Institute for Contemporary Affairs
Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation
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Most Americans involved in government have an opinion regarding “solutions” for the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Predominant is the “2-State Solution” that has become reflexive in circles associated with the political left and less so in circles associated with the political right.
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While Israelis associated with the political left may still support this approach,1 most Israelis do not.2
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Maurice Hirsch outlines several principles that need to be met to demonstrate a Palestinian commitment to peace.3 In presenting these principles, we need to be guided by data that informs us on the best mechanisms and approaches to take in presenting these arguments in public diplomacy.
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A well-constructed research probe that would provide guidance in this regard can help provide the optimal perceptual framework for this. The current experiment looked at how one-time biased messaging, both Israeli and Palestinian, could affect attitudes and opinions on the principles outlined by Hirsch.
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We found that one-time biased messages provide minimal impact on attitudes. We also found that American opinion, still largely supportive of Israel, also would support Palestinian demands for independence. Yossi Kuperwasser’s “five pillars” conception would be important to apply here in any potential messaging effort targeting perceptual change.
Media and Perception
Does the introduction of news and data contained in the presentation and framing of information have an impact on the resultant perception and attitudes of the observer?
Since the publication of McCluhan’s classical work on media,4 much effort and discussion have surrounded the issue of bias and the impact various news sources and social media have on attitudes.5 Studies have shown that the attitudes of adolescents can be influenced by the media6 but other studies showed that the lasting effects of news presentation on public opinion may be limited.7 In a broad discussion of the influence of language on perception, Warshagha and colleagues propose that “…journalists report news and actively shape it by employing evaluative language that reflects their ideological purpose, emotional orientation, and attitudinal implications.” 8
Some have contended that media is biased against the Arab and Palestinian views and that news sources like “Al Jazeera offered more impartial and balanced coverage of both Israel and Palestine. BBC, France24, and VOA, on the other hand, showed a propensity to present their news in a way that was more favorable to Israel and more disparaging of Palestine.”9 One study looked at the BBC and found their coverage of Israel and the Palestinians to be “impartial.”10 Gilboa found, however, that the New York Times coverage during the Israel-Hamas war following the attack of October 7, 2023, was biased.11 Organizations like Honest Reporting12 and CAMERA13 have a mission to expose what they contend is a clear anti-Israel media bias.
With the strong feelings that exist on different sides of the conflict, the proliferation of social media attempts to influence opinion has been steady, with one study showing that Israelis favor censoring social media content.14 Writing in Politico at the start of the war, Scott acknowledged the predominance of social media content oriented toward the Palestinians and contends that this indicates that an algorithm responding to this may result in more similar content being distributed.15
The Israel-Arab conflict, in general, and the Israel-Palestinian conflict in particular, are characterized by a high degree of emotional content, further complicating any attempted objective study of the issue. When it comes to media content, both with mainstream and social network sources, we still cannot say if and how content impacts attitude formation or if the converse is true, that one’s attitude determines what content one will seek out. Research on this issue is not as determinative as we would like, with the large number of materials targeting perception and attitude-formation lacking a data-based approach. Influencers and social media content goals appear to be focused on the number of “hits” or “views” as opposed to measuring attitude change. But as Vaynerchuk has argued,16 the number of “views” one receives does not reflect actual influence.
Is There a Short-Term Impact on Viewers?
We conducted an experiment to determine if framing an argument in a biased fashion, but ostensibly relying on “facts,” will influence perception and attitude regarding the Israel-Palestinian conflict. We created two surveys. Each contained the same questions, but each had a distinct bias in terms of the presentation of information. One was pro-Palestinian; one pro-Israel.
Each survey introduction was decidedly biased, with a similar language style and the same word count to provide cognitive balance. Questions in the form of a Likert-style attitude scale were the same for each survey. Our samples of the general United States population were also picked from the same pool, with each balanced for age and gender. The surveys were launched simultaneously, with data gathered between December 10-12, 2024. We had about 500 subjects in each sample (507 in the Palestinian-biased sample, 505 in the Israel-biased sample), and the results were with a margin of error of +-4%.
