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Strategic Alliances for a Secure, Connected, and Prosperous Region

Migration from the Muslim World to the West: Its Most Recent Trends and Effects

Filed under: Europe and Israel
Publication: Jewish Political Studies Review

Jewish Political Studies Review
Volume 30, Numbers 1–2


This article analyzes patterns of global migration during the last five years, often associated with the “European refugee crisis” since summer 2015, documented by the World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix data (BMM). Based on cross-national data, gathered and documented for this analysis, the article also provides first quantitative analyses of the predictable effects of the rising migration from the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) countries on the societies of the host countries. With around a third of the total immigrant population originating from OIC countries, the growing future Muslim presence in European politics and economics is not a fantasy but a reality. The European Union has become the world’s leading magnet of global migration, with around a fifth of global migration now flowing into the EU countries. Europe seems to have found—as yet—no coherent answer to this. It takes little imagination to realize that the expected monumental shifts in the underlying demographics of Western countries, caused by Muslim mass migration, may have very serious and even dramatic effects on the future support for the state of Israel and on its backing among the populations of the leading Western military and economic powers. The article shows that in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, rich Arab immigration-hosting countries, hitherto the main recipients of OIC migration, became more restrictive in their immigration policies, while a considerable proportion of OIC migration now turned to Europe, accelerated by the instabilities wrought by the civil war in Syria. Contrary to the assumptions of the dominant “welcome culture” in the media and the academia of most West European countries, the negative social and political consequences of this mass migration, especially for gender relations and the overall inequality dimensions, cannot be overlooked and are spelled out in this article, relying on multivariate analysis of the relevant international cross-national data.

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This article analyzes patterns of global migration during the last five years, often associated with the rise of migration to Europe and the “European refugee crisis”1 since summer 2015, documented by the World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix data (BMM),2 which allows researchers to analyze migration from every country of the world to every other country of the world.

The article aims to shed new light on these issues based on a thorough, global, and quantitative analysis of the international flows of the now more than 265 million global migrants. Based on cross-national data, gathered and documented for this analysis, it also provides first quantitative analyses of the predictable effects of these processes on the societies of the host countries of this rising global and OIC (countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) migration.3

The potential consequences of growing Muslim mass migration for the state of Israel, for the entire West, and for the worldwide Jewish communities are manifold. Recent Gallup data suggest that millions of people from countries often fundamentally and violently opposing Israel, and in which hating Jews is endemic,4 now want to migrate to the leading Western military powers, hitherto providing vital support to the Jewish state. At the end of the day and on a global scale, there are now 166 million people willing to emigrate to the United States, 46 million people to the United Kingdom, and 39 million people to France. The large majority of them are from poorer developing countries, above all in the Muslim world.

It takes little imagination to realize that, within just one to two decades, these expected monumental shifts in the underlying demographics of Western countries, caused by Muslim mass migration, may have very serious and even dramatic effects on the future support for the state of Israel and on its backing among the populations of the leading Western powers, and also on the Jewish populations living in Western democracies. With around a third of the total immigrant population in the entire EU-28 now originating from Turkey and the other OIC countries,5 the growing future Muslim presence in European politics and economics is not a fantasy but a reality.6 As this article will show, the European Union has recently become the world’s leading magnet of global migration, with around a fifth of global migration now flowing into the EU countries. There is no indication whatsoever that this is a temporary phenomenon that will abate in the near future. Europe seems to have found—as yet—no coherent answer to the refugee crisis and to the challenges of mass migration across the Mediterranean.7

Thus one of the undoubted effects of the recent global migratory movements to Europe is what they portend in the long term for the rise of anti-Semitism and for Israeli security. This crisis is also combined with other intensifying economic and institutional shortcomings of the European Union and the European Monetary Union, which were already evident even before the economic crisis of 2008, and which will come to the fore in a downward spiral of European politics and economics in the near future.8 If anything, the problems will worsen after Brexit9 and the elections to the European Parliament in 2019.10

This article’s central message is that in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, rich Arab immigration-hosting countries, hitherto the main recipients of OIC migration, became more restrictive in their immigration policies, while a considerable proportion of OIC migration has now turned to Europe, accelerated by the instabilities wrought by the civil war in Syria.

Contrary to the assumptions of the dominant “welcome culture” in the media and the academia of most West European countries,11 the negative social and political consequences of this mass migration, especially for gender relations and the overall inequality dimensions, cannot be overlooked. We test these relationships with multivariate analyses of these effects of migration processes on development indicators of the countries of the world, duly considering key economic, geographical, and political variables influencing these processes such as geographical latitude, geographical distance from Europe, income levels, and years of membership in the European Union.12 The chosen methodologies for these cross-national tests of the effects of migration are partial correlation analyses and promax factor analyses, which are among the standard contemporary tools of multivariate analysis in the social sciences.13 The focus will be particularly on the effects of migration from the OIC countries.

This article is part of a larger research project that analyzes the consequences of the welcome culture after the refugee crisis of summer 2015 and thereafter for the long-term social and political processes of Western democracies. The current article now deals with the quantitative analysis of these migration processes. The aim of the research effort is to challenge the hitherto-existing “air superiority” of a naïve welcome culture among Western political elites, the leading Western universities and research centers, and also among the main liberal and moderate left-wing media in Western countries.


The European Migration System on the Verge of Collapse

In a recent study by one of the important American geostrategic think tanks, Carnegie Europe describes the current dilemmas of European migration policy:

Europe continues to face its greatest migration wave since the end of World War II. The majority of migrants are arriving from outside the continent, especially the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) but also the Sahel and, increasingly, Asia. In March 2017, Frontex, the EU’s frontier agency, warned that the number of people undertaking the Central Mediterranean crossing was on the rise. With the arrival of summer, the next wave of MENA migration into Europe is about to be unleashed. A May 2017 German government report warned that up to 6.6 million people were clustered around the Mediterranean preparing to cross to Europe from Africa, awaiting favorable summer weather to launch to sea. Now that the Western Balkan migration route has been closed, Libya is fast becoming the main transition point, reportedly with 2.5 million migrants in North Africa waiting to cross by boat. Meanwhile, over 3 million remain stalled in Turkey, prevented from entering Europe by the EU’s March 2016 refugee deal with the Turkish government. The figures could be higher still: some estimates put the number of migrants preparing to enter Europe as high as 8–10 million. The uninterrupted flow of migration into the EU has redefined Europe’s geostrategic position. Today, Europe’s Southern border runs deep into Africa along the Sahel and across the Middle East. Southern Europe in particular remains exposed and vulnerable to pressure from MENA migration flows, which have had two ripple effects.14

The Carnegie Foundation points out the following consequences of this growing mass migration:

  1. The progressive erosion of the EU’s Schengen system of passport-free travel across Europe.
  2. The growing polarization among states across the continent, with fundamental and increasingly sharp divisions on the question of resettlement of the newly arriving immigrants especially between Germany and Central and Eastern Europe.
  3. Europeans’ initial calm, goodwill, and even enthusiasm for the new arrivals and welcome culture have given way to growing public anger.
  4. Public confidence in European governments’ ability to deal with the crisis has rapidly declined.

The study notes that the current EU debate on how to tackle the crisis seems to have bifurcated into two strands:15

  • The European Commission and some countries, especially Germany, have made demands for European solidarity on resettlement quotas for the migrants who have already arrived in Europe.
  • Other EU member states have demanded the slowdown of immigration flows by closing off access routes or increasing financial aid to migration transition countries outside Europe to keep the migrants in place.16
  • One of the most likely consequences, according to the Carnegie study, is the strengthening of right-wing and populist political parties that oppose mass migration in upcoming elections.

The Political and Academic Left Does Not Grasp the Dimensions of the Crisis

In contrast, most published analyses in the social sciences—especially in Europe—have hitherto highlighted what they perceive as the dangers of rampant “Islamophobia” and offer so-called critical “discourse” analyses of the arguments of right-wing political parties that oppose mass migration from Muslim countries.17 Certainly the recent mass migration from the Muslim world to Europe seems to have worked as an accelerant, fanning the flames of anti-Semitism, racism, right-wing populism, and fatigue with democracy, already mounting in the region since the 2008 economic crisis.18 To this should be added the widespread poverty and inequality caused by the long-term effects of austerity policies along with the 2008 crisis.19

Empirical analyses from the field of political psychology quite correctly warn about the dehumanization involved in recent political right-wing discourse about refugees.20 Not atypically for the state of the debate in Europe, the left-wing German Jewish intellectual Max Czollek, in his much-acclaimed21 recent essay “Disintegrate Yourself,”22 even called for “radical diversity” as an answer to the strengthening of right-wing and populist political forces in Europe and maintained:

Jews should not make the mistake to think that because Muslims currently are the main focus of attacks from the right that we will be spared. They may burn the mosques now, but they will burn the synagogues later…. I argue that the central concept we must get rid of is the concept of integration. Only then will we be able to honestly appeal to the quarter of the German population who are (post)migrants to help us defeat this resurge[nce] of Nazi-thought…. We need to reach out to other marginalized groups because, ultimately, the challenge the right-wing poses is the challenge to our very existence. It also means to appeal to the part of the German population that refuses to align with the normalization of racist, chauvinistic and arrogant modes of thinking. We will have none of it. And we will not give up easily. This is what de-integration means.23

Left-wing supporters of the welcome culture were quick to accuse what they call “football thugs, politically active gays, Jewish academics, French celebrities, uneasy alliances of feminists and conservatives, politicians hungry for power” of being behind the belief that “Islam will overrun the West.”24

Attempting to listen to what “the other side,” that is, the “migration pessimists” have to say, we find arguments critical of the policies of the European welcome culture, which include statements from the hard core of the Western defense establishment. Israeli former Chief of Staff and former Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon even told The Times of Israel that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was “intentionally Islamicizing Europe. People are ignoring it. It’s deliberate Islamization.”25 Some security experts as well as some politicians usually associated with the left now argue that refugee flows—often consisting these days of mainly young male Muslims—are deliberately used as a kind of “Trojan horse,”26 being part of an “organized invasion” of Muslims into the West.27 NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, the American General Philip Breedlove, recently suggested that refugees are “weaponized” by Russia against Europe.28

