

of Dutch Jews in Israel, Stichting Platform Israel (SPI), pushed harder and even decided to bring the WJC into the negotiations with the banks. Gerstenfeld correctly points out that, for the CJO, it was also important that after the conclusion of the restitution process, Dutch Jewry should remain on good terms with the government and society—whereas for others, living in Israel or the United States, this was just a single, separate case.

As the title indicates, the author interprets the renewed Holocaust restitution process as a means of judging the Netherlands. If the bare facts are taken together, including the failure and shortcomings of postwar restitution policies, one must agree with Gerstenfeld that the verdict is painful for the Dutch government. Another historical issue is why the policies in the 1940s and 1950s were as they were. But that, to be sure, is a topic for another book.¹ Gerstenfeld has provided a clear and insightful analysis of the most recent Dutch restitution debates. The many citations from the interviews he conducted, moreover, make *Judging the Netherlands* not only analytically astute but also a good read for scholars and all those who are interested in restitution policies.

NOTE

1. Editor's note: For the background history of the immediate postwar era in the Netherlands, see J. S. Fishman, "The Reconstruction of the Dutch Jewish Community and Its Implications for the Writing of Contemporary Jewish History," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 45 (1978): 67–101.

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ISRAEL AND EASTERN EUROPE:
FROM DISRUPTION TO RESUMPTION

Relations with the East European States: From Disruption 1967 to Resumption 1989–91, by Yosef Govrin, London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2011, 322 pp.

Reviewed by WOLFGANG G. SCHWANITZ

What a day in history it was, that Saturday, June 10, 1967. It was a frightful scene, as if the mob would at any moment break into the courtyard and the embassy itself. It lasted for hours, writes Yosef Govrin, as the outraged Soviets departed. In

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the last five days Israel had defeated the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, seizing large Arab territories. As Govrin, first secretary of the Israeli embassy, rushed through the streets of Moscow, thousands shouted: "Down with Israel!" It seemed to him, who had told this story in his 1998 book on Soviet-Israeli relations,¹ as if the Soviet giant had declared war on tiny Israel. But the Kremlin had "only" severed ties with the Jewish state. The Israelis lowered their flag singing "Hatikva," their national anthem. All the Israelis at East European missions, except Romania, did the same.

Yosef Govrin was then posted to South America. From 1976 to 1985, he served as director of the Eastern European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For four years he was ambassador to Romania. About two decades after the breakup of 1967, he participated in the restoration of ties with Eastern Europe. Excepting the political changes in Albania, there emerged fifteen new republics from the territory of the former Soviet Union. One country vanished: the German Democratic Republic, the GDR. It was not quite German but Soviet-dominated, and not a republic either but a Kremlin-style dictatorship. Before the German unification in 1990, Govrin negotiated with the East Germans. In 2010, he wrote this book asking if his talks about possible diplomatic ties with them had been only a passing episode.

SOME BACKGROUND TO THE BIG BREAKUP

Govrin deals with the nearly forgotten past. Who remembers the Soviet hold on those East European lands and its influence on the radicals in the Middle East? In the second half of the Cold War, the East European states, writes Govrin, adopted the Soviet formula, demanding: (1) Israel's withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967, (2) the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people, including their right to establish their own independent state, and (3) security guarantees by the UN Security Council for the states of the region. Israel rejected this, claiming that two members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union and China, had no diplomatic ties with the Jewish state, and that it did not regard the PLO as a partner for talks as long as it remained committed to the Palestinian Charter which denied Israel's right to exist. To this day, the Palestinian Authority and its member groups have resolutely retained this document with its offending clauses.

Then the American president Ronald Reagan and his Soviet counterpart, Michael S. Gorbachev, changed the equation. The Russian used an idea of his predecessor, Brezhnev. To counter the U.S. "bilateral" approach which it employed during the Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel, on February 23, 1981, Leonid I. Brezhnev adopted a multilateral path to settle Arab-Israeli conflicts.

