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What’s Behind South Africa’s Anti-Israel Lawfare Campaign? Part II

 
Filed under: Africa, International Law, Israel, Operation Swords of Iron
Publication: Jerusalem Issue Briefs

What’s Behind South Africa’s Anti-Israel Lawfare Campaign? Part II
Then South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor socializes with Hamas activists Emad Saber and Bassem Naim and BDS activist and Palestinian politician Mustafa Barghouti at a conference in May 2024 in Johannesburg.

Institute for Contemporary Affairs

Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation

Vol. 24, No. 18

This is the second article in a series exposing the network of interests behind South Africa’s anti-Israel activities. This part seeks to clarify the soft power of South Africa’s lawfare campaign against Israel. The first part1 introduced the issues of corruption plaguing the African National Congress (ANC), some of the family dynamics, and other factors that made South Africa a perfect opportunity for rogue states like Iran and Russia, and showed how the lack of financial transparency and accountability made South African institutions ideal for political campaigns hostile to Israel. This installment takes a closer look at how nonstate actors, such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, take advantage of the ideological leanings of some of the ANC leadership to contribute to the political firestorm subverting Israel in international institutions.

Hamas and other Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, particularly nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have provided logistical and intelligence support to help make South Africa’s anti-Israel campaign a political success.

Hamas and Pro–Muslim Brotherhood Lobbies

At the heart of the Muslim Brotherhood’s and Hamas’s operational network in South Africa is Mandla Mandela, a grandson of Nelson Mandela who was once a member of the South African parliament. Mandla Mandela now focuses on NGO activism, devoting his efforts exclusively to anti-Israel and pro-Hamas efforts, similar to former foreign minister Naledi Pandor.2

Mandela was seemingly forced to choose between continuing to serve in the government or retaining his membership of the League of Parliamentarians for Al-Quds and Palestine. Al-Quds International Foundation, a similar organization, is sanctioned by the United States.3 According to sources close to ANC members, Mandela’s name was not even on the list of possible ANC parliament candidates. Instead, he focused his efforts on civil society and NGO activism, entering as the public face of an infamous anti-Israel flotilla4 organized in Turkey. The rationale was clear: while Mandla Mandela’s activity poses no problem internally—neither Hamas nor Hizbullah is regarded as a terror organization in South Africa5—he made the ANC vulnerable to U.S. criticism and South Africa potentially liable to sanctions, specifically because South Africa is already greylisted and seeking to benefit from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The AGOA is a piece of legislation that was approved by the U.S. Congress in May 2000. Its stated purpose is to assist the economies of sub-Saharan Africa and to improve economic relations between the United States and the region.6

The Hamas perspective concerning Israel, Gaza, and the Axis of Resistance has been adopted by people and organizations associated with Mandla Mandela. An example is the president of the Parliamentary Pro-Palestine League, MP Hamid bin Abdullah al-Ahmar, who is originally from Yemen and is confirmed to have direct links to al-Islah,7 the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood. Al- Islah is best known for the anti-Israel activism of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Tawakkol Karman, who serves on the board of the U.S.-based NGO, Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN) MENA. Additionally, two Palestinians from different factions serve on the executive committee of the League of Parliamentarians for Al-Quds and Palestine, reflecting the ANC government’s efforts to bring South African Palestinians into a united front led by Hamas.

Mandela, a brand ambassador for the legacy of his grandfather, has initiated a global BDS campaign against Israel, working with such organizations as CAIR (Council on American Islamic Relations), DAWN MENA, and South African anti-Zionist factions such as South African Jews for a Free Palestine headed by Jo Bluen, who hosted a major event demonizing Israel at the Nelson Mandela Foundation on May 9, 2024. At the event, the organizers distributed a brochure providing the participants with talking points titled “Our Narrative: Operation Al-Aqsa Flood,” which advocates for Hamas and even justifies its October 7 attack. A copy of the brochure was obtained and reviewed in preparing this report.

Hamas propaganda manifesto titled “Our Narrative: Operation Al-Aqsa Flood”
Hamas published a propaganda manifesto titled “Our Narrative: Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” on January 21, 2024.

Islamists Advance Apartheid Narrative against Israel at Major Conferences

In a similar vein, the Sandton Conference Center in Johannesburg, South Africa’s largest city, hosted the “Anti-Apartheid Conference for Palestine” on May 10, 2024, in which Naledi Pandor addressed the global community.8 At the reception desk, the organizers distributed a handout titled “Friends of Al-Aqsa.”

Palestine Briefing Pack
Friends of Al-Aqsa “Palestine Briefing Pack” distributed in South Africa in May 2024.

