Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA)

• The European countries currently leading the move to recognize a Palestinian state – France, Spain, Ireland, Norway – are not doing so in a rational political process, but due to domestic political pressure: tumultuous demonstrations, a public arena dominated by Muslim voices, and militant campuses.
• France has 6.8 million Muslims (10% of the population); 2.5-3 million Muslims live in Spain; Germany’s Muslim population is 5.5 million.
• Unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state has become an act of domestic appeasement. It is motivated by the need to appear moral, but ignores the destructive consequences – for Israel’s security, regional stability, and for the future of the Palestinians themselves.
• The Western attempt to differentiate between the “jihadist terrorist” and the PLO-type “nationalist fighter” reflects a fundamental failure to understand the conflict. Both have the same underlying strategy: an ongoing struggle whose ultimate goal is not an accord but the destruction of the Zionist enemy.
• Even if Hamas temporarily disarms, is exiled, or is “distanced from the arena,” its ethos will continue to thrive: in the mosques, the textbooks, the local police force, the discourse of the street. The struggle will not end.
• The budgets of both the PA and Hamas are based mainly on external aid. There is no effective taxation, independent central bank, or orderly economic policy. A state that is established in such a condition will be a completely dependent entity – not an independent, sovereign one.
• It will be both a terror state and an institutionally failed state that will soon become a plaything of external or internal forces. As long as the Palestinian educational, religious, and media systems propagate a discourse of hate, supremacy, and victimhood, no society can be built when its language is one of perpetual conflict.

Here is France’s position, it is clear: Yes, to peace. Yes, to Israel’s security. Yes, to a Palestinian state without Hamas.

– French President Emmanuel Macron, April 2025

This terse tweet masks a policy – or more broadly, a growing problem in Europe itself. The countries currently leading the move to recognize a Palestinian state – France, Spain, Ireland, Norway – are not doing so in a rational political process, but due to domestic political pressure: tumultuous demonstrations, a public arena dominated by Muslim voices, and militant campuses.

Unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state has become an act of domestic appeasement – and just for that reason, it constitutes a dangerous strategic misstep.

It is born out of reactivity, not responsibility. It is motivated by the need to appear moral, but ignores the destructive consequences – for Israel’s security, regional stability, and for the future of the Palestinians themselves.

Europe: “Localization” of the Palestinian State

France: Politics Under a Threat

In France, where about 6.8 million Muslims live (about 10 percent of the population), the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has become a major domestic issue. After Hamas’s October 2023 attack, Macron at first expressed support for Israel – but very quickly shifted gears. The declaration of support for a Palestinian state, in the midst of the fighting, was aimed no less at domestic than external ears.

In the background was a spike of 400 percent in antisemitic incidents; banned demonstrations that were held nonetheless in the streets of Paris; and an unprecedented boost for the radical LFI party led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, which garnered 62 percent support among Muslims compared to only eight percent of the public as a whole. Macron understood: if he did not signal to the street that he was listening, the political center would lose its grip.

Spain: A Government That Aligns Itself with the Protests

In Spain, too, where 2.5–3 million Muslims live, the discourse has become a domestic one. The Sánchez government, comprised of the socialists and their partners from the radical left (Sumar), announced its official recognition of Palestine in April 2024. That declaration did not stem only from ideological commitment; it was also a direct response to growing public pressure.

In more than 50 cities, mass demonstrations were held under the rubric “Stop the genocide.” Strikes were announced at universities, and academic associations demanded that ties with Israeli institutions be cut. Deputy Prime Minister Yolanda Díaz indeed proclaimed “From the river to the sea” – sparking international condemnation but boosting her status among the Muslim population. Here, too, recognizing Palestine was primarily a domestic political maneuver.

Germany: Mounting Pressures

Although Germany may not have officially joined this trend, domestic pressures are mounting there as well. Germany’s Muslim population comes to about 5.5 million residents, and raging protests were held in large cities, antisemitic incidents burgeoned by 320 percent, and Jewish institutions were attacked.