Our goal was to understand if there is evidence to support the hypothesis that framing of information influences perception; and further allow us to understand the valence (direction) and intensity of that perception among our random samples of Americans.
Our questions related to the requirements outlined by Hirsch17 as needed to enter discussions with the Palestinian Authority.
The Surveys
Version 1: Pro-Israel
Israel has suffered attacks on multiple fronts, including Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen (Houthis), Iran, and the Palestinians living on the West Bank. Since its founding as a state in 1948, Israel has accepted the notion of sharing the land, agreeing to withdraw from Gaza and key cities on the West Bank, allowing for Palestinian self-government. Despite this, Israel was attacked by terrorists on October 7, 2023, with over 1,200 Israeli murdered in cold blood and raped, along with over 200 kidnapped and taken hostage. This was the worst attack against Jews since the Holocaust. Considering this background, please respond to the following questions:
Version 2: Pro-Palestinian
Palestinians have suffered for generations without an independent homeland, under what many consider a brutal occupation and lacking basic human rights. For decades, they have experienced settler violence, often ignored and tolerated by the Israeli government and military. They lack freedom of movement and many live behind an imposing concrete wall. On top of this sad history, they have now been under attack by a far superior Israeli military, assisted by U.S. tax dollars, with over 40,000 casualties, including 15,000 children. Israel, the state of the Jewish people, did all this. Considering this background, please respond to the following questions:
Questions were as follows:
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The attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023, is to be condemned unequivocally as an act of terrorism against Israel and the Jewish people.
Agree-Disagree scale 1-5 + no opinion+ agree against Israel, but not against Jews
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Palestinians have a policy of delegitimization of Israel and incitement to violence and dehumanization of Jews and Israelis.
Agree-Disagree scale 1-5 + no opinion+ agree against Israel, but not against Jews
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Just as Israel allows all Jews to resettle in Israel, Palestinian refugees from the past 75 years need to be allowed to return to the homes they once had in what is now Israel.
Agree-Disagree scale 1-5 + no opinion
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The Palestinian self-government (the “Palestinian Authority”) provides monthly stipends and salaries to families whom they call political prisoners and whom Israel calls terrorists. Were you aware of this policy and what is your opinion regarding it?
Agree-Disagree scale 1-5 + no opinion+ aware/unaware
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The best road to peace between Israel and the Palestinians is to allow for an unconditional independent Palestinian state to be created on territory Israel now controls claimed by the Palestinians.
Agree-Disagree scale 1-5 + no opinion
Following these questions (presented sequentially; answering was mandatory and subjects could not change answers after choices were made), we asked:
Who do you believe deserves more sympathy in the war between Israel and Hamas?
Choices were: Israel, Hamas, Palestinians – but not Hamas, Jews – but not Israelis, None of the parties deserve any sympathy, Both parties deserve an equal amount of sympathy, and DK/unsure.
The last question is the same as was asked in a previous study we conducted in June 2024, also on a general, balanced sample of Americans (the introduction then was not intentionally biased in either direction). Results then are presented below:
June 2024 data on overall sentiment in the Israel-Hamas war
Possible Outcomes
We considered several possible outcomes. First, that the respective biased presentations would bias each population sample in the direction of the bias; Palestinian bias would result in answers supporting Palestinians, and Israeli bias would show answers that supported Israel. Conversely, we also considered the possibility that the biased presentations would have no or minimal influence at all. Such a finding would tend to support the notion that the short-term effects of media and social network material are exaggerated.
Other possibilities also exist: They include needing more time or more exposure to messaging before it can have an effect, requiring a known and reliable source as the basis of the message, needing to begin messaging at a specific age for it to “stick,” having more effective messages, or having to tailor messaging to specific populations. The last option presents a challenge for those who currently use a broad-brush approach in messaging, with the possibility that the message is lost on most of the population is at aimed at.
