat, no matter what many Israelis think about his character, at least was perceived by the Palestinians as their real national leader, someone who could speak in the name of all Palestinians. Since then, there has been no Palestinian leader like him and I cannot foresee anyone else achieving his status in the foreseeable future.

Second, the level of trust between both sides also has changed. There are fewer and fewer Israelis who believe that the real intention of the Palestinians is to have only a small Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. There is a stronger Israeli fear that this is not the ultimate desire of the Palestinians. Furthermore, there is less trust in the Palestinians' abilities to keep their commitments, even if they undertake the right commitments.

Third, there is the rise of Hamas. Eight years ago, Hamas was in the opposition and no one could really challenge the Palestinian Authority. Today Hamas is strong enough to do so, and if it is not the main force in Palestinian society, Hamas is strong enough to undermine every political process.

If a solution between the Israelis and the Palestinians could not be achieved eight years ago when most of the circumstances were much better, on what basis can we believe that today we can take the very same solution and suddenly be more successful? I think it is a big illusion that something like this can happen, at least in the foreseeable future.

Possible Modifications to the Conventional Solution

So what can be done? There are basically two different approaches. One says a solution is not going to be achieved in the near future, so rather than try to solve the problem, let's try to manage the conflict and try to improve whatever can be improved and hope that someday the situation will be better.

The second approach is to explore other possibilities or modifications to the conventional two-state solution. According to the conventional solution, at the end of the day there will be two states: Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with borders very similar to the 1967 lines.

This solution suffers from major obstacles that prevent us from moving forward. One is the problem of Israeli security, and another is the territorial problem, or the lack of territory that can be sufficient for all sides.

Israel's Need for Defensible Borders

It is part of the common international approach that Israel should return to the 1967 borders. But before 1967, Jordan and Egypt were responsible for the West Bank and Gaza, respectively. Israel was small and its borders were not very defensible. Now, according to the two-state solution, suddenly an additional Arab state - a Palestinian state - has to be established, which is a different situation than what existed before 1967.

First of all, this future Arab state of Palestine is probably going to be very weak, very fragile, and very dependent. So we are told it is Israel's task to make sure this future Palestinian state is viable, strong, and satisfied, because if the people there are not satisfied, then it will backfire. And because this state is divided between Gaza and the West Bank, to make it a viable state, Israel is expected to agree to a land connection between the two areas.

Unfortunately, there is a state in between - Israel - that is going to be interrupted by this need of the Palestinians for free movement between the two parts of the future state. So from many points of view, Israel is expected to return to a situation that is much worse than what existed before 1967.

The Politically Incorrect Jordanian Option

Today, it is well understood that if Israel were to withdraw completely from the West Bank, then in a short time, perhaps a few months, Hamas would take control, just as it controls Gaza. A Palestinian state controlled by Hamas in the West Bank would create a security situation which is completely unbearable for Israel.

At the same time, many moderate Palestinians in the West Bank are beginning to support greater Jordanian involvement there, and even talk in terms of Jordanian control of the West Bank. If those secular, moderate Palestinians have to decide between Hamas or Jordan, many prefer Jordan. Many also believe that the two-

state solution - of a Palestinian state alongside Israel - is not going to be achieved. So to end the Israeli occupation, perhaps the only way is to create a new political situation in which the West Bank becomes part of Jordan. This is something that Israel would be much more willing to consider when compared to a Palestinian state that is not going to be reliable. Of course, the idea of Jordanian control is not politically correct, so no one is prepared to say it officially, but in private talks many say it.

From the Jordanian point of view the same concern exists. The Jordanians understand very well that if there is a Palestinian state in the West Bank, this state would be controlled by Hamas. The Jordanians are concerned about a Palestinian state that shares a common border with Jordan, where the majority of the population is Palestinian and the Muslim Brotherhood is a rising force. This is a formula that would threaten the Jordanian regime.

Solving the Problem of Gaza

Building two viable states in the narrow strip of territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is probably not possible because there is too little land and too many other problems, such as the situation in Gaza.

The Gaza Strip contains 1.5 million people in an area of 360 sq. km., a population which is expected to grow to 2.4 million people by 2020. Does anyone really believe that those Palestinians will be so happy in Gaza that they will focus all of their attention on their own well-being and in developing their economy, and will live peacefully alongside Israel? If Israel signed a peace agreement with the Palestinians today, would this give the people in Gaza the minimum that is needed for viable economic life?

In Gaza today there is, for all practical purposes, an independent state led by Hamas. It is not part of the Palestinian Authority because that is what the Palestinians decided. If there is an accountable state in Gaza, although it is an enemy state, there is an address - an address for a cease-fire - and Israel can retaliate whenever something goes wrong. Israel has a degree of deterrence because there is another party that has something to lose. The current Israeli policy claims that Israel's goal is to bring about the collapse of the Hamas government in Gaza, but that is not going to happen.

Hamas control of Gaza is a decision of the Palestinians, and the Hamas government is no less legitimate than many other regimes in the region. They won the election and they want to exercise their sovereignty on an area where they actually won the hearts and minds of the people. It is not up to Israel to decide who is going to control the Palestinians in Gaza. I believe that Israel and Hamas can find a way to live together, but that doesn't mean that Hamas will ever agree to a real peace and to an end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

The principle of land swaps has already been discussed as part of the two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians. Why can't we have multilateral swaps

between Israel, Palestine, and Egypt?

If we make Gaza double or triple its current size by adding additional territory from Egyptian Sinai - say another 600 sq. km. - this could give Gaza the space it needs. Suddenly Gaza would have the space to build a new city of a million people, along with a real seaport and airport, and to create the conditions that would make economic expansion possible. At the same time, Israel needs 600 sq. km. in the West Bank because the 1967 line is unacceptable from Israel's point of view. In return, Israel could give to Egypt 600 sq. km. in the Negev in southern Israel. At the end of the day no one loses land, while multilateral swaps enable us to solve the currently intractable problem of Gaza and solve Israeli needs in the West Bank.

According to the two-state solution, Israel will be required to evacuate some 100,000 people from the West Bank. Yet that is something the State of Israel cannot bear. The economic price alone of such a move is about \$30 billion, an amount that is beyond the capability of the state. In addition, there is the security factor. Six hundred sq. km. is about 12 percent of the West Bank, which is the minimum that can secure the real vital interests of the State of Israel.

With this plan, not only does Egypt lose nothing, but at the end of the day Egypt can gain significant benefits from this arrangement. The new seaport and airport next to Egypt can become major economic connections between the Gulf and Europe. Furthermore, Egypt could get a land corridor to enable movement from Egypt to the rest of the Middle East without the need to cross Israel.

In this proposal no one loses anything - neither Egypt, nor the Palestinians, nor Israel. This doesn't solve all of the problems, but it does solve at least one significant problem – the territorial dimension.

The bottom line is that the two-state solution is a very nice slogan, and no one takes any political risk by endorsing it, but it cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future. So we have to decide if there is something better for all the relevant parties. We can either stay more or less in the same situation and try to manage the conflict, or we can try to think of some other solution.

When you ask the Egyptians and the Jordanians the direct question: Are you interested in the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The answer is: Yes. Is it your interest to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Yes. However, an interest is not only something that you want to happen. It is something that you want and are ready to pay for in order to get it.

So far, the only thing that Israel hears from the Arab world is that they want the two-state solution to happen. But what exactly is the contribution the Arab world is prepared to make to achieve this? What kind of proactive role are they ready to take? Taking concrete steps to solve the territorial problem is one thing that the Arab countries can contribute, even if they get back whatever they give in this proposed trilateral swap.