This agitation, too, prompted a political response, albeit more hesitant. Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke of the need for a Palestinian state, denounced scenarios of expulsion from Gaza, and at the same time increased aid to Gaza. New parties such as BSW and DAVA are beginning to attract Muslim sympathy, reminding Germans of the price paid in 2016 when the Social Democratic Party recognized the Armenian genocide and lost about a hundred thousand voters of Turkish background.

A “State without Hamas”? – When Europe Misunderstands the Language

The Western attempt to differentiate between the “jihadist terrorist” and the PLO-type “nationalist fighter” reflects a fundamental failure to understand the conflict. In actuality, there is no difference between the hudna doctrine of Hamas and the phased plan of Fatah. Both stem from the same underlying strategy: an ongoing, carefully calibrated, gradual struggle whose ultimate goal is not an accord but the destruction of the Zionist enemy.

At the core of Hamas’s outlook is the concept of the hudna: a temporary truce when facing a powerful enemy that allows one to reorganize and prepare for the next stage of the struggle. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder of the organization, spoke of this already in the 1990s. Senior officials like Khaled Mashal, Ismail Haniyeh, and Yahya Sinwar have reiterated the notion countless times.

The hudna is never the end of the conflict, but only a tactical hiatus on the way to the next jihad – a hiatus intended to mislead Israel and gain time.

The reality on the ground proves this well. Even if Hamas temporarily disarms, is exiled, or is “distanced from the arena,” its ethos will continue to thrive: in the mosques, the textbooks, the local police force, the discourse of the street. The struggle will not end; it will just pass through a phase.

Fatah and the PLO, touted by Europe as a moderate partner, hold almost the same concept. The 1974 resolution of the Palestinian National Council already speaks of the “phased plan”: if at any political juncture a foothold is gained in any territory, it will serve as a means to continue the struggle until Israel is eradicated.

Yasser Arafat did not hide this aspiration. In 1994 he likened the Oslo Accords to the Treaty of Hudaybiya – a strategic timeout that Muhammad took when facing a stronger enemy, fully intending to violate it in the future. Faisal Husseini called the accords a “Trojan horse” and explicitly acknowledged that the aim was not to exist alongside Israel but in place of it.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, more than 1,400 Israelis were murdered in terror attacks – eight times more than in the decade that preceded the accords. Not only did the Palestinian Authority (PA) fail to condemn this; it glorified it. Hundreds of millions of shekels have been doled out as “salaries” for terrorists; even amid U.S. pressure in 2025 to stop the payments to families of terrorists and “martyrs,” the PA did not put an end to the practice but simply relocated it to the president’s office. The payments continue in a different guise, and Mahmoud Abbas himself has made clear: “Even if we have only a penny left – we’ll keep providing it to the families of the martyrs.”

Educational Contents: Systemic Antisemitism

The PA’s education system, which is largely funded by the European Union, continues to reinforce messages of delegitimization of Israel, glorification of martyrs, and demonization of Jews.

An updated report by IMPACT-se (March 2025) points to such disturbing features as maps with no Israel on them, paeans to dying for Palestine, math exercises where martyrs are the unit of calculation, and depictions of Jews as liars and enemies of Islam.

In the public arena as well, not only does the PA fail to promote a moderate discourse; it sometimes directly encourages terror attacks. In January 2023, after the massacre in a synagogue in Jerusalem, Abbas – under U.S. pressure to condemn it – refused to do so for fear that it would harm him politically. On October 7 itself, Fatah channels showed videos in which operatives of the movement boasted of participating: “Fatah members took part in the massacre – we killed them and stepped on their heads,” “We slaughtered every Israeli,” “Smite the sons of monkeys and pigs.”

It was only after five days, under enormous pressure from Washington, that a vague announcement emerged about “opposing harm to civilians on both sides” – without mention of Hamas or the massacre, and without a word about children.

No Infrastructure – No State

The Mood of the Palestinian Population, and What it Means for the Future

At present, the Palestinian political reality does not meet the conditions for building a moderate or peace-loving state. Public opinion polls consistently find widespread support for radical movements and armed struggle.

