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Israel, Gaza and Humanitarian Law: Efforts to Limit Civilian Casualties

Israel, Gaza and Humanitarian Law: Efforts to Limit Civilian Casualties

Lt. Col. (res.) David Benjamin

Addressing an audience in New York on November 6, 2014, the highest ranking officer in the U.S. military, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that Israel went to “extraordinary lengths” to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage during its Operation Protective Edge in July-August 2014. He also related that the Pentagon had sent a team to see what lessons could be learned from the operation.1

Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, praised Israel for its efforts to avoid civilian casualties in Gaza.

This chapter contains a brief outline of the measures adopted by Israel’s military to minimize the impact on civilians of its campaign to neutralize the rockets and terror tunnels of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip. It should be borne in mind that during this time the rulers of Gaza were engaged in a parallel effort to maximize the exposure of their own civilians to the dangers of the conflict (as described elsewhere in this study).

The Overall Picture: Selective Application of Military Force

The IDF is selective in its application of military force. As in past operations, airstrikes during Operation Protective Edge were clearly directed at specific sites, while ground operations were focused on destroying tunnels leading from Gaza into Israel. The IDF does not engage in “carpet bombing,” as some have alleged, or any other form of indiscriminate attack. Had the IDF wished to simply inflict destruction on the Gaza Strip, it could have done so on a far greater scale and in a much shorter time. Satellite maps published by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), showing the locations of damage incurred in the Gaza Strip, confirm that the IDF campaign was focused on specific targets.2 Subsequent images released by the IDF Spokesperson illustrate the overlap between concentrations of military targets and the areas most affected by IDF operations.3

On Aug. 15, 2014, the United Nations published maps of the Gaza Strip with markings on damaged areas. As this IDF video shows, the UN maps failed to show that Hamas fired rockets from those same areas, including schools and hospitals. (IDF/YouTube)

However, one need not rely on the IDF’s claims about its own conduct. On August 15, 2014, OCHA published its “Gaza Crisis Atlas.”4 The 100-page document showed the location of civilian infrastructure in Gaza along with more than 12,000 points representing damage caused by the IDF strikes during the first month of Operation Protective Edge. The points were color coded according to four levels of damage: crater/impact, moderately damaged structure, severely damaged structure, destroyed structure.

Analysis of the UN’s own “Gaza Crisis Atlas” showed that the IDF’s strikes were precise: 78 percent of all destroyed structures in Gaza were within a three-kilometer distance from the Israeli border.

A geographical information analyst, Dan Smith, extracted the 12,000 data points and displayed his findings on four separate maps, one for each level of damage.5 The findings showed that the IDF’s strikes were precise and concentrated. Seventy-two percent of the total damage points were within a three-kilometer distance from the Israeli border. This distance corresponds with the areas in which the IDF said it was operating in order to destroy tunnels. Furthermore, 78 percent of all destroyed structures in Gaza were within the three-kilometer buffer zone.

Gaza damage points broken down by severity. (Dan Smith/Israellycool)

 

Smith then created a single heatmap based on the four separate maps above. The unified map showed that most of the damage in Gaza was in locations near the border with Israel. The rest of the Gaza Strip was, for the most part, undamaged. The main population areas of Gaza City, Jabaliya, Khan Yunis, Rafah and Deir el-Balah were disproportionately undamaged.

 

Damage intensity heatmap of the Gaza Strip. (Dan Smith/Israellycool)

 

However, the commitment of the IDF to limiting casualties and suffering among enemy civilians extends far beyond its policy of applying military force only when and where necessary.

Legal Supervision and Enforcement

Under the laws of the State of Israel as expounded by Israel’s Supreme Court, the IDF is bound to conduct its operations in accordance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL).6 This obligation is reflected in IDF General Staff Regulation No. 33.0133.7 This means that IDF personnel are obliged to follow the provisions of IHL as they relate to the protection of civilians from the effects of armed conflicts. This commitment to IHL is not dependent on the adversary’s reciprocal compliance with IHL. Thus, in the conflict with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other terrorist groups, the fact that these organizations flagrantly flout international norms does not exempt the IDF from abiding by them.

