RELIGION AND MODERNITY IN OUR DAY

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In this essay a comparison is proposed between the positions of Jewish Orthodoxy in modernistic Western society before and after World War II. It is assumed that the differences arise as a result of major changes in the cultural nature of modernity. The differences are defined, and it is then claimed that they have led to a radical change in the role of all the Jewish modern Orthodox movements. (As a specifically successful example of integration between Orthodoxy and modernity before the war, the changing role of the religious kibbutz movement is particularly examined.) The conclusion is drawn that the modern Orthodox movements can no longer function directly as "bridges" between the religious and the secularistic movements through their former types of synthesis between religiosity and modernity; therefore they seem to lose their position as a unifying factor in Israeli society and much of their influence. Moreover, since Orthodoxy must not pay in our day a visible outward price for its integration in modernity, in terms of faithfulness to the accepted halakhic *norms, and since it must not respond to the spiritual challenges of modernity, it is paying an enormous inner price in terms of spiritual quality and cultural creativity. However, it is believed that the modern Orthodox movements can confront the challenges and regain their former position as "bridges," but only if they will dare to change their strategies and redefine their religious and cultural messages.*

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The concept of modernity embraces the dimension of change, derived from the desirability of innovation as a goal.[1] One, therefore, should not be surprised to find that the idea of change applies, in the final analysis, even to its understanding of itself. There is nothing new in our taking note of this fact: that the concept of modernity has changed substantially over the course of the present generation may be measured by the change which has taken place in the standing of religion since World War II.[2] It is true that the problematic tension between religion and modernity is rooted in the secular dimension of modernity.[3] Nevertheless, the sharpness of this tension stems from the conflict of mentalities between the perception of innovation, in the sense of improvement and progress, as a value in itself, and the conservative traditionalism characteristic of religions generally, and of religions based upon direct historical revelation in particular. Under the criteria of modernity, religion, which stubbornly preserves its contents, its ways of life, and its institutions, is typified as backward and retrogressive, while the stubborn battle it wages to survive without adjusting is typified as "reaction."[4] However, one can easily prove that, during the course of the cultural, social, and political changes which took place following World War II, the attitude toward religion in general, including its most conservative manifestations, likewise changed. Moreover, despite the fact that this change expressed itself, among other things, in the movement of religions from a defensive posture to an aggressive one, it did not originate in any adjustment or compromise on the part of religion, but in a substantial change which has taken place in the nature of secularism — one which has enabled religion to define its status within secular culture on the basis of its own understanding, both of itself and of the nature of secularism.[5]

This phenomenon is a general one, that may be felt in the status of the three great monotheistic religions — Judaism, Christianity and Islam — throughout the entire gamut of cultures whose identities were fashioned by these religions before they became open to the influences of modernity and secularism. After a long period during which it lost its positions of power and spheres of dominance, religion seems to have undergone a certain recovery. Its defensiveness has been transformed into aggressiveness, and it has made rather impressive achievements in terms of influence and power. This is particularly striking in the Islamic countries, in which the processes of secularism and modernization entered as foreign, alien influences. Fundamentalistic Islam is now returning to power in a massive way, while repelling secularization and modernity, which represent alien imperialism.[6] In fact, the recovery of religion may also be felt in the Christian countries, in which the processes of

secularization originated. Even in the former Communist countries, in which there was undertaken the most radical attempt to repress and uproot religion, the phenomenon of return to religion exists.[7] This is even more the case in the democratic and liberal states. The same holds true for Jewish religion, which related to the influence of modernity and secularism from its own unique intermediate cultural position.

Therefore, if one wishes to examine the question of religion and modernity within the Jewish people at the present time, one needs to keep in mind its global background. While we cannot undertake a comparative discussion within the framework of this essay, and will need to focus upon the Jewish people and the State of Israel, we at least ought to emphasize at the outset the following very broad comparative statement: that the Jewish people absorbed modernity and secularism through a tense, intermediate state. They penetrated Jewry as a clearly external influence, carrying with them the serious threat of acculturation, assimilation, and ultimate disappearance. Nevertheless, one is speaking of the influence of a cultural environment within which the Jewish people had lived and participated over the course of many generations. Thus, it internalized the influences of modernity in depth, and contributed more than a little to its development. One may therefore say that, in a number of respects, the external cultural environment which brought about secularization, or at least the problem of the creative relation to it, was an inseparable part of the peculiar structure of the Jewish people's own culture. One is thus dealing with a dual structure, involving intimate tensions between a "general" circle and a particularistic kernel of religious identity. The tension toward the assimilating "outside" was itself an inseparable part of the cultural-historical continuum of this people. For this reason, the phenomenon was so complex, touching upon the cultural and religious roots of the people.[8]