Results. Overall Sentiment: Comparison with Previous Data
We asked the same question of our two current samples regarding the overall sentiment that we asked last June. As noted earlier, the question came at the end of the survey, which did not allow adjusting previously answered questions. Both the Palestinian-biased and Israeli-biased groups answered in a similar pattern as our previous (June) group, although the Israeli-biased group had a slightly higher positive sentiment toward Israel (30%) viz. overall sympathy than did the Palestinian-biased group (24%). The results are presented below:
Overall sympathy: Israel-biased group
Overall sympathy: Palestinian-biased group
Of significance in all three samples is the split we see where sympathy for Hamas is low and limited, but sympathy for “Palestinians, but not Hamas” is not, with all samples around the 20% mark. Furthermore, we see the choice made expressing sympathy for “both parties” is about the same percentage of respondents (16-18%).
We may be able to deduce from these data that there is consistency in the United States general population favoring Israel, but also not in an overwhelming fashion when compared to non-Hamas (who are thought of as non-terror) actors. When given a choice, our samples showed a nuanced approach to support for Israel, balancing it with what appears to be a perception of closely similar support for Palestinians should they not be identified with Hamas.
Other Results
The limited impact of our biased messaging is seen in our other results with responses to our other questions. On the question “The attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023, is to be condemned unequivocally as an act of terrorism against Israel and Jews,” the agreement in the Israel-biased group was around 63% (45% “strongly agree”), with the agreement in the Palestinian-biased group around 61% (“40% “strongly agree”). Both groups had a similar percentage (21%) saying that they “neither agree nor disagree.”
Question 1: Israel-biased group
Question 1: Palestinian-biased group
Question 2 stated, “Palestinians have a policy of delegitimization of Israel and incitement to violence and dehumanization of Jews and Israelis.” In the Israel-biased group, 48% agreed (25% “strongly”) while in the Palestinian-biased group, 43% agreed (21% “strongly”). More than a third in each group neither agreed nor disagreed.
Question 2: Israel-biased group
Question 2: Palestinian-biased group
For Question 3, we asked, “Just as Israel allows all Jews to resettle in Israel, Palestinian refugees from the past 75 years need to be allowed to return to the homes they once had in what is now Israel.” In the Israel-biased group, 46% agreed (20% “strongly”), while in the Palestinian-biased group, 48% agreed (22% “strongly”). Both groups again showed over a third neither agreeing nor disagreeing.
Question 3: Israel-biased group
Question 3: Palestinian-biased group
Question 4 examined attitudes toward the “pay for slay” policy. For the Israel-biased group, 60% did not agree with it (but only 16% were aware of the policy). For the Palestinian-biased group, 50% did not agree with it (with 15% aware of the policy).
Question 4: Israel-biased group
Question 4: Palestinian-biased group
Our final question was related to what is commonly known as the “2-State Solution.” We asked, “The best road to peace between Israel and the Palestinians is to allow for an unconditional independent Palestinian state to be created on territory Israel now controls claimed by the Palestinians.” For the Israel-biased group, 37% agreed (15% “strongly”), with 40% expressing no opinion. For the Palestinian-biased group, 38% agreed (17% “strongly”) with 41% expressing a “neither agree nor disagree” opinion.
Question 5: Israel-biased group
Question 5: Palestinian-biased group
The Predominant Attitude
While our study aimed to understand the effects of messaging on cognition and perception, the results provide another look into the mindset of many Americans viz. the Israel-Palestinian issue. On all our queries, and for both the Israel-biased and the Palestinian-biased samples, a large cohort of uncommitted, unsure, or “both sides” responses were tallied. This phenomenon has been previously discussed,18 and its appearance here again shows how both information and moral clarity interact in forming opinions. Despite positive attitudes toward Israel and negative attitudes toward Hamas and its terror activities, many Americans still are either unsure about the issue of Palestinian independence (the “2-State” Solution) or see it as an example of “both sides” deserving the same treatment. The data from our previous studies19 would suggest that this effect has been stable throughout the period following October 7, 2023, including among Jewish Americans.20
Discussion
While there was a slight “bump” in pro-Israel sentiment in some questions for the group that was exposed to the Israel-biased message (with the same true for the pro-Palestinian message group), the differences are mostly negligible, with no more than a few percentage points at best separating the two groups, and not on every issue.