Attendees included Emad Saber, a frequent visitor to South Africa, and Bassem Naim, both Hamas activists and operatives. Pandor socialized with both, as well as with Mustafa Barghouti, a Palestinian physician, BDS activist, and politician who serves as general secretary of the Palestinian National Initiative, also known as al-Mubadara. Barghouti has been a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council since 2006 and is also a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization Central Council. Bassem Naim is the Doha-based former minister who took over the infamous Gaza Ministry of Health from the PLO in 2007. He frequents Johannesburg and Cape Town, as well as Moscow.9 Naim remains active in Hamas politics and gained recent notoriety for claiming not to know which of the Israeli hostages were dead or alive.10 Mandela, who also attended the conference, was photographed in a keffiyeh with a Palestinian flag. In other photos he appears in the company of the Hamas leadership in Istanbul, and of Hizbullah leaders in Johannesburg.

Mandela oscillates easily between meetings with top-level leaders and with activists from assorted pro-Hamas NGOs. Thanks to his enthusiasm, and propped up by the Pandor family, pro-Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated organizations, as well as mainstream international human rights NGOs sympathetic to those causes, have been steadily flocking to South Africa. Mandela and his supporters frequently invoke Nelson Mandela’s legacy to justify the ties with the extensive network of Muslim Brotherhood and self-styled pro-Palestinian organizations increasingly active in South Africa.11

In light of its own past struggles with racial apartheid inside the country, South Africa became the vehicle for unfounded accusations of apartheid against Israel. The ANC’s status both with the domestic and international community was used to discredit factual examinations of Israel’s record. The classic logical fallacy of “appeal to authority” is used to overwhelm any impartial, evidence-based approach. The ANC conveniently chose to disregard the substantial differences between the political histories and social realities of South Africa and contemporary Israel. There is indeed no comparison. Israel’s integration of ethnic and religious minorities in government and civil society is nothing like apartheid in South Africa. Most importantly, Israel’s independent judiciary is a means for redressing injustice in a way that would have been inconceivable in apartheid South Africa.

In successfully pushing this narrative, despite free travel to Israel by visitors around the world attesting to the opposite, the ANC posits that Palestinians living in the self-governing autonomous entities of the West Bank and Gaza are entitled to the same legal rights and protections as Israeli citizens and permanent residents. Thus, not only does the ANC cynically and deceptively misapply apartheid in the traditional sense, but it redefines it in a way that contravenes its original meaning or iteration. This trend, which feeds on poor understanding of the history and meaning of that word, began with the Soviet involvement in “liberation” movements. The notion that is propagated would obligate Israel to violate the Oslo Accords, which mandated separating Israeli-controlled and PA-controlled territories into distinct zones. This novel interpretation of the “apartheid” concept was quickly embraced by many of the pro-Brotherhood NGOs sojourning to South Africa and taking their cue from ANC rhetoric.

One of these organizations is Forward Thinking, a British group. Visiting South Africa just before the October 7 terror attack, the group met with various South African government officials and with Palestinian representatives in Johannesburg and Cape Town. Some of the meetings were arranged by Muhammad Baba, a former South African MP, lawyer, and negotiator who has connections with CAIR’s Cleveland office.12 CAIR purports to be a Muslim civil rights organization but is actually a Muslim Brotherhood front group, and an unindicted coconspirator in the Holy Land trials for funneling funding from U.S. charities to Hamas.13

DAWN MENA

Another major NGO facilitator of this anti-Israel agenda is the aforementioned organization DAWN MENA, which is based in Washington, DC, and registered to an Al Jazeera journalist. DAWN MENA is a relatively new organization that became active after the death of its founder, Jamal Khashoggi, and purportedly follows his vision. Yet DAWN has a long record of activism on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood and anti-Israel causes, including the campaign to get the NSO Group and other Israeli cybersecurity companies blacklisted in the United States and around the world. This blacklisting was the most consequential BDS success in the United States.14 DAWN MENA also gained infamy for hosting a gathering of Qatari propagandists, Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, and lobbyists for assorted anti-Western causes, such as the pro-Russia Algerian regime.15