What, then, is our own assessment? However much, as a European author aware of the horrors of intolerance practiced by European right-wing regimes in the 1930s and 1940s, we might originally sympathize with such an approach,29 the outlook epitomized by Czollek’s analysis overlooks the undeniable dark sides of the evolving situation in Western countries, especially in Europe, in the wake of sharply increased migration from the conflict zones of the Muslim world.30 Indeed Czollek’s call for “radical diversity” was anticipated in the famous novel Submission by the French writer Michel Houellebecq, in which, in the upcoming French presidential elections of 2022, the left teams up with the Muslim Brotherhood to defeat the National Front of Marine Le Pen—after which a sharia society is introduced in France.31

Growing European Anti-Semitism in the Wake of the Recent Migration Waves

Much of the European academia and media still seem to be in a state of shock-induced paralysis, unable to come to terms with the challenges posed by Islamism and Muslim anti-Semitism almost two decades after 9/11 and almost half a decade after the Paris 2015 terror attacks. But these aspects are well-known to any serious analyst of developments in the region, and are often glossed over in the call for “radical diversity.”32 Official reports published on behalf of the European Commission now also openly highlight the dangers emanating from Islamist political violence in Europe and from Muslim anti-Semitism. Such documents also include the annual European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports33 as well as the reports of the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency,34 including their reports on anti-Semitism35 and the FRA flagship Annual Report.36

Of the 205 terror attacks recorded in Europe in 2017, 137 (66.83%) were separatist in character, 33 (16.10%) were jihadist, 24 (11.71%) were left-wing, and 5 (2.44%) were right-wing.37 Certainly, unease about “imported” anti-Semitism and even terrorism is spreading, especially among Europe’s Jewish communities.38 The events in Paris on November 13, 2015, which killed at least 130 people and wounded hundreds,39 along with the rising Islamist attacks on Jewish people and institutions all over Europe, are typical of this situation.40

The Fundamental Rights Agency, in its most recent report on anti-Semitism in Europe,41 interviewed over 16,000 Jewish respondents from the entire European Union. A majority of the Jewish respondents in 9 out of 12 countries said that the Arab-Israeli conflict affects their feelings of safety “a great deal” or “a fair amount.”42 That majority comprised over 85% of the Jewish respondents in Belgium and France and at least 70% of them in Spain, Germany, and Denmark.43 The survey also asked Jewish respondents if they felt that they were deemed responsible for the Israeli government’s actions. Half of the Jewish respondents in Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain (50%–55% depending on the country) said that people in their country “frequently” or “all the time” blame them for anything done by the Israeli government. According to the FRA report, the results suggest that in some EU member states Jewish respondents feel a close link between their safety and events taking place in Israel as well as relations between Israel and its neighbors.44

What the FRA calls the “normalization of anti-Semitism” is also evidenced, according to the report,

by the wide range of perpetrators, which spans the entire social and political spectrum. The most frequently mentioned categories of perpetrators of the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment experienced by the respondents include someone they did not know (31%); someone with an extremist Muslim view (30%); someone with a left-wing political view (21%); a colleague from work or school/college (16%); an acquaintance or friend (15%); and someone with a right-wing political view (13%).45

We are inclined to agree with a realistic and pessimistic long-term scenario of migration to Europe, which would estimate that the problems Muslim mass migration now poses are almost unsolvable. Consolidated population-weighted figures compiled from international surveys suggest that 17.38% of the entire Muslim population in the world on average now support terrorist organizations and acts of terrorism (average rates of favoring Hamas, Hizbullah, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, suicide bombing) and that in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 74% of the population are anti-Semitic.46

This scenario also would emphasize especially the long-term strategic implications of mass migration from the Muslim world to the leading Western countries, and for Israel and the Jewish communities in the West. Given the growing dependence of European political decision-making on “Turkish goodwill” to stumble along in the “refugee crisis,”47 such a scenario would also cautiously take into account the role that Turkey’s current government now plays in global Islamism (see also below).

Population Projections to 2050: More than 20% Muslims in Europe?

As background for the present empirical study, it is also worth noting what is at stake in pure demographic terms. Already some time ago, a high-ranking U.S. diplomat and security analyst, Timothy Savage, caused an uproar in the scholarly debate by stating that in light of the sheer demographics to be observed in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, Europe’s Muslim population could rise to 20% by 2050.48 Writing more than a decade before the refugee crisis of 2015, Savage then almost prophetically stated:

Most European countries closed their doors to labor immigration in the 1970s, following the first Arab oil embargo and the subsequent economic downturn, yet some 500,000 immigrants—primarily family reunification cases—and 400,000 asylum seekers arrive in western Europe each year. According to the International Organization for Migration, Muslims make up a large and increasing proportion of both groups, coming primarily from Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia. Muslims probably also make up a significant proportion of western Europe’s illegal immigrants (between 120,000 and 500,000 enter the EU annually). Indeed, in a number of European countries, the words “Muslim” and “immigrant” are virtually synonymous. 49

Only to add:

Currently, the waves of immigrants and asylum seekers from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)—the region with the world’s second-highest fertility rate—have had more to do with the worsening conditions in the MENA countries than with labor shortages in Europe, the region with the world’s lowest fertility rate. As the MENA population doubles in the next three decades and Europe’s shrinks, increased migratory flows from south to north appear unavoidable—a trend augmented by Europe’s graying population, as opposed to the youthful MENA average. In 2000 the UN projected that, to counterbalance their increasingly graying populations, EU states annually would need 949,000 migrants to maintain their 1995 populations; 1,588,000 migrants to maintain their 1995 working-age populations; or 13,480,000 migrants to maintain their population support ratios (the ratio of people aged 15-64 to those aged 65 and older).50

In light of recent more sophisticated population projections (see below), it should be emphasized that Savage also observed already in his 2004 article that the Muslim birthrate in Europe is “higher than that of non-Muslims,” contributing to what he called the “burgeoning numbers of Muslims in Europe” even if no further migration were to occur. As a result, he predicted that Muslim communities in Europe would be “significantly younger than the non-Muslim population” and that Europe’s “Generation X” and “Millennium Generation” would include considerably more Muslims than would the continent’s population as a whole.

Savage also highlighted that one-third of France’s five million Muslims are under the age of 20 (compared to 21% of the French population as a whole); one-third of Germany’s Muslims are under 18 (compared to 18% of the German population as a whole); one-third of the United Kingdom’s Muslims are under 15 (compared to 20% of the British population as a whole); and one-third of Belgium’s Muslims are under 15 (compared to 18% of the country’s population as a whole). Savage concluded by noting that conservative projections estimated that, compared to 5% at the time of his analysis, Muslims would constitute 20% of Europe’s population by 2050.51

Compared to the key findings of more recent and sophisticated population projections (see below), Savage was also not far off the mark at least for key EU countries. He also drew the attention of global scholarship to the fact that the growing Muslim presence in Europe has tended to cluster geographically within individual states, particularly in industrialized, urban areas within clearly defined, poorer neighborhoods such as Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, London’s Tower Hamlets, and the banlieues (suburbs) of major French cities:

Two fifths of Muslims in the United Kingdom reside in the greater London area; one-third of Muslims in France live in or around Paris; and one-third of Muslims in Germany are concentrated in the Ruhr industrial area. Muslims now constitute more than 25 percent of the population of Marseille; 20 percent of Malmo, Sweden; 15 percent of Brussels and Birmingham, as well as Paris; and 10 percent or more of London, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Oslo, and Copenhagen.52

A recent study by the Washington-based Pew Research Center revealed the relevance of this approach.53 The study relies on state-of-the-art demographic modeling developed at the IIASA research center in Laxenburg near Vienna.54 The baseline for all three Pew European Muslim population scenarios is that the Muslim population in Europe (defined here as the 28 countries of the European Union before Brexit, plus the countries of the European Economic Area—EEA—closely associated with the European Union, i.e., in the Pew study Norway and Switzerland)55 as of mid-2016 is estimated at 25.8 million (4.9% of the overall population)—up from 19.5 million (3.8%) in 2010. Even if all migration into Europe were to immediately and permanently stop—a “zero migration” scenario—the Muslim population of Europe still would be expected to rise from the current level of 4.9% to 7.4% by the year 2050. 56 This is because Muslims are younger (by 13 years on average) and have higher fertility (a difference of one child more per woman, on average, than the rest of the European population) than other Europeans, mirroring a global pattern. A second, “medium” migration scenario assumes that all refugee flows will stop as of mid-2016 but that recent levels of “regular” migration to Europe will continue (i.e., migration of those who come for reasons other than seeking asylum). Under these conditions, Muslims already could reach 11.2% of Europe’s population in 2050.57

Finally, the most realistic “high” Pew migration scenario projects the record flow of refugees into Europe from 2014 to 2016 to continue indefinitely into the future with the same religious composition (i.e., mostly made up of Muslims) in addition to the typical annual flow of regular migrants.58 In this scenario Muslims could make up 14% of Europe’s population by 2050—nearly triple the current share.59

Also worth considering are some of the country implications of these demographic trends. Germany’s population (6% Muslim in 2016) would be projected to be about 20% Muslim by 2050 in the high scenario—a reflection of the fact that Germany has accepted many Muslim refugees in recent years—compared to 11% in the medium scenario and 9% in the zero-migration scenario. Sweden, which also has accepted a relatively high number of refugees, would experience even greater effects if the migration levels from 2014 to mid-2016 were to continue indefinitely: Sweden’s Muslim population (8% in 2016) could grow to 31% in the high scenario by 2050, compared to 21% in the medium scenario and 11% with no further Muslim migration.

An estimated 3.7 million Muslims migrated to Europe from mid-2010 to mid-2016. They include approximately 2.5 million regular migrants entering legally as workers, students, and so on, as well as 1.3 million Muslims who have been or are expected to be granted refugee status including an estimated 980,000 Muslim refugees who arrived from 2014 to mid-2016.60

Non-Muslim migration to Europe was much smaller. From mid-2010 to mid-2016 only an estimated 1.9 million Christians emigrated to Europe, followed numerically by people with no religious affiliation (410,000), Buddhists (390,000), and Hindus (350,000). Christians made up only 30% of regular migrants (1.6 million regular Christian migrants) and only 16% of all refugees (250,000 Christian refugees).61 This dovetails with the conspicuous silence in the West about Christianity as the most persecuted religion worldwide. One does not necessarily have to share the values and convictions of the religious right in America to arrive at the conclusion that Western migration policy has done little to support Christians in countries where they indeed suffer from massive restrictions and even persecutions.62 According to Open Doors, the organization monitoring Christian persecution, 215 million Christians experience high levels of persecution in the countries on the group’s World Watch List. This amounts to 1 in 12 Christians worldwide.63 North Korea is ranked number one for the 17th consecutive year as the most dangerous country for Christians. During the World Watch List 2018 reporting period, 3,066 Christians were killed, 1,252 were abducted, 1,020 were raped or sexually harassed, and 793 churches were attacked. Islamist oppression fuels Christian persecution in 8 of the top 10 countries.64

The Pew population projections offer a realistic image of what European politics will look like three decades from now (Map 1 and Table 1).