The Problem of Palestinian Leadership

I would say that Palestinian society is divided into three groups. Maybe 20 percent of the people are supportive of Hamas. They are religious, they believe in this ideology, and they will be against any agreement with Israel. Another 20 percent are more moderate, secular, and they really want peace. The remaining 60 percent are the silent majority. Many of these people will follow whoever can deliver, whoever can give them something. While the only side that is offering something to the people is Hamas, if you offer them the proposal suggested here and say that this is a chance to build something that gives you real hope to someday become the Singapore of the Middle East, things might change if there were the right leadership, which is missing today.

In the end, nothing can happen unless there is a real Palestinian leadership that accepts this proposal. In a way, this is similar to the policy of the first Israeli prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, who said we cannot get all that we want, we have to make real concessions. But he was ready to pay the price and move forward because he wanted to have a state for his people. So far, this is not the message of the Palestinian leaders when they speak about the importance of an independent state. Palestinian rhetoric speaks about misery, about justice, about how Israel is doing terrible things. But the efforts that are made in order to improve what can be improved within domestic Palestinian society are minimal, and unless there is a change in this attitude, I agree that certain important conditions for peace are missing.

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The Geneva Accord: A Strategic Assessment (2003)

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

- A self-appointed Israeli negotiating team, claiming to speak in the name of a majority of Israelis, concluded the Geneva Accord with a Palestinian delegation. It conceded almost all the security arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza Strip sought by past Israeli governments.
- The Geneva Accord leaves Israel with no safety net in the event that the agreement is violated by the Palestinian side. It is as though its architects learned nothing from the collapse of the Oslo Agreement.
- The Geneva architects agreed to the expulsion of more than 100,000 Israeli Jews from the territories.
- In the name of the Jewish people, the Israeli Geneva team gave up the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Jewish history. They seem unaware of

the long-term implications for the Zionist movement of conceding Zion.

- According to Geneva, Israelis recognize for the first time a Palestinian "right of return" to pre-1967 Israel. In exchange, the Palestinians agreed that not all the Palestinians will come to Israel. The number that will enter Israeli territory cannot be understood from Geneva's wording.
- The Geneva model should not be adopted by anyone concerned for the security and future of the Jewish state.

The Geneva Accord, which perhaps should have been called the Dead Sea Agreement, for that is where it was negotiated, is not an agreement between states. Nevertheless, its Israeli signatories present it as a "model" for a future treaty. In this context, it is fitting to examine what exactly the Geneva model contains and what it lacks, as though it was a real peace treaty, for only in that way can the model it proposes be judged.

Looking at some of the comments about the agreement, it appears to be based on very tangible Israeli concessions in exchange for what is presented as a real Palestinian concession over their claim of a "right of return." Is this really the case? This requires detailed examination.

The Israeli Concessions

The Temple Mount

What did the Israeli team concede in this model agreement? First, the Israelis took a step that no Israeli government had ever taken before: they transferred sovereignty over the Temple Mount in Jerusalem to the Palestinians, establishing "Zionism without Zion." This is an ideological concession that is a matter of individual values – something everyone can judge according to his or her own world view.

There will be those who see in this concession a break between Israel and its historical heritage, and therefore an act that negates the very legitimacy of the return of the Jewish people to their land. According to this view, Geneva provides the Palestinians with their ultimate victory on the central question that has been raised since the beginning of the modern return to Zion: have the Jewish people returned to their historic homeland or did they come as foreign occupiers? True, Israel lived without the Temple Mount from 1948 to 1967, but this would be the first time it actually conceded possession.

In contrast, there will be quite a number of Israelis who will see the Temple Mount issue in very practical terms - that formalizing Palestinian sovereignty is only making permanent the present-day arrangements that have existed on an interim basis since 1967, since the Muslim Waqf (originally Jordanian and now Palestinian), and not the State of Israel, really determines what happens on the Temple Mount. From this perspective, "territorial compromise" must necessarily include Jerusalem, and the Temple Mount within, and there is no added significance to this concession except the recognition that, without it, Israel will

be forced to live by the sword for eternity. Accordingly, it is worthwhile to make this compromise over symbols in order to reach a better future.

The Geneva model contains the most extreme version of this approach, for it conceded the most important place in Jewish history. Gauging the impact of this kind of concession over a central value tied to the national soul of a people is not easy to measure, but it is probably far more damaging than those who elected to follow this course might ever imagine. Moreover, in Geneva this concession is total. The agreement ironically establishes that the supreme authority over the Temple Mount will include various states, the United Nations, and the European Union, as well as representatives of the Organization of Islamic States – but Jewish representatives will not take part in the proposed international body.

The West Bank and Gaza

The second major Israeli concession is an almost total withdrawal from the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and the Gaza Strip. In the matter of territory, the Israeli Geneva signatories took a major step beyond the concessions offered by the Barak government: of all the settlement blocs, Geneva leaves mainly those surrounding Jerusalem. Its concession of withdrawal from the Ariel area dramatically increases the number of Israeli citizens who will have to be removed or expelled from their homes. Geneva also entails an almost total abandonment of the high ground dominating the metropolitan Tel Aviv region, leaving the central stretch of Israel's coastal strip, where most of its population and industrial capacity are located, completely exposed, without any real strategic depth.

The transfer of the Jordan Rift Valley to the Palestinians leaves Israel with no ability to defend itself from threats from the east, should they emerge once again in the future (no one knows exactly what will be in Iraq in the long term). The withdrawal from the West Bank also has elements in common with the concessions the Geneva architects made over Jerusalem. The power of its historical significance may be less, but the withdrawal has broad practical significance for both Israeli security and for the vast numbers of Jews who will have to be removed. Moreover, even the tiniest Palestinian territorial concession is fully compensated for with an equivalent amount of empty land inside the State of Israel. Thus, in effect, there isn't even the slightest territorial concession by the Palestinians to Israel.

Security Arrangements

The third concession in Geneva worth analyzing is the loss of "security arrangements" that had been an essential part of previous Israeli proposals. Looking at the results of this negotiation, the involvement of former Israeli army officers was completely superfluous. The Geneva Accord contains no security safety net whatsoever. There is evidence of the involvement of former Israel Air Force personnel in the drafting of Geneva, for the only arrangement that is related to security is the right reserved for the Israel Air Force to conduct military exercises in the airspace over Palestine.

It is true that there are a few elements that remain of what former Prime Minister

Yitzhak Rabin insisted upon - that Israel will have its military border along the Jordan River. Geneva provides Israel with two isolated, and hence worthless, early-warning stations. But all of Rabin's other security requirements are dropped in Geneva, either immediately or over the course of three years. The Geneva security arrangements are even scaled back from what appeared in the draft to which the Palestinians gave their agreement during the Barak period.

In essence, almost all of Israel's security requirements were exchanged for the idea of deploying a foreign military presence that will be supervised by an international committee created to oversee the agreement's implementation. Israel's security needs were also conceded in return for basically empty declarations about cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security establishments. According to the logic of Geneva, the Israel Defense Forces can be dismantled, for the IDF has no role in fighting terrorism and in defending the State of Israel. These responsibilities, according to Geneva, will now lay with the proposed international force. The end result is that decisions on matters crucial to Israel's sovereignty and security are put in the hands of an international committee. Since the end of 1947, such committees have consistently rallied against Israel. In Geneva, the European Union, the United Nations, and others will be responsible for the security of Israel.

For example, there is no provision in the agreement for the deployment of Israeli forces in the Jordan Valley, if a concrete threat from the east evolves. Israel would have no control, or even an Israeli presence, at the borders between Palestine and Egypt or Jordan in order to thwart the infiltration of terrorist elements into Palestinian territory. There would be no Israeli presence at the international entry points, or at Palestinian airports and seaports, in order to prevent the smuggling of illegal weaponry (which was attempted regularly during the Oslo years). Even if the Palestinian regime or the international forces that are deployed fail to take effective measures against persistent terrorism, Israel would have no right to operate against terrorist cells coming from Palestinian territory or to act against terrorists that it knows are planning to strike. Indeed, there is an Israeli responsibility to avoid such actions. The only right Israel has is to complain about the negligence of those who are supposed to protect its security.