I

The phenomenon of the return of the Orthodox form of religion from the margins, or from the rear guard of "progressive" history, to the center of public life is today quite apparent, constituting a tangible component of the public agenda of our people.[9] This may be seen first and foremost in the ascent of the political weight of Orthodoxy in general, and of ultra-Orthodoxy in particular, within the State of Israel. In everyday life, this is felt first of all in the strengthening of the impositions placed by ultra-Orthodoxy upon

the other religious movements within Jewry, and together with that in the impositions it attempts to place upon the Jewish-national public arena in general. The return of religion to the center of the public stage may be seen, on the one hand, in the recognition of the Orthodox viewpoint as the exclusive, authoritative and authentic embodiment of Jewish religiosity,[10] and, on the other hand, in what the secular public describes as the growth of religious coercion.[11] One is no longer dealing with an agreement stemming from the willingness of the non-religious public to consider the sensitivities of the religious public, and of the willingness of the modern-Orthodox public to meet the secular population "half-way" at the maximum line of compromise in order to preserve the unity of the people. Today, one finds calculated manipulation of political power on the part of religious parties, in order to shape the general Jewish public street in accordance with religious norms and symbols.

Obviously, political power is no more than a function of structural processes: of demography, of the availability of material resources, of the organization of institutions expressing the control of the appropriate tools and expertise in their use; and no less than all these, it is a function of a reorientation in the processes of thought and the norms of social behavior. The facts are well-known and have been thoroughly studied. It is true that, from the demographic viewpoint, the overall proportion of religious Jewry within the Jewish people as a whole has not changed much, and is still clearly a minority. However, there can be no doubt that, first of all, the Orthodox religious population, which was deeply hurt by the Nazi Holocaust, has succeeded in rehabilitating itself in the countries of Western Europe and America and in the State of Israel, and that its numbers in those countries have measurably increased.[12] Second, the proportion of ultra-Orthodox Jewry has risen relative to that of other religious movements within the Jewish people.[13] Third, the phenomenon of abandonment of religion has ceased and reached a situation of stability, raising the prospect of demographic growth as opposed to the anticipated decline in the non-religious or non-Orthodox religious Jewish population, particularly in the diaspora (as the result of a shrinking birth rate and assimilation).[14] We must remember that the religious public found itself in a situation of perpetual decline prior to World War II, shaping the confidence of secular leaders that religion was no more than an anachronistic remnant of an old world, destined to disappear completely within two or three generations.[15] By contrast, no one today deludes himself with such forecasts. Even those who champion radical secularism are well aware that they must make their peace with the existence of religi-

osity in general, and of ultra-Orthodox religiosity in particular, as an ongoing component of their cultural environment.

Together with its demographic stabilization, there was a rise in its economic level. Prior to World War II, the religious public was predominantly poor, particularly in terms of those resources which it was able to marshall for purposes of public activity. Today, it has by and large attained middle class status, and is able to marshall resources for such needs which do not fall short proportionately of those of secular institutions. Thus, the Orthodox religious public has succeeded in solving with growing efficiency the problem of its incorporation within a modern economic system, without needing to sacrifice for this end the values of its Orthodox religious identity. On this basis, it has become more successful in creating the conditions to assure the retention of the majority of its younger generation within the framework of its communities. Moreover, it has likewise succeeded in organizing itself politically in a more efficient manner than in the past, so that its political success in turn strengthens its economic stability.

However, the strengthening of the status of religion also entails another dimension, one which may be described as a reservoir of spiritual power. The religious public seems to have succeeded in developing an immunity against the arguments characteristically launched against religion by secularism, both from the scientific-philosophic direction, and particularly on the ethical and existential planes. On the contrary, there has now emerged the possibility of exploiting the self-criticism of secularism against itself, turning the struggle around from one of religious defense against secular attack to religious attack against a defensive secularism.[16] To summarize all of these changes, the picture that emerges is the following: throughout the period beginning with the Emancipation and the Enlightenment until the mid-twentieth century, the Jewish religion needed to adjust itself to secular modernism, with its cultural baggage and educational methods, world-view and beliefs, and norms and values of social and religious behavior, as a precondition for benefiting from its material and spiritual attainments. The choice was one between radical change in the understanding of religion by internalizing the cultural contents of modernity, and remaining in a situation of backwardness on the fringes of modernity.[17] However, during the period that reached its zenith following World War II, we begin to find Jewish religion in all its streams, including the most extreme ultra-Orthodoxy, within the broad and expanding circle of modernity and the heterogenous syndrome of its culture. Note: every stream in the religious community is able retroactively to enjoy every modern accomplishment in which it is interested. More-

