This article originally appeared in Hebrew on the N12 website on November 28, 2024.
There is no point in analyzing whether to support or reject Israel’s ceasefire agreements with Hizbullah: they are a done deal. It is clear that given the IDF’s military achievements, it would have been desirable for the agreement to approximate closer to the far-reaching expectations many of us had developed. We would have been happy if the agreement had established a buffer zone, prohibited the return of Lebanese border village residents to their homes, and required Hizbullah to disarm, per UN Security Council Resolution 1559 of 2004. On the other hand, what we achieved is not insignificant, and the agreement is very different from Resolution 1701, on which it is ostensibly based.
Iran is discovering a reality: there is no military way to stop Israel. The freedom of action guaranteed to Israel in the event of Hizbullah moving south or resuming its efforts to rearm, the significant involvement of the United States, as well as the transition to the Trump era in the White House, which promises political backing and a continuous supply of arms, and above all, the strength of the blows Hizbullah has suffered, including the elimination of Nasrallah and the severing of the connection between Lebanon and Gaza – all place Israel in a much-improved position compared to before October 7, 2023. It will be difficult for Hizbullah to rebuild its infrastructure in southern Lebanon and its leadership across Lebanon. Its ability to rebuild its arsenal may also be limited, depending on Israel’s response.
The main questions at hand are, first and foremost, to what extent the agreement contributes to achieving the ultimate goal of the war, namely the removal of the threat posed by Iran and its Axis of Evil to the State of Israel, and consequently, to the moderate elements in the region, and to the West, led by the United States. Additionally, we must ask if it contributes to achieving the more tangible goals of the war, including the return of the hostages from Gaza and the safe return of the residents of the communities along the northern border to their homes, and if it reflects the lessons learned from the failures of October 7, 2023.
Questions that Need Answers
The answer to these three questions is, apparently, positive. The agreement provides an achievement that both the outgoing and incoming administrations have longed for, and it allows Israel to prepare for a united struggle with the Trump administration against the Iranian threat, with Iran’s two main proxies severely damaged and its power limitations demonstrated. It will improve Israel’s bargaining position against Hamas, which will lose Hizbullah’s backing, and give Israel freedom of action against Hizbullah beyond what is permitted by the UN Charter in the context of self-defense (Article 51), which does not allow action against a mere buildup of the enemy. This is part of learning the lessons of October 7, and the real test in this context will be in Israel’s response when a Hizbullah violation is discovered. There is little doubt that there will be violations, as the organization will continue to be committed to its jihadist identity and its patron Iran. If the response is only targeted and proportional, then we have failed the lesson. If it aims to create a new reality in southern Lebanon and the entire Lebanese state, then it is a fundamental change necessitated by the lessons of October 7. The current arrangement can create legitimacy for Israel’s future plans.
The question also arises as to why it is appropriate to reach an arrangement in Lebanon based on the withdrawal of the IDF from an area where it thwarted threats, while in Gaza, Israel is not willing to withdraw from the Strip, especially from the Philadelphi Route along the Egyptian border. The answer is, that there are many differences between the two arenas. The most prominent is the difference between the war objectives (the collapse of Hamas and its removal, versus creating conditions for the safe return of residents, which does not require the collapse of Hizbullah). There is also the fact that Hamas initiated the war and carried out the massacre on October 7, not Hizbullah (although it built the capability to do so, most of which was thwarted by IDF operations). The political and geographical realities are also different. Therefore, it is not appropriate to draw an equal comparison between the two arenas, and the effort to defeat Hamas must continue, along with the effort to bring back the hostages.