Of course, if Palestinian terrorism does not come to a halt, Israel will find itself without the necessary capabilities to prevent such attacks and bring them to an end. Moreover, since an international force will be present, Israel will lose its freedom of action, even if it is forced to ignore its commitments under the agreement. Zeev Schiff, the commentator on national security for *Ha'aretz* newspaper, has already noted that if a Geneva-like agreement were to collapse for any reason after it was implemented, Israel would find itself in a far more difficult situation. The assessment of the security threat to Israel under such a scenario must include regular Katyusha rocket attacks on Tel Aviv, unrestrained terrorist attacks across all of Israel, and the use of far more sophisticated weaponry than has been used in the past. The qualitative improvement in the weaponry on the Palestinian side will make it much more difficult for the Israel Defense Forces to counter them.

A reader of the Geneva Accord gains the impression that those who drafted it completely forgot that there was already a "peace process" begun in Oslo that collapsed and continued in the form of a brutal terrorist campaign, that was supported by some of the Palestinian signatories to Oslo. The Geneva exercise is not based on any serious attempt to learn any lessons from Oslo's breakdown: What if the dream of peace is not realized because the intentions and capabilities of the other side were not correctly evaluated? When Israeli intelligence warned that the Oslo agreements could end up with the firing of Katyusha rockets on Ashkelon, this appeared at the time to be illogical to its architects and supporters. Among former Israeli officers, the question must be asked how some people allow themselves to ignore this possibility, even today, *after Qassam rockets have already struck Ashkelon and Sderot*. It is a sad irony that the language on Israel's rights in the Geneva Accord leave it only with the option of issuing a complaint, even if it detects the movement of tanks and armored vehicles within the Palestinian corridor it is to create between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This encapsulates the extent to which Israeli security was treated irresponsibly in the Geneva Accord.

The Palestinian Concessions

What are the Palestinians giving in return for the Israeli concession of sovereignty over the Temple Mount, the near total withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, and the loss of all meaningful security arrangements? The Israeli Geneva architects say that the Palestinians gave up their claim of a "right of return" of Palestinian refugees to pre-1967 Israel. This point requires very careful examination, because with the exception of Sari Nusseibeh, no leading Palestinian public figure has dared to speak of a concession on the "right of return." To the contrary, the more negotiations progress, the more it will become clear that the Palestinians still insist on their demand for "the return."

From the Palestinian viewpoint, the "right of return" contains two elements:

1. The matter of principle – meaning the recognition of the existence of such a right.
2. The method of implementation – meaning how many Palestinians will actually exercise this right if it is accorded to them.

The Israeli Geneva architects assert that their main achievement is with respect to the second element of the right of return, for they claim to have reached an agreement that will let Israel control the numbers of those returning. Yet the very recognition of the first element, the principle of a "right of return" based on Geneva's explicit reliance on UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948 and on the resolutions of the Beirut Arab Summit of 2002, is nothing less than an historical error of the highest order of magnitude. It connects the very existence of Israel to a Palestinian version of a fundamental injustice whose historical accuracy it can no longer refute after Geneva. In short, it undermines Israel's very right to exist.

It is clear upon examination of Geneva that its main achievement for Israel - blocking the Palestinian right of return - is far from hermetic. True, the Palestinians concede their unqualified demand to allow all the refugees to immigrate to Israel. Yet the Palestinians obtained Israeli recognition of the "right" to assert it in large numbers. The actual number of "returnees" is supposed to be calculated according to the average number of refugees that will be taken in around the world. On one hand, the agreement stipulates that it is up to the individual Palestinian refugee to decide where he wants to settle (in Palestine, Israel, or a third country). On the other hand, the agreement recognizes Israel's sovereign right to determine the entry of refugees. This potential contradiction is bound to leave Israel open to continuing international pressure to open its doors. It is not surprising to find the Palestinian legislator who was one of the Palestinian team leaders, Kadura Fares, telling the London Arabic daily *al-Hayat*, in mid-October 2003, that the Palestinians did not give up the "right of return." The results of this could be devastating, even leading to a change in the demographic balance inside Israel in a manner that will threaten its character as a Jewish state.

The Geneva proposals on the Palestinian refugees are a trap for Israel, for if an Israeli government were to refuse to fully implement the decisions of the international committee concerning the "return" of tens or hundreds of thousands of refugees to Israeli territory, the Palestinians retain the right, according to the Geneva Accord, to continue the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and their struggle as they did before the agreement was signed. This is a formula for future disarray. The section on refugees ends with an Israeli commitment to commemorate the memory of former Palestinian villages that existed before the 1948 invasion by the Arab states. Wouldn't such a project simply reinforce Palestinian awareness of their refugee status forever? This is a huge Palestinian achievement.

Other Issues Emanating from Geneva

While the above analysis covers the major issues that appear in the Geneva Accord, there are other aspects of the proposed model that need to be critically examined:

Conditionality and Reciprocity

There is no conditionality in the timetable of Geneva's implementation. According to the agreement, Israel's complete withdrawal is to take place even if terrorism persists. Of course, Israel has the right to complain to the international committee, but it may not halt its withdrawal, even if Israel has solid confirmation that the Palestinian Authority is not lifting a finger to combat terrorism or if there are intelligence indications that it is actually providing tangible assistance to terrorist groups. Even under these conditions, Israel is required to transfer territories vital to its national defense and to concede its ability to fight terrorism.

The Issue of Water

The Geneva Accord contains no understanding between the parties over the

question of water resources. Nonetheless, the Palestinians have achieved a significant advance payment in this area: explicit Israeli recognition of Palestinian sovereignty over water resources in their territory. There is no reference to the fact that these water resources are part of the mountain and coastal aquifers that stretch into Israel and constitute the primary source of water for Israelis residing in central Israel. It is not clear why, even in this unfinished area of negotiation, the Israeli team created a position of clear-cut inferiority for Israel, right from the start.

Corridors

The Palestinians are to be given a corridor from the Gaza Strip to the Hebron highlands that crosses the State of Israel. By contrast, in cases where such corridors would have been useful for Israelis, such as from Jerusalem to Ein Gedi or along Route 443 connecting Tel Aviv and Jerusalem through Beit Horon, Israelis have no equivalent rights of passage.

Israel as a Jewish State?

Even what ostensibly should have been a fundamental matter of principle – that the Palestinians recognize the State of Israel as a Jewish state – is phrased carelessly and in a manner that is open to diverse interpretations. This allows the Palestinians to give a very different meaning to this clause, so that there is no connection between any claim of an achievement for Israel and the actual language that Geneva adopts. In the agreement, the State of Israel recognizes a Palestinian state, with its national character defined, but "Palestine" only recognizes Israel as a state, with no reference to its character. Indeed, Kadura Fares of the Palestinian negotiating team told *al-Hayat* that the Palestinians did not recognize Israel as a Jewish state in the Geneva document. Furthermore, given the clauses in Geneva on the "right of return," the Palestinians can wage a campaign to alter Israel's demographic make-up and remain true to their signature on the agreement.

In summary, an analysis of the Geneva model indicates that it is completely slanted to the Palestinian side. It is an agreement that contains virtually no Israeli achievement whatsoever in comparison with the tangible concessions it grants to the Palestinians: principally, the abandonment of the Temple Mount and the loss of security arrangements that up until now Israel insisted upon, and whose importance has been demonstrated over the years since the signing of the Oslo Agreements and their crashing failure. Israel loses an important part of its national sovereignty in this agreement to an international committee, and it concedes the ability to defend itself to an international force. In addition, Israel will have to deal with the "right of return" and absorb massive numbers of refugees on its territory within the "green line," for Israel itself is not to decide how many will come.

