Why the War with Hamas Will Not End

The optimism surrounding the latest effort to end the war in Gaza is exceptional. Two years of war, which started with the October 7, 2023, massacre, could finally be coming to an end. The plan has all the necessary elements. Release of all the hostages, ending the Israeli assault on the terrorists in the Gaza Strip, flooding the area with humanitarian aid, and rebuilding the deradicalized area and turning it into the utopian panacea it could and should become.

One of the critical elements that led to the deal was Israel’s failed attempt to eliminate the Hamas leadership in Doha. All moral people agree that the Hamas leadership, which not only executed the worst massacre against the Jewish people since the Holocaust, but also provoked one of the worst, if not the worst, disasters on the Gazan people, deserves to die.

Nonetheless, they found safe haven, for decades, in Qatar, living in the lap of lavish luxury. Their belief, and that of their supporters, was that in Qatar, they were immune from justice.

While the attempt to eliminate them appears to have failed, the strike nonetheless changed the equation. Even though Qatar is committed to the destruction of Israel, that commitment was limited in scope: Hamas was given the green light to attack Israel, so long as Qatar remained outside the scope of the fighting.

When Israeli war planes attacked in Doha, the Qataris suddenly realized that the game was up, and that their continued support for Hamas would potentially endanger their Muslim-brotherhood supporting tranquility.

Thus, after nearly two years of fighting, and after a mealy-mouthed apology from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for inadvertently killing a Qatari citizen, Qatar was miraculously convinced to exert the pressure it wields against Hamas, and the opportunity to strike a deal was reached. When life gives you lemons, as the adage prescribes, make lemonade.

However, when the fanfare of President Trump’s and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speeches subsides, reality will, unfortunately, take hold.

Presenting the deal, President Trump repeatedly referred to the “Avraham Accords.”

Struck in 2020, the “Avraham Accords” were a historic divergence from the traditional position held by Arab countries. Instead of subjugating their foreign policy to the whims of the ruling Palestinian rejectionists, the “Avraham Accords” were an expression of the desire to promote regional reconciliation based on “Peace for Peace.”

The great achievement of the Accords was not bringing Israel to agree to peace. Instead, it was the recognition that some of the Arab world was ready and willing to abandon traditional collective hostility towards Israel, in favor of promoting individual national interests.

The reason the same rationale cannot be applied to the war in Gaza rests on the understanding of who and what Hamas represents.

In contrast to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and to a certain extent, Egypt and Jordan, Hamas is not a pragmatic actor.

Hamas is a genocidal terrorist organization; it is not interested in promoting the best interests of the Gazans. Instead, Hamas is driven by an ideology that sees devotion to the supposed divine promise of reward to those who engage in “Jihad,” – Holy War – as an expression of loyalty to Allah.

When Hamas launched the October 7 massacre, they knew they would not destroy Israel and that the attack would most probably evoke a harsh Israeli response. That did not interest Hamas.

For Hamas, the death and destruction in Gaza is nothing more than the “Price of Jihad,” and the very fact that they persist in achieving their goals, despite the losses, is proof of their religious devotion, which will eventually reap future rewards.

Surrender, in the eyes of Hamas, is a breach of the religious genocidal belief that has been a guiding principle of the movement since its creation. Moreover, for Hamas, surrender is not only a betrayal of the “Martyrs” who sacrificed themselves, but also a betrayal of what they perceive to be their national-religious mission for “Palestine.”

In addition to their religious motivation, Hamas is also a political movement. The decision taken by Hamas to participate in the Palestinian Authority (PA) elections in 2006 was not a simple one. Having secured a landslide victory in the elections – the last ones held – Hamas truly believes that it, and not the PLO/Fatah of Mahmoud Abbas, are the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people.

Thus, for Hamas, their surrender would pave the way for Fatah and the PA to return to the center stage of Palestinian politics. Relinquishing the control of Gaza, as proposed, would also mean waiving the control of the only territorial area controlled by the terrorists, and that has become, over the years, the center of gravity and operation of the organization.

Accepting the terms of the latest plan would mean that Hamas would be relinquishing the last stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood, and that, in the absence of a clear victory, the organization would lose its position in the Palestinian street.

For an international perspective, Hamas sees the October 7 massacre and the ensuing war as a diplomatic victory. In this context, the pressure and the growing isolation and condemnation of Israel are all positive outcomes. When coupled with the growing international recognition of the non-existent “State of Palestine,” Hamas is rightfully emboldened.

Refined to its core, Hamas’ ideology is a combination of a destructive divine, religious conviction, which no true believer is entitled to ignore, mixed with internal political motivations, in which the continued control in Gaza is a foundational element.

Even if it were possible to negate or even temporarily suspend Hamas’s religious motivations, Hamas is also emboldened by internal Palestinian public opinion. Here, too, similar to the international diplomatic reward reaped from the growing recognition of the “State of Palestine,” Hamas is encouraged.

Surveys conducted in May by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research exposed a harsh picture.

• Fifty percent (50%) of Palestinians still believe that Hamas was correct in its decision to launch the October 7 Massacre.
• Eighty-seven percent (87%) of Palestinians deny that Hamas committed the atrocities of the October 7 Massacre.
• Forty-three percent (43%) of Palestinians still believe that Hamas will emerge victorious from the war.
• Forty-two percent (42%) of Palestinians still believe that Hamas will continue to control the Gaza Strip after the end of the war.
• Seventy-seven percent (77%) of Palestinians reject the demand that Hamas disarm.
• Fifty-seven percent (57%) of Palestinians expressed satisfaction with the actions of Hamas (compared to just fifteen percent who expressed satisfaction with the actions of Mahmoud Abbas).
• If elections for the position of PA “President” were held, the Hamas candidate would receive thirty-two percent (32%) of the vote, compared to just twelve percent (12%) who would vote for Abbas.
• If new elections for the PA parliament were held, with the participation of the same parties that ran in 2006, forty-three percent (43%) said they would vote for Hamas, compared to twenty-eight percent (28%) who would vote for Fatah.
• Sixty-one percent of Palestinians still support using violence to achieve their political goals.

In theory, the combination of the three factors – the religious ideological drive, the diplomatic-international reward for the massacre, and continued domestic support for Hamas – would be sufficient to persuade Hamas to reject any offer that could signal an end to the war.

The new plan then adds an additional complication. While the demand that Hamas immediately – within seventy-two hours – release all of the hostages is certainly morally justified, for Hamas, the hostages it holds, stolen during the October 7 Massacre, are the only insurance policy they have. Releasing them, without exacting a full price and without being able to claim victory, is a non-starter.

Only by understanding what drives Hamas is it possible to understand what could potentially motivate them to accept a deal to end the war. Business concerns, prosperity, and security for the Gazans do not entice Hamas. While Israel and the international community see the death of the Israelis and the Gazans as a tragedy, for Hamas, the death and destruction are a strategy.