Partial Statistical Analysis
We took the largest apparent observable difference, that on Question 1, and applied a “t” test for statistical significance to the distribution of the answer on a 7-point scale where “strongly agree” was a 1. Our results showed a two-tailed P value for the distribution equal to 0.2309. By conventional criteria, this difference is considered to be not statistically significant, meaning that any results or differences found here are likely due to chance and cannot be confidently attributed to a real effect.
Distribution of results on Question 1: “The attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023, is to be condemned unequivocally as an act of terrorism against Israel and Jews.”
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Pro-Palestinian |
Pro-Israeli |
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Having said that, only repeated testing with other samples would be able to determine if this lack of effect is “real” and meaningful. Should messaging in fact be able to affect even a small percentage consistently, this may be something that would have statistical significance. However, statistical significance differs from “clinical” or “practical” significance. While statistical significance would point out a consistent trend, the “practical” significance of small percentage trends may not be consequential.
This begs the question of what would in fact be “consequential” and effective in creating attitude change and more importantly, how could that be accomplished? Here, there are several approaches to take, based on the scientific literature of attitude change. Complicating this is the unique relationship between the modern political attitudes one has toward Israel and the more culturally embedded attitudes one has toward Jews. It has already been demonstrated21 that Israel, among all countries in the world, may be unique in having antisemitism feed hostility toward it (and vice-versa). A more recent paper published by the University of California at San Diego with the National Conflict Resolution Center reinforces the notion of an interrelationship between Israel and cultural antisemitism, especially after the events of October 7, 2023.22
No matter what approach is taken, only a scientific approach based on empirical evidence would be able to clarify how and why technological-based approaches would succeed in attitude change. To date, this approach is bandied about widely, but empirical data related to it is lacking. Mashiah and Avraham applied this approach to one aspect of public diplomacy related to speeches by Prime Minister Netanyahu.23 Another interesting analysis of Israeli efforts toward the Arab and Muslim world is presented, curiously enough, in a study led by a Palestinian researcher.24 The overall importance of social media efforts at attitude change is highlighted by a New York Times report alleging an Israeli government influence campaign targeting United States representatives.25 Politico reported that this influence campaign involved Israeli sources “flooding” social media platforms around the world.26 Palestinian sources are also critically aware of the power of social media and have published analyses on how social media impacts the conflict.27
While the primary purpose of our study was to look at the short-term impact of isolated messaging, another important finding was the consistency of an apparent “both sides”28 attitude that we saw. This perception, namely, that “both sides” have similar goals and aspirations and both sides are entitled to those goals, persists with the attitude that “innocent civilians” have suffered equally, along with a tendency to forgive perceived victims, no matter the behavior involved. The result is a solid consistent sympathy for Palestinians (if not specifically Hamas) that continues notwithstanding the behavior of either Hamas or the Palestinian Authority.
Inherent in our findings is the question of “why” and “what” (messaging) to apply to create meaningful effects. While we looked at the principles outlined by Hirsch, we also need to look (from a pro-Israeli perspective) at what cognitions to target to affect perceptions that may alter the attitudes we found here. As discussed in an earlier paper by Mansdorf and Kuperwasser,29 the “five pillars” of Palestinian identity outlined by Kuperwasser present the greatest perceptual challenge in understanding current Palestinian culture and the obstacles that culture presents for conflict resolution. As long as these “pillars” remain part and parcel of Palestinian thinking, the impact on proposed paths to potential Palestinian independence must be considered in any possible resolution.
Our study was one attempt to objectify the approach to social media as related to its impact on cognition and perception. The conclusions reached have limitations (discussed in the “possible outcomes” section above). While we cannot generalize our results beyond what we found, we can say that the lack of strong effects from one-time biased messaging suggests that attitudes in this area are robust and may require earlier and more frequent interventions to effect any real change. Of course, any intervention first must meet the test of demonstrating that its content does in fact make a difference. Despite claims by some organizations as to the popularity of their social media approaches,30 without real data on attitude change, we cannot conclude that such efforts are anything more than spitting in the wind.