Under the laws of the State of Israel as expounded by Israel’s Supreme Court, the IDF is bound to conduct its operations in accordance with International Humanitarian Law. The fact that Hamas and Islamic Jihad flagrantly flouted international norms did not exempt the IDF from abiding by them.

In broad terms, this means that the IDF may only launch attacks against military objectives and that civilians and civilian objects may never be deliberately targeted. It also means that the “collateral damage”8 expected to ensue from an attack on a military objective must not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military benefit of the attack. It also requires the IDF to adopt all feasible precautions to minimize the risk to civilians from an attack. Failure to abide by the above requirements constitutes a violation of IHL and consequently a violation of Israeli law for which perpetrators are liable for prosecution. The State of Israel has a highly developed state apparatus for legal supervision and enforcement to ensure that its armed forces abide by IHL. The Military Advocate General’s Corps (MAG) of the IDF provides expert legal advice and training on IHL to IDF commanders. Instruction in IHL is provided by the IDF’s School of Military Law, while legal advice is given to the General Staff level down to Division level by military lawyers from the IDF’s International Law Department. The MAG is also responsible for initiating criminal investigations and prosecutions in the event of suspected violations. It is important to note that in all professional matters, the MAG is not subject to the IDF chain of command and has full independent discretion. The MAG may order a criminal investigation into any incident involving a suspected IHL violation. Such a decision may be taken based on the complaint alone or on the factual findings of an operational debriefing. Trials of IDF personnel accused of misconduct take place in independent military courts. The MAG in turn is subject to the supervision of the civilian Attorney-General of the State of Israel who has the power to overrule the MAG if he/she deems it necessary. The entire government apparatus, including the IDF, is subject to judicial oversight by the Israel Supreme Court. The rules of standing and justiciability are such that anyone, including Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip or human rights NGOs, can petition the Court to intervene in any act of government on the basis that the act is unlawful. This includes military operations as well as decisions on whether an investigation or prosecution is warranted in a particular case. The depth and breadth of judicial oversight of the military by the Israel Supreme Court has no parallel anywhere in the world.

The depth and breadth of judicial oversight of the military by the Israel Supreme Court has no parallel anywhere in the world.

In 2012, the “Turkel Commission,” established to examine, inter alia, Israel’s mechanisms for examining and investigating complaints and claims of violations of the laws of armed conflict, published its report. The Commission, comprised of a former Supreme Court justice and senior Israeli jurists, with a prominent Irish diplomat and a former Judge Advocate General of Canada as observers, found that, on the whole, the Israeli investigation mechanism described above is consistent with Israel’s international legal obligations. It also made several recommendations for improving the system. Central to the Commission’s recommendations was the establishment of a fact-finding assessment mechanism, composed of experts in military operations, international law and investigations, outside the operational chain of command, which would be able to provide the MAG with as much information as possible within a short time-frame regarding incidents involving possible violations of IHL.9 Such a Fact Finding Assessment Mechanism (FFAM) was indeed set up and activated during Operation Protective Edge. The FFAM, headed by a major-general and composed of operational and legal experts, mostly reservists, began its work about two weeks into the operation. To date, around 100 incidents have been referred by the MAG for examination by the FFAM. Pursuant to various allegations of IHL violations by Israeli forces during Operation Protective Edge, the MAG has thus far ordered a total of 13 criminal investigations into incidents involving harm to civilians or civilian property in the Gaza Strip. Five of these investigations were ordered after an FFAM examination, while the other eight were ordered directly based on initial reports. The incidents under investigation include:

  • an alleged attack leading to the deaths of four children on the beach in Gaza on July 16;
  • an alleged strike in the vicinity of an UNRWA school in Bet Hanoun on July 24 resulting in the deaths of 15 civilians;
  • the alleged shooting in Dahaniya on July 18 of a woman whose movements had allegedly been coordinated with IDF forces;
  • the alleged deaths of two ambulance drivers – one in Khan Younis, the other in Beit Hanoun, as a result of IDF strikes, both on July 25;
  • the alleged deaths of 27 civilians in an attack on the Abu Jama family house on July 20;
  • the alleged shooting death of an individual carrying a white flag in Khirbeit Haza’a on July 29;
  • alleged mistreatment of a 17-year-old youth while in the custody of IDF forces in Khirbeit Haza’a;
  • several instances of alleged looting, and one of civilians allegedly being used as human shields.