Israel rejected it because it could be outmaneuvered by Arab majorities. The forum would boost the detrimental Soviet influence. But on October 30, 1991, Gorbachev at the UN Madrid Peace Conference favored a new joint American-Soviet approach as an opportunity for possible bilateral Arab-Israeli deals.

This was the framework in which East Europeans broke off and later resumed their ties with Israel. During the decades which followed the big breakup on Saturday, June 10, 1967, most of these states abandoned Communist doctrine and voted for democracy, laying the foundation for normal ties. When the Six Day War broke out on Monday, the reviewer was in school as a sixth grader near the pyramids. After 9 a.m. all hell broke loose in Cairo. On the streets men screamed as in Moscow: "Down with Israel!"

That week, Israel defeated Arab armies stopping on Saturday, day six of its preemptive war. President Abd an-Nasir (Nasser) had stepped down, and protesters demanded his return. Backing him up, the Soviet Union, followed four days later by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia severed ties with Israel. Although the GDR's head, Walter Ulbricht, maintained no such ties, he acted as a driving force. He also fulfilled Arab wishes and hoped to deflect a West German threat in the form of the Hallstein Doctrine, which stated that Bonn would punish all countries that established ties with the GDR, by means of a large-scale, coordinated Arab recognition of the GDR which would make the threat of a boycott useless, since Bonn would not act against a whole group of states.

Govrin, in seven chapters, surveys the path from the breakup in 1967 to the resumption of ties in 1991. Five of these are devoted to the countries that broke ties, one each to Albania and the GDR. Since he has aptly enlightened us, I shall add East German and Arab background with regard to the broader European and Middle Eastern situation. Govrin shows that potential ties between East Berlin and West Jerusalem loomed during the brief period of 1989 to 1990. Before this, he notes, Israel refrained from diplomatic ties with the GDR because, in contrast to Bonn, it rejected its moral and material obligation to the victims of the Holocaust. He also notes correctly that the GDR's hostile attitude toward the Jewish state was the most pronounced of the Soviet bloc. He stresses that East Germans refused to recognize outright Israel's right to exist (96). But their approach was much more sophisticated and harmful because they claimed: "Israel yes, Zionism no."²

The same applies to Govrin's argument that "no East German leader ever denounced the Nazis' crimes against the Jews as people" (94). Since I lived "on the other side" of the Berlin Wall and know their doctrine, I would say that of course they did. But the East Germans had to hide some dark secrets. One of these was Stalin's order which turned German Communists like Walter Ulbricht against the Social Democrats, calling them "Social Fascists." In 1933, this policy helped Adolf

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Hitler gain power. Later, Ulbricht even supported the Non-Aggression Pact between Hitler and Stalin of mid-1939. Its secret protocol not only divided Poland between the two dictators. They even agreed that, if Jews were to flee to the Soviet side, they would be returned to the Nazis—and they were, as Govrin documented in his previous book.³

GERMAN RESTITUTION, ISRAEL, AND PALESTINIANS

After the war, Ulbricht's group of faithful hard-line Communists gained power only by the force of Stalin's occupation army. They would have stood no chance in fair elections. As co-enablers of Hitler's rise, they shared responsibility for the fate of the Jews. Concealing the parallels between the left and right dictatorships in Europe, they did not call the Third Reich "National Socialism" but Fascism. Using the word socialism would have come too close to their Soviet model. By using the definition "Fascism for class warriors," they also eliminated the racist aspects of Hitler's double atrocity against the "Judeo-Communist empire": racialist and ideological. After 1945, these Communists or socialists portrayed themselves as the "left victims" of Nazis who had "nothing to make up" to the Jewish victims. Their ideological argument against restitution was as follows: "Why should we empower capitalists in the aggressive state of Israel that didn't exist when the genocide took place?" So this rationalization of "red class warfare" permitted them to evade the most basic questions of decency and humanity.

