Sinai: The Strategic Pivot of Egypt-Israel Security Interdependence

What connects Egypt and Israel today is not just a peace treaty but a shared strategic understanding of both common and unexpected threats that cross borders.

Dalia Ziada

The Sinai-Gaza Predicament

For the Egyptian people, the sympathy with the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and fear of terrorist groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) has stirred a complex blend of emotions resulting from a heritage of conflicting ideologies and beliefs. Egyptians are struggling to reconcile the contradictory judgments of their hearts and minds about the Gazans.

Decades of pan-Arab nationalist rhetoric, layered with religious affinity, have ingrained in the Egyptian mindset a subconscious cultural and political connection to the Palestinian people and the so-called “Palestinian cause.” Gaza seems familiar, almost like an extension of Egypt itself. Yet, this empathy is sharply contrasted by visceral resistance to opening Sinai borders for the Gazans to take refuge from the war, even temporarily.

This contradiction is not hypocrisy but genuine schizophrenia. Many Egyptians who sing praises to the Palestinians and the so-called “Palestinian Cause” day and night would unapologetically argue that former President Anwar Al-Sadat, when signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, had intentionally abandoned Gaza for a good reason.

The Egyptian people and government fear the influx of the Gaza refugees into Sinai more than they fear an armed conflict with Israel. The economic burden of the refugees is not the issue, but rather the dread of importing the most chronic geopolitical crisis in the Middle East to Egyptian territories. The Palestinians, mostly indoctrinated with poisonous ideas that honor violent resistance and suicidal victimhood, are legitimately often perceived as agents of trouble.

The Palestinians’ collective identity is deeply rooted in a culture of violence, which could easily ignite brutal conflicts with Sinai’s Bedouin tribes, who would not tolerate their presence. While Egyptians may genuinely care about the suffering of Gazans, history has taught them a harsh lesson: whenever Palestinian refugees have crossed borders in large numbers, their arrival has triggered protracted security dilemmas for the host country, as evident in the cases of Jordan and Lebanon.

Nevertheless, for the Egyptian political leadership and military, Gaza is not a humanitarian concern but a national security nightmare. The Egyptian army views Gaza as a breeding ground for extremist ideology, with a proven record of allowing jihadist groups to infiltrate Sinai, radicalizing Sinai youth, and smuggling weapons with Sinai tribes. The Egyptian military has refrained from controlling smuggling to avoid angering local tribes that see smuggling in Gaza as a profitable business.

Since Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2006, and mainly because of its direct ties to Egypt’s banned Muslim Brotherhood, the strip has turned into a launchpad of ideological and physical threats to Egypt’s stability. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolutions (2011) and the rapid rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Egypt (2012-2013), Egypt’s current President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who was defense minister at that time, found it necessary to seek the help of the Israeli army to combat the terrorist cells that groups like Hamas and the PIJ had embedded in Sinai. These jihadists organized themselves into an ISIS franchise and brutally targeted both Egyptian civilians and military personnel across the peninsula.

The Troops in Sinai

The Egyptian military buildup in Sinai and near the Rafah border with Gaza has not been a recent development that started after October 7, 2023. It began in 2014 as part of a long-term effort to stabilize Sinai, integrate it into Egypt’s national fabric, and prevent it from becoming a safe haven for militants. In 2018, the then-Chief of Staff of the Egyptian armed forces publicly bragged about the unprecedented concentration of Egyptian ground forces in Sinai, which he estimated at that time as “88 battalions, with a total of 42,630 fighters and 800 vehicles of various types.” The number of these troops increased in 2024 after Egypt relocated some forces, including heavy weaponry, from the Second and Third Field Armies, which are based in cities along the Suez Canal, to reinforce the existing troops in Sinai.