Lawfare

A closer examination of DAWN MENA’s general network and modus operandi traces back to Russia’s intelligence strategy and global interests.16 DAWN MENA features a number of Brotherhood and Hamas supporters, including the cofounder of CAIR, Nihad Awad,17 who joined DAWN MENA as a board member, and Mia Swart,18 an international human rights lawyer who is a protégé of John Dugard and active commentator in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case against Israel. Dugard, a well-credentialed and awarded South African lawyer, has been a member of the Board of Trustees of Law for Palestine since 2020.19 He represented South Africa as lead counsel at the ICJ in January 2024. Swart is an Al Jazeera analyst, a visiting professor in South Africa, a former employee of the Brookings Institution (a recipient of millions of dollars from Qatar),20 and one of the leading voices in the International Criminal Court (ICC) case against Israel. There is reason to believe the ICJ case against Israel was in the works since 2009.21 Dugard is backed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); allegations that Iran has directly funded both the ICJ and ICC cases do not bear scrutiny. Any foreign funding going toward the legal work on the ICJ case is channeled through third parties and proxies such as the PFLP, and through individual donors.

Dugard’s mentor is the outspoken Richard Falk, chairman of the Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, a Geneva-based independent organization with direct links to Hamas. Swart posted on her Facebook page on October 7, 2023: “Oh what a beautiful morning…,” which perhaps carries more meaning for her than the attached photos. Since then, Swart has become the media face of the ICJ case.

Facebook page screenshot
Mia Swart, an international human rights lawyer and media commentator on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case against Israel, posted, “Oh what a beautiful morning…” on her Facebook page on October 7, 2023.

In the first weeks of the war following the October 7 attack, DAWN MENA was instrumental22 in bringing the names of 40 IDF officers active in Gaza to the ICC’s attention. Another of DAWN MENA’s associates, the Qatar-based British professor Marc Owen Jones, a nonresident fellow at the organization, has enthusiastically whitewashed Hizbullah, the Iran-backed Bahraini opposition, and Hamas attacks on Israelis on social media. Jones likewise has a connection with South Africa, having written about “Africa and the West” for the South African Institute of International Affairs.23

CAIR and DAWN MENA are no longer taking pains to conceal their ideological positions. Having once included CAIR as a partner to combat antisemitism, the U.S. government distanced itself from the organization after Awad publicly praised the October 7 attack.24

On the ANC and South African government side, Zane Dangor is suspected to be the connection between DAWN MENA and South African officials.25 Likewise, DAWN MENA is no longer concealing its policy coordination with the like-minded in the “human rights–industrial complex.” Indeed, a long list of human rights NGOs and other “social justice”–oriented organizations have joined forces with Mandla Mandela and the Pandors and have provided backing to South Africa’s case. These include Amnesty International, the International Foundation for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch (another recipient of Qatari money),26 the American Friends Service Committee, the Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Lawyers Guild, the Palestinian Rights War Resistance League, Code Pink, American Muslims for Palestine, as well as PFLP proxies such as the Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, al-Haq, and International Defense for Palestinian Children.

All these organizations have at various points expressed support for some version of the anti-Israel rhetoric advanced through the ANC’s BDS global initiatives under different umbrella groups. The NGOs involved in the pro-Hamas endeavor have varying degrees of legitimacy. While many of these organizations are internationally prominent leftist groups, others are more closely associated with the Palestinian cause or Islamist ideology. The Muslim Brotherhood is using Al-Quds South Africa and Al-Quds Youth League South Africa, Africa for Palestine, and the Mandela Foundation to host antisemitic and anti-Israel events, along with more specialized groups such as African Artists Against Apartheid.

To some extent, this method of signing on many different groups with varying degrees of involvement, resources, numbers, and efficiency mirrors a traditional Soviet–Russian strategy of constructing a maze of shell organizations and fellow travelers to create an appearance of a large united front. Most of these organizations are competing for resources, and frequently face a clash of egos and competitive agendas. In many cases, they boost their numbers by cross-pollinating staffers and operatives from the network.

The Mandela Foundation, while overtly trying to remain a neutral entity, seems to have been hijacked and subverted by Mandla Mandela’s anti-Israel agenda. Even though the Mandela grandson has no formal role in the foundation, and this agenda only represents the views of a small minority of the South African population, he has managed to gain control of the organization’s name.27

As elaborated in the first article in this series on Iran and South Africa,28 the Pandor and Dangor “mafia” families have cultivated devoted fellow travelers to propagate concern about the Palestinian issue in the public discourse at the cost of diverting attention from more immediate economic, political, and social problems in South Africa. Indeed, the Pandor links to assorted schemes and enterprises have created a shadow state that in turn invites foreign influence.