Thus, Ulbricht refused Israel's *aide mémoire* of August 3, 1955,⁴ requesting payment of one-third of the restitution monies for Jewish lives and properties lost in the territory that in 1949 became the GDR. Bonn had agreed to two-thirds of \$1.5 billion in the Luxembourg treaty of September 10, 1955, which was paid in products or transfers to persons. When, on July 9, 1956, Israel demanded \$412.5 million from the GDR, Ulbricht rejected the restitution for the state of Israel. But he could not deny the Nazi murder of Jews, that also German survivors lived in Israel, and that there were many Jewish properties left in East Germany. His ideology evaded the responsibility for Nazi racism.

Ulbricht ignored Israel for reasons of ideology and foreign expediency. Nonetheless, East Germans showcased the Jewish genocide. All of the youth visited the concentration camps. The radical left saw the Jewish question as a social but not a national issue. So, in their view of class warriors, Israel was no solution. Instead, the "Palestinian cause" became Ulbricht's ticket for rejecting Israel and scoring points with the Arabs. Fighting against West Germany, he sided with Arab states and Palestinian Arabs. To him, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a promising unifier of Arabs which would open the path to gain their recognition. While West Germans accepted their responsibility toward Jews according to the terms of the

1952 Reparations Agreement, Ulbricht's group denied it, hid the sins of the radical leftist past, and turned against Israel in the rivalry of the divided Germanies. At first he welcomed a Jewish state, but when Stalin turned against it in 1953, predictably he followed suit.

Israel became a robust democracy, and in 1952 rejected a West German offer for full diplomatic ties.⁵ In the following year, divided German representatives presented themselves in the capitals of the Middle East. Among these were the West German ambassador to Cairo, Günther Pawelke, and the East German consul, Kurt Enkelmann. The door was now open for Ulbricht's "nation game," a method of blackmailing Bonn and West Jerusalem on Jewish and Palestinian questions, a tactic that the Arabs discovered early on. Whenever Bonn did something to Israel's benefit, the Arabs turned to East Berlin. Working with the Jewish genocide and the German Nazi past, this turned out to be a delicate matter in the Middle East and divided East European and West German politics. This became evident during the Eichmann trial in 1961, which had implications for foreign policy of both German and Arab countries. Al-Hajj Amin al-Husaini, ex-grand mufti of Jerusalem, and Nazis in Israel's neighboring states were main factors as were the ex-Nazis around Konrad Adenauer's state secretary, Hans Globke, and spy-master, Reinhard Gehlen.

KEY POINTS BEFORE 1967

When Ulbricht made his 1965 visit to Abd an-Nasir in Cairo, he also initiated official ties with Ahmad ash-Shuqairi's PLO and publicly criticized arms deals between West Germany and Israel. Bonn punished Cairo for this visit by withdrawing aid and recognizing the state of Israel. Then, ten of the thirteen Arab countries sided with Abd an-Nasir and broke their ties with Bonn as well. For about seven years the East Germans became the only German diplomats in Arab countries, while West Germans focused on their ties with Israel. The radicals, the East German leftists, Arab nationalists, and Islamists gladly filled the vacuum with a string of plots and hostilities against the Jewish state.

On February 23, 1966, a Syrian *coup d'état* brought Baath radicals to power such as Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad. Nur ad-Din al-Atasi became president (his clan was close to Amin al-Husaini), Yusuf Zuawin prime minister, and Ibrahim Makhus foreign minister. Initiated and led by al-Husaini in the Arab League, the Syrians headed an Arab delegation to Bonn protesting in vain against restitution for Israel, which they set out in an *aide mémoire*. In early 1967, Makhus suggested to Ulbricht's envoy in Damascus, Horst Grunert, a new policy line toward Israel: East Berlin should take the lead among East European states in breaking their ties with the Jewish state and promoting "the Arab fight to liberate Palestine."