For example, in a survey published a few months after Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023:

• 72 percent of Palestinians supported the attack.
• 70 percent said violent struggle is the most effective way to achieve national goals.
• Only 34 percent supported the two-state solution.
• If general elections had been held, Hamas would have won by a substantial margin both in Gaza and the West Bank.

The Palestinian public is not only disappointed in its leadership, it is also redefining the concepts of “steadfastness” and “resolve.” The figures who inspire trust are mainly those identified with armed struggle – such as Marwan Barghouti, who is serving five life sentences for murder, while pragmatic figures such as Salam Fayyad are considered weak or even “collaborators.”

It should be noted, however, that alongside the radical majority, a minority exists that is quiet, civic, and moderate. There are educators, students, entrepreneurs, academics, and businesspeople who believe in a different approach based on institution-building, dialogue, and improving their society from within. They are not the majority, and they do not have political power – but they are there, and are contending with pressures from Hamas and sometimes from the PA.

This is not, for now, a functioning opposition – but a potential nucleus from which the leadership, the society, and hope could be built.

Even if we ignore for a moment the public discourse and the radical ideology, the practical question remains: Does there exist at present a Palestinian entity capable of maintaining a state? The answer – by every political, institutional, and economic criterion – is negative.

A Deep Rift – with No Prospect of Unification

Since 2007, Gaza and the West Bank have been governed by two rival entities: Hamas – ruling Gaza as an independent, armed, Islamist body; and the PA – partially ruling the West Bank, with limited powers and fragile stability. These two groups’ attempts at reconciliation – the Cairo agreements, temporary unity governments, announcements of a settlement – have all failed again and again.

There is no single authority, policy, or legal system – and certainly no joint security control on the ground, single governmental address, or realistic chance of unification.

Economic and Infrastructural Dependence – Not Sovereignty

The budgets of both the PA and Hamas are based mainly on external aid – from the European Union, Arab states, and sometimes also private organizations. There is no effective taxation, independent central bank, or orderly economic policy. With most of the public budget reliant on contributions, in the absence of aid both entities would collapse.

A state that is established in such a condition will be a completely dependent entity – not an independent, sovereign one.

Even if we assume the existence of governmental structures, the content of the institutions themselves is deeply defective. The legal system is not independent but subject to political pressures and to the security forces; the government institutions suffer from corruption, bloated bureaucracy, political appointments, and lack of transparency; the education system does not aim for reconciliation but promotes conflict and an ultranationalist narrative; the media and the religious establishment do not serve the public but, rather, the ruling parties.

The PA in the West Bank, and even more so in Gaza, relies almost completely on Israel for basic infrastructural needs: water, electricity, and fuel. In the West Bank, Israel provides about 40 percent of the water consumption and almost all the electricity. In Gaza, about 50 percent of the electricity and 10 percent of the water come from Israel – even though, for the most part, the local water is not fit to drink.

Thus, the gap between the discourse on sovereignty and the total lack of basic infrastructural independence stands in sharp relief. In such a situation, even if a state is recognized, it will not function as a state. It will be both a terror state and an institutionally failed state that will soon become a plaything of external or internal forces.

In Lieu of Declaring a State – a Plan for Building a Society

If Europe really wants to help build a Palestinian state, it must recognize that at this time, a unilateral declaration will not promote but, rather, thwart a solution. The current situation provides no basis for a sovereign state, and any hasty recognition will only exacerbate the chaos. Instead, Europe – purportedly the party that will lead the effort – must, in cooperation with the United States and the moderate Arab states, create the conditions on the ground for the gradual building of state infrastructure.

The lesson from Lebanon is clear: a state cannot rise as long as armed terror organizations operate alongside it. Therefore, a fundamental requirement is the total disarmament of all the Palestinian organizations – both in Gaza and the West Bank.

This measure, which will likely require a role for a dedicated international-local force, must be implemented under close supervision, in coordination with Israel, and within an agreed framework for sovereign demilitarization.