Israel has not only permitted Egypt to undertake this step which deviates from the stipulations of the Camp David Accords but has also provided the diplomatic and security cover that enabled Egypt to dispatch more troops into Sinai over the years. This was not due to naivety on Israel’s part, as suggested by some Israeli observers, who are understandably frustrated with Cairo’s imprudent response to the October 7 attacks and the increasing hostility toward Israel in mainstream Egyptian circles. However, at that time, Israel had no choice but to assist Egypt in combating terrorists in Sinai because they posed a major threat to Israel’s security as well. Three strategic considerations underpin this unprecedented military cooperation:

Counter-terrorism Imperative: The decade-long insurgency by Wilayat Sinai, an Islamic State (Da’esh) affiliate, exposed the Egyptian military’s inability to impose complete control over its territory. Military operations, particularly the Comprehensive Operation Sinai in 2018, have shifted doctrine from sporadic raids to a systematic counterinsurgency approach, combining tribal co-optation, intelligence coordination with Israel, and kinetic strikes at specific hot targets.
Assertion of Sovereignty: Historically, Cairo has struggled to govern Sinai effectively due to its inhospitable topography, the tribal population’s limited loyalty to central authority, and the ongoing smuggling business between the Bedouins in Sinai and the terrorist groups in Gaza. Deploying heavy weapons projects state power and signals to domestic and regional actors alike that Egypt retains sovereign capability to control Sinai, at least to refute calls for external intervention by international powers to secure the peninsula.
Development as Security: Under President Sisi, a military buildup has been accompanied by ambitious infrastructure projects aimed at integrating Sinai’s economy with mainland Egypt, thereby reducing the incentives for extremist recruitment. Military involvement in economic development in Sinai has entrenched the army’s influence while pacifying local tribal dynamics.

This brief episode of successful military cooperation between Israel and Egypt in Sinai (2013-2015) highlights how the two neighbors’ national security is so interdependent. However, the recent deployment of troops near the Rafah border is mainly a performative necessity in response to Israel’s control over the Philadelphi corridor on the Gaza side of the Rafah border. Such a move aims to satisfy domestic and regional audiences angered by Al-Jazeera’s footage of the Gaza war and inflamed by the “jihad on Israel” fatwas from Doha-based Islamic clerics. To Cairo’s distress, the broader Arab public views Egypt as the primary regional actor that should and could intervene in Gaza.

Egypt’s Military Upgrade

Beyond Sinai, President Sisi has been aggressively upgrading the army’s capabilities to further strengthen and justify the military institution’s expanding role in political and economic domains. The Egyptian military is the de facto ruler of the Egyptian state, while the civilian technocratic government has limited decision-making power and primarily implements decisions made by the president and his closest circle of advisors, who are often drawn from the military leadership. Moreover, maintaining a robust Egyptian army is crucial in guaranteeing continued interest from Arab Gulf states in investing in Egypt’s stability, as part of ensuring their own security and the broader regional security.

Since Sisi’s rise to power in 2014 and the subsequent freeze on U.S. military aid under the Obama administration, Egypt has decided to diversify its armament resources and no longer rely on the United States as its primary source of armaments. According to the Camp David Accords, Egypt has been receiving an annual military aid package of approximately $1.3 billion from the United States, comprising military equipment and economic development support.

In recent decades, the Bush and Obama administrations utilized the military aid package to pressure Egypt to improve its human rights record and promote democratization. Therefore, the current Egyptian leadership has decided to pursue armament from other destinations, including Europe and Japan, as well as from the United States’s great power competitors, Russia and China.

Between 2015 and 2019, Egypt became the world’s third-largest arms importer, acquiring advanced fighter jets, naval vessels, and drones from France, Russia, Germany, and China. In 2023, Egypt and Turkey reached technology transfer agreements in the naval and aerial sectors, marking a historic pivot in defense industrial cooperation between the two countries. In April of this year, the Chinese air force traveled all the way to Egypt’s Red Sea military bases to perform a joint exercise with the Egyptian troops in eastern Sinai, a few kilometers away from Israel and the heated war in Gaza.

Ironically, instead of discouraging the United States from continuing its military support to Egypt, Sisi’s outreach to other armament sources has incentivized the United States to provide more. Recently, in December 2024, the U.S. State Department approved over $5 billion in potential arms sales to Egypt, including upgrades for 555 M1A1 Abrams tanks and Hellfire missiles. In February 2025, further approvals included the modernization of fast missile craft worth $625 million and Northrop Grumman’s AN/TPS-78 Long Range Radar systems, valued at $304 million.

Domestically, Egypt has advanced its defense manufacturing capabilities, unveiling indigenous armored vehicles, including the RAAD 200 multiple rocket launcher and the amphibious SENA 200 infantry fighting vehicle. In naval procurement, the commissioning of the MEKO A-200EN frigate ENS Al-Qadeer in December 2023 further augmented Egypt’s maritime power projection.