Israelis should judge the model put forward in the Geneva Accord according to what it contains and what it lacks. This analysis is far more important than the ceremonies and participation of foreign leaders, for whom the destiny of Israel has never been a top priority.

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The Beginning of Israeli Rule in Judea and Samaria (1989)

Raphael Vardi

A Sudden Reassignment

At the outbreak of the Six-Day War, I was serving as the commander of the district of Jerusalem. On the afternoon of June 7, 1967, I was riding in a half-track on the way to capture Bethlehem when I received a call on the radio to come back to Jerusalem because the Minister of Defense wanted to see me. I argued that I was in the midst of the campaign, but they repeated the message and kept insisting.

By the time I arrived back at headquarters, Dayan had already left, but the commander of Central Command told me to report to the Ambassador Hotel in East Jerusalem where the new headquarters of the IDF forces occupying Judea and Samaria had been established. I was to be chief of staff to Major General Herzog (our present President), who was appointed as the commander of IDF forces in the West Bank. In December 1967 I became commander of the West Bank and in 1974 the Coordinator of Government Operations in the administered territories.

That same evening, on June 7th, the rule of military government by the IDF was proclaimed in Judea and Samaria, a rule now in its 22nd year.

Disbelief on Both Sides

Both the Arab population of the area as well as ourselves were surprised by the fact that in 48 hours we had occupied the West Bank of Jordan. They were made to believe, at the outbreak of hostilities, that the Jordanian and other Arab forces were in no time going to occupy Israel. Suddenly they were overwhelmed by the IDF defeating the Jordanian army in a matter of hours. Such was their surprise that the Israeli forces that entered Nablus were welcomed by the population with flowers and with flags because they believed that these were Iraqi forces that had come to support the Jordanians. We too were surprised because we believed and hoped that there would be no war with Jordan. Messages had been sent to King Hussein by Prime Minister Eshkol saying that if he would not start shooting, we shall refrain from shooting as well and there would be no war between us. But the Jordanian army started the war by occupying the UN headquarters located near Talpiot, and by shelling Jerusalem. The IDF counterattacked and in 48 hours the whole of the West Bank and Jerusalem was

under our control. The liberation of East Jerusalem and the Western Wall and all the other holy places was greeted on our side with great rejoicing.

We did not believe that the Israeli rule of the territories would last more than a few months following our experience after the Sinai Campaign in 1956 in which by March 1957 we were compelled to withdraw from the whole of Sinai. Some preparations for a military government in the West Bank, in case of war, had been made, but these were minimal because the possibility that the Big Powers would allow the occupation of the West Bank seemed unreal. Therefore we had to start organizing the military government virtually from scratch in order to establish the rule of the IDF, assume the functions of a civil government, maintain law and order, organize and provide public services, look after all the other necessities of the population, restore life to normal, and especially to reconstruct the economy.

A Local Arab Leadership Arises

During 21 years of IDF rule in the West Bank, only in those first two years was the local leadership of the Arab population ready to take its own fate in its own hands and try to negotiate a settlement with Israel. The local leadership, which at that time was comprised mainly of the notables of the leading families, began to send out feelers to us to find out what role they might play in future peace negotiations.

In that first month of June 1967, the local Arab population was ready and willing to fully cooperate with the military government in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well. As a result of the IDF occupation, the West Bank was cut off from Jordan, including the top administration of Islamic religious (Wakf) property and the court of appeals in religious matters, which were all located in Amman. Some local Moslem religious leaders approached us and requested the establishment, by an ordinance of the Military Government, of a religious court of appeals in Jerusalem as well as a local administration for Moslem religious affairs and property. This unqualified willingness to cooperate lasted only several weeks.

After the Knesset had enacted the act for the reunification of Jerusalem on June 28th and Israeli law had been established in East Jerusalem, the Arab leadership in Jerusalem ceased cooperating and began their first moves at resistance to the Israeli government. This fact had an immediate impact on the attitude of the population in the West Bank which at that time accepted and followed the Jerusalem leaders as their own.

In spite of that, some Arab leaders in the West Bank initiated some other political moves. At the beginning of July a certain notable from East Jerusalem brought me a petition signed by 200 notables of Jerusalem and the West Bank requesting permission to hold a convention to discuss their role in future peace negotiations, but the government rejected this request. Probably as a reaction to this refusal, the Jerusalem religious and political leadership began moves toward

independent political action against the wishes of both Israel and Jordan. At the end of July 1967 we received a letter signed by 22 leaders, mainly from Jerusalem, telling us that they had decided to establish a Supreme Moslem Council which would take care of all religious and judicial matters and the administration of the Wakf property.

Religious Autonomy

A Supreme Moslem Council had been established by the British Administration early in the 1920s and the infamous Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el Hussein, was appointed president of the Council until he fled the country sometime during the disturbances of 1936-39. After the Jordanians had annexed the West Bank in 1950, they dissolved the Supreme Moslem Council in Jerusalem. Instead they established in Amman a Ministry for Religious Affairs. This ministry was put in charge of all Arab religious matters in Jordan and in the West Bank formerly managed by the Supreme Moslem Council.

In 1967 the 22 local Arab leaders decided to reestablish the Supreme Moslem Council. They informed us, contrary to their earlier request, that foreigners such as ourselves, who were not Moslems (virtually heathens), could not control Moslem religious affairs, though the Jordanian law which prevailed in the West Bank obliged the military government to control and take care of all religious institutions. In addition they decided to establish an Islamic (Shari'a) religious court of appeals in Jerusalem for Jerusalem and the West Bank, and announced that hence they would nominate the justices of this court, as well as of the lower Shari'a courts in Jerusalem and elsewhere in the West Bank. The justices and other officials were employees of the Jordanian government that paid their salaries. When the Israeli administration offered to pay those salaries, they refused, contending that even salaries could not be accepted from us because we were non-Moslems. What is especially interesting to note is that only a few weeks earlier, in June, they had asked us, as the legitimate government of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, to exercise our authority according to Jordanian law and to organize and control the same religious affairs.

The Supreme Moslem Council, which still exists today, was accepted by the population in those years as the political as well as the religious leadership of Jerusalem and the West Bank. The Council led and inspired the resistance that started against the military occupation of the West Bank and the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem. Strikes started gradually in August-September 1967, and then built up to a crescendo in 1968 and 1969. There were widespread commercial and school strikes as it is today in the intifada, though they were not violent at first. It began more as a kind of civil, non-violent resistance until the beginning of 1968 when it developed into violent demonstrations.

The majority of the members of the Supreme Moslem Council were secular, not religious leaders. When they started leading the resistance, we expelled some of them and restricted the movement of others. As a result the Council's overt activities concentrated more on religious matters while their political and other

anti-Israeli activities were covert. Since the Council had not been established by agreement but rather unilaterally, the military government did not formally or otherwise recognize it. The Council, to the contrary, did recognize the authority of the military government in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and tried to involve it in matters concerning Jerusalem. The Council was consistent in its refusal to recognize the Israeli civilian authorities in Jerusalem and entirely disregarded them, but was willing to deal with the Military Government in matters concerning Jerusalem. The chairman of the Council would periodically notify me of various nominations and appointments and other matters they undertook in Jerusalem and the West Bank. I never replied to the Council's notifications because we refused to recognize the Council. The Council cooperated, to a certain extent and when necessary, with the Jerusalem municipality. Years later, out of necessity, they "recognized" the Prime Minister of Israel, but failed to recognize the Ministries of Interior and Religious Affairs and refused to cooperate with them.

The Supreme Moslem Council acted in religious matters with complete independence. Our policy was not to intervene because we did not want religious matters to become issues of controversy between us.