So far, the MAG has also decided, based on information collected by the FFAM, that nine additional complaints received do not warrant criminal investigations. The summaries of the MAG’s decisions, published on-line, provide an insight into the procedures mandated by the IDF to minimize harm to civilians and their property. These will be elaborated upon below.10

The IDF Code of Ethics

In addition to being bound by IHL, the IDF has a Code of Ethics entitled “The Spirit of the IDF.”11 IDF personnel are charged with upholding the moral standards reflected in the Code which incorporates a section named “Purity of Arms.” This includes the duty to use force only when and to the extent necessary to maintain one’s humanity during combat, to refrain from harming persons uninvolved in combat and prisoners, and to do everything in one’s power to prevent harm to their persons, dignity, and property.12

IDF Orders, Procedures, and Planning

As a matter of course, all operational planning in the IDF incorporates the minimizing of harm to civilians and their property as an operational goal. As such, this aspect finds expression throughout all operational orders, procedures and rules of engagement, all of which are drafted, as a rule, in consultation with IDF legal advisors.13 In addition, battle orders issued by the General Staff contain detailed annexes devoted to humanitarian and legal matters. The motivations for this are twofold: the first being the  binding legal and moral framework described above, while the other is the understanding, acquired through a succession of bitter lessons, that casualties and suffering among enemy civilians are likely to impede one’s ability to achieve one’s military objectives as well as lead to diplomatic fallout with major strategic consequences.

Battle orders issued by the IDF General Staff contain detailed annexes devoted to humanitarian and legal matters.

Situations where civilian casualties have had a direct impact on the progress of military operations have been dubbed “Kafr Qana Syndrome” in the media and in defense circles. The term refers to two incidents which occurred in the southern Lebanese village of Qana on two separate occasions. The first was during the IDF’s Operation Grapes of Wrath against Hizbullah in the spring of 1996. An errant 155mm artillery shell landed in a UN compound in Kafr Qana where numerous Lebanese civilians had taken shelter, killing over 100 people. International pressure resulting from the incident forced Israel into winding down its operation and agreeing to a ceasefire before all its operational goals were accomplished. The second incident took place during the Second Lebanon War in 2006 when an IDF bomb destroyed a building resulting in what was initially alleged to be over 60 civilian deaths. The resulting international outcry brought about a 48-hour cessation of Israeli aerial activity over Lebanon and a significant erosion of international support for the IDF’s campaign against Hizbullah. It later transpired that the number of civilian casualties had been less than half of that originally alleged, but the damage had already been done. Avoiding the “Kafr Qana Syndrome” has been dominant in the minds of IDF planners ever since. The most notable case where civilian casualties have had long-lasting negative strategic consequences for Israel came in the aftermath of Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009). Following initial reports of over 900 non-combatant deaths in the Gaza Strip, the UN Human Rights Council sent a fact-finding mission to Gaza. The report of that mission, dubbed the “Goldstone Report” after the mission’s head, Judge Richard Goldstone, was a blistering indictment of the IDF’s conduct, including pronouncements that the IDF was guilty of the most heinous of war crimes – the systematic and deliberate targeting of civilians. While Goldstone himself retracted this accusation nearly two years later,14 and while the number of civilian casualties was eventually shown to have been much lower, the damage caused to the IDF’s and Israel’s standing has been immeasurable. Ever since Goldstone, global efforts to delegitimize the State of Israel and its policies have gained unprecedented impetus. In the wake of this and other experiences, no one in the Israeli military establishment fails to comprehend that civilian casualties play into the hands of the enemy.

Target-Vetting Procedures

The IDF has an advanced, standardized procedure for target-vetting which incorporates intelligence, operational, and legal experts in all decisions involving strikes on pre-planned targets.15

  • Intelligence: provides information on the nature of the target, its location, and the civilians and civilian objects in the target’s vicinity.
  • Operations: provides information on the operational aspects, e.g., the operational platforms and munitions available for attacking the target as well as the likely impact of various munitions on the target and its surroundings.
  • Legal: provides an opinion on the legality of attacking the target and of the various options for attack as well as the precautions to be taken.