Notably, none of these procurement actions violates the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which imposes no restrictions on Egypt’s level of military upgrade. However, seeking Russian and Chinese weapons risks endangering U.S. military aid, a crucial resource not only for Egypt’s defense but also for its broader economic leverage. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision not to meet with President Sisi during his recent visit to the Middle East in May is a concerning sign of his disapproval of Egypt’s growing economic and military alignment with China. Beijing’s growing role in arming and training the Egyptian military challenges U.S. strategic dominance and complicates the security calculus for both Israel and the United States.

Egypt-Israel Bond of Trust

Despite recent diplomatic tensions, basic game theory rules suggest that neither Egypt nor Israel is likely to gain from engaging in an armed conflict. The last thing Israel wants right now is to add another front to the seven warfronts it is currently fighting on. Meanwhile, Egypt realistically recognizes that its chances of winning a war single-handedly against Israel’s “rising lion” army are slim.

Despite the optics and contrary to alarmist views, the Egyptian troops’ deployment to Sinai and near the Rafah border is not a sign of imminent war with Israel. Egypt’s military doctrine is strictly defensive. The Egyptian military has never initiated a war. Egypt has no plans to engage in military confrontation with Israel, not over anything, and especially not over Gaza. The idea that Egyptians would sacrifice their sons in uniform for Gaza is unrealistic. Even if some of the brainwashed young soldiers want to do it, the military command would strictly prevent this from happening. The way the Egyptian army command dealt with incidental clashes between Israeli and Egyptian soldiers at the Rafah border in early 2024 proves this point.

More importantly, there are few incentives, if any, for Egypt and Israel to fight each other. In contrast, the two neighbors share a genuine interest in combating jihadist groups in Sinai and limiting Hamas’s militarization of Gaza. Their security and economic cooperation, including intelligence sharing, joint counterterrorism efforts, and border management, remains preordained despite rhetorical disagreements. In this context, Egypt’s current military buildup in Sinai should not be seen as a provocation to Israel. Instead, the Egyptian troops in Sinai might be seen as a strategic move to safeguard Egypt’s and Israel’s interdependent security needs, especially during the current state of regional instability.

Still, Israel’s frustrations and concerns over Egypt’s flawed policies in Gaza after October 7 are completely understandable. The bond of trust built between Egypt and Israel over the past decade, especially since President Sisi took office in 2014, has been severely strained by Cairo’s subsequent poorly thought-out policy responses to the October 7 attacks. Egypt’s vocal criticism of the deeply wounded Israel, perceived sympathy for Hamas terrorism, and rapid troop buildup near Rafah without proper coordination and consultation with Israel raised alarms in Tel Aviv and Washington. To Israel, this seemed like an implicit warning, but for Cairo, it was a necessary show of action to calm an outraged domestic public and maintain Egypt’s regional leadership role in the Arab world.

Looking ahead, security cooperation between Egypt and Israel will eventually be restored and will continue to grow beyond border policing toward joint regional security initiatives. What connects Egypt and Israel today is not just a peace treaty but a shared strategic understanding of both common and unexpected threats that cross borders. As long as Gaza remains unstable and Sinai vulnerable, Cairo and Tel Aviv will find themselves aligned on security issues, even if they publicly debate the details.

References

Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Significant Arms Sales to Egypt. U.S. Department of Defense, 2024.
Egyptian Armed Forces. Official website and publicly available publications, 2014–2025.
Feldman, Shai. Egypt and Israel: A Reversible Peace? Crown Center for Middle East Studies, 2016.
International Crisis Group. Egypt’s Strategy in Sinai: Counterterrorism or Counterinsurgency? 2023.
Naval News. “Egypt Commissions MEKO A-200EN Frigate ENS Al-Qadeer,” 2023.
Sayigh, Yezid. Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Military Economy. Carnegie Middle East Center, 2019.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2020.

Dalia Ziada

Dalia Ziada is an award-winning Egyptian writer and Senior Fellow for Research and Diplomacy at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA). Previously, Dalia worked in leading positions at major regional and international think tanks and civil society organizations, where she analyzed the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean region, advocated for peace and democracy in the Middle East, and fought tough political and cultural battles against radical Islamist groups in Arab countries. Dalia studied International Security at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University (in the United States). She is the author of the best-selling book The Curious Case of the Three-Legged Wolf – Egypt: Military, Islamism, and Liberal Democracy and other internationally acclaimed books on the political complications of the Middle East region.

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