The Beginning of the PLO

In 1967-68 the PLO was in its infancy and had not yet reached the status that it reached later on. They had started operating in July 1967. A small quantity of explosives was found near the wall of a police station in central Israel. Only later did we discover that this was the first terrorist act by the PLO against Israel after the Six-Day War. Later on, by the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968, they started infiltrating in great numbers from Jordan and tried to establish bases of operation in the hills of Samaria and Judea. The IDF had quite difficult problems fighting the PLO terrorists and infiltrators at the time. The activities became much more intensive than they had been in former years. The border along the Jordan River was wide open and men, weapons and explosives were smuggled in in great quantities. Only after the Karame operation in March 1968 when a barbed wire fence and other obstacles had been constructed and methods of tracking and combat tactics were developed did the situation come under control.

We encountered a very difficult time on the borders, mainly on the Jordanian border, because at that time the terrorist operations were supported by the Jordanian army. Our positions as well as our settlements in the Jordan Valley were shelled almost daily by Jordanian artillery for three years until September 1970. We had constant clashes with the Jordanian army and with the PLO terrorists infiltrating into the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, as well as into Israel. Even after we had established the fence along the Jordan River and installed other devices which made infiltration much more difficult, infiltrators kept coming and we had encounters with them in the West Bank and sometimes in Israel proper. Infiltration stopped almost entirely and terrorist activities decreased substantially after the Jordanian army expelled the PLO gangs from Jordan in

September 1970.

Educational Autonomy

In September 1967 the resistance of the local Arab population came into focus with the start of the school year. Arab schools did not open because at the time the Israeli Ministry of Education decided that the Jordanian curriculum in West Bank schools was to be replaced by the Israeli Arabic curriculum. The local population were afraid, and I believe with good reason from their point of view, that we were going to intervene with their education, to be followed by intervention in their Arab culture, social and religious life. Therefore they vehemently opposed this move and started a strike which included all schools and part of commerce. The strike went on for three months. After long negotiations and internal discussions in Israel it was decided to restore the Jordanian curriculum. A committee comprised of local Arab educators was established, which virtually runs the education system to this day. Only anti-Israel textbooks or passages in such books were removed. Following these changes they stopped the strike and the schools were opened. Though the military government maintained a department of education headed by an Israeli officer, there were only four Israeli officials in the whole establishment of the military government who were assigned to supervise education. All the rest, teachers and administrative staff, were local Arabs. To the present day they run the whole system, and they do it according to the curriculum, programs, books and examinations announced by the Jordanian Ministry of Education. Though we provide the money to pay the salaries of the 8,000 local teachers, construct and furnish schools, print books, etc., education is another field in which the Arabs are virtually completely independent. Under the military government six universities were opened (before 1967 there were none) which run their academic affairs without any Israeli intervention.

Autonomy Negotiations in 1968

In those first months after the war, it was, strangely enough, the leadership of Nablus who were the first to approach us and ask what they could do in order to begin negotiations between Israel and King Hussein of Jordan. They offered to act as mediators. They declared their wish to be returned to Jordan, even though they had suffered heavily under Jordanian rule. As all know, Jordan dealt very harshly with them because of their frequent uprisings against King Hussein in the West Bank in the 1950s and early 1960s. Those uprisings had endangered Hussein's regime, his rule and his crown, and the Jordanians subdued them with brutal force.

The Nablus leaders' offer to mediate was not accepted, but they returned sometime later, together with leaders from Ramallah and later on from Bethlehem and Jerusalem, and suggested the establishment of a local autonomy to run their own affairs, which would eventually develop into a form of self-rule for

the Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank.

Thus the idea of autonomy had been conceived and negotiations started. The Israeli government considered that it might be to our advantage to start negotiations with the local leadership, thereby signalling to Jordan that there was an alternative partner if Jordan did not hurry to begin peace negotiations with Israel. Agreeing to a certain degree of autonomy conformed with Israeli government policy to not interfere in the internal affairs of the local Arab population and to let them run their own lives the way they chose.

At first the Arabs proposed that there be a withdrawal of the IDF from the West Bank and that they would undertake responsibility for assuring that Jordanian forces would not cross the river into the West Bank. Autonomy would then be established and developed. Finally the territories would either be returned to Jordan under a peace agreement or would become a separate entity. Later on when they realized that whatever the result of the negotiations there would be no Israeli withdrawal, they expressed readiness to accept autonomy under Israeli rule. In such an autonomy they would manage all internal affairs except security and external affairs. The negotiations had their ups and downs and dragged on for many months during 1968. Moshe Sasson, at the time advisor to the Prime Minister, conducted the negotiations on behalf of the Israeli government.

Eventually a point was reached when a group of Arab leaders convened in Ramallah to answer certain questions that were put to them by the Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, on behalf of the government of Israel. Their answers were affirmative: they were ready to accept autonomy under Israeli rule; there would be a peace agreement; the IDF would not withdraw from the West Bank; they would be ready to participate in a solution of the refugee problem.

Then there was the problem of Jerusalem. They proposed that Jerusalem come under a kind of condominium of dual sovereignty – Israeli sovereignty and Arab sovereignty – provided that Jerusalem would remain united.

Further, to avoid the sensitive problem of Jerusalem, it was suggested that instead of having a single administration for the whole area of the West Bank, a separate canton for Samaria and a separate one for Judea would be established. (In January 1968 Israel officially changed the name of the West Bank to Judea and Samaria.) This solution would allow the question of Jerusalem to remain open without obstructing the autonomy.

At a certain stage the leaders from Nablus stopped participating in the negotiations, and only the leaders from Ramallah and Bethlehem continued. On the other hand, leaders from Hebron, who had not participated in the negotiations previously, came to join in the talks. The negotiations continued with all those leaders and focused on establishing either autonomy for the whole area or at first in the Ramallah-Bethlehem-Hebron areas (Judea) and later on in Bethlehem-Hebron only. By July 1968, agreement had almost been reached on the establishment of autonomy in the area of Bethlehem and Hebron and details were already discussed. Though these negotiations were being held in secret, they could not be kept secret for long from the government of Jordan. One day in

July 1968 the Prime Minister of Jordan went on radio in Amman, revealed the whole story and warned and threatened all the leaders on the West Bank to stop. After the exposure the local leaders broke off negotiations for several months, and resumed them again only in 1969.

In 1969 the Hebronites initiated negotiations for establishing another form of autonomy by extending the administrative powers of the Arab mayors to become similar to those of local governors under Jordanian law. These negotiations again went on for some time and then they too stopped because both the local leadership and the government of Israel became quite hesitant regarding their continuation. Two years of Israeli rule had already passed, law and order were by and large maintained, the economy expanded, unemployment disappeared, and the population's cooperation with the Military Government increased. Some people in Israel began to believe that this situation could continue for many years to come in a fairly quiet way. Eventually it did, for over twenty years, until recently.

Those early negotiations were accompanied by constant doubts as to their chance to succeed. We often felt that the leaders were not serious enough and their ability to conclude and implement an agreement was very limited, in view of Jordanian and later PLO objections. These doubts deepened under the laborious stages of the negotiations. Only in July 1968 were there some grounds to the belief that the efforts were not in vain and that something might materialize. After that initiative had collapsed we became quite sceptical about future prospects to strike a deal. However, whenever a chance to resume negotiations arise, we willingly joined. Notwithstanding the negative results, it is important to understand that at that time there was a genuine readiness on behalf of the West Bank leadership of the day to take the risk and negotiate with Israel in defiance of Jordan and the PLO. Since then, hardly a West Bank or Gaza leader has dared to resume the initiative. Later, whenever the question arose, the same leaders and others pointed to Jordan and the PLO as the only parties to such negotiations.

It is important to emphasize that the national unity government of Israel at that time was ready to negotiate with the local leadership. In the years 1968-69 all the parties that formed the government seemed to be ready to negotiate territory for peace with King Hussein. But he did not come. After the Arab summit in Khartoum, he could not come even if he wanted to.

