Israel, Gaza, and the Race Against Time

Israel faces unprecedented pressure to rescue its remaining 48 hostages, dead and alive, and eradicate Hamas. Ongoing protests in Israel demanding an immediate ceasefire and the return of the hostages, essentially asking the government to concede to Hamas, as well as the international community waving the “sanctions” card, and recent statements by U.S. President Donald Trump and his Special Envoy Steve Witkoff that the Gaza war should wrap up before the new year “one way or another”¹ – are all pressure points.

This pressure comes in the context of Israel’s two years of fighting a multifront asymmetric war against a terrorist enemy that controls the global media narrative, embeds itself in its civilian population, and purposefully exposes women and children to killing to gain international legitimacy, while starving the remaining 20 living Israeli hostages. In this situation, Israel’s rolling offensive and takeover of Gaza City is its remaining high-risk, high-reward option with an objective of “smoking out” Hamas, and rescuing the hostages. IDF advances, so far, have had good outcomes: the recovery of two hostage bodies and the assassination of high-level Hamas operatives, including spokesman Abu Obaida.

Yet time is a key factor. In the United States, the Democratic Party, and more recently some MAGA supporters, have displayed restiveness over Gaza, further pressuring the administration. Yet President Trump’s support has remained strong: his proposal titled the Gaza Reconstitution, Economic Acceleration and Transformation Trust (GREAT Trust), envisages a U.S. trusteeship lasting at least ten years, offering displaced Gazans incentives like $5,000 each, rent subsidies, and digital tokens redeemable for future housing. In addition, on August 29, the State Department said it would deny or revoke visas for members of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization ahead of a September 2025 U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York,² a move that may deter or delay a vote to recognize a Palestinian state in that UNGA session, a declaration that other Western democracies, such as France, the UK, Canada, and Australia have supported.³ 

Israel’s August 29 lightning assassination of the Iran-backed Houthi senior leadership in Sanaa, Yemen, eliminating a U.S. regional enemy that threatened Red Sea shipping and oil trade, may buy some U.S. credit,⁴ though public pressure campaigns designed to fracture the U.S.-Israel alliance are mounting. An August 2025 Gallup poll showed that American approval of Israel’s military action dropped to just 32%,⁵ while a Harvard/Harris poll revealed that 50% believe Israel is committing genocide – 77% of Democrats versus 20% of Republicans.⁶ Even the usually Israel-supporting MAGA base now harbors doubts after Hamas’s factually unfounded “Gaza starvation” propaganda campaign.⁷ High-decibel media-rich Israeli hostage protests demanding elusive partial deals also serve Hamas’s calculated strategy to internationalize the conflict by turning Israel’s defenders into critics.

As a result, growing calls for sanctioning Israel and cutting military support have emerged from governments, media, and NGOs. For example, the United Kingdom froze trade negotiations with Israel, and the European Union announced a review of its relationship with Israel due to concerns over its conduct in Gaza, particularly regarding humanitarian aid restrictions, following reports of Israel limiting aid into Gaza, which the UN also deemed insufficient, despite facts to the contrary.⁸ Additionally, more than 160 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), trade unions, and civil society organizations called on the EU to ban trade with Israeli settlements.⁹

These developments indicate that Hamas’s strategy has been successful. Palestinian public opinion remains strongly supportive of Hamas despite it having caused the large-scale destruction of Gaza. May 2025 polling showed that Hamas maintains 50% Palestinian approval for the October 7 massacre (35% in Gaza as opposed to 59% in the West Bank).¹⁰ In the same poll, when asked how they would vote should elections be held in the Palestinian Authority, 18% picked Fatah while 27% would elect Hamas (21% in Gaza and 16% in the West Bank support Fatah; 34% in Gaza and 22 % in the West Bank would vote Hamas). Since the PA shares Hamas’s goal of Israel’s destruction, Western recognition of “Palestine” is a strategic victory for the jihadist agenda, regardless of which faction “wins” – though neither Gaza nor the West Bank has seen elections for decades.

The Three-Front Strategic Imperative

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a difficult choice: taking complete control of Gaza City militarily or using the threat of massive offensive action to force Hamas into a comprehensive hostage deal. Though Trump wanted to avoid a complete conquest and reach an agreement, chances of a ceasefire remain slim before Israeli forces enter all of Gaza City. Swift execution is required since delays serve Hamas’s human shield strategy while international pressure mounts for partial deals, amounting to surrender.

To solve the regional problem more broadly, Netanyahu and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer have outlined an ambitious triangular strategy: achieving Hamas’s defeat and demilitarization of Gaza, while securing demilitarization and normalization agreements with Lebanon and Syria, to avoid a similar situation to the quagmire in Gaza.¹¹

Yet, in line with its classic “deception warfare,” Hamas is demanding complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, including the strategically vital Philadelphi corridor on the Egyptian-Gaza border, while agreeing, nominally, to partial hostage releases in exchange for hundreds of Palestinian security prisoners. For a comprehensive deal, Hamas demands Israel return to pre-October 7 lines and accept end-of-war declarations, while refusing to disarm.

