Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror is a former Israeli national security advisor. He formerly served as director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is former commander of the IDF's National Defense College and the IDF Staff and Command College and former head of the IDF's Research and Assessment Division, with special responsibility for preparing the National Intelligence Assessment. In addition, he served as the military secretary of the defense minister.

Publications by Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror

The Risks of Foreign Peacekeeping Forces in the West Bank

UN peacekeeping forces from the Philippines after their abduction and release by Syrian rebels. The troops belonged to the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF)that was stationed on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights. Israel’s Experience with International Peacekeepers During the […] Read More »

The Risks of Foreign Peacekeeping Forces in the West Bank

Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience

Download the full report (pdf) Summary Contrary to popular belief, conventional armies can indeed defeat terrorist insurgencies. This study will detail the six basic conditions which, if met, enable an army to fight and win the war against terrorism, among […] Read More »

International Law and Military Operations in Practice – I

Israel’s Requirement for Defensible Borders

The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran and Its Aftermath: A Roundtable of Israeli Experts

Between 2003 and 2005, the Iranians refrained from any nuclear activity under the influence of the impression created by America’s pre-emptive policies in the region, which served as the main instrument that enabled the Europeans to force Iran to postpone uranium conversion and enrichment. But when the Iranians realized in 2005 that there was no actual threat behind their fears of U.S. pre-emption, they decided to start conversion and then enrichment. Read More »

Strategic Lessons of the Winograd Commission Report

In general terms, the Winograd Commission Report dealt mostly with the flaws in the decision-making process in Israel. However, the report contains important insights into the strategic thinking that was predominant in the Israeli political-military leadership from the time of Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon until the outbreak of hostilities in July 2006, with the advent of the Second Lebanon War. Read More »

Misreading the Second Lebanon War

What is the real mood of the Israeli people after the war? It is that we are not suckers and we are not going to make the same mistake again. We are not going to put ourselves in danger if it is not necessary. We unilaterally retreated from Lebanon and didn’t retaliate for six years, and in the end we found Hizbullah in a stronger position to fight against us. When Israel retreated from Gaza what was the result? More Kassam rockets on Sderot and Ashkelon. Read More »

Can a Conventional Army Vanquish a Terrorist Insurgency?

It is necessary to adopt an alternative concept of victory, which should be called “minimal victory,” in which terror is not destroyed, but is contained at a minimal level, and one must invest constant energy in order to prevent its eruption. In a continuous and uninterrupted effort since Operation “Defensive Shield” in April 2002, after it counted 132 dead in one month (the equivalent of 1,400 deaths a year), Israel’s terror casualty rate declined to 11 civilians for all of 2006. Read More »

An International Force in Lebanon: Advantages and Disadvantages

Discussions about security arrangements in Lebanon at the end of the war have included the proposal to station an international force in that country. Yet the UN has a very bad name in terms of confronting strong forces in areas where it is stationed.
Read More »

A Strategic Assessment of the Hizballah War: Defeating the Iranian-Syrian Axis in Lebanon

Israel’s current military operations to uproot Hizballah and to destroy it as a formidable military and terror organization is not merely an operation against another determined terror group like Hamas in Gaza. Hizballah has a disciplined, well-trained army with sophisticated weaponry, backed directly by Syria and Iran. Read More »

Will a Gaza “Hamas-stan” Become a Future Al-Qaeda Sanctuary?

 Vol. 4, No. 7     8 November 2004 In light of Israel’s planned disengagement from Gaza, to take place in 2005, and the termination of Yasser Arafat’s hold on power, the eventual take-over of the Gaza Strip by Hamas […] Read More »

Will a Gaza “Hamas-stan” Become a Future Al-Qaeda Sanctuary?

In light of Israel’s planned disengagement from Gaza, to take place in 2005, and the termination of Yasser Arafat’s hold on power, the eventual take-over of the Gaza Strip by Hamas certainly cannot be ruled out. Would a Gaza "Hamas-stan" become another al-Qaeda sanctuary in the future? In the past, al-Qaeda sought to establish itself wherever there was a security vacuum – in remote mountain areas or in economically weak, failed states. Read More »

The Geneva Accord: A Strategic Assessment

A self-appointed Israeli negotiating team, claiming to speak in the name of a majority of Israelis, concluded the Geneva Accord with a Palestinian delegation. It conceded almost all the security arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza Strip sought by past Israeli governments. The Geneva Accord leaves Israel with no safety net in the event that the agreement is violated by the Palestinian side. It is as though its architects learned nothing from the collapse of the Oslo Agreement.
Read More »

Israel’s Strategy after the Iraq War

In seeking democratization for the Middle East, the U.S. sees as its models Japan and Germany following World War II, both defeated in war and reconstructed in its aftermath. Let us remember that Israel paved the way for the Americans by halting Iraq’s nuclear plans in 1981, a demonstration of strategic cooperation between Israel and the U.S.
Read More »