The End of the “Turkish Tango”

Migration optimists would respond to all this by saying that by promoting democracy and free trade in Europe’s neighborhood, migration problems can be solved and peaceful relations between the participating countries will ensue, thus promoting a zone of peace in the Mediterranean.65

In the rhetoric of official EU policies, this—now rather waning—scenario still plays an important role, as a look at the official websites of the European Commission and the European Parliament will show.66 The anchors of this policy were:

  • Accepting Islam in the European Union67
  • Combating anti-Muslim hatred68
  • Enhancing the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)69
  • Offering a perspective for Turkey—making it an EU member70
  • Orderly migration71
  • Solving the refugee crisis in Europe72

Turkey, the country of origin of millions of migrants to Europe and partner of the West since the end of the Second World War, was given an especially important role in this scenario, both in the context of migration and also in that of possible future EU membership. It was hoped that society and politics in Turkey would eventually develop along a “Muslim Calvinist” or “Islamic Calvinist” trajectory,73 thus providing an alternative to radicalization and Islamism, especially after the 9/11 attacks. To be both a majority-Muslim country and a stable and reliable Western ally like Turkey would prove to be possible, and at the end of the day democracy and free trade would diminish the migration processes across the Mediterranean.

Part of this scenario would be not only the EU-membership possibility for Turkey but eventually also a similar possibility for Israel, and the enhanced development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership with most of the other countries of the region.74 In the early years of the new millennium, the European Union and the then European Commission President Romano Prodi strongly promoted this approach and called it the “ring of friends” involving a joint economic area extending between Morocco and Russia.75 This “ring of friends” was supposed to be a countermodel to Islamist terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, creating a zone of peace in the Mediterranean. As Prodi put it at that time:

I want to see a “ring of friends” surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbors, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea. This encircling band of friendly countries will be diverse. The quality of our relations with them will largely depend on their performance and the political will on either side…. The goal of [European Union] accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect? A substantive and workable concept of proximity would have a positive effect. The existing and well-functioning instruments of the EU’s policy for its neighbors are the foundations for any new approach. We should be able to combine this proposal with the variety of existing partnership, cooperation, association and stabilization agreements. But we must also better exploit their potential and build on this basis. Let me concentrate on the question of what political perspective would best extend the area of stability without immediate enlargement of the Union. We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter.76

An important element of this approach is the idea that democracy and free trade are key requirements for peaceful relations between nations, anywhere in the world.77 Moderate and organized migration across the Mediterranean would be part of this model, and it would be manageable and also affordable in terms of its political costs.

The “Muslim Calvinist” model was also pinned on the assumption that there is good reason to hope that the overwhelming majority of Muslim migrants to Europe are deeply committed to democracy, the market economy, and especially the capitalist work ethos, a scenario that would facilitate the societal integration of these millions of migrants and would leave ample room for optimism for an otherwise aging continent.78 The scenario was also connected to the view, shared by most analysts in the Western world in the early years of the 2000s, that the Turkish Republic under Erdogan was a valid countermodel to radical Islamism and that Turkey’s path was based on a conservative-liberal society. Turkey—in all aspects, involving both migration and EU expansion—would have been the anchor for this model; and Turkey’s eventual EU membership would also prove to the rest of the world that Europe was not exclusively a “Christian club.”79

Turkey, an active member of NATO since 1952,80 to this day plays a pivotal role in the refugee deal between the European Union and Turkey since the refugee crisis of 2015, making Europe still more dependent on its partnership with Ankara.81

The initial empirical studies on “Islamic Calvinism” all focused on the deeply religious and hard-working Turkish regions of Central Anatolia, where Erdogan’s political party, the AKP, had and still has its strongest power base. The positive assessment of Turkey’s role as a Western ally with a majority-Muslim population also underlay the decision by European leaders, reached in Helsinki in 1999, to grant Turkey after all the status of an official candidate for EU membership after the first promises in this respect were already made in the so-called Ankara Agreement of 1963 between the then European Economic Community of six countries and Turkey.82

A large number of key Western decision-makers in both the United States and the European Union shared this hope, overlooking the “small print” of the deeply Islamist origins of the AKP and the role played by such radical Islamist organizations as Milli Görüs,83 the Muslim Brotherhood, and others in Turkey, which became evident in the country especially after 2008.84

The illusions held and even cultivated by Western politicians, military and intelligence officials, academics, foreign policy strategists, and other members of the Western “foreign policy machinery”—the present author, surely part of this machinery, included—may be understandable, but looking the other way when a political strategy encounters difficulty is never a good strategy.85 To debate President Erdogan’s role in Turkey without mentioning his mentor and idol, Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011), the prime minister of Turkey from 1996 to 1997, is to neglect Turkish realities and the virulent anti-Semitism that characterized Erbakan’s entire political life.86

Illusions often have a long life, including in politics. After 9/11, for Western decision-makers it sounded like “music from another planet” to read about the results of the NATO summit of 2004, held in Istanbul, or about the then forward-looking liberal declarations of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which is the official state institution established in 1924 to administer religion in the secular Republic of Turkey.87 But by around 2008, the true Islamist face of the AKP Party came to the surface, and “dancing the Turkish tango” for all practical purposes came slowly to an end.88 In 2010 the close strategic cooperation between Israel and Turkey, which began to evolve in the 1990s, most definitively ended with the Mavi Marmara affair when the Turkish ship, which was part of the so-called Gaza Freedom Flotilla in support of Hamas, did not heed the Israeli navy’s warnings and IDF commandos had to raid it, leading to the death of 10 Turkish activists. This event was in many ways also the turning point in Turkish foreign and domestic policies in the direction of forming alliances with Islamist forces.89

Many observers have begun to ask themselves how Turkey still functions as a NATO member and nominally still aspires to EU membership while, for all practical purposes, it is situating itself in radical opposition to the West. The current Turkish leadership’s rhetoric is increasingly similar to that of America’s adversaries and is only rarely that of a partner and ally.90 A recent study by the Hudson Institute, a U.S. think tank, offers this perspective:

In December 2017, U.S. national security advisor General H. R. McMaster singled out Turkey and Qatar as prime sources of funding for extremist Islamist ideology globally. Roughly at the time of McMaster’s pronouncement, his point was unwittingly reinforced by a key mouthpiece of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the editor of the Islamist daily Yeni Şafak, Ibrahim Karagül: “Turkey is emerging as a new power center opposing the United States, the world’s strongest power…the matter is no longer about Jerusalem or about Turkey and Israel. It is a showdown between the United States and Turkey.” Karagül went on to claim that America’s aim was to occupy Islam’s holy sites, Mecca and Medina.91

Thus, to this day, European politics does not seem to have found a coherent strategy for integrating Muslim minorities.92 Instead the discernible patterns are a growing political radicalization of the European majority population along with a significant trend of radicalization among segments of the Muslim immigrant population.93 And a weak and internally divided European Union, affected by several other internal and external crises such as Brexit,94 the malfunctioning of the European Monetary Union,95 and the lack of a coherent European foreign policy,96 seems to be stumbling its way through this predicament.

Data and Methods

This article relies on the original data on bilateral migration in the countries of the world as presented in the exhaustive Bilateral Migration Matrix (BMM),97 collected by the World Bank for the periods of 2013 and 2017.98

The Bilateral Migration Matrix contains information on how many people from 217 countries, regions, and regional entities are present in each of the 217 countries, regions, and regional entities. That makes 47,089 data for 2013 and 47,089 data for 2017, or 94,178 data in all. From these 94,178 data almost unlimited further statistical information can be extracted. What was the exact number of people from, say, Afghanistan or Albania migrating to Zambia or Zimbabwe in 2013 and in 2017, and what was the increase of this number over time? The challenges to providing an exact, compact summary of the most important findings from this mass of data are considerable.

The migration data obtained by analyzing the World Bank BMM data were then tested for their quantitative, statistical relationships with standard global development data.99 Appendix Table 4 documents all our variables and the sources for these analyses.

As indicated earlier, this article is part of a growing research tradition of studying issues of migration and asylum with quantitative and cross-national data.100 In accordance with a vast tradition in economics and other quantitative social science, this research tradition attempts to explain the drivers and the macroeconomic and social consequences of migration at the level of the nation-state (or regional subunits).101 The statistical methodology for drawing conclusions from the cross-national data relied here on the well-known techniques of partial correlations and promax factor analysis, which are standard procedures in quantitative social science.102

Our independent variables were approximately time-matched with the dependent variables of our partial correlation analyses:

  • The EU as recipient of global migration from this country in %
  • Migration balance per inward migration in %
  • Share of total immigrant population per total population in %
  • Share of total immigration from OIC countries in % of total inward immigration

In our partial correlation analyses of the effects of the welcome culture and increased migration from Muslim countries, we held the following variables constant:

  • Absolute geographical latitude: Easterly, William, New York University—Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, May 2000, “The Middle-Class Consensus and Economic Development,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2346, available at:
  • Distance to Belgium:
  • Income per capita, 2010 (EU = 100): calculated from
  • Income 2013 (EU = 100) ^2: calculated from
  • Years of membership in the EU, 2010: website of European Commission: and EU Scadplus, as well as

So that we could present meaningful conclusions from the BMM, we worked with the following country groupings, taking the divisions into the old and new member states of the European Union, the BRICS countries, and Turkey particularly into consideration:

  • Australia, Canada, New Zealand
  • Brazil
  • China
  • EU-15 (“old members” of the European Union)
  • High-income Arab countries
  • India
  • Mexico
  • New EU member states
  • OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation)
  • Russia
  • South Africa
  • Rest of the World (RoW)
  • Turkey
  • USA

The Appendix lists the country groupings of the analysis.