In appropriate cases, civil affairs experts are also consulted regarding the possible impact of the target’s destruction or incapacitation on the civilian population or the environment generally. This procedure guarantees that pre-planned targets are attacked only after thorough deliberation and examination of the relevant considerations, including the potential impact on civilians and the legality, under IHL, of the attack. This does not mean that the IDF’s targeting process is foolproof. There is always the possibility that ostensibly reliable intelligence information forming the basis for a decision is incorrect or incomplete. There can also be miscalculations or mistakes. One ever-present possibility is that the situation on the ground will change at the last minute or even after the attack has been launched. For example, a group of civilians might unexpectedly enter a targeted site moments before an attack. In such situations, we have seen that the IDF has aborted attacks.16 We also know that missiles have been diverted in mid-flight when civilians suddenly entered the target zone. There are a number of video clips available online showing such diversions seconds before impact.17

The IDF calls off an airstrike on a moving target in real-time when civilians suddenly appear nearby. (IDF/YouTube)

As terrorists approached a group of civilians, the IDF redirected an airstrike at the last possible moment. (IDF/YouTube)

The procedure outlined above applies to pre-planned targets. Clearly, it isn’t always possible to conduct consultations of this nature for real-time targeting decisions in a dynamic battlefield environment. Thus, for example, when troops come under fire, require close air-support or need to be extracted from a combat-zone, the targeting decisions have to be taken in real time by commanders based on their professional assessment of the situation and their understanding of the legal principles involved.

Operational Measures to Avoid Harm to Civilians

Use of Intelligence

The IDF makes use of its intelligence assets not only to locate the enemy but also to provide real-time information to commanders on the presence of civilians in or near targeted locations. For example, it is common for the IDF to employ its aerial surveillance capabilities to monitor movements of civilians around intended targets.16

Watch three separate instances of IDF aircraft calling off airstrikes during Operation Protective Edge due to the presence of civilians near the target. (IDF/YouTube)

The Israel Air Force calls off an airstrike in Gaza on July 10, 2014, after children are seen near the target. (IDF/YouTube)

The Israel Air Force postpones air strikes in Gaza after identifying Palestinian civilians in the area. (IDF/YouTube)

Use of High-Precision Munitions

It is evident that the IDF has used predominantly, if not exclusively, high-precision munitions for its airstrikes in the Gaza Strip. Use of these munitions enables highly accurate strikes on enemy targets and drastically limits the potential for collateral damage.18 Thus, for example, the IDF has been able to target individual rooms or stories in buildings, while leaving the rest of the building more or less intact. It is important to note that these munitions are significantly more expensive than less-precise alternatives.19 Many of the targets destroyed could have been dealt with much more cheaply by using “dumber” weapons which would have caused far greater destruction and collateral damage. The huge financial resources that Israel devotes to acquiring and deploying smart weaponry are a clear indication of Israel’s commitment to minimizing harm to enemy civilians and civilian objects.

Follow an IDF missile as it makes a precision strike on a Hamas target in Gaza on July 12, 2014. (IDF/YouTube)

Timing of Attacks

The IDF has shown that it is careful to time its attacks in such a way as to reduce the risk of harm to civilians. Thus, for example, schools or office buildings serving military purposes are generally attacked during night hours when the building is unoccupied. Also, video clips of attacks on moving vehicles clearly show an effort to wait until the vehicle is positioned away from civilians before launching the strike.20

Advance Warnings

The element of surprise is generally understood to be a fundamental requirement for success in military operations, yet Israel routinely foregoes the element of surprise by announcing its intentions in advance. By providing warnings to residents of buildings about to be attacked or to people in neighborhoods in which military operations are imminent, the IDF often allows militants to escape and even endangers its own troops by enabling the enemy to organize. Moreover, the IDF invests significant resources and efforts to provide such warnings.

