Is the U.S. Looking for a New Approach to Disarming Hizbullah in Lebanon?

The issue of disarming Hizbullah in Lebanon has reached a deadlock. The Lebanese government, including President Joseph Aoun, has concluded that it is unable to compel the defiant Shiite militia to surrender its arsenal to the state, as stipulated in the ceasefire agreement based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Enforcing such a demand would likely lead to an open clash with Hizbullah and risk plunging Lebanon into another civil war.

Hizbullah has strategically aligned itself with President Aoun’s position, demanding an early Israeli withdrawal from five strategic positions in southern Lebanon before any discussion of its own disarmament. Israel, conversely, insists on the opposite: Hizbullah must first disarm before any Israeli withdrawal. Hizbullah argues that as long as Israel occupies Lebanese land, its weapons remain necessary to confront Israel.

Moreover, Hizbullah has stated its willingness to consider surrendering its weapons, but only as part of a negotiated agreement with the government involving a “joint defense strategy.” Otherwise, Hizbullah claims, disarming would be tantamount to surrendering to Israel. Hizbullah MPs and leaders, including Naim Qassem, have publicly and unequivocally declared that they will never submit their weapons to the Lebanese state, asserting that their arms are intended for renewed confrontation with Israel.

Since November 2024, several options have been explored. The idea of integrating Hizbullah units into the Lebanese army – similar to how other militias were integrated following the 1990 Taif Agreement – has been rejected by both the United States and President Aoun. This approach was dismissed due to fears that it could lead to a Hizbullah takeover of the army and drastically alter its character. The Syrian model – wherein 3,500 militia members were incorporated into a restructured Syrian army with U.S. acquiescence – was also considered and dismissed. The Lebanese army remains financially supported by the United States and Qatar, and there is no intention of allowing Hizbullah fighters – funded by Iran – to receive an additional salary stream. Doing so would, in effect, be “feeding your own enemy.”

For months, American envoys have engaged in discussions regarding Hizbullah’s disarmament. Former U.S. envoy Morgan Ortagus took a confrontational approach, demanding a detailed timetable from the Lebanese government for Hizbullah to surrender its weapons. The Lebanese government tried to sidestep this pressure, which included three U.S.-proposed options:

1. Disarm Hizbullah according to a clear timetable (which did not happen).
2. Dismantle Hizbullah’s financial arm, the Qard al-Hassan institution (which also did not happen).
3. Begin disarming the 12 Palestinian “refugee” camps, with a process scheduled to begin on June 15 in the three main camps around Beirut (which also did not happen).

Ortagus – labeled the “ugly American” by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt – was replaced by Thomas Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey and of Lebanese descent. Barrack adopted a different tone. Instead of demanding a timetable, he sought (and obtained) the Lebanese perspective on how disarmament might proceed. Rather than applying pressure, Barrack emphasized that Lebanon must find its own solution to the Hizbullah issue.

However, he introduced a new threat: Without a solution to Hizbullah’s armament, Lebanon could become part of Bilad al-Sham (Arabic for “the Levant”), a reference to historical Syrian ambitions over Lebanon. This rhetoric caused widespread panic, especially amid rumors that Lebanon’s northern city of Tripoli and parts of the northern Bekaa Valley might be handed over to Syria.

Barrack introduced two potentially dramatic shifts in the U.S. position:

1. Differentiating Hizbullah’s Wings: Barrack suggested distinguishing between Hizbullah’s political and military wings. Until now, both wings have been treated as part of a unified terrorist organization – a stance reaffirmed by the State Department spokesperson following Barrack’s remarks. Making this distinction could pave the way for direct U.S.–Hizbullah negotiations, similar to the U.S. engagement with Hamas.
2. Selective Disarmament: More significantly, Barrack indicated that the U.S. and Lebanese governments were mainly concerned with Hizbullah’s weapons that threaten Israel.

This implies that Hizbullah could retain other arms – an approach that might offer both Hizbullah and the Lebanese government an honorable exit from the current impasse.