Later in the early 1970s the local leadership used to say that they had learned their lesson from the liberal Israeli rule and when the time came to return to Jordan they would return on their own terms. When Hussein in March 1972 announced his plans for a confederation with the West Bank, this was considered as recognition on his part that the pre-1967 relationship with the West Bank would have to undergo a change and that a new deal would have to be concluded with the Palestinians of the West Bank.

Some additional contacts took place in the early 1970s, but they were not of such intensity or form as the earlier negotiations. Practically speaking, from 1970 until

December 1987, the Arab population of Judea, Samaria and Gaza never dared to try again to resume or respond to an initiative on their own. At first it was Jordan who quashed any sign of independent action. Then there was the upsurge of the PLO, mainly after the Yom Kippur War, when the Arab states recognized that organization's claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinian cause and people. The result was that the more than one million Palestinian Arabs living in Judea, Samaria and Gaza could no longer dare or try to express freely their positions and wishes. Whenever a leader was suspected by the PLO of acting independently, he would be threatened and sometimes murdered.

Was an Opportunity Missed?

We have asked ourselves all these years if we really missed an opportunity in those first years after the Six-Day War to reach a settlement. I recall that when I received the reports of these negotiations, I doubted that they might really achieve serious results such as the establishment of autonomy or some other agreement that would lead to a viable solution since there was always hesitation on both sides. But mainly it was the West Bank leaders who were the ones who hesitated and withdrew even when there were good prospects to succeed. In July 1968 and later on in 1969 we were quite close to an agreement but they backed out, not we. Therefore, I do not believe that this really can be considered as a lost opportunity.

Until the Yom Kippur War both sides believed that Israel would continue to rule the territories, not only the West Bank and Gaza but Sinai as well, for a very long time. After the 1973 war various Israeli governments tried to take the initiative and formulate a policy. The trouble was and still exists that we could not agree among ourselves which way we should go. Will it be a territorial compromise or a certain form of autonomy annexation or keeping the situation as it is or something else? As long as we cannot agree among ourselves, there is no plan that may reflect the national consensus and may become a starter for serious negotiations.

Resettling the Refugees

Time and again people have asked why the refugee problem was not handled separately. In the first place, this happened because since 1948 all the Arab states, and the PLO later on, wanted the refugee problem to be kept alive and considered as a political problem, not as a refugee problem. The solution would come through the right of the refugees to return to their homes in Jaffa, Haifa and the rest of Israel. Israel had prepared some programs to solve the problem of refugees living in the camps. After the 1967 war we found in Judea and Samaria about 120,000 refugees out of a population of 800,000, as opposed to Gaza where out of 400,000, more than half of the population were refugees. The refugees, except for several thousand, had refused to leave the refugee camps

since according to UNRWA rules whoever left the camps lost his refugee status. We did not think it proper to compel them to leave the camps against their will though the alternatives we offered could improve their situation considerably. Facing this situation we tried to improve conditions as far as possible in the camps themselves, which we found in 1967 in a most deplorable condition. However, these improvements could not be very effective since UNRWA objected to plans which might have changed the camps' structure.

The Uprising [First Intifada]

In December 1987 the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza made a move of their own to try to take their fate in their own hands. On December 9th they launched the disturbances that gradually developed into an uprising. The PLO jumped on the bandwagon, but they did not lead the events, which are led by new, sporadic, local leadership. They decide what to do and when to do it. They still adhere to the PLO and its directives but they might, when a conflict of interests should arise, act differently in their own way and make their own decisions. For the first time they have learned that they are in a position where they can, if they wish, form their own policies and even dictate them to the PLO. In the midst of stones and molotov cocktails a new leadership is growing. There is no reason to expect that it will be moderate. If this leadership becomes strong enough to follow its own interests, then some schism may arise between it and the PLO. They may understand in the long run that nothing practical can be achieved through stones and molotov cocktails, and may try to find other ways, which include negotiating on their own with Israel.

One of the difficult problems facing the local leadership who may turn to negotiate with us is that they will be labelled as stooges of Israel, with tragic results. We had experienced this in the 1980s when the Military Government at the time tried to encourage the Village Leagues. In a situation where the population is hostile, on the one hand, and threatened by the PLO, on the other, it was a sheer dream to believe that Israel could succeed in developing an alternative leadership. True local leadership has to grow and rise naturally from the people and by the people. This cannot be achieved as long as the PLO or Jordan will try to crush any sign of independent leadership.

This experiment in independent behavior has started the uprising, but in the future it may culminate in some kind of negotiation. Then we shall see if they have matured to follow their own best interests and not be led by the interests of the other parties including the external PLO. They too know very well that there are differences between their own public and personal interests and those of Arafat's PLO, despite their repeated declarations that they are all PLO and that the PLO is their sole representative. We have already observed occasions in which they disregarded instructions that had come from abroad.

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Ethical Dilemmas in Fighting Terrorism

(2004)

Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin

- When the IDF updated its military doctrine in 2003, Prof. Asa Kasher, Professor of Professional Ethics at Tel Aviv University, joined me on an ethics committee to craft principles on how to make moral and ethical decisions in Israel's operational campaign against terror.
- As we sought to formulate how to fight terror, we understood that the main asymmetry is in the values of the two societies involved in the conflict - in the rules they obey. We are fighting with a people that have totally different values and rules of engagement.
- How do we differentiate between terrorists and non-terrorists? Everyone who is directly involved in terror is a legitimate target. Those who are indirectly involved in terror are not a legitimate target.
- Some asked if the collateral damage was producing future terrorists. We found that because of the level of incitement, the collateral damage only raised public support for terror from 95 to 96 percent.
- In August 2002 we had all the leadership of Hamas in one room and we knew we needed a 2,000-pound bomb to eliminate all of them. Think about having Osama bin Laden and all the top leadership of al-Qaeda in one house. However, use of a 2,000-pound bomb was not approved – we used a much smaller bomb – and they all got up and ran away.
- We should do the job at the checkpoints ethically, professionally, and as fast as we can because we have to care about the many times the ambulance is really carrying somebody who needs help.
- The bottom line is that Israel has to fight terror because terror declared war on us. In the current war Israel has lost over 1,000 people – equivalent to the U.S. suffering 45,000 dead and 300,000 wounded. We can win, but we must do it ethically as the Jewish people, as a democratic state, and as IDF officers who respect our ethical profession.

Updating the Concept of War

The IDF found it necessary to update its military doctrine in 2003 in light of changing threats to Israel's security. While we were prepared for traditional war, a war in which tanks fight tanks, planes fight planes, and infantry fight infantry, we needed to update our doctrine to include threats from ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and terror – in which the fighting has no clear front where armies meet.

As part of that updating, Prof. Asa Kasher, Professor of Professional Ethics at Tel Aviv University, joined me on an ethics committee – comprised of field commanders, brigade commanders, division commanders, philosophers, even a lawyer – to craft principles on how to make moral and ethical decisions in Israel's operational campaign against terror.

As we sought to try and formulate how to fight terror, we understood that we were in a different kind of war, where the laws and ethics of conventional war did not apply. It involves not only the asymmetry of tanks hunting against guerilla fighters or airplanes chasing terrorists. The main asymmetry is in the values of the two societies involved in the conflict – in the rules they obey. This is not a war between the U.S. and Russia or Germany and France, where the international rule of law is accepted by both sides. In this case, we are fighting with a people that have totally different values and rules of engagement.

In postmodern warfare, every fundamental concept of war has changed. First, who is the enemy in this case? Normally, a state is the enemy, or a well-defined organization such as the PLO. In this war, no state or organization is accountable. Second, wars in the past happened at the front line. Suddenly there is no defined front, no defined border. The terrorists are all over. What kind of rules are we to take into consideration when we plan an operation when there is no border? Third, who are the combatants? Are they soldiers with uniforms? The basic law of a just war was based on the assumption that one has to differentiate between those who fight and those who are non-combatants. There are rules of engagement based on the idea that it is possible to differentiate between the two. In the case of terrorists, however, civilians are killing civilians.