Left: Original Arabic flyer dropped over the Gaza Strip on July 16, 2014, with specific evacuation instructions for the residents of Shuja'iya and Zeitoun. The arrows direct people to move into Gaza City. Right: English translation of flyer for illustrative purposes (IDF/Twitter)
Left: Original Arabic flyer dropped over the Gaza Strip on July 16, 2014, with specific evacuation instructions for the residents of Shuja’iya and Zeitoun. The arrows direct people to move into Gaza City. Right: English translation of flyer for illustrative purposes (IDF/Twitter)
Left: Original Arabic flyer dropped over the northern Gaza Strip on July 13, 2014, with specific evacuation instructions for the residents of Beit Lahia; Right: English translation of flyer for illustrative purposes (IDF/Twitter)
Left: Original Arabic flyer dropped over the northern Gaza Strip on July 13, 2014, with specific evacuation instructions for the residents of Beit Lahia; Right: English translation of flyer for illustrative purposes (IDF/Twitter)

The IDF drops emergency evacuation pamphlets in the Gaza Strip on July 29, 2014. (IDF/YouTube)

Warnings come in several forms: First there are the general warnings issued to residents of a neighborhood or village in which IDF military operations are impending. These are typically communicated in flyers dropped from aircraft as well as by notices interrupting TV or radio broadcasts. Residents are advised to leave the location for their own safety and are instructed where to evacuate to and by when. Thus, for example, a flyer distributed during Operation Protective Edge to residents of Shuja’iya and Zeitoun instructed them to move to Gaza City by 8:00 a.m. on July 16.21 Specific warnings are also issued in the form of phone calls or text messages to individuals. Thus, for example, telephone calls are placed to occupants of a building housing a missile stockpile several minutes before the building is targeted to enable them to evacuate.22 Calls are also made to people in surrounding buildings who may be affected by the blast or by secondary explosions that may follow when the stockpile blows up. Follow-up calls are also made to ensure that people have left the area. Evacuation of civilians is then verified by aerial surveillance vehicles.

“Roof-Knocking”

In the Gaza Strip it is common for people to ignore IDF warnings or even congregate nearby or on the rooftops of targeted buildings when warnings have been given. This is part and parcel of a widespread and openly-declared strategy employed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to use the civilian population of Gaza as human shields against IDF attacks.23 The IDF has developed an ingenious solution for such situations known as the “roof-knocking” procedure. The procedure initially involves repeating the warnings given to the building’s residents. If the warnings remain unheeded, the IDF launches, a small, non-explosive projectile at the corner of the roof. The result is a bang loud enough to persuade the “human shields” to evacuate the building but small enough so that the risk of casualties is very low. If necessary, the process can be repeated. Once the IDF has established that the site is clear, the main ordnance is released which destroys the target.24

After the IDF fires a warning shot on a house in Gaza on July 9, 2014, the residents evacuate, but neighbors soon swarm the roof in an effort to prevent an IDF strike. (IDF/YouTube)

Digital Maps

Sensitive sites such as civilian shelters, UN facilities, hospitals, mosques, schools, kindergartens, etc., are marked on all IDF digital maps which are updated in real-time according to developments on the ground.25

Training and Simulations

The IDF has built one of the largest and most advanced training facilities in the world for urban warfare simulation. IDF troops learn here how to conduct military operations in a complex, civilian-populated environment. Military forces from all over the world train at this world-renowned facility.26

Civilian Affairs Officers

During Operation Protective Edge, every IDF unit deployed in the Gaza Strip, from battalion level and up, had a specially trained Civilian Affairs Officer (CAO) whose role was to advise the unit commander on matters relating to the civilian population in the zone of operations. This included informing the commander of the proximity of sensitive sites, such as civilian shelters, UN facilities, hospitals, schools, mosques and the like, and regarding the whereabouts of civilians and their situation. CAOs are Arabic-speakers who are able to communicate with the local population in order to assess their needs, assist with evacuations, and coordinate the movement of emergency services and humanitarian relief efforts with IDF forces on the ground.27 It must be appreciated that coordination of emergency vehicle movements in a battle zone is a very complicated and delicate task. It is made all the more difficult due to the wholesale use by militants of ambulances for transporting fighters and weapons.28

Every IDF unit deployed in Gaza, from battalion level and up, had a specially trained, Arabic-speaking Civilian Affairs Officer to assess the needs of the local population, assist with evacuations, and coordinate the movement of emergency services and humanitarian relief efforts.

Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)

The State of Israel has a government agency exclusively dedicated to the welfare of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip. Staffed by military and civilian personnel, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) in the Israel Defense Ministry was the official body responsible for civil affairs in the Gaza Strip before Israel’s disengagement from the area in 2005. Due to its expertise and experience, the Israeli government decided that COGAT would continue to coordinate interaction with the Gaza Strip with respect to civil affairs despite Israel’s no longer having a presence in the area. Most of the coordination effort is concentrated in COGAT’s Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA) located on the Israeli side of the Erez crossing point. During periods of relative calm as well as during hostilities, the CLA closely monitors the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and the needs of the civilian population. The CLA also coordinates the civilian interface between Israel and the Gaza Strip, such as the movement of people and goods through the crossing points. Importantly, the CLA also works to facilitate the humanitarian activities of international aid organizations and NGOs in the Gaza Strip.29 This includes joint planning and preparations for emergencies during periods of calm. During Operation Protective Edge the CLA operated a situation room, manned by IDF personnel and representatives of international organizations such as the UN and the ICRC, for the monitoring and coordination of humanitarian activity in the Gaza Strip. The IDF, in conjunction with international organizations, has used a common language map of the Gaza Strip which enables coordination between them for humanitarian purposes.

Humanitarian Efforts

Throughout Operation Protective Edge, Israel, through the IDF and COGAT, conducted an intensive and wide-ranging humanitarian campaign aimed at alleviating the suffering and hardship of civilians in the Gaza Strip.30 These efforts included:

Humanitarian Supplies

A total of 5,779 trucks carrying humanitarian supplies entered the Gaza Strip from Israel through the Kerem Shalom crossing. These included 997 tons of medicines and medical supplies. The crossing was kept open and operated by Israeli personnel even though it was subjected to frequent shelling from inside Gaza and a terror tunnel that exploded nearby.

The IDF prepares to transfer medical supplies to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom crossing on July 19, 2014. (IDF/Flickr)
The IDF prepares to transfer medical supplies to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom crossing on July 19, 2014. (IDF/Flickr)

Electricity and Fuel Supply

Israel continued to supply electricity and fuel to the Gaza Strip throughout the Operation. Providing power and fuel to an enemy during an armed conflict is normally considered unthinkable, especially since these are essential to the enemy’s war effort.

Repairs to Infrastructure

86 repairs to infrastructure serving the Gaza Strip were carried out during the Operation: 55 repairs to the electricity infrastructure; 18 repairs to water infrastructure; six repairs to sewage systems; and seven repairs to communications infrastructure.

Medical Evacuations

2,630 medical transfers were made by ambulances between Gaza and Israel through the Erez crossing. The Erez crossing also came under fire on numerous occasions, causing the death of an Israeli civilian as well as several other casualties.

IDF officers escort an injured Palestinian woman for treatment at the IDF field hospital on the Israeli side of the Erez border crossing with the Gaza Strip on July 21, 2014. (IDF/Flickr)
IDF officers escort an injured Palestinian woman for treatment at the IDF field hospital on the Israeli side of the Erez border crossing with the Gaza Strip on July 21, 2014. (IDF/Flickr)

Field Hospital

A field hospital was set up by the IDF at the Erez crossing for the treatment of sick and wounded civilians from the Gaza Strip.31

Humanitarian Ceasefires

Israel agreed to and implemented a number of humanitarian ceasefires during Operation Protective Edge, all of which were violated by Hamas. The IDF also implemented several unilateral suspensions of operations for humanitarian purposes.32

* * *

Notes

1 David Alexander, “Israel Tried to Limit Civilian Casualties in Gaza: U.S. Military Chief,” Reuters, November 6, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/06/us-israel-usa-gaza-idUSKBN0IQ2LH20141106

2 Gaza Crisis Atlas, August 2014, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory, http://www.ochaopt.org/gazacrisisatlas2014/#/0. See the analysis of the maps by blogger Dan Smith, “Assessing the UN’s OCHA ‘Gaza Crisis Atlas 2014’ Report,” August 24, 2014, at http://www.israellycool.com/2014/08/24/assessing-the-ocha-gaza-crisis-atlas-2014-report/ and “Further Analysis of ‘Gaza Crisis Atlas 2014’ Damage Clusters,” August 25, 2014, http://www.israellycool.com/2014/08/25/further-analysis-of-gaza-crisis-atlas-2014-damage-clusters/

3 “Hamas Terrorism: What You Can’t See on the UN’s Maps of Gaza,” Israel Defense Forces, http://www.idfblog.com/operationgaza2014/#Unmaps