In order to test the empirically observable consequences of the welcome culture, we also performed a factor analysis of the main available internationally comparable variables of democracy and migration policy. Table 2 lists the variables used for our model. For 110 countries there were fully available data.

We should recall that a reduction in the number of foreign residents in a given country basically can have the following main reasons:

  1. The target country of migration has become less attractive to this specific immigrant community, and migrants have returned to their home country because of the movement of wages, employment, inequality ratios, and so on in the target country or improved economic conditions in the home country or both.
  2. The acquisition of citizenship of the target country by members of the migrant community. Migrants thus disappear from the screens of the BMM because they are now citizens of the target country and are no longer counted as migrants.
  3. Deteriorating political, social, or ecological conditions in the target country and/or improved conditions in the home country, or rising xenophobia against members of the immigrant community among citizens of the target country.
  4. Toughening migration policy rules for citizens of the foreign country, applied by the host country (“Send them back”).
  5. Migrants have become illegal aliens in the target country and disappeared from the screens of the statistical system underlying the BMM.


The information contained in the Bilateral Migration Matrix was first of all processed in three Appendix tables. Appendix Table 1 analyzes the shifts in the global patterns of migration, 2013-2017. Appendix Table 2 analyzes the shifts in the patterns of migration to the EU-28, now the global number-one destination of global migration, 2013-2017. Appendix Table 3 shows the shifts in the patterns of migration to the United States, now the global number-two destination of global migration, 2013-2017.

In the following we briefly summarize our initial results. The statistical tables in this article contain the distilled most important statistical information from the BMM. Our survey of results also contains a subchapter, which may be more interesting for specialists than for the general readership of this article.

  • In a nutshell, global migration patterns changed considerably from 2013 to 2017, with Turkey, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, South Africa, Uganda, Oman, Malaysia, Kuwait, Canada, the Russian Federation, Angola, and France (in descending order) taking in more than half a million or more additional migrants in 2017 than in 2013, while Saudi Arabia and Pakistan reduced the number of migrants residing in these respective two countries by half a million or more migrants each. That is, Turkey and Germany dramatically increased their inward migration while Saudi Arabia and Pakistan dramatically reduced it.
  • In 2017 just four states in world society were the target of more than 10 million migrants each (United States, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Russian Federation) and another 10 countries (United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Canada, France, Australia, Spain, Italy, Ukraine, India, and Turkey) hosted 5 to 10 million migrants each. Together these 14 countries were the target of more than 57% of overall global migration.
  • Just three countries increased their outward migration by one million migrants or more than in 2013: Syria, India, and South Sudan, while only one country—Mexico—decreased its outward migration by one million people or more than in 2013.
  • In 2017 just 10 states were the source of five million or more outward migrants to other countries: in descending order, India, Mexico, Russian Federation, China, Bangladesh, Syria, Pakistan, Ukraine, Philippines, and Afghanistan. These 10 countries already accounted for some 35% of global outward migration, documented in our tables.
  • From 2013 to 2017 there were also some more dramatic shifts, this time in the pattern of migration-sending countries to the European Union. Sixteen countries increased their migration stock residing in the European Union by 100,000 or more people each: Syria, Poland, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, China, Spain, Hungary, Moldova, Iraq, India, Greece, Portugal, Pakistan, and Croatia. Apart from increased migration from the poorer European east and south, the inflow of new migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan was considerable. At the same time (i.e., 2017), the number of nationals from Serbia, Albania, and Russia residing in the European Union was reduced by 100,000 or more people than in 2013.
  • Among the EU countries, the following 14 migration-sending countries had a million or more nationals residing in a (another) country of the EU-28 (in descending order): Romania, Poland, Morocco, Turkey, Russian Federation, Germany, Italy, Algeria, India, Portugal, Ukraine, United Kingdom, France, and China.
  • For a number of decades now, migration to the United States has been dominated by inflows from the Asia-Pacific region and from Latin America. But the United States was also not immune to the general trends analyzed in this article. In the United States, the largest immigrant communities with more than a million people are nowadays from (in descending order) Mexico, India, China, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, El Salvador, Vietnam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the Republic of Korea and thus have a relatively small share of people of Islamic faith. But Appendix Table 3 also shows the trends of increased Muslim migration to the United States over the period 2013-2017. This is all the more significant because in those five years, under the Obama administration, the number of foreign residents from stable and long-term political allies of the United States, like Germany or South Korea, declined considerably. In addition, migration to the United States from other close friends and allies such as Canada, Poland, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines corresponds to this pattern. Reducing the migrant stock from friends and allies as a de facto policy of the Obama administration is also evident from the cases of Romania, Hungary, Ireland, Colombia, Chile, Thailand, Greece, and Lithuania, of which there were now 10,000 to 500,000 fewer migrants residing in the United States than in 2013. At the same time, under the Obama administration the number of migrants from some Muslim countries to the United States increased considerably. The number of Tunisians residing in the United States, for example, now increased by 110,000 from 2013 to 2017. During the same period, the number of migrants to the United States from Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Gambia, Turkey, Malaysia, Yemen, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait increased by 10,000 to 100,000.

Aggregating our data according to major country groupings, we can draw the following conclusions. Table 3 shows that the 15 old center countries of the European Union (i.e., the 15 countries forming the community before the big EU enlargement since 2004) are already the main target of global migration, now taking in some 20% of global migrants, while the United States now even trails Europe and takes in less than 18% of global immigration. One could state pointedly that U.S. policy is to attract engineers from India, while Europe takes in asylum-driven migration from the Muslim world. Compared to the almost magnetic effects in the direction of Europe, the role of the rich Arab immigration countries (global recipient share of 10.8%) and of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (global recipient share of 6%) as other, alternative targets of global migration from the Muslim countries is now far smaller, and has diminished in importance over time. The table also provides insight into other discernible shifts of global migration patterns, 2013-2017.

Graph 1 and Graph 2 further highlight the shifts that have taken place over time—with “Old Europe” now in the dominant role of global migration recipient number one, while the United States, the Dominion countries, and the rich Arab countries have all reduced their role as global migration target countries.

Clearly, Turkey and neighboring Muslim OIC states as well as South Africa have also become significant destination countries in recent years.

Table 4 and Graphs 3 and 4 show that poorer Muslim countries and the rest of the world now account for over 60% of global migration senders. Apart from India, the poorer Muslim countries are also the countries with a very high increase of migration over time, while Mexico’s high outward profile in 2013 was significantly diminished in the last five years by restrictive U.S. immigration policies.

The following section highlights some further trends for the specialists and may be skipped over by the general readership. These readers may directly continue at the next section, “The Growing Muslim Migration to Europe.”

Highlighting Some Further Trends for Specialists

Graphs 3 and 4 further highlight these inexorable shifts in global migration patterns to be observed from 2013 to 2017.

A growing large part of global migration now originates from the Muslim world, from India, and from poor countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, listed here among the “other countries.”

Compared to these global shifts, increasing global migration from Europe’s south, devastated by the economic crisis of 2008 and its aftermaths, as well as from Europe’s east, is rather a trickle.

In the following statistical materials, we analyze the absolute numbers of people who moved across borders around the globe from 2013 to 2017 (Graphs 5-9). They highlight the huge numbers of people involved in the almost tectonic shifts in the structures of global migration in those years. It again emerges that the European center countries of the “old” EU-15 became the target region of growing migration from the poor countries of the Muslim world and from Sub-Saharan Africa. In absolute numbers, the increases in the number of people residing in another country both from the poor countries of the Muslim world and from Sub-Saharan Africa, in a time span of just five years, amount to more than five million people.

There was an increase of more than four million migrants in the center of the European Union. Apart from Turkey, Europe has become the real center of global migration flows.

Graph 7 shows that these shifts in global migration affected the EU-15 far more dramatically than the United States, South Africa, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and also the rich Arab countries. Whereas in the rich Arab countries there were around 150,000 fewer migrants than in 2013, and the United States, South Africa, and the traditional “Dominion emigration countries” of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand took in only around an additional 1.1 to 1.3 million migrants, the number of migrants in Europe has recently increased by 4.2 million people. The above-described increases in global migration also led to an influx of almost 2.6 million additional migrants to Turkey, almost 3.0 million additional migrants to neighboring Muslim countries, and 4.6 million additional migrants to the rest of the world.

Graph 8 looks at the shifts among the major migration-sending countries. Around the world there were three big winners and one big loser in the process of transnational migration. The winners were the Muslim countries, the poorer nations of Africa, and India, and the big loser was Mexico. There were more than five million migrants more from the OIC countries than in 2013, and migration from the countries of the “rest of the world”—in their great majority poorer nations in Africa—also increased by more than five million people, while global migration from India increased by more than 2.5 million people. In the same period Mexico’s global migration decreased by more than a million people, and compared to the other big global migration flows, the increase in global migration by one million people from the new member states of the European Union is a relatively smaller, not to say negligible quantity.

Finally, Table 5 and Graph 9 highlight the share of migration from OIC countries in the countries of the EU-15 by international comparison. OIC inward migration in the EU-15 plays a far larger role than in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and in the United States. The table shows, for example, that in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand the share of migrants from China is 8.41%, from the EU-15 it is 25.56%, from India it is 7.20%, and so on, while in Brazil 42.14% of migrants were from the EU-15. The share of the poorer Muslim countries in total inward migration in, say, Brazil was 4.82%, in China 8.21%, in Mexico 0.33%, and so on.

The Growing Muslim Migration to Europe

Our data suggest that the OIC countries (poorer OIC countries plus high-income Arab countries plus Turkey) in the West have now reached the following share of total inward immigration:

By all standards, European openness to Muslim-country inward migration is without parallel in the West. By comparison, European immigration policy did little to actively attract immigration from other regions of the world outside Europe, as shown in Graph 9.

The following sections address policy-relevant issues with the help of choropleth maps, based on Excel country data. The computer programs for creating such choropleth maps are freely available.103 Map 2 highlights the share of the EU-28 countries as a percentage of total outward migration destination from any country of the world. It is a map of the global migration market share of Europe in the international competition for labor, and the map also reflects the migration choices that global migrants made compared to other destination countries.

