Vol. 6, No. 15 December 8, 2006
- Israel should not try to second-guess U.S. decisions about putting American soldiers in harm’s way. However, the specific strategy that the Baker-Hamilton report proposes for facilitating an American pullback in Iraq – the use of an international support group including Iran and Syria – poses serious problems that affect vital Israeli interests.
- Baker confirmed on December 6, 2006, that the Iraq Study Group derived some of its inspiration from the “six-plus-two” talks on the future of Afghanistan at the UN. But in Afghanistan, back in the 1990s, Iran sought to contain a radical Sunni regime under the Taliban. In 2006, in contrast, Iran seeks to dominate Iraq through its Shiite majority. The two situations are entirely different.
- Obtaining a constructive approach from Iran and Syria would involve a 180-degree shift in their policies. Clearly the authors of the report have no awareness of the ideological commitment of the Iranian regime to export its revolution to Shiite communities throughout the Middle East as it seeks to achieve regional hegemony.
- Should the Bush administration adopt this approach from the Iraq Study Group, it would not be seeking a radical shift in Iranian and Syrian policies from a position of strength. From the perspective of Teheran and Damascus, the U.S. would be seeking their help after they had succeeded in defeating coalition forces. As a result, the price for their cooperation would be exorbitant.
- The Iraq Study Group suggests that “the Israelis should return the Golan Heights.” There is no negotiation over the withdrawal as in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It appears that the Golan Heights are being used as an inducement to obtain cooperative Syrian behavior on Iraq. On the Palestinian track, the Baker-Hamilton report does not call for talks over “refugees,” but rather over “the right of return,” adopting Palestinian legal nomenclature and undermining Israel’s legal position.
The Iraq Study Group (ISG) which was chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and former House member Lee H. Hamilton, argues in its newly-released report that there is a growing dissatisfaction in the American public with the continuing U.S. military presence in Iraq, and therefore it seeks to outline an exit strategy for U.S. forces. One Saudi advisor writing in the Washington Post on November 29, 2006, already warned, in anticipation of the report, that a U.S. withdrawal could lead to ethnic cleansing of Iraq’s Sunni Muslim minority by Iraqi Shiites, backed by Iran.
While a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will have enormous implications for the security of the Middle East as a whole, Israel and other American regional partners should not try to second-guess this decision when it involves questions about whether the U.S. should put its soldiers in harm’s way. However, the specific strategy that the Baker-Hamilton report proposes for facilitating an American pullback – the use of an international support group including Iran and Syria – poses serious problems that affect vital Israeli interests.
Iran and Syria: Supporters of Regional Stability?
The underlying assumption of the Iraq Study Group is that it is possible to replicate the experience of the 1990s, when Iranian representatives sat with diplomats from the U.S., Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan to discuss the stabilization of that county in what was called the “six-plus-two” talks. Indeed, Baker confirmed on December 6, 2006, that the ISG derived some of its inspiration from the “six-plus-two” talks on the future of Afghanistan at the United Nations. By analogy, the ISG hopes that a similar multilateral group can end the chaos in Iraq. However, the “six-plus-two” talks failed to stop the conversion of Afghanistan into a sanctuary for al-Qaeda.
More importantly, given the fact that both Iran and Syria have played leading roles in de-stabilizing Iraq and resupplying the various Shiite and Sunni insurgency groups, obtaining a constructive approach from these countries would involve a 180-degree shift in their policies. Clearly the authors of the report have no awareness of the ideological commitment of the Iranian regime to export its revolution to Shiite communities throughout the Middle East as it seeks to achieve regional hegemony. This has been accentuated with the rise to power of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s president in 2005. In Afghanistan, back in the 1990s, Iran sought to contain a radical Sunni regime under the Taliban. In 2006, in contrast, Iran seeks to dominate Iraq through its Shiite majority. The two situations are entirely different.
Moreover, should the Bush administration adopt this approach from the Iraq Study Group, it would not be seeking a radical shift in Iranian and Syrian policies from a position of strength. The report characterizes the situation in Iraq as “grave and deteriorating.” It asserts that there is no domestic consensus any longer on the war with mounting U.S. casualties. From the perspective of Teheran and Damascus, the U.S. would be seeking their help after they had succeeded in defeating coalition forces. As a result, the price for their cooperation would be exorbitant.
The Price of Iranian and Syrian Cooperation
The paramount Iranian interest in such a dialogue over Iraq would be the continuation of the Iranian nuclear program: it could be expected that Teheran would seek a quid pro quo, exchanging its cooperation on Iraq for Western acquiescence to its nuclear program. Syria would follow a similar course, seeking to protect its most vital interests in exchange for being helpful on Iraq: this might include halting the UN investigation into the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri or the reassertion of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon.
Because this constitutes a high price even for the Iraq Study Group, it suggests that “the Israelis should return the Golan Heights.” There is no negotiation over the withdrawal as in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It appears that the Golan Heights are being used by the Iraq Study Group as an inducement to obtain cooperative Syrian behavior on Iraq.
It is particularly disturbing that the ISG does not call for the complete dismantling of international terrorist organizations in Syria as a precondition for the Israeli-Syrian agreement it foresees. Syria is supposed “to use its influence with Hamas and Hizballah” to obtain the release of Israeli soldiers. There is supposed to be a cessation of arms shipments to Hamas, Hizballah, and other groups. But their offices and training camps remain open. This situation would still constitute a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 which legally prohibits states from harboring international terrorist organizations. Adoption of these policies by the Bush administration would seriously compromise the war on terrorism that the U.S. declared after 9/11.
On the Palestinian track, the Baker-Hamilton report makes detailed suggestions that include support for a “Palestinian national unity government.” The suggestion is tantamount to acquiescence to the Hamas role in the Palestinian political system. It is extremely disturbing that when the report lists the subjects for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over final status, it does not call for talks over “refugees,” but rather over “the right of return” (p. 58), adopting Palestinian legal nomenclature and undermining Israel’s legal position. At least, unlike in the Syrian case, the report calls for future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over borders, and does not presume to suggest a predefined border ahead of time.
The report’s contention that “the United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict” seeks to make this issue the main root cause for regional instability. This has been proven in the past as a patently false assertion and remains so today. What do al-Qaeda attacks on Shiites in Iraq have to do with Israel? What does Israel have to do with Sudan’s policy of genocide against black tribes in Darfur? Unfortunately, such thinking is likely to divert attention away from the real sources of instability in the Middle East – like revolutionary Iran – and blame Israel instead.
Clearly, the Iraq Study Group expresses a strong American desire to come up with an alternative strategy on Iraq that allows for graduated U.S. disengagement. Should the U.S. withdraw from Iraq, that will be its own decision. But at least the Bush administration should not adopt a line of policy that will leave its regional allies weaker and their adversaries emboldened, as it brings to a close a difficult period of its military involvement in the Middle East.
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Note: A pdf version of the Iraq Study Group report is available at: http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html
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Dore Gold is the President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, and served as Israel’s ambassador to the UN from 1997 to 1999. He is the author of Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Regnery, 2003); Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos (Crown Forum, 2004); and The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City (Regnery, January 2007).
