Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA)

On August 14, 2024, during the national memorial for the martyrs of the Iran-Iraq War in a province of Iran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei framed a new narrative: standing firm unto death against the psychological warfare of the enemy. Iran’s enemies, he said, are sowing fear through psychological warfare to force the Iranian nation to retreat on various fronts. This warfare is meant to amplify the enemies’ capabilities; since the dawn of the Islamic Revolution, Khamenei averred, the United States, Israel, and Britain have sought to instill fear of what they can do, with the aim of inducing retreat. According to the Koran, however, any retreat that is not a tactical decision, in any military, political, or economic domain, will provoke God’s wrath. The way to confront psychological warfare, Khamenei asserted, is to be cognizant of Iran’s capabilities and avoid exaggerating the power of the enemy. The martyrs of the Iran-Iraq War stood firm against such warfare and thwarted it, and he called to honor them in the ceremonies.¹

Khamenei – an epitome of psychological warfare, the supreme ideological guide who believes that conflicts worldwide are won via the media, and that the media’s influence in overcoming enemies is greater than that of a missile, a drone, a warplane, and weapons, in general² – now understands that a psychological counterattack could defeat even him and his regime.

Khamenei – who during the Swords of Iron War has used the narratives of the occupying regime,³ racism,⁴ and genocide⁵ against Israel to bolster the pro-Palestinian, ideological jihad of the American demonstrators against America itself⁶ – now needs to construct a new narrative to counter the high-intensity psychological warfare being waged both within and outside of Iran.

With the U.S. defense secretary’s announcement on August 11 about the deployment to the region of the nuclear-powered submarine Georgia, the rapid dispatch of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, and the operation of more than 12 warships in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean,⁷ in the wake of the U.S. CENTCOM commander’s visit to Israel for coordinated planning, the United States has decided to upgrade its “Don’t” model. Clearly, Khamenei was forced to realize that he not only erred in assuming the United States would not stand by Israel as in the past, while threatening the moderate Sunni countries with his own “Don’t,” but also that Israel was now in a position to launch a preemptive strike and, certainly, a substantial response within Iran if Iran were to go through with its attack.

In the military-psychological battle, the elimination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in the heart of Tehran in a secure guesthouse of the Revolutionary Guards sends a clear message about Israel’s intelligence penetration of the Guards and related capability. Israel’s attack on the Hodeidah port in Yemen, far from Israel, likewise points to Israel’s ability to strike in Iran. The presence of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East in general, shows that the United States is standing by Israel, and senior Iranian analysts view this as U.S. support for an Israeli preemptive strike on Iranian targets.⁸

Notwithstanding Iran’s investment in developing precision and long-range missiles, drones, and air defense systems, its military weakness lies in its air force. Much of Iran’s aerial fleet dates back to the era of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and many planes have been grounded due to a lack of spare parts. Iran also acquired a small fleet from Russia in the 1990s. Its tanks and armored vehicles are likewise outdated, and its naval fleet has only a few large vessels.⁹

The Economist reports that Iran has more than 3,000 ballistic missiles in its arsenal, but not all have the range to reach Israel. Iran’s liquid-fuel missiles, like the Emad used against Israel in April, require hours of fueling and preparation for launch – during which time the enemy can strike the launchers. Iran also has thousands of cruise missiles and drones that can reach Israel, but these take hours to traverse the more than 1,000 kilometers between the two countries, giving Israel ample warning. Geography is crucial, and Iran is too distant from Israel to deliver a decisive blow against it.¹⁰

In the psychological-economic battle, Israeli statements about targeting oil and gas facilities have likely taken their toll. A regime-affiliated channel specializing in military matters declared that Iran, a country of 85 million, already suffers from frequent water and electricity outages that have caused significant losses to industry, and all that remains for the enemy is to strike power plants, oil refineries, and energy centers to bring the country to catastrophe.¹¹ In addition, a tweet from the official account of Iran’s central bank stating that no banking system had been attacked and the rumors were part of psychological warfare to prevent the dollar’s decline in Iran, indicates that even if the Israeli cyberattack (reported only by Iran International) did not occur, Iran’s economic situation is precarious.

Khamenei’s speech can be interpreted in two ways, possibly reflecting the dilemma he faces. The first is a call to “stand firm unto death” because retreat “will provoke God’s wrath” – words intended to prepare the public for an Israeli strike despite the fear of U.S. and Israeli power and concerns about the economy. The second centers on “any retreat that is not tactical,” meaning that Khamenei could retreat from a response against Israel and present it as a strategy, amid fears that severe damage to Iran’s economy and energy sources could ignite public anger across the country.

Support for a tactical retreat from an attack on Israel, in the wake of Khamenei’s speech, can also be seen in the words of Ali-Akbar Raefipour, the Islamic Republic’s propagandist, who said on August 15 that the response should be managed wisely and cautiously. Iran, he claimed, has brought Israel to a difficult situation of attrition: northern residents are homeless because of Hizbullah, trade routes are paralyzed because of the Houthis, and attacks from militias in Iraq and Syria may mean that an Iranian response is not necessary.¹² Similarly, an official statement by IRGC commander General Hossein Salami, who announced the death of a colonel in the IRGC’s Aerospace Force after being seriously injured in a “coalition raid” in Syria,¹³ clearly alludes to Israel’s strike about 10 days ago near the airport in Homs. His avoidance of referring to Israel, speaking of the coalition instead, may have been intended to ensure that Iran would not again find itself in a situation demanding retaliation.

It is up to Israel to exploit this Iranian dilemma. An Israeli preemptive strike, whether cyber or kinetic, on power stations, oil and gas facilities, or banks could constitute a turning point in the current conflict, forcing Iran to fear the resulting internal unrest and resort to the “tactical retreat” strategy instead of attacking Israel. Khamenei may well regret moving from the proxy method to direct warfare against Israel.

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