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Consul General Grunert reported on February 22 that this meant getting the East European states to break their relations with Israel and support the current Syrian line of liquidating the Jewish state by force. This, stressed Makhus, would lead to fulfillment of all the goals of the GDR (full diplomatic ties with Arabs) in this region.⁶

Deputy Foreign Minister Günter Kohrt sent Grunert's report to Ulbricht with his commentary that the GDR could not accept the Makhus proposal. "Israel's existence is a fact which cannot be eradicated militarily or otherwise. It is a UN member, recognized by more than 80 states...." The advice to East Europeans "to break their ties with Israel would be unrealistic and likely wouldn't lead to positive results...." Eventually, he concluded, recommending to them a slow freeze of their relations with Israel would not be adhered to "for they are already down to a minimum with respect to the Arab countries." Instead, he suggested bilaterally consulting East Europeans on how to exploit the recent Syrian suggestion, to coordinate their position toward Israel, and to organize a campaign of solidarity for the Palestinian refugees by offering them medical aid, nutrition, and training facilities.

Ulbricht set three goals: to be the vanguard against Israel among the East Europeans, to get them to freeze their ties with Israel, and to coordinate among the East Europeans. Indeed, he adopted Syria's proposition to end all East European ties with Israel as "key of East Berlin's goals." He circulated the text to the top brass of his ruling party. Damascus launched negotiations for full diplomatic ties with East Berlin. Now Ulbricht was ready to seal the deal by visiting Syria. On June 9, 1967, he ordered arms deliveries to radical Arab states. He also sent Foreign Minister Otto Winzer on a tour of five of such states. On May 22, 1967, the minister stated that his Algerian counterpart, Abd al-Aziz Butafliga, had again demanded that East Berlin take the lead among the East Europeans to press for a rupture of their ties with Israel; East Berlin should have done it two years ago when Bonn established ties with Israel. Thus, we may observe here a coordinated effort on the Arab side. Two weeks later though, on June 5, 1967, Israel, which was subjected to an Egyptian act of war—the closing of the Straits of Tiran—and confronted with Egyptian forces massing in Sinai, undertook the preemptive strike that opened the Six Day War.⁷

ULBRICHT'S INITIATIVE AND THE GDR'S REWARD

On June 9, 1967, Ulbricht met in Moscow with Soviet and other East European officials. His handwritten notes of the talks that day contain the following phrases: "surprise war by Israel like 1956," "its intelligence apparatus," "Sixth U.S. Fleet," "UN division of Palestine, 11/29/1947," "Gulf of Aqaba," "Abd an-

Nasir's rejection of UN troops," "readiness to negotiate with America." The last phrase should have alerted everyone in the Kremlin, because this "readiness to negotiate with America" came up later when Anwar as-Sadat achieved power. As we can prove, this potential alternative Arab approach was already a point in the discussions among the East Europeans in mid-1967. Then Ulbricht noted some questions: how could such an aggression have occurred? What should happen to Israel? We read among his conclusions: "global strategy of imperialism," "consultations," "coordination of joint solidarity plan for Egypt and Syria," "permanent committee," "changes," "the protection against air raids."⁸

Obviously, the advice of Foreign Ministers Makhus of Syria and Butafliqa of Algeria suited Ulbricht's policy of taking the lead in having the East European states break their diplomatic ties with Israel and then coordinating joint anti-Israeli and pro-Arab actions after the war. He was rewarded, though, not by the Syrians but by the Iraqis. The Iraqi leader Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr heard about the ongoing talks between Syria and the GDR on diplomatic ties. In the usual rivalry between the two Baath factions, al-Bakr, and in his tow Saddam Husain, rushed ahead and proclaimed on Radio Baghdad, on May 1, 1969, the opening of full diplomatic ties with East Berlin.⁹