THE PANDOR FAMILY INFLUENCE

South Africa’s ANC Agenda

One of the Pandor family’s loyal lieutenants is Damascus-educated Muhammad Khalid Sayed, who is close to Naledi Pandor and to South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, and is the force behind the anti-Israel protests in Cape Town. Sayed is a close associate of Imtiaz Sooliman of the Gift of the Givers, yet another anti-Israel NGO. This NGO is a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” part of the same pro-Hamas network, with connections to Mandla Mandela. Gift of the Givers set up several medical clinics in Gaza including Khuza Clinic, just three kilometers from Kibbutz Nir Oz, which Hamas murderously attacked on October 7.29

Sayed was photographed at a February 3, 2024, soccer stadium fundraiser in Cape Town with a banner reading “Free Palestine from the River to the Sea” and “South Africa Supports Hamas.” An identical banner was displayed at protests which Naledi Pandor attended, prompting criticism of her ties with Hamas and Iran.30

Another member of the same pro-Hamas milieu is Khaled Qaddoumi, the Iran-based Hamas representative who is a liaison between Iran, Hamas, and South Africa. Hamas is involved with two organizations that appear linked to indoctrination and to moving money and are associated with this clique: the South Africa–based Sharing Hope Foundation, and the Essa and Fatima Moosa Education Foundation.31

The ANC’s relationship with Hamas is a two-way street; ANC officials visited Gaza frequently in the past. It is suspected that evidence of South Africa’s cash flow to Gaza in foreign currencies was found by the IDF among the huge sums in Hamas coffers.32 Delegations such as Gift of the Givers may even be implicated in bringing in additional assets, over and above humanitarian donations. The network extends past the Gaza–South Africa–Iran triangle.

Al-Quds Foundation

The Al-Quds International Foundation in the United States has direct links to South Africa. The ANC is courting support and influence in U.S. circles, building ties with the local Muslim Brotherhood and pro-Hamas contingencies. An ANC delegation was sent to the United States in late July.33

Well-known international human rights NGOs are not the only means by which the Muslim Brotherhood wields influence, finances its projects, or funds ideological indoctrination and political lobbies and campaigns while soliciting support. A list of Muslim Brotherhood–linked organizations’ bank details indicates that the network has established and entrenched a well-run machine for moving and laundering money, fundraising, and reinvesting its ill-begotten wealth all throughout South Africa, complementing hawala (a traditional, informal honor-based value transfer system via money brokers) networks and better-known international charity channels, such as the notorious Islamic Relief.34

Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood and pro-Hamas factions trade as much in political capital as in currency. By some coincidence, key foreign policy positions and seats in important commissions and committees in South Africa under ANC rule end up being assigned to Islamists and cronies of the ANC’s kleptocratic elitists with similar ideological proclivities.35

For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood sympathizer Muhammad Dangor, former South African ambassador to Libya, Syria, and special envoy to Lebanon, just happens to be a special adviser to the president of South Africa. Muhammad Khalid Sayed, mentioned above, the head of one of the opposition parties in Cape Town, has visited Iraq and Iran, regularly meets with extremists in the Pakistani Ministry of Defense, and is suspected of having visited Qatar shortly before South Africa opened the ICJ case. Mandla Mandela until recently was a member of South Africa’s National Assembly. Paul Mashatili, the deputy president of South Africa, supports Hamas, Hizbullah, the PFLP, Islamic Jihad, and has connections with Islamic Relief of South Africa.

Former ambassador to the United States Ebrahim Rasool has ties with CAIR,36 while South Africa’s ambassador to Iran Vika Kumalo answers directly to Zane Dangor in the latter’s role as director general of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). Rasool, Mohammed Dangor and Zane Dangor acted as kingpins of foreign policy in South Africa, consistently pursuing anti-Israel and pro-Brotherhood positions.

Mohammed Khaled Sayed is an ANC politician who heads the territory of the Western Cape district of South Africa and he is also coincidentally the nephew of Imtiaz Sooliman who is the founder of the Gift of the Givers. Dangor is very close to Imam Ibrahim Gabriels, who is affiliated with the Al-Quds Foundation and secretly drives anti-Israel NGO activism in South Africa and beyond. Gabriels is a close associate of Mandla Mandela and also cooperates with the Islamic Relief in South Africa. Islamic Relief is a member of the United Nations Economic and Social Council and is a signatory to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s Code of Conduct. It is also a member of Bond (British Overseas NGOs for Development) and the Disasters Emergency Committee.37 However, it is also one of the largest Muslim Brotherhood charities and has raised concerns in the U.S. State Department over allegations of antisemitism. Germany and the Netherlands likewise distanced themselves from the organization, although the UK did not.38

DANGOR / DUARTE FAMILY INFLUENCE

The former South Africa ambassador to Iran Yusuf Saloojee was arrested on charges of corruption and bribery in one of the MTN telecommunications scandals.39 He mysteriously died some two weeks after his arrest, raising suspicions of foul play done to prevent the possibility of incriminating evidence coming to light.40

In a long list of corrupt, Islamist ANC officials, Mo Shaikh is a particularly striking example. Shaikh is South Africa’s high commissioner to Canada, and also the former intelligence director of the foreign intelligence wing of State Security. His brother Shabir, whom he was very close to, was involved in former president Jacob Zuma’s corruption involving the Gupta family and is a convicted criminal.