The Definition of Victory

Finally, what does it mean to win such a war? Is it putting a flag on a hill? Is it conquering territory? Is it destroying the enemy's divisions or airfields? To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the rationale of the other side.

In the current war Israel has lost over 1,000 people. This is equivalent to the U.S. suffering 45,000 dead and 300,000 wounded. This is more than Israel lost in the Six-Day War, a "real" war. At the start, all of Israel's strategic criteria were declining: no economic growth, no newcomers, no tourists, no hope in the hearts of people, no light in their eyes. But today the economy is growing, we see tourists arriving again, we see that people are getting back to their normal lives. This is the meaning of victory, in this case.

New Ethical Rules for the Counter-Terrorism War

A new model of warfare – the counter-terrorism war – requires a new set of rules on how to fight it. The other side is fighting outside the rules and we have to create new ethical rules for the international law of armed conflict, in keeping with the traditional IDF concept of "the purity of arms."

Terror is easier to fight in non-democratic states. King Hussein used a lot of force in 1970, with no supreme court, and without being exposed to the media, and terror stopped in Jordan. In 1982 in Hama, Syrian President Assad killed 30,000 people and he got rid of Islamic fundamentalist terror. Yet Israel cannot use these means; we have to do it in an ethical way.

Our job is preventing terror. Yet we face a tragic dilemma. Whatever we decide when fighting terror, some innocent people are going to get hurt. On the one hand, there are the Israeli citizens that the terrorists want to kill. On the other hand, the terrorists are hiding behind innocent civilians. It is very important when people's lives are at stake that there is a moral understanding and precise rules for moral conduct.

The duty of the state is to defend its citizens. Any time a terrorist gets away because of concerns about collateral damage, we may be violating our main duty to protect our citizens. We look for alternatives so as not to cause collateral damage, or to cause the minimum amount of collateral damage, but the main obligation is to defend our citizens. We also have an obligation towards the citizens on the other side who are under our effective control. We have an obligation to hit the terrorists. And we have an obligation toward our soldiers, to protect their lives. Who should be our first priority?

We decided we have two separate obligations to the citizens on the other side. Those who are under our effective control are almost like our citizens. When we are in a position to arrest the terrorists, there is no need for a targeted interception. But in Gaza, which is controlled by the terrorists, many people will be killed on both sides when trying to arrest a terrorist. In such a situation, interception becomes much more efficient and a more ethical choice in this case.

Under the international law of war, military necessity justifies almost everything. Yet Israel has limited its right to invoke military necessity by requiring additional conditions, including: *Purpose* – that the action is really helping to defend our citizens; *Intelligence and Proof* – that what we are doing is really saving the lives of people in Israel; *Effectiveness* – that if there is going to be a lot of collateral damage we have to look for another alternative.

We did not tailor this ethical code just for the IDF in its war against Palestinian terrorists. We think this code is good for the Americans or for the Russians when they are fighting terrorists – it fits any kind of hypothetical counter-terrorist scenario.

Differentiating between Terrorists and Non-Terrorists

How do we differentiate between terrorists and non-terrorists? International law says one may target any soldier. Today, everyone in Israel will agree that one is allowed to kill someone carrying a ticking bomb. But where do we draw the line? We know that everyone on the other side who belongs to a certain mosque may support terror because in that mosque they are inciting to terror. Everyone on the other side who watches Palestinian TV may support terror because the entire

Palestinian media is supporting terror. Is it legitimate to attack them? No.

We have to learn who belongs to the *operational terror chain*, which includes the suicide bomber, the one who produces the explosives, and the driver. Everyone who is directly involved in terror is a legitimate target in this war on terror. Those who are indirectly involved in terror are not a legitimate target. The one who brings in money to the Hamas charity in Nablus, who is indirectly involved in terror, will be arrested by the legal system and not targeted by a military action. The same holds for the preacher in the mosque who says that all Jews are pigs and monkeys.

The principle of *liability* also comes into consideration. How liable is it that someone who has committed ten suicide bomber deliveries will do the eleventh? Until he announces his retirement from the terror attack business, he is on the list based on liability. If he retires, the legal system will take care of him, not the military.

Deterrence is also a principle to be considered. If Israel is seen to be targeting every terrorist, this tells the terrorists that they have to worry about being terrorists.

In the case of preventive action based on liability or deterrence, since the prevention of imminent threat is not as clear, the bar of collateral damage is much higher. We are not allowed collateral damage when we are operating based on liability or deterrence.

The principle of *proportionality* in Israel's actions is based on the amount of danger: How imminent? How great is the threat? Is it mega-terror? Is it a weapon of mass destruction? Is it chemical terror?

Some members of the committee asked if we weren't creating wonderful rules of engagement for fighting terror, but that the collateral damage was producing future terrorists. We looked very seriously at this issue of the long-term consequences of operations against terror and found that because of the level of incitement, the collateral damage only raised public support for terror from 95 to 96 percent, and not from 30 to 90 percent.

Nevertheless, we decided that from an ethical point of view, whenever possible, we must give early warning to those who are living around terrorists. Sometimes from an operational point of view this will cancel the operation because the terrorist whose neighbor is being warned will disappear. This is balanced on a scale and, if the threat is not imminent, a decision is sometimes made to let the terrorist run away and look for an opportunity to target him in a place where there will be no collateral damage.

Targeting the Dolphinarium Bombing Planner

The case of Salah Shehada, the head of the military arm of Hamas, is a prime example of ethical concerns in decision-making. Shehada planned terror attacks in Israel, including the attack on the Dolphinarium discotheque where twenty-one

teenagers were killed, and he was in the process of planning a "mega-attack." We knew that if we hit him, the mega-terror process would stop because he was the mind behind it, the planner, the one who was really pushing the button. Shehadea was always surrounded by innocent people until one night in July 2002 we found him almost alone, and we delivered a 2,000-pound bomb on his apartment and he was killed. Unfortunately, the intelligence about those in the surrounding buildings was wrong, and innocent people were killed. Yet when the decision was made, it was the right decision from an ethical point of view because the scale included a mega-attack threatening the lives of hundreds of Israelis, balanced against a terrorist with some collateral damage. But in this case the collateral damage was too high.

A month later, in August 2002, we had all the leadership of Hamas – Sheikh Yassin and all his military commanders, all his engineers, all the minds of terror – in one room in a three-story house and we knew we needed a 2,000-pound bomb to eliminate all of them – the whole leadership, 16 people, all the worst terrorists in the world. Think about having Osama bin Laden and all the top leadership of al-Qaeda in one house. However, due to the criticism in Israeli society and in the media, and due to the consequences of innocent Palestinians being killed, a 2,000-pound bomb was not approved and we hit the building with a much smaller bomb. There was a lot of dust, a lot of noise, but they all got up and ran away and we missed the opportunity. So the ethical dilemmas are always there.

The chief of staff is always asking, "Bring me an operational plan that will endanger fewer civilians around the terrorist." This is an important principle: We never target civilians. They kill our civilians but we will not kill theirs as a punishment. We are always targeting terrorists on their way to do us imminent harm. The dilemma is that the terrorists are within these civilians.

Closing Weapons Tunnels in Rafiah

The IDF operation earlier this year in Rafiah in which the army had to eliminate Palestinian homes because of the weapons tunnels raised some very difficult ethical dilemmas, but there were good solutions for them. There was good intelligence about smuggling weapons with a new scale of capabilities that would change the whole situation in Gaza. We had a situation where the citizens of Israel in Sderot and even Ashkelon would be under the threat of katyusha rockets like the Hizballah has in southern Lebanon. On the other hand, there were houses in places where we knew the tunnels led to.