4 “Gaza Crisis Atlas – August 2014,” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GazaCrisisAtlas_2014_web.pdf

5 Dan Smith, “Assessing the UN’s OCHA ‘Gaza Crisis Atlas 2014’ Report,” Israellycool, August 24, 2014, http://www.israellycool.com/2014/08/24/assessing-the-ocha-gaza-crisis-atlas-2014-report/

6 See, for example, the Israel Supreme Court’s decision in the so-called “Targeted Killings Case,” HCJ 769/02, The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v The Government of Israel, para. 16-21, December 11, 2005, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.HTM

7 See “Israel’s Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to International Law, Second Report – The Turkel Commission (Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010), http://www.turkel-committee.gov.il/files/newDoc3/The%20Turkel%20Report%20for%20website.pdf, at p. 276.

8 I.e., harm to civilians or civilian objects.

9 Turkel Commission report, http://www.turkel-committee.gov.il/files/newDoc3/The%20Turkel%20Report%20for%20website.pdf

10 “Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General regarding Exceptional Incidents that Occurred during Operation ‘Protective Edge’ – Update No. 2,” IDF MAG Corps, December 7, 2014, http://www.law.idf.il/163-6958-en/Patzar.aspx

9 Ibid., http://www.law.idf.il/163-6958-en/Patzar.aspx

11 “IDF Code of Ethics,” Israel Defense Forces, http://www.idfblog.com/about-the-idf/idf-code-of-ethics/

12 See the Israeli government’s official account of Operation Cast Lead: “The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008–18 January 2009, Factual and Legal Aspects,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 29, 2009, at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/Operation_Gaza_factual_and_legal_aspects_use_of _force_IDF_conduct_5_Aug_2009.aspx

13 Richard Goldstone, “Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and War Crimes,” Washington Post, April 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html

14 See “The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008–18 January 2009, Factual and Legal Aspects,” http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graphics/MFA%20Gallery/Documents/GazaOperation%20w%20Links.pdf, p. 96. The targeting process was also described in a lecture by the Head of the IDF International Law Department at Haifa University on November 5, 2014.

15 “Video: IDF Postpones Strikes After Identifying Civilians within Targeted Areas,” Israel Defense Forces, July 14, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PuL-OA84p54

16 “Video: IDF Redirects Targeting Due to Civilian Presence,” Israel Defense Forces, July 19, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXrxLglOoRM

17 “Video: The IDF Works to Prevent Civilian Casualties in Gaza,” Israel Defense Forces, July 9, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTArVIHDelg; “How the IDF Gets Real-Time Intel to Abort Strikes,” Israel Defense Forces, August 18, 2014, http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/08/18/how-the-idf-gets-real-time-intel-to-abort-strikes/

18 “Video: IDF Makes Precise Strikes on Hamas Infrastructure,” Israel Defense Forces, July 12, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBkTmfr4oHw

19 On precision munitions stockpiles and budgetary considerations see, for example, Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “NATO Allies Might Be Unprepared for Syria,” Defense News, December 17, 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121217/DEFREG01/312170002/NATO-Allies-Might-Unprepared-Syria; and “The High Cost of Precision Attack,” Defense Update, May 6, 2011, http://defense-update.com/20110506_precision_attack.html#.VKBH-F4AKA

20 “Video: IDF Targeting of Three Senior PIJ Terrorists – Mahmoud Walud, Ham Balusha and Alla’a Abd Al-Nabi – in Northern Gaza Strip,” Israel Defense Forces, July 10, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pGS0A6zxgoc

21 “Video: IDF Urges Civilians to Leave Areas of Gaza Targeted for Strikes,” Israel Defense Forces, July 16, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yoK9YL6D5RE#t=82 and “How Is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in Gaza?” Israel Defense Forces, July 16, 2014, http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/16/idf-done-minimize-harm-civilians-gaza/

22 “How Is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in Gaza?” Israel Defense Forces, http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/16/idf-done-minimize-harm-civilians-gaza/

23 Ibid., http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/16/idf-done-minimize-harm-civilians-gaza/; “Video: Hamas: We Place Civilians in the Line of Fire,” Israel Defense Forces, July 18, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzFgIhFKII8#t=68