The highest attractiveness of the EU-28 as a migration destination was observed in:

  1. Monaco
  2. Isle of Man
  3. Andorra
  4. Greenland
  5. Faroe Islands
  6. Luxembourg
  7. Algeria
  8. Morocco
  9. Romania
  10. Curaçao
  11. Slovakia
  12. Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
  13. Turkey
  14. Albania
  15. Madagascar

The lowest attractiveness of the EU-28 as a migration destination was observed in:

  1. Saint Martin (French part)
  2. Puerto Rico
  3. Marshall Islands
  4. Guam
  5. Northern Mariana Islands
  6. Lesotho
  7. South Sudan
  8. Palestinian Territories
  9. Micronesia, Federated States of
  10. Samoa
  11. Burma
  12. Tonga
  13. Mexico
  14. Macao
  15. Tuvalu

Map 3 shows the changes of these relationships over time based on the changes of percentage rates in 2017 and 2013, converted to rankings to increase visibility in the map. The most dramatic decreases of the European Union’s attraction as a migration destination were observed in Sao Tome and Principe, the Republic of the Congo, and Cape Verde. Among the highest percentage increases were observed in Qatar, Greece, and Bulgaria. The highest numerical value in the map—213 (black)—corresponds to the highest increase of the EU’s attraction as a migration destination; the lowest value—1 (white)—corresponds to the lowest attractiveness.

The greatest increases of the attractiveness of the EU-28 as a migration destination, 2013-2017, were observed in:

  1. Isle of Man
  2. Seychelles
  3. Bermuda
  4. Cayman Islands
  5. Qatar
  6. Greece
  7. Saint Kitts and Nevis
  8. Bulgaria
  9. Iraq
  10. North Korea
  11. Hungary
  12. Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
  13. Madagascar
  14. Moldova
  15. Syria

The greatest decreases of the attractiveness of the EU-28 as a migration destination, 2013-2017, were observed in:

  1. Sao Tome and Principe
  2. Congo, Republic of the
  3. Cape Verde
  4. Gabon
  5. Tunisia
  6. Libya
  7. Gambia, The
  8. Uganda
  9. Montenegro
  10. Zambia
  11. Albania
  12. Sweden
  13. Czech Republic
  14. Angola
  15. Kenya

The Growing Global Importance of Muslim Migration

The next politically relevant question we would like to answer with our data analysis is the share of poorer Muslim country immigration compared to total immigration. Table 6 lists the countries of the world precisely ordered by the ascending share of total immigration from the OIC countries in percentage of total immigration.

There was no migration from Muslim countries to American Samoa; Burundi; Comoros; Greenland; Guam; Haiti; Isle of Man; Jamaica; Kiribati; Kosovo; Laos; Macao; Marshall Islands; Micronesia, Federated States of; Palau; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Samoa; Tonga; Turks and Caicos Islands; Tuvalu; or Virgin Islands (British).

Their (upward weighted) rank for the variable: DYN share of OIC countries, 2013-2017 was 93; their upward weighted rank for the variable rising share of Muslim migration was 53.

Map 4 and Map 5 show the percentage rates of Table 6 above. Map 5 also offers a zoom on the European macroregion and the European neighborhood.

Map 6 uses the same methodology as Map 3 and applies this methodology to the data of Table 6, in order to show which countries became more dependent on OIC immigration over time from 2013 to 2018.

The ranks in Table 6 used in this map are marked in black, and highlight that a country became more open and oriented toward immigration from the OIC countries.

The following countries experienced the fastest expansion of the percentage of migrants from OIC countries per total migration over the period 2013-2017:

  1. Turkey
  2. Sri Lanka
  3. Turkmenistan
  4. Brunei Darussalam
  5. Somalia
  6. Chad
  7. Togo
  8. Mauritius
  9. Ethiopia
  10. Syria
  11. Afghanistan
  12. Madagascar
  13. Barbados
  14. Finland
  15. Denmark
  16. Belgium
  17. Nigeria
  18. Trinidad and Tobago
  19. Sierra Leone
  20. Congo, Republic of the
  21. Germany
  22. Austria
  23. Guinea-Bissau
  24. Qatar
  25. Namibia
  26. Spain
  27. South Africa
  28. Australia
  29. Canada
  30. South Sudan

These tendencies are also highlighted in our zoom on the European macroregion.

Migration Balances: How Arab Countries Now By Far Outperform Western Nations on the Global Migration Ladder

Table 7 and Map 7 address the next politically relevant question arising from the debate on migration issues: the migration balance per total inward migration. This table shows how rich Arab countries and the United States and Australia had a very high ratio of the migration balance per inward migration, showing in a way how attractive these countries are on the ladders of international migration. To explain this concept of the migration balance per inward migration, let us look at the data in Table 7 for Oman, the world leader, in 2017. Oman had an inward migrant population of more than two million people within its borders (2.07 million), while Oman’s role as a migration-sending country was negligible and there were only some 26,000 citizens of Oman living abroad. The migration balance for Oman was thus 2.05 million people, that is, the migration balance was almost 99% per inward migration. The citizens of Oman just did not care about living and working abroad, while more than two million people chose to live in Oman.

For all intents and purposes, the reverse is the case for Cuba. Only 16,177 foreign citizens lived in Cuba in 2017 while no less than 1.6 million Cubans lived abroad, and the migration balance was 1.58 million people. Our ratio of Cuba’s attractiveness as a migration destination was very negative, namely, 97.84 or 25%. The 15 most highly classified countries of the world were:

  1. Oman
  2. Qatar
  3. United Arab Emirates
  4. Saudi Arabia
  5. Guam
  6. Maldives
  7. Kuwait
  8. United States
  9. Virgin Islands (U.S.)
  10. Bahrain
  11. Australia
  12. American Samoa
  13. New Caledonia
  14. French Polynesia
  15. Turks and Caicos Islands

The following countries were at the bottom of the international migration ladder: high outward migration and a very negative migration balance per inward migration.

  1. Cuba
  2. Lesotho
  3. Somalia
  4. Bosnia and Herzegovina
  5. Eritrea
  6. El Salvador
  7. Sri Lanka
  8. Afghanistan
  9. Haiti
  10. Jamaica
  11. Guyana
  12. Burma
  13. Lao PDR
  14. Morocco
  15. Philippines

Map 7 now highlights the results from Table 7. In this choropleth map, the countries with high attractiveness and placed at the top of the international migration ladder are painted in white, while the least attractive countries for international migration are painted in black. Hardly anybody around the world would like to go to these, while a large number of their own citizens have left, voting with their feet on how they evaluated the conditions at home. Map 7 portrays the world in 2017. For reasons of map visibility, we based our maps on inverted ranks of migration balance per inward migration in percentages. Oman is the world leader, painted in pink, and Cuba is the world laggard, painted in black. We also offer a zoom for the Euro-Mediterranean macroregion (Map 6).

The following countries most spectacularly improved their position on the international migration ladder, 2013-2017:

  1. Lesotho
  2. Somalia
  3. Morocco
  4. Lao PDR
  5. Bosnia and Herzegovina
  6. Afghanistan
  7. Vietnam
  8. Equatorial Guinea
  9. Romania
  10. Bulgaria
  11. Tunisia
  12. Angola
  13. Iraq
  14. Haiti
  15. Trinidad and Tobago

The following countries most dramatically worsened their position on the international migration ladder:

  1. Sri Lanka
  2. Eritrea
  3. Cuba
  4. Sao Tome and Principe
  5. Syrian Arab Republic
  6. Cape Verde
  7. Seychelles
  8. Armenia
  9. Samoa
  10. Nepal
  11. Albania
  12. Central African Republic
  13. South Sudan
  14. Tonga
  15. Grenada

Based on the results of Table 7, we now portray the inverted ranks of the last column of Table 7 (DYN Migration ladder, based on percentages) in a choropleth map. The map tells us which countries moved higher and which countries moved lower on the scales of transnational migration. Deteriorations are marked in black, improvements in white. Again, we also offer a zoom on the Euro-Mediterranean macroregion. The map clearly shows that the days of European high ratios of the migration balance per inward migration are gone, indicating that Europeans, confronted by Monetary Union austerity and the aftermaths of the 2008 economic crisis, in turn are beginning to migrate to other countries. These trends are exacerbated by high inward migration in the wake of the European refugee crisis of 2015.

Tendencies Emerging from the Multivariate Analysis: Partial Correlations

The methodology section explained that in order to determine the long-term effects of our variables, we first of all looked at the partial correlation coefficients of key variables, discussed in the work, with an array of dependent variables, especially collected for this study and presented in the Appendix. In each case we test the effects of our key variables independent of absolute geographical latitude; geographical distance from Belgium as the geographical center of the European Union; income per capita 2010 (EU =100), income per capita 2010 (EU=100) squared; and finally, years of membership in the EU, 2010.

In presenting the partial effects, we concentrate on those that falsify basic assumptions of the welcome culture. Table 8 answers the politically relevant question whether a tendency of a given country’s population to have a preference to emigrate to the European Union over other migration destinations has socially and politically beneficial effects on the migration-sending countries independent of geographical latitude; geographical distance from the EU; the nonlinear effects of income on key social and political variables; and finally, years of membership in the EU. Table 8 neatly falsifies some of the key assumptions of the welcome culture and the illusions of “win-win” only effects of a propensity to emigrate to the EU. Independent of the effects of the variables, kept constant in the partial correlations, the EU as a recipient of global migration from a given country of the world in percentage has a positive and significant effect on the unemployment rate in the home country of the migrants to the EU, and on the unemployment rate of immigrants in the home country of the migrants to the EU. There are also significant negative effects on the satisfaction with the safety situation in the home country of the migrants to the EU. In other words, a propensity to emigrate to the European Union over other migration destinations does nothing to alleviate the unemployment situation at home, and it contributes to a deteriorating safety situation in the home countries of the migrants.

