Summary
On November 10, 2025, the public discourse in Iran has crystallized along two parallel axes: externally — a nuclear deadlock and a mounting sense of geopolitical siege in light of the “12-Day War” (referred to in Iran as “Committee S-3”); internally — revelations of governance failures, economic corruption, declining industry, a historic drought, and a widening gap between the political system and the populace.
Despite projecting military strength and a narrative of “defending sovereignty,” patterns of societal wear, struggles around the hijab, and worsening welfare and rights crises are becoming more evident.
On November 10, 2025, Iranian public discourse reflects a reality of external stalemate and internal fracture. On the international front, many Iranians feel besieged amid the 12-Day War and the ongoing deadlock with Washington and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Domestically, the widening gap between the regime and citizens continues to sharpen. While the leadership projects military capability and a “defensive” posture, citizens show growing fatigue, struggle over religious and personal freedoms, and sense deepening geopolitical isolation.
Between Isolation Anxiety and Structural Fracture
Public discourse portrays international gridlock—especially over the nuclear issue and the aftermath of the 12-Day War—alongside a sharp exposure of governance failures and socio-economic crises that threaten national stability. Officials emphasize Iran’s ability to respond militarily, yet the gap between the political system and the public remains stark, especially in economic, social, and environmental matters.
Governance, Economy, and Industry
Observers describe economic corruption as a “systemic disturbance in growth mechanisms,” claiming it consumes up to 17% of growth for every 1% increase in corruption. Government critics reveal chronic mismanagement of crises and overlapping institutions that prevent clear decision-making or accountability. The steel sector illustrates this distortion: it operates at only about 30 million tons annually out of a nominal 52 million capacity. While gross exports grew by 100%, finished goods barely increased. Gas and electricity costs soared severalfold, but consumer prices remained tied to the NIMA foreign-currency exchange rate, undermining manufacturers’ stability.
At the same time, Iranian officials highlight achievements in nanotechnology. Iran ranks sixth globally in scientific publications, and domestically developed nano-medicines saved $636 million in foreign currency over nine years. However, the government struggles to convert these achievements into commercial advantage.
In energy, Iran boosted oil exports in September 2025 to their highest level since 2018, despite new UN sanctions. China purchases roughly 90% of Iranian oil, followed by the UAE. Yet Tehran faces continued pressure over its refusal to comply with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an issue that divides domestic policymakers.
Society and Environment: Water, Hijab, and Youth
Iran faces its worst drought in 50 years. The spokesperson of the Water & Electricity Industry warned that Tehran’s dam reserves cannot meet upcoming demand and that a further 10% consumption cut may be necessary. Officials blame the crisis on ignored warnings and poor water management.
Socially, the hijab remains a flashpoint of identity conflict. Although the National Security Council repealed the harsh hijab law, hardline factions try to revive it. President Dr. Masoud Pezeshkian pursues a “two-sided consent” strategy to block the law’s return and cited this stance in a cabinet meeting. Extremist legislators accused him of betraying religious principles and claimed that “the lack of hijab enforcement causes the drought.”
Reports suggest that the public rejects regression and focuses instead on economic survival. A social study notes rising child marriages in rural areas, mainly due to poverty, unemployment, and hopelessness. In sports, verbal abuse in football stadiums damages efforts toward inclusivity, with some fans saying “mothers and sisters should not attend matches.”
The Nuclear Freeze and Relations with Washington and the IAEA
Senior Iranian officials declare that negotiations with the U.S. remain impossible without “equality and reciprocity.” They accuse Washington, under President Trump, of maintaining maximalist demands—ending enrichment, limiting missiles to 500 km, and halting support for “resistance groups.” Tehran condemns this as “shifting goalposts” and demands that the U.S. first cease support for Israel, withdraw from its West Asian bases, and end regional interference before any dialogue.
Iranian media describe relations with the IAEA as “complex.” Since the “aggressive” strikes in June, Tehran has barred inspectors from returning to Fordow and Natanz, where uranium enriched to 60% remains stored. After the last war, Iran suspended cooperation and even hinted at withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Military Power: The 12-Day War
Iranian outlets portray the response to the Israeli strike as a turning point. Commanders characterized the initial operation as a “blitz attack” designed to create shock and confusion. The recovery period lasted less than half a day because the high command quickly appointed replacements and restored unity between the army and the Revolutionary Guards. Iran’s counterattack, including missile launches that disabled NATO radars, became a source of national pride as the “enemy sought a cease-fire.” The discourse stresses unity and maturity between the army and the IRGC, and defines the current stance as “defensive” to preserve independence and Islamic values.
Israel and Gaza: Humanitarian Issues and Law
Iranian media focus on Gaza’s humanitarian crisis. They accuse Israel’s government of waging a “hunger war,” allowing only 171 aid trucks per day—one-third of the required 600. Palestinian sources allege that Israel controls the type, quantity, and price of aid, using “engineered hunger” as a weapon of “soft punishment.” A Palestinian doctor reports deaths from malnutrition, while other accounts describe incoming aid as “symbolic and nonessential”—instant noodles and snacks instead of protein and dairy.
Meanwhile, The Guardian reported that Israel reopened the “Rakefet” prison under the order of Minister Bezalel Smotrich. The facility holds Gazan detainees, including those without indictments, in isolation, without sunlight or contact, and subjects them to “severe torture and abuse.”
Regional Map Shift and Geopolitical Isolation
Analysts in Syria identify a dramatic shift. They interpret the visit of interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to the U.S. as an accelerated move toward normalization with Washington and Israel, a “U.S.–Israel conspiracy” to turn Syria into a “large military base” and fuel ethnic-sectarian division serving Israeli interests. Iranian media claim Israel exploited Assad’s fall to occupy the UN buffer zone in southern Syria, reinforcing perceptions of Iranian strategic failure.
From Israel’s perspective, Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs analyst Yoni Ben Menachem warns that al-Sharaa’s visit could pressure Israel to cede strategic territories like Mount Hermon. He argues that agreements with such a leader could restrict the Israel Defense Forces’ freedom of action without sufficient guarantees for the Druze or other groups. “This endangers our interests,” he states.
While the U.S. urges northwestern Syria to join the anti-ISIS campaign, Iranian commentators see a coordinated attempt to contain Iran and Russia by redrawing regional influence zones and expanding Western border-surveillance capabilities along the Syrian-Lebanese frontier.
At the same time, Iranian outlets report on the expansion of the Abraham Accords into Central Asia. According to President Donald Trump, Kazakhstan will become the first Muslim country to join during his second term—a move Tehran views as a Western effort to encircle Iran and Russia through new economic, technological, and security partnerships with Israel and the West.