This was the breakthrough to which Ulbricht had devoted so many years and jettisoned his responsibility toward Jews and Israel. Sudan, Syria, South Yemen, and Egypt followed suit. Thus, Bonn's Hallstein Doctrine fell, and the German question in Europe changed for the worse, making it now acceptable for most other countries to recognize the dictatorial regimes of the Soviet type. Because a group of Arab states had established full ties with East Berlin, there now was no point for Bonn to attempt to prevent this any longer, and there followed the recognition of a leftist regime not based on commonly shared values but on a radical ideology, backed by the Soviet occupation forces. Suddenly, the GDR gained international recognition. This also transformed the German question in Europe, postponing any thought of unification and resulting instead in a long period of inter-German coexistence.

ARMING PALESTINIANS, DENOUNCING ZIONISM

Indeed Baghdad's recognition was a great reward for the East Germans. As did the Syrians, the Iraqis forwarded a political and economic wish list. Point one contained a request "for more powerful support of the Iraqi position in the East German media against Zionism and the illegal Zionist existence on Palestinian territory [liquidation of Israel]." Point two demanded arms deliveries to the Palestinians. That East Berlin would not recognize Israel was included in point three, and point four included "free gifts" (a code for invitations or vacations and round trips in East Germany).

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Since the wish list explicitly asked to arm Palestinian groups,¹⁰ and Moscow favored a new line toward the PLO after Yasir Arafat's takeover,¹¹ East Berlin sent arms to the Syrian Palestinian faction as-Sa'iqa ("hit force," "shock troop," or "strike guard," named by al-Hajj Amin al-Husaini with an eye to Heinrich Himmler's SS commandos).¹² In 1970, East Berlin sent for 5,000 as-Sa'iqa fighters, 3,000 AK-47 rifles, 560 light machineguns (MG 34), 2,000 bolt-action carbines (Mauser 98), 10,000 hand grenades, 260 binoculars, and ammunition (at a value of 4.4 million marks). Two decades later, the Pentagon still listed as-Sa'iqa as a Middle Eastern terror group closely allied with Syria's Baath party.¹³

East Berlin also pushed hard to denounce Zionism. The infamous Soviet campaign, often in the official party newspaper *Pravda*, claimed that "Zionism is a world evil," "Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan are allied with the henchmen of Maidanek, Auschwitz, other death camps, and neo-Nazis" (accusing the ex-Nazi Party members in the West German government), and that "Zionists of the Third Jewish Empire should erect a memorial for Hitler, for they took over from him the idea of a Jewish Race." The Soviets made booklets of such propaganda and disseminated them in many languages.

This led to the 1975 UN Resolution 3379 in which "Zionism is a form of racism," repealed in 1991 by 111 against 25 states with 13 abstentions. Returning to Govrin's central point, it is self-evident that the resumption of Israel's relations with East European countries was a most important step toward ending such incitement, though it lingers on. Many East Germans took their opportunity to become properly informed. At the same time, while Govrin was involved in three rounds of negotiations on Israeli-East German ties, East German academics founded a Friendship Society.¹⁴ Already in 1985, others began to study Modern Hebrew at Humboldt University of Berlin with such teachers as Heinrich Simon, Rahel Stillmann, and Angelika Timm.

CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately, no diplomatic ties between Israel and the GDR were formed, but this problem was resolved when West Germany, which had already established relations with Israel, absorbed East Germany. Govrin has uncovered key chapters of this comparative history. From his book and the background presented here on the evolution of the East Bloc policy, we may conclude:

- a) Half a year before the war of June 1967, the East Germans had decided to work for a large-scale East European rupture of relations with Israel. The Syrian and Algerian proposal on how to "solve the German and Palestinian question" envisaged a deal by which they would recognize the leftist

East German regime and it would become the East European vanguard in arming the Palestinians for the destruction of Israel. The reward: full diplomatic recognition of the East German regime at once by a group of radical Arab states.