Let us remember that the entire Philadelphia corridor along the Egypt-Gaza border is Israeli territory in an area three hundred meters wide, according to an international agreement between Israel and Egypt. Israel never imposed its authority all the way to three hundred meters because there were Palestinians living there. As long as everything was under control, Israel agreed to PA authority in these areas within the corridor, which in practice narrowed to seventy meters in some places. But now there is war there. Terrorists are shooting from

the houses of civilians at IDF forces and, according to the Geneva Convention, one is allowed to shoot at a house where gunfire originates, even if there are civilians inside. So what do you do?

On the one hand, we had to deal with the terrorists and look for the tunnels. On the other hand, we had to avoid collateral damage or hitting the civilians. So first of all we applied the principle of warning. We warned the civilians that they had to leave because the terrorists were there.

We had to make every attempt to move them before the fighting began. Two soldiers paid with their lives because they were trying to help a Palestinian old lady get some water and Palestinian snipers killed them. Think about the commander who has to go to the parents of the soldiers and tell them that because of ethical issues they helped this old lady but your son is dead because of it. It's an awful dilemma.

Israel's Security Fence

Everyone can see that where the anti-terror fence was built, the number of terror attacks in the area facing it dropped almost to zero. One of the reasons terror has declined is due to the fence which closes off the ease of getting into Israel's cities. In addition, closing the border between the Palestinian area and the State of Israel freezes the situation and it becomes easier for intelligence to trace the movement of operational members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Steps to Protect the Innocent

The ethical dilemma is easily solved when the intelligence is very clear about a suicide bomber coming. But how do we balance this at a checkpoint used by 1,000 people every day and there is only one terrorist every week?

The indignity, suffering, and waste of time for innocent Palestinians presents a moral dilemma. But even if the probability is low of a terrorist appearing, this is not negligible when human life in big numbers is at stake.

But we must behave ethically. We can check an ambulance in two minutes instead of two hours. But we have to check it because the Palestinians have taken advantage of this and in the past have hidden explosive belts and terrorists in ambulances. We should do the job at the checkpoints ethically, professionally, and as fast as we can because we have to care about the many times the ambulance is really carrying somebody who needs help.

The IDF is very sensitive to humanitarian issues. On the other hand, most of them can be corrected in the future. Even the refugee camp in Jenin is now rebuilt. But those young, sixteen-year-old girls that were killed in the discotheque, or the 1,000 people who were killed in Israel, will never be brought back to life. There are another 10,000 people who are now handicapped. Did we destroy too many houses in Rafiah to find the tunnels and stop the Palestinian terrorists who were shooting at us? We can rebuild them when peace will come. From an

ethical point of view, I think we did the right thing.

The bottom line is that Israel has to fight terror because terror declared war on us. We can win, but we must do it ethically as the Jewish people, as a democratic state, and as IDF officers who respect our ethical profession.

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Notes

Winning Counterinsurgency War – Yaakov Amidror

* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Dore Gold for his contributions to this analysis. An earlier version of this article originally appeared in Hebrew in *Maarachot, Journal of the Israel Defense Forces* in three parts. Part III of this article is based on a lecture given at the Fisher Institution for Air and Space Strategic Studies, Herzliya, Israel, May 2007.

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24. It should be noted that at the time there was an argument over which principle was more important, "simplicity," favored by Lt. General Ehud Barak, who was Chief of Staff, or "administration," favored by Major (res.) Benjamin Amidror, who was head of the IDF's military doctrine and training branch. Thus, eleven principles appear in the booklet issued by the Command and Staff College, that is, both "simplicity" and "administration." The principle of "full utilization of force" was added by Lt. General Moshe Levy when he was Chief of Staff.

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Setting the Route of the Security Fence in Jerusalem – Danny Tirza

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About the Authors

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Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror is former head of the IDF Intelligence Research and Assessment Division, with special responsibility for preparing the National Intelligence Assessment. In addition, he served as military secretary to the Minister of Defense. Amidror was asked by the Israel Defense Forces to analyze the intelligence leading up to and during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. He is the author of *Thoughts about Security and Military Affairs* (Israel National Security College, 2002); and *Intelligence: Theory and Practice* (Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 2006). His chapters in this volume were all written prior to his appointment in 2011 as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. His chapter "Misreading the Second Lebanon War" is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on September 6, 2006.

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan served as Head of the Planning Branch of the IDF General Staff and headed the Israeli security committee to peace negotiations with the Jordanians, Palestinians, and Syrians. He later served as head of the Central Command and as Deputy Chief of the General Staff. He also served as Chairman of Israel's National Security Council and was the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister. This chapter is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on December 7, 2006.

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland chaired Israel's National Security Council from 2004 to 2006. Prior to that he served as head of the IDF's Operations Branch and its Planning Directorate, where he was responsible for designing and implementing the IDF's operational and strategic policies. Gen. Eiland retired from active duty in January 2004. His chapter "The Future of the Two-State Solution" is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of

the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on November 17, 2008.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Shalom Harari served in the territories for twenty years as a senior advisor on Palestinian affairs for Israel's Defense Ministry, retiring in 1997. He is a senior research scholar with the Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, and is associated with the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) in Jerusalem. This chapter is based on his presentation to the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on October 11, 2005.

Col. (res.) Danny Tirza was in charge of planning the security fence between the West Bank and Israel, Israel's largest infrastructure project. Since 1994, Col. Tirza has headed a special staff in the IDF Central Command in charge of regional strategic planning. He has taken part in formulating Israel's security positions in negotiations with the Palestinians and has participated in various stages of the negotiations. Col. Tirza specializes in the geography of Judea and Samaria, the Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem. The chapter "The Strategic Logic of Israel's Security Barrier" is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on January 26, 2006.

Maj.-Gen. Rephael Vardi was the principal figure in the government of Judea, Samaria and Gaza in the decade after the 1967 war. This chapter is based on his presentation at the Jerusalem Center Fellows Forum in 1989.

Col. (res.) Yehuda Wegmen served for over a decade as a senior instructor of fighting doctrine at the IDF Command and General Staff College. During the Yom Kippur War he served as an officer in the first reservist battalion to reach the Golan Heights. Today he develops military instructional methods and writes on military and security matters. An earlier version of this chapter appeared in the IDF journal *Marachot* 385 (July 2002) (Hebrew).

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amos Yadlin served as head of Military Intelligence and as Israel's military attache in Washington. Formerly head of the IDF National Defense College and deputy commander of the Israel Air Force, he participated in the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Gen. Yadlin headed the IDF team that outlined the principles of the war against terror. This chapter is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on June 23, 2004.

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The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs is a leading independent research institute specializing in public diplomacy and foreign policy. Founded in 1976, the Center has produced hundreds of studies and initiatives by leading experts on a wide range of strategic topics. Dr. Dore Gold, Israel's former ambassador to the UN, has headed the Jerusalem Center since 2000.

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Jerusalem in International Diplomacy – Dr. Dore Gold analyzes the legal and historic rights of Israel in Jerusalem and exposes the dangers of compromise that will unleash a new jihadist momentum in his book *The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City* (Regnery, 2007). Adv. Justus Reid Weiner looks at *Illegal Construction in Jerusalem: A Variation on an Alarming Global Phenomenon* (2003).

Iran and the Threats to the West – Preparation of a legal document jointly with leading Israeli and international scholars and public personalities on the initiation of legal proceedings against Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for incitement to commit genocide and participate in genocide. This program also features major policy studies by security and academic experts on Iran's use of terror proxies and allies in the regime's war against the West and its race for regional supremacy.

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Post-Holocaust and Anti-Semitism – a monthly publication examining anti-Semitism after the Holocaust.

Jewish Political Studies Review – a scholarly journal founded in 1989.

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