Table 9 offers an answer to the question about the long-term effects of the migration balance per inward migration, again independent of our economic, political, and geographical control variables. Ceteris paribus, there is an interesting effect on the dissent from the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws, and inequality between the richest and poorest strata is reduced by a country’s high position on the global migration ladder. The movements of hundreds and hundreds of thousands of citizens abroad with a negative effect on the migration balance in fact petrifies structures of religious fundamentalism and limits religious secularism, well captured by the variable: dissent from the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws. A country’s dominant position on the international migration ladders alleviates inequality, while a country’s low position on the international migration ladders with the concomitant heavy outward migration contributes to the wrath of different strata in society, leading toward “fundamentalist” currents in society that are so familiar from countries and territories like the Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

Table 10 and Table 11 offer the final tests of the effects of increased immigration from the Muslim world, overlooked by the welcome culture of recent years, again independent of the economic, political, and geographical control variables. The array of social and political negative effects of the share of total immigration from OIC countries on a great number of variables is impressive and further falsifies basic assumptions of the welcome culture of recent years. Equality, civil rights, absence of high military burden rates, absence of terrorism, environmental data, satisfaction with life and the main economic and social conditions in the country, economic growth, gender equality, effective democracy, social protection, secularism, employment, education, and global tolerance are, ceteris paribus, the losers of the share of total immigration coming from the OIC countries.

The same can be said about the long-term negative effects of the share of total immigrant population per total population, independent of our economic, political, and geographical control variables.

Tendencies Emerging from the Multivariate Analysis: Promax Factor Analysis

In the following, we tested the multivariate effects of key variables of the welcome culture on a host of variables, measuring economic and social well-being for the 110 countries with complete available data. Variable definitions and sources are listed in Appendix Table 4.

If basic assumptions of the welcome culture were true, then its key variables—such as asylum recognition rates, share of migration from OIC countries, and so on—would have to have very significant and positive effects on the most important social and political development variables. To this end we applied the sophisticated statistical methodology of promax factor analysis, which allows the analysis of the correlations between the dimensions (factors) and best reproduces the correlation matrix between the variables.

The following variables measured the welcome culture of a given country:

  • Asylum recognition rate
  • Asylum seekers as permille of total population
  • EU as recipient of global migration from this country 2013 (%)
  • Immigration—share of population 2005 (%)
  • Migration balance per inward migration 2013
  • Net international migration rate 2005-2010
  • Share of international immigrant stock (%)
  • Share of total immigration for OIC countries 2013 (%)

The following variables measured the effects of the welcome culture on socioeconomic development:

  • Civil and political liberties violations
  • Closing economic gender gap
  • Closing educational gender gap
  • Closing health and survival gender gap
  • Closing of global gender gap, overall score 2009
  • Closing political gender gap
  • Combined Failed States Index
  • Corruption avoidance measure
  • Democracy measure
  • Effective Democracy Index
  • Global Terrorism Index
  • Immigration—share of population 2005 (%)
  • Overall Development Index based on 35 variables
  • Rule of law

Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14 now highlight the main results of our factor analysis, based on the IBM SPSS 24 version of promax factor analysis. There are six resulting factors, explaining more than 76% of the total variance of the entire model. According to the practices of social science statistics, they were interpreted according to their “loadings” with the original variables of the model. For each factor, “loadings” equal or above the usual threshold of +-0.500 were taken into due consideration. The resulting factors can be named in the following way:

  • Corruption avoidance
  • Closing the gender gap
  • Development and freedom
  • International asylum-driven immigration
  • Protection of civil rights
  • Victims of global terrorism

The following tables now list the most important results of our statistical investigation. We leave the details of our statistical results to the specialists, interested in multivariate analysis. But the main result, summarized in Table 14, speaks for itself: international asylum-driven migration negatively affects corruption avoidance, gender equality, and the dimension of development and freedom. For our other results, see Table 12 and Table 13.104 The country results of our factor analytical procedure are listed in Appendix Table 5.

Clear contradictions of the reasoning of the welcome culture are the negative loadings of closing the gender gap with the share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013, in percentages, and the negative loading of the factor “development and freedom” with the asylum recognition rate.

Asylum-driven immigration, defined by a high share of international immigrant stock (%) and by the variable “asylum seekers as permille of total population,” affects the variables of our factor analytical investigation in the following way: it strongly and negatively affects closing educational gender gap and the UNDP Human Development Index, 2012. Lesser but still noteworthy negative effects between -0.499 and -0.100 are evident for the Overall Development Index, based on 35 variables, the democracy measure, the ratio of the closing of the global gender gap overall score, the Effective Democracy Index, the Rule of Law Index, the corruption avoidance measure, and closing the economic gender gap. The following negative tendencies in society are likewise enhanced by asylum-driven immigration: civil and political liberties violations, the Combined Failed States Index, and the Global Terrorism Index.

Prospects and Conclusions

On the Breakdown of the Welcome Culture

Our analysis spelled out some of the dire consequences of the welcome culture in Europe from 2015 onward. A senior Israeli analyst of international relations and international security, Manfred Gerstenfeld, recently remarked correctly that the policies of the welcome culture in Europe have reached their limits.105 Liberal and left-wing European political elites, the media, and academia appear to be simply unwilling to hear such arguments. Gerstenfeld pointed out:

Yet [Angela Merkel’s] legacy may well be heavily influenced by a single fateful decision: to open Germany’s borders to migrants in September 2015. Since then, about a million and a half migrants have entered the country. Many came from Muslim countries, in particular Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Merkel misjudged both the extent of the problems that so many non-Europeans would bring with them and the absorption capacity of the German population…. Germany’s newly appointed Anti-Semitism Commissioner, Felix Klein, has said he is not surprised that many German Jews are debating whether to leave. This leads to a troubling question: Whereas Chancellor Kohl enabled the building up of a greatly increased Jewish community through immigration, will Chancellor Merkel’s legacy be a substantially diminishing Jewish community through emigration?106

In a similar vein, in 2017 Mordechai Kedar aptly described realities already evolving all over Europe :

Some of the refugees will not find work in the countries to which they have migrated and will live on the economic and social fringes. They will become part of poor Islamic neighborhoods, many of which have existed in West European cities for years with local police afraid to enter them. Poverty and life on the margins turn some young Muslims into easy prey for terror recruiters, who stir up the urge for jihad in them by portraying the absorbing society as rotten to the core and overrun with promiscuity, prostitution, alcohol, drugs, materialism, and corruption. Those societies, the recruiters argue, use the immigrants as slaves for factories, garages, shops, and humiliating and degrading service professions while the natives are exploitative lawyers, accountants, businesspeople, and owners of houses and apartments. The recruitment of Muslim young people, particularly those who have learned in public schools that “everyone is equal,” is only a matter of time. The refugee-absorbing countries will suffer a concomitant upsurge in crime: violence in the public domain, sexual harassment and attacks, burglaries, car thefts, consumption of drugs and alcohol, and unofficial, untaxed work. This will be in addition to illegal building, along with a growth in public spending on social services for immigrants related to children, unemployment, aging, and health. Already today, the rate of first- and second-generation immigrants in West European prisons is substantially higher than their rate in the general population.107

Timothy Hatton contended in a recent article that the existing asylum system, which encourages migrants to make hazardous maritime or overland crossings to gain access to an uncertain prospect of obtaining refugee status, is inefficient, poorly targeted, and lacks public support.108 In the long run, Hatton argues, it should be replaced by a substantial joint program of refugee resettlement that would help those most in need of protection, eliminate the risks to refugees, and command more widespread public support. Hatton foresees the feasibility of three elements for reform: first, implementing tougher border controls to reduce unauthorized entry; second, promoting direct resettlement of refugees from countries of first asylum; and third, expanding refugee-hosting capacity through enhanced burden-sharing among destination countries.

In Hatton’s view, the existing asylum policy is simply dysfunctional.109 In order to lodge a claim for asylum, potential applicants must “risk their lives in hazardous sea voyages, circumnavigating fences and dodging border guards, and often falling prey to unscrupulous people smugglers.”110 The current policy, Hatton maintains, selects a range of migrants more than half of whom are rejected as genuine refugees, and some of whom remain in the limbo of the informal economy. Worse still, it leaves behind many of those who are in greatest need of protection, doing little to assist them in the camps and shanty towns where they languish.111

In Hatton’s analysis one of the dire consequences, running counter to the central assumptions of the welcome culture, is that the incentives for “spontaneous” asylum migration must be reduced.112 Border controls that have broken down need to be strengthened. Low asylum recognition rates show that many of those who do manage to gain unauthorized entry to European countries are not genuine refugees.113 Tighter borders deter applications.114

Hatton also underlines that most refugees (86%) are located in relatively poor countries, often just across the border from the country from which they have fled. Hence resettlement of genuine refugees must be on the international agenda.115 International asylum policies, then, need to shift away from spontaneous asylum migration toward a substantial resettlement program that would target those who most need help.116

One of our main empirical results accords entirely with Hatton’s argument that asylum-driven migration negatively affects development. Our factor analysis has shown that key Western countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Scandinavia, and the German-speaking democracies in Europe, have now joined the bandwagon of international asylum-driven immigration. The factor scores from Appendix Table 5, projected onto a choropleth map of the world and onto the zoomed-in map of the Euro-Mediterranean macroregion, clearly support our contention about the spread of Chancellor Merkel’s welcome culture and its connection to events in the Muslim world.

Growing Distance from the Welcome Culture in the Global South

World Values Survey data117 show that on a global scale, and in light of the shadow economy for migration via asylum,118 support for a strict immigration policy is anyway on the global increase, paradoxically even in the countries whose citizens were initially the main beneficiaries of the welcome culture initiated by Chancellor Merkel in September 2015. Table 15 and Map 10, again also with a zoom on the Euro-Mediterranean macroregion, show these results.

No Room for Complacency: The Free World Must Take Stock of What It Is All About

Our concluding maps (Map 11, Map 12, and Map 13), based on the cross-national data, documented in our cross-national dataset of Table 4 and Appendix Table 5, are meant to provide a final empirical reflection of the issues under debate in this article. The free world—characterized by development, freedom, and respect for civil rights in the spirit of the Enlightenment—is under threat from transnational terrorism. In the days since September 2015, when for the sake of the welcome culture border controls were abolished and hundreds of thousands of individuals entered countries like Austria, Germany, or Sweden without proper controls of identities, documents, and other vital indicators, the fact that the Western world is under an existential threat from radical Islamism seems to have been forgotten completely.

Our empirical analysis falsified some of the key assumptions of the welcome culture and the illusions of “win-win” only effects of a propensity to emigrate to the European Union. We showed some of the negative, long-term societal effects of increased immigration from the Muslim world that have been overlooked by the welcome culture of recent years, independent of the economic, political, and geographical control variables. Equality, civil rights, absence of high military burden rates, absence of terrorism, environmental data, satisfaction with life and the main economic and social conditions in a given country, economic growth, gender equality, effective democracy, social protection, secularism, employment, education, and global tolerance are simply not, ceteris paribus, the winners of the share of total immigration coming from the OIC countries. The same can be said about the long-term negative effects of the share of total immigrant population per total population, independent of our economic, political, and geographical control variables. International asylum-driven migration strongly and negatively affects corruption avoidance, gender equality, and the dimension of development and freedom.