The ANC’s anti-Israel attitudes have influenced other parties. Ahmed Sheikh of the National Freedom Party threatened to kill Jews in Cape Town, in an ominous homage to the release from prison41 of members of Pagad, a terror organization,42 who had been charged with antisemitic and other crimes. Ahmed Sheikh has capitalized on Pandor’s anti-Israel threats to promote antisemitic notions of dual loyalty.

Terror Incitement and Support in South Africa

As noted, the pro-Hamas Pagad gangsters who carried out terror attacks in Cape Town in the late 1980s and spent 21 years in prison were recently released. They are now calling themselves “Hamas South Africa.”43

Anwar Adams has gained notoriety as a member of Pagad, the Muslim Brotherhood–linked Al-Quds Youth League, and the Muslim Students Association. Adams has shared the stage with Ibrahim Mousawi,44 editor of the weekly Hizbullah newspaper al-Intiqad in Beirut. He has been quoted as a Hizbullah spokesman since at least 1998, a spokesman for the Lebanese parliament, a journalist for Hizbullah’s al-Manar, and as Lebanese minister of telecommunications.45

Left-wing extremists such as Julius Malema and his Economic Freedom Fighters also have connections with foreign Islamists, who have offered arms to Hamas and are an important source of financing.46

Sharia banking47 dominates South African financing for the Muslim community,48 and has started to garner the support of Black Christians who believe they will get jobs and otherwise derive benefits by closing ranks with the Muslim communities. The Jewish community, on the other hand, feels betrayed by the ANC and especially President Ramaphosa, who for many years supported them in exchange for their loyalty.

ANC financing is now intermingled with that of national campaigns, such as the Global Campaign to Return to Palestine headed by the aforementioned Mustafa Barghouti, a backer and friend of Mandla Mandela, and Naledi Pandor. The ANC–Islamist network is small but far more extensive than meets the eye.

The Axis of Resistance

The ANC’s corrupt dealings with Iran’s defense industry and other economic sectors cannot be easily distinguished from its dealings with Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood–linked lobbies and NGOs. Indeed, as Iran has drawn closer to assorted anti-Israel factions throughout the Middle East, the financial and political connections among this nexus have become far more intertwined, and the anti-Israel agenda has surfaced as a priority unifying many otherwise divergent interests. For that reason, the ANC’s contributions to Iran-backed agendas likewise are linked to state and nonstate actors that have joined Tehran’s sphere of influence. South Africa’s support for Iran and its proxies is long-term and committed, and has traversed periods of hardship when Iran’s influence was significantly diminished by sanctions.

South Africa was one of the only nations to actively oppose sanctions on Iran in the Security Council in 2012.49 This loyalty was reflected in practical results. With Iran remaining effectively isolated from the West for the past decade, China and Russia, at the time concerned with their own geopolitical agendas, could not openly sell weapons to Tehran until 2020, when some of the sanctions started to expire. South Africa became one of the only conduits for weapons sales to the Islamic Republic. Moreover, Iran already had a robust domestic armaments industry, meaning Africa did not have to sink further valuable resources, such as technicians and researchers, into integrating or sustaining Iran’s military infrastructure. While Iran itself could not dedicate as many resources to its regional proxies as before the sanctions were imposed, its trade with South Africa made up for some of the shortfall. That meant South Africa was effectively involved not only in keeping Iran afloat but in arming Hamas and other terror organizations for years leading up to the October 7 attack.

Moreover, this relationship allowed South Africa to expand its limited resources, pursuing arms sales to other Iranian allies in the region—namely Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. Many of these states were eager to upgrade their aging forces. Not only did military trade with Iran make South Africa useful to nonstate actors in the Middle East, but allies and satellite states of Iran became clients as well. South Africa had to balance these new relationships with the business risk of potentially losing a financial lifeline from some of the more moderate Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in case of future financial crises. But as Muslim Brotherhood influence returned to the Middle East,50 particularly after the signing of the Al-Ula Accords51 that normalized relations with Qatar, this tension greatly declined and in recent years South Africa had even more incentive to collaborate with the Axis of Resistance directly and indirectly. Iran’s normalization of ties with many of the Arab states likewise made financial retribution less likely. If South Africa’s strategy of realpolitik pays off, it could yet develop a significant export market, albeit one restricted to the other side of the Persian Gulf. And perhaps, as Iran grows ever more dominant in the region, South Africa can surpass even these limitations to become one of the leading defense and mining powers for the Middle East.