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Notes
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https://en.idi.org.il/articles/51746↩︎
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https://jcpa.org/poll-reveals-dramatic-shift-in-israeli-public-opinion-after-october-7-attacks/↩︎
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https://jcpa.org/article/five-requirements-abbas-must-meet-to-demonstrate-his-commitment-to-peace/↩︎
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https://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/mcluhan.mediummessage.pdf↩︎
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https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03637751.2022.2149830↩︎
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https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3521609/↩︎
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https://www.jstor.org/stable/2749580↩︎
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https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pei-Ang-3/publication/383592836_Comparative_Framing_of_the_Palestinian-Israeli_Conflict_in_Newspapers_An_Analysis_of_Affect/links/66d6bf102390e50b2c2a3ade/Comparative-Framing-of-the-Palestinian-Israeli-Conflict-in-Newspapers-An-Analysis-of-Affect.pdf↩︎
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https://migrationletters.com/index.php/ml/article/view/10899↩︎
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https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1296&context=honors_capstone↩︎
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https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537121.2024.2394292↩︎
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https://honestreporting.com/↩︎
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https://www.camera.org/↩︎
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https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/08/26/many-israelis-say-social-media-content-about-the-israel-hamas-war-should-be-censored/↩︎
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https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/does-social-media-favor-palestine-over-israel/↩︎
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https://medium.com/@garyvee/numbers-dont-matter-influence-does-53aecc56b0bd↩︎
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Op. Cit. 3↩︎
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https://jcpa.org/both-sides-and-innocent-civilians-the-psychological-effect-of-language-in-the-gaza-war/↩︎
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https://jcpa.org/new-u-s-poll-raises-questions-about-americans-support-for-israels-war-against-hamas/↩︎
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https://jcpa.org/survey-among-american-jews-over-51-support-for-bidens-decision-to-withhold-arms-shipments-to-israel/↩︎
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https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Florette-Cohen/publication/232591982_The_Modern_Anti-Semitism_Israel_Model_An_empirical_relationship_between_modern_anti-Semitism_and_opposition_to_Israel/links/09e415086a1374d446000000/The-Modern-Anti-Semitism-Israel-Model-An-empirical-relationship-between-modern-anti-Semitism-and-opposition-to-Israel.pdf↩︎
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https://www.lifeafterhate.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Impact_paper_9.12.24.pdf↩︎
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https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/61940549/Mashiah_and_Avraham_JGPCD_201920200130-98294-11z90ed-libre.pdf?1580391438=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DThe_Role_of_Technology_and_Innovation_Me.pdf&Expires=1734075975&Signature=Qn8KBd-~LGSvCP3u2jJE7bz9Lq6foVMs6N6RxAgJAvOo90hnoOBp0xpzSj0QBXu1hU378vyuLj56ZvSt3ZtxMvjkisJ7WC1xg-fJKL492R6NMR2vFbgwvCyK7zxmCe~-yYmwYsF4thu-R~cbZ8rzjqWU2iaoYxDahYVavEktBwlAxUG4kFlN7vHOkqt6cnmY6NCEUTWg1ClCZ8oes1vezjHqkZYyJsUKFqfwvbIIzTFMIvaoVQjSZUNGWQuXmcI-E9EfIm~NvUP1o0ibAEARfMFkxfgY~6ysMg0oO5uVstj004HruBfX8ev-fFHK1OQzVAbp1SqL8LrqxA7~2dL9zw__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA↩︎
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http://sbbwu.edu.pk/journal/Winter2023,Vol.17,No.4.php/5.%20Examining%20Israeli%20Media%20Targeting%20Arab%20and%20Muslim%20Audiences.pdf↩︎
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https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/05/technology/israel-campaign-gaza-social-media.html↩︎
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https://www.politico.eu/article/israel-social-media-opinion-hamas-war/↩︎
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https://www.pcrf.net/information-you-should-know/item-1707234928.html↩︎
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https://jcpa.org/both-sides-and-innocent-civilians-the-psychological-effect-of-language-in-the-gaza-war/↩︎
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https://jcpa.org/article/understanding-the-psychology-of-terrorist-behavior-how-the-virtual-pack-stirs-lone-wolves-to-action/↩︎
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https://www.standwithus.com/post/standwithus-proves-popular-on-new-social-media-platform-threads↩︎