24 “How Is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in Gaza?” Israel Defense Forces, http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/16/idf-done-minimize-harm-civilians-gaza/

25 Mitch Ginsburg, “The IDF’s First Fully Digital War,” Times of Israel, August 21, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/the-idfs-first-fully-digital-war/; “Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General regarding Exceptional Incidents that Occurred during Operation ‘Protective Edge’,” http://www.law.idf.il/163-6958-en/Patzar.aspx

26 “Urban Warfare Training Center,” Israel Defense Forces, http://www.idf.il/1562-en/Dover.aspx; “Photos: Future IDF Infantry Officers Train for Complex Urban Warfare Scenarios,” Israel Defense Forces, September 2, 2013, http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2013/09/02/photos-future-idf-infantry-officers-train-complex-urban-warfare-scenarios/

27 “Video: A Captain Speaks: Entering Gaza to Care for Civilians,” Israel Defense Forces, September 17, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O1K0YxYlISs&src_vid=Acis6dQcG8w&feature=iv&annotation_id=annotation_1019817703

28 “Hamas Uses Hospitals and Ambulances for Military-Terrorist Purposes,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 28, 2014, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/Hamas-uses-hospitals-and-ambulances-for-military-terrorist-purposes.aspx

29 “Coordination and Liaison Administration for Gaza,” Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), Israel Defense Forces, http://www.cogat.idf.il/1328-en/Cogat.aspx

30 “Daily Report: Civilian Assistance to Gaza – August 27, 2014, Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Israel Defense Forces, http://www.cogat.idf.il/Sip_Storage/FILES/8/4558.pdf

31 “IDF Opens Hospital for Palestinians, Hamas Prevents Access,” Israel Defense Forces, July 25, 2014, http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/25/idf-opens-hospital-for-palestinians-hamas-prevents-access/

32 “Protective Edge: Hamas’ Violations of Ceasefires – A Chronology,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2014, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/Protective-Edge-Hamas-violations-of-ceasefires-chronology.aspx

Contents
The Gaza War 2014: The War Israel Did Not Want and the Disaster It Averted
Preface
by Hirsh Goodman, Amb. Dore Gold
Israel’s Narrative – An Overview
by Hirsh Goodman
Telling the Truth about the 2014 Gaza War
by Amb. Dore Gold
Israel, Gaza and Humanitarian Law: Efforts to Limit Civilian Casualties
by Lt. Col. (res.) David Benjamin
The Legal War: Hamas’ Crimes against Humanity and Israel’s Right to Self-Defense
by Amb. Alan Baker
The Limits of the Diplomatic Arena
by Amb. Dore Gold
Hamas’ Strategy Revealed
by Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi
Hamas’ Order of Battle: Weapons, Training, and Targets
by Lenny Ben-David
Hamas’ Tunnel Network: A Massacre in the Making
by Daniel Rubenstein
Hamas’ Silent Partners
by Lenny Ben-David
Gazan Casualties: How Many and Who They Were
by Lenny Ben-David
Key Moments in a 50-Day War:
A Timeline
by Daniel Rubenstein
About the Authors
  Download pdf  
Hamas Video: Depicting the End of Israel
Hamas Video: Infiltrating Israel from a Tunnel
View: Hamas on the March
Video: Hamas’ Terror Tunnels
Map: Cross-Border Tunnels Uncovered
Video: Attack by Hamas Frogmen
Chart: Number of Rockets Fired from Gaza Each Day
Video: IDF Thwarts Hamas Infiltration into Israel
Video: U.S. Military Praises Israel for Efforts to Avoid Civilian Casualties
When Does a Civilian Structure Become a Legitimate Military Target?
Video: Abbas Blames Hamas for Needless Loss of Life
View: IDF Leaflets Provide Gazans with Evacuation Instructions
Maps: Israel’s Response Concentrated on 3-Km. Border Zone
View: Hamas’ Use of Civilians as Human Shields
Palestinians Killed by Hamas' Errant Rockets
Fraudulent Claims of Civilian Deaths
View: Hamas Staged Casualties at UNWRA School
View: Hamas Execution of Civilians
Chart: Proportion of Civilians Killed in Recent Wars Fought by Western Armies
Poster: Brothers in Arms: Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad
View: Hamas Poster Featuring Osama Bin Laden