If anything, this article should be a contribution to a growing debate initiated by Israeli scholars and policymakers on the contradictions of the welcome culture. The critique of this ideology cannot be left only to the right-wing populists in the West, now gaining in election after election.


OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation)119

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Arab Rep., Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, The, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen Rep.

EU 15 (old EU member states)

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom

New EU member states (countries that joined the EU in 2004 or later)

Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia

High-income Arab countries

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

Other OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation; see above)

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Arab Rep., Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, The, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen, Rep.

Other countries (rest of the world)

American Samoa, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Bahamas, The, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Channel Islands, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Faeroe Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Georgia, Ghana, Greenland, Grenada, Guam, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong SAR, China, Iceland, Isle of Man, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Dem. Rep., Korea, Rep., Lao PDR, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Macao SAR, China, Macedonia, FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Fed. States, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Martin (French part), St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, RB, Vietnam, Virgin Islands (U.S.), Zambia, Zimbabwe

Data in Excel format is available from:

For tables, charts and maps see the PDF version of the article.

* * *


  1. All statistical data, quotations, and internet downloads for this article were double-checked as of January 16, 2019. On the controversial term “European refugee crisis” see, among others, Guild, Elspeth et al., The 2015 Refugee Crisis in the European Union, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2015; Tausch, Arno, “Europe’s Refugee Crisis. Zur aktuellen politischen Ökonomie von Migration, Asyl und Integration in Europa” (Europe’s Refugee Crisis: On the Current Political Economy of Migration, Asylum and Integration in Europe), October 22, 2015, available at SSRN: or
  3. On the OIC, see; Kayaoglu, Turan, The Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Politics, Problems, and Potential (London: Routledge, 2015); Slesman, Ly, Ahmad Zubaidi Baharumshah and Wahabuddin Ra’ees, “Institutional infrastructure and economic growth in member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),” Economic Modelling 51 (2015): 214-26; Mohieldin, Mahmoud et al., The Role of Islamic Finance in Enhancing Financial Inclusion in Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Countries, World Bank, 2011; Sharqieh, Ibrahim, “Can the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Resolve Conflicts?” Peace and Conflict Studies 19, 2 (2012): 219-36. For a critical assessment of the role of the OIC, see Lebl, Leslie S., “The EU, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation,” Orbis 57,1 (2013): 101-19.
  4. See Grinin, Leonid, Andrey Korotayev and Arno Tausch, Islamism, Arab Spring, and the Future of Democracy (Heidelberg: Springer, 2019).
  5. See our data below.
  6. See Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch, Islamism. On various possible negative and positive scenarios of increasing Muslim presence in Europe, see; Ahmed, Akbar, Journey into Europe: Islam, Immigration, and Identity (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2018).
  7. Schmid, Alex P., Links between Terrorism and Migration, ICCT Research Paper, International Centre for Counter-terrorism, 2016, available at; see also Heisbourg, François, “The strategic implications of the Syrian refugee crisis,” Survival 57, 6 (2015): 7-20; Akbarzadeh, Shahram et al., “The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” Middle East Politics and International Relations: Crisis Zone 65, 2 (2018): 216-21; Brady, Erika, “An Analysis of Patterns of Change Arising from the Syrian Conflict: Islamic Terrorism, Refugee Flows and Political Destabilization in Europe,” Journal of Terrorism Research 8,1 (2017); Carrera, Sergio, Steven Blockmans, Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild, The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities, CEPS Essay 20/16, December 2015, available at SSRN:; Chetail, Vincent, “The Common European Asylum System: Bric-à-Brac or System?” (February 14, 2015), in V. Chetail, P. De Bruycker, and F. Maiani, eds., Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2016), 3-38, Criminal Justice, Borders and Citizenship Research Paper No. 2564990, available at SSRN:
  8. Tausch, Arno, Titanic 2010?: The European Union and Its Failed Lisbon Strategy (Nova Science, 2009); Tausch, Arno, The City on the Hill?: The Latin Americanization of Europe and the Lost Competition with the USA (Amsterdam: Rozenberg, 2007). On the empirical analysis of the regional inequalities in Europe, which led to the current “yellow vest” crisis in France, see Tausch, Arno and Alfonso Galindo Lucas, “Globalización, Crisis Económica Mundial y Desarrollo Regional. Tendencias Globales e Implicaciones Europeas” (Globalization, World Economic Crisis, and Regional Development: Global Tendencies and European Implications), July 22, 2013, Revista del Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, Madrid, 96 (Economía y Sociología): 147-74, available at SSRN: or;
  9. On the unfolding events regarding Brexit, see; On the background, see Inglehart, Ronald F. and Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash, HKS Working Paper RWP16-026, July 29, 2016, available at SSRN: or; Goodwin, Matthew J. and Oliver Heath, “The 2016 referendum, Brexit and the left behind: An aggregate‐level analysis of the result,” Political Quarterly 87, 3 (2016): 323-32; Clarke, Harold D. et al., Brexit (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Sinn, Hans-Werner, Der Schwarze Juni: Brexit, Flüchtlingswelle, Euro-Desaster-Wie die Neugründung Europas gelingt (Verlag Herder GmbH, 2016); Munin, Nellie, “EU-Israel Partnership: Future Economic Prospects in Light of the 2017 ‘White Paper,’” European Studies 4 (2017): 185-202, available at SSRN:
  10. Fitzi, Gregor, Mackert Jürgen and Bryan S. Turner, eds., Populism and the Crisis of Democracy, Routledge Advances in Sociology (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019); Kuttner, Robert, Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism? 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2018); Agarin, Timofey and Nevena Nancheva, eds., A European Crisis: Perspectives on Refugees, Solidarity, and Europe (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2018); Thorleifsson, Cathrine, Nationalist Responses to the Crises in Europe: Old and New Hatreds, Research in Migration and Ethnic Relations Series (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019).
  11. There are many ways of translating the German-language term “Willkommenskultur” into English. We opted for the version “welcome culture” used by the New York Times; see
  12. On the cross-national analysis of the effects of different processes on global development, see Tausch, Arno and Almas Heshmati, Globalization, the Human Condition, and Sustainable Development in the Twenty-first Century: Cross-national Perspectives and European Implications (Anthem Press, 2013).
  13. On the statistical methodology, see, among others, Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science, 2014).
  15. Ibid.
  16. Ibid.
  17. Baker, Paul, Costas Gabrielatos and Tony McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Allen, Chris, Islamophobia (London: Routledge, 2016); Meer, Nasar, “Racialization and religion: Race, culture and difference in the study of antisemitism and Islamophobia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, 3 (2013): 385-98.
  18. Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds., Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Mudde, Cas, “Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?” European Journal of Political Research 52, 1 (2013): 1-19; Akkerman, Agnes, Cas Mudde and Andrej Zaslove, “How populist are the people? Measuring populist attitudes in voters,” Comparative Political Studies 47, 9 (2014): 1324-1353; Tausch, Arno, “Global Catholicism in the Age of Mass Migration and the Rise of Populism: Comparative Analyses, Based on Recent World Values Survey and European Social Survey Data,” September 20, 2017, available at SSRN: or
  19. On the cross-national analysis of the effects of different processes on global development, see Tausch and Heshmati, Globalization. Currently 22.5% of the population of the entire EU-28 are classified as poor, see
  20. Esses, Victoria M., Stelian Medianu and Andrea S. Lawson, “Uncertainty, threat, and the role of the media in promoting the dehumanization of immigrants and refugees,” Journal of Social Issues 69, 3 (2013): 518-36; Esses, Victoria M., Leah K. Hamilton and Danielle Gaucher, “The global refugee crisis: Empirical evidence and policy implications for improving public attitudes and facilitating refugee resettlement,” Social Issues and Policy Review 11, 1 (2017): 78-123; Cave, Margaret E. and Briana M. Roberts, A “Moral” Crusade: Central-Eastern European Nationalism, Xenophobia, and Far-Right Extremism in Response to the “Refugee Crisis,” University of Wyoming, 2017, available at
  21. Czollek’s book was widely and positively received in the German-language media in Europe, among others in Die Zeit (Hamburg),; Der Falter (Vienna),; and Deutschlandfunk (German Radio),, while Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich) reviewed the book critically,
  22. Czollek, Max, Desintegriert euch! (Munich: Hanser Verlag, 2018).
  24. Othen, Christopher, Soldiers of a Different God: How the Counter-Jihad Movement Created Mayhem, Murder and the Trump Presidency (Amberley, 2018).
  26. For quotations, see Schmid, Links.
  27. For quotations, again see ibid. As Schmid suggests, the “Trojan horse” suggestion and the notion of an “organized invasion” are from Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman, “Zeman nennt Flüchtelingenstrom ‘organisierte Invasion,’” Die Welt, 27 December 2015,
  28. As Schmid, ibid., notes, in a hearing of the U.S. Senate’s Armed Services Committee on March 1, 2016, NATO’s Supreme Commander Philip Breedlove talked about the “weaponization” of migrants. The Deutsche Welle quoted him as saying: “Together, Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve…. These indiscriminate weapons used by…Bashar al-Assad, and the non-precision use of weapons by the Russian forces—I can’t find any other reason for them other than to cause refugees to be on the move and make them someone else’s problem.” “NATO Commander: Russia Uses Syrian Refugees as ‘Weapon’ against the West,” Deutsche Welle, March 2, 2016, See also:
  29. Much of the European debate seems to be characterized by an almost automatic reflex: “My enemy’s enemy is my friend.” Since European right-wing parties target Muslim mass immigration, for many Europeans who deem themselves “progressives” or “liberals” and oppose right-wing populism, anything connected with Islamism and Muslim anti-Semitism is beyond discussion; see also Krantz, Frederick, “Antisemitism (New and Old), Islamist Judeophobia, and the Defense of Israel: Remembering and Using the Work of Robert Solomon Wistrich,” Antisemitism Studies 2, 1 (2018): 109-46.
  30.; Jikeli, Günther, European Muslim Antisemitism: Why Young Urban Males Say They Don’t Like Jews (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015). One could remark here wryly that all has been predicted by Houellebecq, Michel, Submission, trans. L. Stein (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2015).