At the heart of it all is Sharif Pandor and his business coalition of defense and mining interests. With the West largely uninvolved in the issue of uranium, Pandor and his mining companies were able to capitalize52 on the market vacuum. Pandor became the director (currently inactive) of a private company that was at the forefront of uranium-related trade53 until approximately 2015, when Iran appeared to have frozen its nuclear program. Arguably, the Pandor family’s fertilizer trade with Iran, discussed in the first part of this series, was a cover for trade in other elements used in Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, or otherwise helped disguise the funneling of weapons or components to the Middle East.54

South African exports of fertilizers to Iran Value Year
Animal or vegetable fertilizers, fertilizers produced by mixing $6.62K 2021
Mineral or chemical fertilizers, other fertilizers $30.56K 2011

The fertilizer trade could also be a convenient means for Iran to divert attention from its redirection toward banned nuclear weapons research.55 Iran has always been a major fertilizer producer, therefore, it is suspicious that it now imports fertilizer from South Africa. This raises the possibility that Iran is now importing other products under the guise of fertilizer, to avoid U.S. sanctions, since not all exports are disclosed officially. How much of these dual-use products were then reexported to nonstate actors remains an open question.

During the last five years South Africa’s exports to Iran have increased at an annualized rate of 17.5%, from $40.2 million in 2017 to $90.1 million in 2022 (figures for 2023 and 2024 are not available). For South Africa, the fertilizer business became a convenient way to build its reputation, expand influence in Africa and the Middle East, and become a go-to reference for dual-use products.56

Recommendations

This report in two parts is the first comprehensive effort to examine the familial, professional, financial, and associative networks and details underlying the corrupt, antisemitic, and anti-Israel shift within the ANC and its implications for South Africa. While the ANC may be losing support because of its general corruption and mismanagement, decades of institutional control have taken their toll. More radical parties are rising and promising a change. Various foreign state actors and movements are taking advantage of the systemic political, economic, and social failures in South Africa to assert control, exploit the natural resources, and advance their own objectives through a takeover of the institutional infrastructure.

For those reasons, South Africa is moving to the forefront of the ideological and information warfare Israel is currently facing. While on its own, South Africa may seem to be a feeble adversary, the formidable support of its network of allies should not be discounted. Up until now, the international community, including Israel and the United States, largely ignored South Africa as a nuisance. But recent events demonstrate that the country’s persistent lobbying of international institutions is paying off and Israel is losing political and diplomatic ground daily, as global public opinion is overwhelmed by propaganda messaging and South Africa’s self-righteous grandstanding. Therefore, Israel and its allies can no longer afford to ignore the persistent and growing threat stemming from the network of interests that support and fuel South Africa’s ANC.

This is an initial probe, and much more work is needed.

Funding should be allocated toward a thorough financial investigation of the money transfers between ANC members and their allies and henchmen. Charity and human rights organizations and bank accounts, as well as Iranian, Gaza-based, Qatari, and other international participants in these arrangements must be scrutinized. Evidence of conflicts of interest, corruption, and financing of terror should be gathered pending legislation proposed to the U.S. Congress, as well as other executive and legislative efforts to hold South Africa accountable for its cynical misuse of public resources to advance extremist objectives and to isolate Israel on the global stage. The United States and others should put pressure on the ANC leadership to:

  1. Cease and desist from any support of BDS, anti-Israel, pro-terror, and pro-Hamas activity.

  2. Designate Hamas as a terror organization.

  3. Disavow further attacks on the Jewish community and threats to dual nationals.

  4. Allocate resources and take other measures to protect the Jewish community from potential harm and violence from terror groups such as Pagad.

  5. Disassociate and divest from any funding linked to entities, officials, or countries sanctioned by the United States and the United Nations.

Failure to comply with these demands should result in direct sanctions against both entities and individuals involved in these schemes. Furthermore, the United States, Israel, and other allies should focus on investigating and exposing the adversarial networks behind these developments in South Africa and use the intelligence gathered from these probes to put an end to Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood operations, and to put pressure on Iran through economic and other means.