Accordingly, in keeping with a security plan to be agreed beforehand, confirmed by Israel and the regional framework, weapons must remain only in the hands of municipal actors whose task is to preserve civic order. Any other process – in the absence of demilitarization and actors responsible for security – will turn the European declarations into a dead letter.

Another requirement concerns people. For two decades, it has been impossible for a new Palestinian leadership to grow. A whole generation of professionals, academics, entrepreneurs, and educators has been excluded from the political framework. An ossified government and a corrupt structure have blocked any dynamic of renewal.

The true leadership, however, will not grow from the offices of the PA but from a deep civilian stratum: professionals, entrepreneurs, academics, young people, and women who espouse a pragmatic and feasible worldview. Such a leadership will not deal initially with the conflict with Israel, but with the internal building of a civil society, a stable labor market, and education, media, and health services.

Future coexistence will not emerge from declarations but from practice: technological, occupational, and environmental collaborations. There already are such initiatives, but they remain marginal and restricted to the civic sphere because of the restrictive political framework. The potential is much greater.

That potential could be advanced by working for infrastructural and economic independence. One of the main defects of the existing Palestinian structure is the almost total dependence on Israel for water, electricity, fuel, and basic infrastructure. For real – not just symbolic – sovereignty to develop, gradual infrastructural independence must be built, European investments should be conditioned on regulation, coordination, and oversight with Israel, including the development of water sources, power stations, and expanded domestic production in both the West Bank and Gaza.

Europe can – and must – fund and help guide such a process, and condition aid on its emergence. The aim should not be to disconnect from Israel, but to develop a real capacity for economic-administrative independence.

In the practical sphere, sound government and a local economy are essential. At present, there are no Palestinian institutions capable of functioning on a sovereign level. There is no effective budgetary oversight, no economic independence, no professional administration. The rehabilitation must begin from below – not in the central authority but at the municipal level. Municipalities, local councils, economic zones – all can become laboratories of good governance, responsible management, and local development.

Last but not least is the sphere of awareness. As long as the Palestinian educational, religious, and media systems propagate a discourse of hate, supremacy, and victimhood, no civic awareness can develop. The schools must undergo a deep reform: in contents, in values, and in instruction. The mosques must be under supervision. The media must be open to new voices.

A society cannot be built when its language is one of perpetual conflict. Only if a systemic change occurs in the public discourse can a future political transformation be contemplated

As noted, no process can succeed without the ongoing support of the moderate Arab states. Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates can provide an accompanying framework that includes political backing, economic guidance, and strategic connections to the Arab world.

European involvement will be needed not only to counteract pressures and guarantee disarmament, but also to confer legitimacy on the new, emergent leadership.

Only after all that is achieved will it be the right time to begin thinking about a political settlement. Not at the beginning – but after a moral, administrative, and public infrastructure has been created that can sustain itself.

The possibilities include: sovereign autonomy under supervision, a regional federation, or a form of confederation. What is important is that decisions are not reached to allay political pressure, but as part of genuine readiness for change, opposition to terror, demilitarization, and a desire for peaceful, good-neighborly relations.

Europe: The Blindness Starts from Within

The latest declarations by European governments about recognizing a Palestinian state are not the result of a diplomatic breakthrough, but a political response to growing domestic political pressure. The problem is that this pressure – which stems from Muslim communities, the street, campuses, and the Internet – does not demand a rational solution but an emotional gesture. And Europe, time after time, gives in to it.

Yet Europe, at present, suffers not only from a misconceived foreign policy but also from severe domestic blindness. Instead of contending courageously with a process of domestic radicalization – sealed-off neighborhoods, radical mosques, antisemitism under a guise of moral causes, the rise of pro-Hamas parties – Europe chooses to export the problem. And it does so with proclamations like “a Palestinian state now” – which may sound nice but reflect a loss of domestic control.

This is no longer just a question for Israel or the Palestinians. It is a European question: Can liberal democracy survive when it gives up on understanding reality, on political morality, on setting clear boundaries?

If Europe wants to contribute to a solution, it must begin by strengthening the moderate forces, both among the Palestinians and within Europe itself. It must not submit to a discourse of force, but regain a discourse of responsibility.