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The Strategic Logic of Israel’s Security Barrier

March 8, 2006 | Col. (Res.) Danny Tirza

The main reason for the delay in building the security fence was because the line of the fence was a major issue of political debate inside Israel. The government didn't want to build it, out of concern that any line on the ground would have a political meaning in future negotiations. In all government decisions it was emphasized that the line the army was building was only a security line and it would not be the line for future negotiations.

Sharon’s Strategic Legacy for Israel: Competing Perspectives

January 12, 2006 | Dan Diker

Some Israeli opinion-makers, seeking to define Sharon's political legacy, are determined to transform him into a political dove due to his unilateral disengagement plan that pulled Israel out of Gaza. They claim that the "new" Sharon was willing to lead Israel in another major pullback - this time from at least 90 percent of the West Bank. This interpretation assumed the West Bank security fence would constitute Israel's eastern border.

Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank

December 23, 2004 | Maj. Gen. (res.) Doron Almog

As part of the implementation of Oslo, Israel gave up 80 percent of Gaza on May 18, 1994. When we talk about disengagement from Gaza, this means withdrawal from the remaining 20 percent of the area. During my time as Commander of Southern Command in the years 2000-2003, there were more than 400 attempts by Palestinians to cross into Israel, all of which failed. Together with rebuilding the fence, a key security element was the creation of a one-kilometer security buffer zone.

The Security Fence: An Imperative for Israel

January 15, 2004 | Uzi Landau