Finally, the information in this report should serve as a foundational basis for further research and discreditation of the corrupt practices, malign movements, fanatical and hateful ideologies, and illicit relationships that have been unduly normalized and legitimized in the relevant international relations. The likes of Naledi Pandor and her increasingly authoritarian and demagogic associates should not be receiving warm welcomes at social functions around the world; instead, they should be shamed for turning South Africa into a propaganda front for rogue regimes.

* * *

Notes

  1. https://jcpa.org/article/what-is-behind-south-africas-anti-israel-lawfare-campaign/↩︎

  2. https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-796939; https://www.bdssouthafrica.com/post/south-african-parliament-stands-palestinian-people/↩︎

  3. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1725#:~:text=The%20Al%2DQuds%20International%20Foundation,in%20transactions%20with%20these%20parties↩︎

  4. https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-796939↩︎

  5. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/south-africa170224 ↩︎

  6. https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa↩︎

  7. Interview with “Shield Z,” April 10, 2024; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Islah_(Yemen)↩︎

  8. https://www.bnaibrith.org/dismayed-by-global-anti-apartheid-conference-on-palestine-set-to-open-in-south-africa/↩︎

  9. https://x.com/MKhalidSayed/status/1730300232406118431; https://www.jns.org/hamas-delegation-in-south-africa-for-palestinian-solidarity-event/; https://www.timesofisrael.com/moscow-hosts-hamas-delegation-and-irans-deputy-fm-prompting-israeli-outrage/↩︎

  10. https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-800781↩︎

  11. “We congratulate all who joined our call for Parliament to take a strong stand on this matter, including the MJC, Al Aqsa Foundation, BDS, The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), solidarity organizations, human rights bodies and other groups and individuals who hold Madiba’s legacy and the Palestinian cause close to their hearts”

    https://www.bdssouthafrica.com/post/south-african-parliament-stands-palestinian-people/↩︎

  12. Interview with “Shield Z,” April 10, 2024.↩︎

  13. https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2010/11/judges-ruling-on-islamic-groups-as-unindicted-co-conspirators-made-public-030922↩︎

  14. https://besacenter.org/the-bds-campaign-against-israel-de-localizes-the-palestinian-cause-focuses-on-global-surveillance/↩︎

  15. https://dawnmena.org/about/who-we-are-2/ These include the nonresident fellow Marc Owen Jones, whose commentary and other work frequently reflects the official position of the Qatari government and who is paid by a Qatari government–funded university in Doha; Tawakkol Karman, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood chapter in Yemen, al-Isla; and Sarah Leah Whitson, who lobbies for Qatar, Algeria, and Armenia.↩︎

  16. https://web.archive.org/web/20230627095939/https://tvpworld.com/70854797/how-russia-uses-ngos-to-destabilize-countries↩︎

  17. https://dawnmena.org/about/who-we-are-2/nihad-awad/↩︎

  18. https://dawnmena.org/author/mia-swart/↩︎

  19. https://law4palestine.org/prof-dr-christopher-john-robert-dugard/ ↩︎

  20. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/06/17/john-allen-brookings-institution-fbi-qatar-00040380#:~:text=Meanwhile%2C%20the%20current%20Brookings%20annual,not%20to%20include%20Qatari%20money↩︎

  21. See https://sussex.figshare.com/articles/report/Occupation_colonialism_apartheid_A_re-assessment_of_Israel_s_practices_in_the_occupied_Palestinian_territories_under_international_law/23392841?file=41120669 and https://www.icc-cpi.int/node/194133↩︎

  22. https://dawnmena.org/prime-suspects-gaza/↩︎

  23. https://dawnmena.org/dawn-fellow-marc-owen-jones-explains-disinformation-campaigns-in-the-middle-east/ ↩︎

  24. https://www.nationalreview.com/news/cair-director-stands-by-celebration-of-october-7-attack-claims-he-was-praising-everyday-palestinians/↩︎

  25. Interview with “Shield Z,” April 10, 2024.↩︎

  26. https://www.memri.org/reports/raven-project-leaks-alleged-qatari-support-3-million-euros-human-rights-watch↩︎

  27. https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2024/05/south-africas-equality-gap-at-the-heart-of-elections/↩︎

  28. https://jcpa.org/article/what-is-behind-south-africas-anti-israel-lawfare-campaign/↩︎

  29. https://giftofthegivers.org/healthcare/khuzaa-clinic/32885/↩︎

  30. https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/news/minister-pandor-slammed-for-ties-with-hamas-and-iran-125958c2-14fd-4f25-855e-417c833b785a ; http://Jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-786600↩︎