- b) In the Kremlin's new 1969 pro-PLO line, the most disputed point was that Yasir Arafat insisted on Israel's destruction while the Soviets opposed it. Nevertheless, they (and the East Europeans) began providing him weapons. East Berlin's claim, "Israel yes, Zionism no," was not true either because the GDR clandestinely did much to arm Israel's foes and to undermine the state's very existence.
- c) There was a specific and long-lasting leftist ideology and party line set in place from Stalin to Ulbricht which prevented them from recognizing the realities (as in Islamism today). This ideology favored the coordinated UN campaign against Zionism. (This is similar to the current campaign that aims at delegitimizing the state in the Durban process sponsored by UNESCO since mid-2001: its draft resolution singled out Israel for criticism and likened Zionism to racism. Canada, the United States, and Israel walked out. The European Union also rejected demands by Arab states to criticize Israel for "racist practices.")
- d) The Arab victory in breaking relations with Israel and gaining the recognition of East Germany was a Pyrrhic victory (like the present attempt of the Palestinian Authority to attain a state by means of a UN vote rather than by direct negotiations with Israel). But this concerted action between Arab and East European states generated a vacuum for the democratic powers. West German representatives vanished from the region for about seven years while the GDR had a strong presence. We can compare the situation with the weak American position of today and ask who will now fill this gap of democratic leadership and influence? The Russians, Chinese, Iranians, and other Islamists are trying hard and have already had a measure of success (just look at Syria).
- e) Govrin makes us see that only *after* the East Europeans returned to a more realistic worldview did the resumption of ties with Israel become possible, and that there were already moderate people at work on the other side. They, and among them of course moderate Islamists, will become especially important in the present situation as well.
- f) With regard to a more realistic worldview, we are currently witnessing just the opposite as a consequence of a regionally triumphant Islamism. This means that the carriers of an unrealistic approach seem to be achieving power on a large scale. If this is the case, we can expect a long phase of difficulties and conflicts ahead as was the case for two decades after the East

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Europeans' big breakup with Israel. Progress can only be achieved when other sides or potential partners abandon their unrealistic ideology.

As Govrin demonstrated, a process of deradicalization took place in Eastern Europe which was the precondition for normalization with Israel. From 1965 to 1967, the opposite process had taken place, resulting in a democratic retreat. During the 1950s, the advancing Soviets prepared a new regional strategy against Israel and the "Main Enemy," America. During the 1960s, under Soviet and East German leadership, some radical Arab states allied with East European states, intensifying the Cold War in the Middle Eastern arena and creating the conditions for real wars which prevailed in the region during the second half of the Cold War. After the East European peoples dismantled that leftist ideology from within, the Berlin Wall and other walls fell. Thus, the wave of democratization in Eastern Europe swept away a major obstacle which had prevented the rebuilding of diplomatic ties with Israel. One might ask if, sometime, a similar process could take place in the Islamic regions. The ideology of Islamism is derived from a world religion, from which it should be separated. This development, which hopefully would displace the radical Islamist current by liberal Muslims and others, might include the initiation of a process of de-jihadization and the building of peaceful and positive relations in the region.

NOTES

1. Yosef Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953–67: From Confrontation to Disruption* (London: Cass, 1998); Yosef Govrin, *The Six-Day War in the Mirror of Soviet Israeli Relations, April-June 1967* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1985).
2. Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, "Israel ja, Zionismus nein": Zum Israel-Bild in SED-Akten über Arabien (1948 bis 1968), " in Mario Keßler, ed., *Arbeiterbewegung und Antisemitismus: Entwicklungslinien im 20. Jahrhundert* (Bonn: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1993), 129–164, documents 156–164.
3. See Soviet refusal to accept Jewish refugees who fled from Polish territory occupied by Germany, Memorandum, Berlin, December 5, 1939, and Krakov, December 20, 1939, in Yosef Govrin, *The Jewish Factor in the Relations between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union 1933–1941* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2009), Appendices 13 and 14, 132–133; see also my review thereof in *Jewish Political Studies Review* 22:3–4 (Fall 2010): 111–116.
4. Political Archive of the Foreign Office, Berlin, PArchAA, Bestand MfAA, A13308, Overview on The GDR's Position Toward Israel, East Berlin 1960, 4–5; all via Moscow Embassy, Israel's aide mémoire 08/03/1955, GDR's Reply 12/28/1955, Israel's Reply 04/20/1956, GDR's Reply 07/09/1956.
5. Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, "Adenauers Botschafter in Kairo. Die geheime Friedensvermittlung Ägypten–Israel 1953," in *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* 10 (2003): 151–172; see also related documents online in my overview: "Adenauer in New York, Pawelke in Kairo. Neues zu