  31. Houellebecq, Submission.
  32. Tibi, Bassam, “The totalitarianism of jihadist Islamism and its challenge to Europe and to Islam,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8, 1 (2007): 35-54; Tibi, Bassam, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: From Jihadist to Institutional Islamism (London: Routledge, 2014).
  34. On the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency, see Toggenburg, Gabriel N. and Jonas Grimheden, “Upholding Shared Values in the EU: What Role for the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights?” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54, 5 (2016): 1093-1104. Its presence on the internet is:
  37. Schoenberg, Arnold, Die Zukunft Europas und das Judentum: Impulse Zu einem gesellschaftlichen Diskurs, ed. Oskar Deutsch (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2017); see also the novel by Menasse, Robert, Die Hauptstadt (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Suhrkamp, 2017), which won a 2017 German Book Award and portrays the European bureaucracy as the vanguard of Enlightenment in Europe. See also “Brussels, E.U. Capital, Gets a Novel, Tart, Empathic,”
  38. On developments in France:; on developments in Sweden:; on developments in Germany: This list could be continued endlessly.
  41. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism: Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU, December 2018, available at On its reports on the subject, see also Elman, R. Amy and Marc Grimm, “Augmenting the European Union’s Response to Antisemitism,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 10, 3 (2016): 457-69.
  42. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Experiences and perceptions.
  43. Ibid.
  44. Ibid.
  45. Ibid.
  46. See Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch, Islamism.
  47. See Günter Seufert, Turkey as Partner of the EU in the Refugee Crisis: Ankara’s Problems and Interests, SWP Comment 2016/C 01, January 2016, available at: Seufert aptly described this dependency: “Meanwhile, in Germany and other EU member states, a public critical of Turkey sneered at what was deemed ‘kowtowing’ by European politics to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. All this illustrates that eyes remain firmly closed to the unpleasant realisation that the familiar power balance between the EU and accession candidate Turkey has now turned on its head, for, in the refugee crisis, the EU is more reliant on Turkey than vice versa.” For the official EU policies, see; see also Annegret Bendiek, A Paradigm Shift in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: From Transformation to Resilience, SWP Research Paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, October 2017, available at
  48. Savage, Timothy M., “Europe and Islam: Crescent waxing, cultures clashing,” Washington Quarterly 27, 3 (2004): 25-50.
  49. Ibid.
  50. Ibid.
  51. Ibid.
  52. Ibid.
  53. Pew, Europe’s Growing Muslim Population: Muslims are projected to increase as a share of Europe’s population—even with no future migration, Pew Research Center, November 29, 2017, available at
  54. On IIASA, see; on their demographic/religious modeling efforts, see; Hackett, Conrad et al., “The future size of religiously affiliated and unaffiliated populations,” Demographic Research 32 (2015): 829-42; Potančoková, Michaela, Marcin Stonawski and Anna Krysińska, “How Many More Muslims? The Effect of Increased Numbers of Asylum Seekers on the Size of Muslim Population in European Countries,” Yearbook of International Religious Demography (2017).
  55. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is the intergovernmental organization of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. It was set up in 1960 by its then seven member states for the promotion of free trade and economic integration between its members.
  56. Pew, Europe’s Growing Muslim Population.
  57. Ibid.
  58. Ibid.
  59. Ibid.
  60. Ibid.
  61. Ibid.
  64. Ibid.
  65. The present author, having been a European migration policy bureaucrat and EU-policy analyst from 1992 to 2016, actively contributed to this thinking.
  66. As to the testing of vital assumptions, see especially Tausch, Arno and Almas Heshmati, “Testing Turkey’s place within the maps of global economic, political and social values,” DOI: 10.1515/ppsr-2015-0043, Polish Political Science Review, Polski Przegląd Politologiczny 5, 1 (2017), available at
  73. The term was prominently used by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) in its 2005 study Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia, available at
  74. Herrmann, Peter and Arno Tausch, Dar Al Islam—the Mediterranean, the World System, and the Wider Europe: The “Cultural Enlargement” of the EU and Europe’s Identity (Nova Science, 2005); Herrmann, Peter and Arno Tausch, Dar Al Islam—The Mediterranean, the World System, and the Wider Europe: The Chain of Peripheries and the New Wider Europe (Nova Science, 2005). The analysis of Israel and the European Union in this context was written by Professor Alfred Tovias of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the then president of the European Parliament, Pat Cox, wrote the foreword. See also Arad, Ruth W., Seev Hirsch and Alfred Tovias, Economics of Peacemaking (Springer, 1983); Aliboni, Roberto et al., Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective, EuroMeSCo Paper 68 (2008): 1-33; Tovias, Alfred, “Exploring the ‘Pros’ and ‘Cons’ of Swiss and Norwegian Models of Relations with the European Union: What Can Israel Learn from the Experiences of These Two Countries?” Cooperation and Conflict 41, 2 (2006): 203-22; Pardo, Sharon and Joel Peters, Uneasy Neighbors: Israel and the European Union (Lexington Books, 2009).
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  77. Oneal, John R. et al., “The liberal peace: Interdependence, democracy, and international conflict, 1950-85,” Journal of Peace Research 33, 1 (1996): 11-28; Russett, Bruce et al., “The democratic peace,” International Security 19, 4 (1995): 164-84; Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett, “Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986,” American Political Science Review 87, 3 (1993): 624-38; Russett, Bruce, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
  78. On the “integration” of Muslim minorities into the European political systems, see, among others, Yaqin, Amina, Peter Morey and Asmaa Soliman, eds., Muslims, Trust and Multiculturalism: New Directions, Palgrave Politics of Identity and Citizenship Series (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); on “Muslim Calvinism,” see Pipes, Daniel, “God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?” The National Interest 66 (2001): 14-21; Tausch, Arno, Christian Bischof and Karl Mueller, Muslim Calvinism (Amsterdam: Rozenberg, 2009); Tausch, Arno and Hichem Karoui, Les musulmans: un cauchemar ou une force pour l’Europe? (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011); Tausch, Heshmati, and Karoui, Political Algebra.
  79.; and
  80. On the most recent developments regarding Turkey’s membership in NATO, see, among others,; on general aspects of Turkey and NATO, see Çalış, Şaban H., Turkey’s Cold War: Foreign Policy and Western Alignment in the Modern Republic, Contemporary Turkey, 2 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017); Smith, Mark, Nato Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance, Cold War History Series (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2000).
  82. Öniş, Ziya, “Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey‐EU Relations,” Government and Opposition 35, 4 (2000): 463-83; Balkir, Canan, “The Customs Union and Beyond,” in Libby Rittenberg, ed., The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 51-78; Müftüler-Bac, Meltem, Divergent Pathways: Turkey and the European Union: Re-Thinking the Dynamics of Turkish-European Union Relations (Leverkusen Opladen, Germany: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2016); Macmillan, Catherine, Discourse, Identity and the Question of Turkish Accession to the EU: Through the Looking Glass (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2013).
  83. Peter, Frank and Rafael Ortega, eds., Islamic Movements of Europe: Public Religion and Islamophobia in the Modern World, Library of European Studies 21 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014).
  84. See especially Behlül Özkan, “The Cold War-Era Origins of Islamism in Turkey and Its Rise to Power,” Hudson Institute, November 5, 2017, available at The hopes of many Western leaders for a “moderate Muslim Brotherhood” were analyzed, among others, in Leiken, Robert S. and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007. Turkey’s shift away from the West, which became more evident after 2009, was analyzed, among others, in Cagaptay, Soner, “Is Turkey Leaving the West?” Foreign Affairs, October 26, 2009.
  85. Aviv, Efrat, Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism in Turkey: From Ottoman Rule to AKP (London: Routledge, 2017).
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  89. Efron, Shira, The Future of Israeli-Turkish Relations, Rand Corporation, 2018, available at; Alsarhan, Mohammad, Turkish-Israeli Regional Cooperation during 1990s, USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003). On the prospects for Israeli-Turkish intelligence cooperation see;;; on the most recent trends see:—108657.
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  92. Liang, Christina Schori, Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right (London: Routledge, 2016), 19-50.
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  97. The research tradition based on the data of the Bilateral Migration Matrix was presented, among others, by Özden, Çağlar et al., “Where on earth is everybody? The evolution of global bilateral migration 1960-2000,” World Bank Economic Review 25, 1 (2011): 12-56.
  98. Bilateral Migration Matrix (BMM), 2018, available at
  99. Tausch and Heshmati, Globalization, and the updated data, contained in the freely available Excel-format database of this article at
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  102. Tausch, Heshmati, and Karoui, Political Algebra.
  103.; On the social scientific methodology, see also Okabe, Atsuyuki, GIS-based Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences (CRC Press, 2016).
  104. We should emphasize at this point that the main recipients of international migration were developed Western democracies with a good performance in corruption avoidance. For that reason, corruption avoidance has positive loadings with the net international migration rate, 2005-2010, and with immigration as share of population for 2005 (percentage). The same effect also explains why the protection of civil rights has a high positive loading with the migration balance.
  105. Manfred Gerstenfeld, Angela Merkel’s Legacy and the Jews, Perspectives Papers, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, January 3, 2019, available at
  106. Ibid.
  107. Mordechai Kedar, The Ebbing of Warfare in Syria Will Spell Catastrophe for Europe, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Perspectives Papers, September 11, 2017, available at
  108. Hatton, Timothy J., “Refugees and asylum seekers, the crisis in Europe and the future of policy,” Economic Policy 32, 91 (2017): 447-96.
  109. Hatton, Timothy J., “The migration crisis and refugee policy in Europe,” in Francesco Fasani, Refugees and Economic Migrants: Facts, Policies and Challenges, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2016.
  110. Ibid.
  111. Ibid.
  112. Ibid.
  113. Ibid.
  114. Ibid.
  115. Ibid.
  116. Ibid.
  117. (online data analysis) or (machine-readable datasets in SPSS or SAS format).
  118. Tausch, “Europe’s Refugee Crisis.”
  119. For data matrix management purposes (missing values for the multivariate analysis), Bosnia and Brunei were not included in the OIC sample. In numerical terms the effects of this are marginal.