  31. https://sharinghope.org.za/; http://musafoundation.org/↩︎

  32. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hklmaxg36↩︎

  33. https://agoa.info/news/article/16501-sa-trade-minister-tau-confident-us-will-maintain-sa-s-agoa-inclusion.html; https://agoa.info/news/article/16225-south-africa-s-trade-minister-off-to-the-us-to-save-country-from-agoa-agony.html↩︎

  34. According to the “Investopedia” website: “Hawala is an informal method of transferring money without any physical money actually moving. It is described as a “money transfer without money movement.” Another definition is simply “trust.” Hawala is used today as an alternative remittance channel that exists outside of traditional banking systems.” https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hawala.asp#:~:text=Hawala%20is%20an%20informal%20method,outside%20of%20traditional%20banking%20systems. https://www.meforum.org/MiddleEastForum/media/MEFLibrary/pdf/Islamic-Relief-Dossier-v3.pdf↩︎

  35. https://www.newarab.com/news/explainer-how-s-africa-palestinian-struggles-are-linked↩︎

  36. https://ca.cair.com/sfba/updates/thank-you-for-attending-cair-sfbas-28th-anniversary-gala/↩︎

  37. https://www.islamic-relief.org.za/about-us/↩︎

  38. https://policyexchange.org.uk/blogs/uk-diverges-from-allies-in-treatment-of-islamic-relief-worldwide/↩︎

  39. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibrahim_Mousawi; https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-811875↩︎

  40. https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ex-sa-ambassador-to-iran-arrested-over-mtniran-cellphone-deal-19324420 ↩︎

  41. https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/opinion/why-is-pagad-attacking-the-jewish-community-4ab542e6-68b8-429f-8ff7-b5737ea76324↩︎

  42. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-10-09-how-pagad-was-stopped-and-the-scorpions-emerged-and-the-renewed-need-for-cri↩︎

  43. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRsh3iueS5I; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=weqZbcNP3wc↩︎

  44. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibrahim_Mousawi; https://x.com/ibrahimmousawi?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor ↩︎

  45. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVH6zGpr_DY↩︎

  46. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africas-divisive-malema-could-be-post-election-kingmaker-2024-05-27/↩︎

  47. https://www.standardbank.co.za/southafrica/personal/learn/what-is-shariah-banking↩︎

  48. https://www.banking.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Islamic-Banking-Paper-05112021.pdf↩︎

  49. https://www.africandefence.net/rethinking-south-african-arms-sales-to-the-persian-gulf/↩︎

  50. https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/political-islam-now-commands-the-middle-east/↩︎

  51. https://www.mei.edu/blog/gcc-al-ula-statement-perhaps-step-not-solution↩︎

  52. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/34631gon790.pdf↩︎

  53. https://www.environment.co.za/poisoning-carcinogens-heavy-metals-mining/uranium-mining-in-south-africa.html#google_vignette↩︎

  54. https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/exports/south-africa/fertilizers↩︎

  55. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/nitrogenous-fertilizers/reporter/zaf↩︎

  56. In 2022, South Africa exported $423M in nitrogenous fertilizers, making it the 31st largest exporter of nitrogenous fertilizers in the world. In the same year, nitrogenous fertilizers were South Africa’s 38th most exported product. The main destinations of nitrogenous fertilizers exports from South Africa were: Zambia ($174M), Zimbabwe ($66.3M), Botswana ($38.8M), Ghana ($31.8M), and Democratic Republic of the Congo ($26.4M).

    In 2022, South Africa imported $847M in nitrogenous fertilizers, becoming the 18th largest importer of nitrogenous fertilizers in the world. In the same year, nitrogenous fertilizers were South Africa’s 15th most imported product. South Africa imported nitrogenous fertilizers primarily from: Saudi Arabia ($206M), Qatar ($191M), Oman ($162M), China ($101M), and Russia ($85.6M).

    The fastest-growing import markets in nitrogenous fertilizers for South Africa in 2021 and 2022 were Oman ($99.9M), Russia ($66.8M), and Qatar ($53.8M).

    In April 2024, South Africa exported nitrogenous fertilizers mostly to Zambia (ZAR207M), Zimbabwe (ZAR68.5M), Democratic Republic of the Congo (ZAR52.3M), unclassified (ZAR43.6M), and Namibia (ZAR32M), and imported them mostly from Belgium (ZAR69.4M), Saudi Arabia (ZAR49.3M), Netherlands (ZAR34.2M), China (ZAR32.3M), and Russia (ZAR11.6M).↩︎