- geheimen Friedensführern Ägypten–Israel 1953, I, II,” Webversion 7–2011: http://www.trafoberlin.de/pdf-dateien/2011_08_12/Wolfgang%20G%20Schwanitz%20Adenauer%20in%20New%20York,%20Pawelke%20in%20Kairo.pdf.
6. For the 1952 Syrian *aide mémoire* against West German restitution payments to Israel, see document 4, endnote 2, 161–164; for the 1967 document, Kohrt about Makhus and Grunert to Ulbricht, February 1967, see endnote 2, document 1, 156–158.
 7. Federal Archive Berlin, BArchBe, SAPMO, NL182, 1337, B79–92, Travel Report Winzer, five Arab states, 03.-19.05.1967, speech by Algerian foreign minister Abd al-Aziz Butafliga, East Berlin 22.05.1967, signed Winzer.
 8. Ibid., NL182, 1759g, Walter Ulbricht’s Handwriting, Moscow, 09.06.1967, p. 3.
 9. Author’s audio interview with Hans-Jürgen Weitz (1923–1997), first East German ambassador to the Middle East, Berlin, 22.02.1993.
 10. BArchBe, SAPMO, NL182, 13333, Expectations and Demands of the Iraqi Government in Light of the Normalization of Relations with the GDR, Baghdad, April 1969, Iraqi Wish List with 4 Points.
 11. BArchBe, SAPMO, NL182/1333, For Ulbricht, Stoph, Honecker, Axen [Circular Note, SED Polit Bureau], New line for the Palestinian Resistance on Ambassador’s Conference in Moscow 08/19/1969: Inviting, Equipping, Using and Arming of Palestinian Organization Leaders for Joint Action, Moderating of Radicals, East Berlin 10/01/69, signed Otto Winzer.
 12. Al-Hajj Amin al-Husaini, *Mudhakkirat al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husaini* [The Memoirs of al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husaini], ed. Abd al-Karim al-Umar (Damascus: Al-Ahali, 1999), 138.
 13. ArchBStU, HAXXII, 18852, Profile terroristischer Gruppen, Berlin, 01.03.1989, 1–87, 54–55. The Pentagon published this watch list under the title “Profiles of Terrorist Groups” on January 10, 1989. It tied as-Sa’iqa under Baathist Syrians Isam al-Qadi and Sami al-Attarito to eight terrorist events, including: an attack on a train with Soviet Jewish emigrants in Austria (1971), a failed operation in Amersfoort (Netherlands) by Abdallah Mustafa Ataya (1975), two bombings of twenty Jewish students in Paris (1979), an attack on Israeli civilians in Tiberias (two dead, 32 injured) (1979), an attack on an Israeli bus near Tulkarm (1985), and an infiltration attempt from the sea in which three terrorists were killed and one captured (1987).
 14. Wolfgang G. Schwanitz: “Gesellschaft DDR-Israel,” *Israel Journal* 5 (1990): 10; *Horizont International* 6 (1990): 19; “Es war einmal ein Klein Mauerretanien,” *Israel Journal* 9 (1990): 33. See also Angelika Timm, *Jewish Claims against East Germany: Moral Obligation and Pragmatic Policy* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1997).

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