This is Hamas’s “forever war” strategy – scoring international pressure on Israel while violating Israel’s core security requirements: Hamas must completely disarm and accept Gaza’s demilitarization; Israel must maintain overall security control; a new civilian authority must replace both Hamas and the PA; and Israel must always retain its Philadelphi Corridor presence to prevent Egyptian tunnel weapons flow to Gaza.

Ceasefires may not exceed tactical pauses since strategic cessations allow Hamas to recover and rebuild. It’s not just theoretical; Hamas has already recruited between 10,000 and 15,000 additional fighters, bringing their numbers back to pre-October 7 levels of about 40,000.¹²

Hamas will never agree to Israel’s demands since acceding means ending their control over Gaza. There are no partial victories against genocidal terror organizations. The choice is binary: complete victory or strategic surrender.

The Northern Sinai Solution

The solution to the maximum pressure campaign against Israel and its own high-pressure “deal or die” campaign against Hamas lies south of Gaza’s Rafah district across Egypt’s border in northern Sinai. Israel must quickly move a substantial part of the Gaza public to northern Sinai to eliminate Hamas while avoiding additional humanitarian crises and casualties, risking further international opprobrium. Other relocation options require more time and complicated logistics.

Trump’s pledge to establish a 10-year American-secured administrative trust for Gaza civilians would provide the Egyptians more confidence to open the border near Rafah to northern Sinai. Trump enjoys great power and influence across the Arab world, acting as a Middle East “strong horse.” He holds unique leverage over President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi through political power, a billion-dollar annual military aid package, and further economic incentives that may now persuade the Egyptian leader to open the critical Rafah crossing.¹³

It is not a simple calculation. Egypt has deployed significant military troops to the Sinai near the Rafah border in recent weeks as a perceived deterrent. That’s not the final word. In the Middle East, appearances do not necessarily determine outcomes, especially when faced with a strong U.S. leader.

Reality demands action. More than one million displaced Palestinians are squeezed into Gaza tent camps in southwestern Gaza, while Egypt’s vast, thinly populated Sinai Peninsula remains closed to temporary civilian evacuation. This artificial constraint serves Hamas’s strategy of trapping civilians in combat zones to maximize international sympathy and constrain Israeli operations. The question is political will, not capability.

Egypt’s security concerns about the potential outbreak of violence or a prolonged civil conflict between Gaza refugees and Sinai tribes are legitimate and understandable. Yet, these risks can be effectively contained, and even entirely avoided, through robust coordination with Israel and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) stationed in Sinai. Recent history demonstrates that the Egyptian and Israeli militaries have successfully cooperated in countering Hamas networks and ISIS cells in Sinai, proving that joint security arrangements can neutralize threats and maintain stability.

Proper evacuation of the Gazans into Sinai would allow Israel to isolate Hamas militants from deliberately endangering civilians, enabling more precise military operations. It is also Egypt’s moral responsibility to save the Palestinian civilians as the direct neighbor of the conflict and the only Arab country that ruled Gaza in the past.  

Calculated Risks

Would Sisi risk Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel with acts of belligerence? The economic and strategic costs would be catastrophic for Egypt’s struggling economy. Moreover, Egypt already violated treaty obligations by allowing tunnel networks from Egypt to Gaza to become terror supply highways, creating a multi-billion-dollar smuggling business.

Alternatives have proven inadequate. Israel’s international isolation deepens daily – exactly as Hamas planned. Without civilian evacuation, Israel faces an impossible choice: accept gradual defeat through international pressure or risk massive civilian casualties in dense urban warfare.

Every passing month with hundreds of thousands of trapped civilians makes Hamas’s human shield strategy more effective while hostages remain captive and families endure unbearable anguish.

The Trump Factor

Trump’s return presents a unique opportunity that may not recur. His transactional approach and willingness to challenge conventional diplomatic wisdom uniquely position him to demand Egyptian cooperation. His previous success in reshaping Middle Eastern dynamics through the Abraham Accords demonstrates his capacity to think beyond traditional frameworks.

October 7 wasn’t just an attack on Israel – it was an assault on America’s interests and values. This war requires defeating jihadist terror, not managing it. Partial solutions leaving Hamas intact represent strategic defeats disguised as diplomatic achievements.

Trump has indicated that Israel has weeks to begin to determine the war’s outcome. Even in an optimistic assessment of his intention, this conflicts with Israel’s assessment that securing complete Gaza control requires months. This temporal mismatch underscores the urgency of a prospective Egyptian northern Sinai interim solution.

Trump can push to help open northern Sinai, enabling Israel to complete its mission: defeat Hamas, recover the hostages, and establish a new security architecture ensuring October 7 never happens again. The alternative isn’t a “partial deal” or “managed conflict.” Rather it would constitute a strategic defeat for Israel and jihadist terror victory that will reverberate far beyond the Middle East. In this race against time, hesitation equals capitulation, and partial measures would constitute failure.

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Notes