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There is solid recognition among Americans that a nuclear Iran presents a danger to the United States.
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Despite this, there is also a very significant segment of the American public that unconditionally is opposed to any military involvement.
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In the event the United States does get involved in offensive operations, opinion among those who either supported Israel’s actions or opposed them will not likely change.
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However, the entrance of the United States into an active military conflict will change the perceptual reality for many uncommitted Americans. Among this large segment, people either are not informed regarding the issues associated with Iran or do not care about them. However, once the effects of American involvement enter one’s daily reality, perception is affected.
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Public diplomacy efforts are best directed primarily at the uncommitted, providing both accurate and effective information and adequate reasoning why American actions are relevant to their lives.
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Ultimately, support or opposition to United States involvement will depend on the personal price the previously uncommitted American is willing to bear.
In the guessing game/debate over United States involvement in the Israel-Iran war, the only clear insight is that such involvement may assist in attaining military objectives at a quicker pace. This is due to the added firepower that use of B-2 and B-52 aircraft, along with specialized “bunker-buster” ordinance, will bring to the game. While this will certainly make the war effort more efficient and effective from a military point of view, there is less clarity on how this will affect domestic U.S. opinion and, in turn, on future U.S.-Israel relations.
There are risks for both the United States and Israel with U.S. involvement. For the United States, consideration needs to be given to potential Iranian retaliation against U.S. interests and the effect this will have on the American homefront. Such retaliation can come in the form of plans the Iranians already have in such a scenario to attack U.S. bases in the region or even to attack U.S. allies that include Sunni states in the region. While such capabilities on the part of Iran may be diminished, any such action would be perceived by Americans as paying a price, one that they may not be prepared to pay.
Other possibilities include the prospect of overseas terror against Americans and American institutions, sleeper cells in the United States itself, and the economic ramifications of a crippled Iran on the American public.
While there is solid base support for Israel versus Iran in the United States, there is much less support for American military involvement.1 If such involvement were to take place and negative consequences result (U.S. casualties, Iranian retaliation, etc.), the effect on public opinion with regard to Israel will no doubt be perceptible. This is because despite the solid pro-Israel base in the United States, there also exists a large swath of others who are less sympathetic to Israel, notwithstanding their lack of sympathy for Iran as well.
Based on studies2 we have conducted since the start of hostilities against Israel on October 7, 2023, we can isolate several trends related to American public opinion other than the base of support for Israel. These segments can be described as the “both siders,” the “no-siders,” the “I don’t knower’s,” and the “I don’t care’ers.”
Both siders
The “both sides” argument is one that is consistent with the more progressive and liberal philosophy that is based to some degree on post-modern thinking that holds that there is no objective “right” and “wrong” and that such judgments are dependent on one’s personal perspective.3 Since no universal truth exists, assigning responsibility for any situation becomes almost impossible. What results is an attitude of “both sides” are right, both are wrong and a slew of “it depends” answers to questions that have binary choices. In our studies of opinion on the Israel-Palestinian issue (as well as the Israel-Iran war), we found about 20% of our samples in the “both sides” category.
No siders
Born largely out of the more extreme end of the “America first” movement, the “no-sides” argument comes from an isolationist philosophy that is against any American involvement in outside wars. Non-interventionism and a focus on domestic affairs drive their thinking. In our studies, we probed for this point of view and found that about 5-6% feel that way in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, with a much higher number (around 18%) in the Israel-Iran war.
I don’t knowers-I don’t carers
In our research surveys, we often provided an option for answering “I don’t know” or “neither agree nor disagree.” There are two possibilities with this group of people, which represent a considerably large swath of our American samples. One possibility is that they are short of information and do not have an opinion because they really do not know. The other possibility is that the reason they do not know is that they just do not care. The subject, the dispute, or the issues, are not important to them. We have consistently found that around 40% of our American samples fall into this category. To the degree that any issue is non-existent in their daily lives, many Americans simply do not see the relevance of offering or carrying an opinion on the matter.
Implications for policy
To the degree that support for any policy relates to the amount of support that policy has in the community, the effects of American military involvement are likely to be reflected in the division between those clearly supportive of Israel and those clearly not. But while those two segments are less likely to be affected by events, the same cannot be said of the large uncommitted and uninformed public. The more events impact on daily life and more interpretation of those events become relevant to one’s personal ethical standards, the more their opinions are likely to move into one of the other categories. For example, if a “don’t knower” who has compassion for children sees images of suffering children, it is possible that they will be impacted to move into a category that shows support for those children. Similarly, if an uncommitted American sees gas prices rise because of an American action overseas, they also will move into a category that opposes such action.
Focus for Israel
Public diplomacy directed at either clear supporters of American involvement or clear opposers of such action are not likely to affect thinking or effect any change in perception. On the other hand, such efforts directed at an uncommitted public may have impact in moving people from being uncommitted to taking a distinct side. Here, efforts will be challenged by reality. Perception is based on perspective and any explanatory efforts need to take the perspectives of the uncommitted American into consideration.
The questions that need to be asked and probed empirically need to be related to the bottom line of what price is the average uncommitted American willing to pay to see a denuclearized Iran and what level of discomfort is one willing to bear toward this end. Support for an effort, noble as it may be, for outcomes that do not affect one’s personal life is easier to engender than for efforts that may have more burdensome outcomes. Any messaging or communication that ignores the personal price people must pay, notwithstanding their personal views, will likely fail. Likewise, any messaging or communication that is not constructed from the perspective of the uncommitted individual will miss its mark as well. Should the United States in fact take an active, offensive role in the Israel-Iran war, diplomacy will need to be tailored to the perceptual reality Americans will experience.
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Notes