over, it seems to be able to do so, at least from an external viewpoint, without paying any visible religious price. We therefore see that, at least from a superficial point of view, Orthodox religion in the final analysis succeeded in its stubbornness. It did not need to alter any aspect of the principles of its faith, its educational approach, or its norms of behavior, but succeeded in moving toward itself that modern culture that had penetrated into the Jewish people, adopting it to its own demands and expectations in terms of those aspects that were vital from its point of view. This is the case, in any event, in the State of Israel, but the situation appears to be similar as well in the diaspora of the democratic countries, especially in the United States.

What, then, is the source of the change which has occurred in the status of religion? There is a considerable measure of justice in the claim that Orthodox, and especially ultra-Orthodox, stubbornness contributed something to this accomplishment. Since Orthodoxy's struggle was concerned with its own survival as it was, and not with changing the nature of the surrounding culture, it succeeded in making the secular environment obligated towards it. It did this by exploiting the democratic and liberal principles of the secular environment for its own benefit, even though it does not champion these ideas within its own community life.[18] This suggests that we have here a change which stems not from religion but from the values of modern secularism and its developmental dynamic. On the part of modernity, this is caused by the impulse to expand and to attain an all-embracing compass. But this impulse may only be maintained by gradually relinquishing its ideology of uniformity in the political, social, cultural, and religious spheres, and by internalizing a high degree of tolerance and pluralism.[19] In other words, while it is true that secular modernity within the Jewish people came into the world represented by a uniform world-view, it carried within itself the seeds of pluralism.[20] The more successful it was in expanding, in branching out and "swallowing" a broad variety of diverse social and cultural groups, the more it needed to adjust itself to them, allowing them to determine their own place within it for themselves. In the final analysis, it once more accepted a pluralistic and heterogenous definition due to the contradictory elements that it had absorbed within itself, and was influenced by them no less, and perhaps more, than it influenced them.[21] In any event, one may summarize by saying that religious Orthodoxy, including ultra-Orthodoxy, has today become an inseparable part of modern culture, and as such exemplifies the characteristic heterogenous syndrome of the latter. It is clear that, against this background, the problem of the relationship between religiosity and modernity is completely different than it had seemed during the period in which

Orthodoxy saw itself, and was understood by its environment, as standing on the outside.

II

Aryeh Fishman's book, *Between Religion and Ideology*,[22] provides a particularly suitable background and context for examining the significance of the change that has taken place around the question of religion and modernity, particularly from the social-value viewpoint. Fishman describes the successful confrontation of one religious movement, that of the religious kibbutz movement (Ha-Kibbutz ha-Dati), during the first half of the twentieth century. He presents the problem of the relationship of Jewish religion to modernity during that period in a clear and vital manner. If we compare the functioning of the solution found then to its functioning today, we shall be able to evaluate the degree of change that has taken place and its implications.

Indeed, already by its name the book presents the ideational focus of this change. For the religious kibbutz movement, the tension between religion and the positive values of modernity was understood in terms of the tension between the religious world-view guiding their way of life, and ideology. This implies that the positive values of modernity, which it wished to internalize in its religious being, were represented to the religious kibbutz by ideology. Of course, the religious kibbutz was not the only one to follow this ideological path. Fishman brings out clearly the close relationship between the religious kibbutz and the two mainstreams within modern Orthodoxy: the movement of "Torah with worldliness" (*Torah im derekh eretz*), on the one hand, and religious Zionism of the Mizrachi school, on the other.[23] The implication is that all attempts to find a positive solution to the problem of religion and modernity took place through the intermediacy of modernistic ideology, whether cultural-political, on the one hand, or nationalistic, on the other. The religious kibbutz movement was distinguished from the two modern Orthodoxies upon which it draws in that it succeeded in uniting the two of them through the intermediary of a third ideology, which likewise drew upon the melting-pot of modernity — namely, the communal-socialistic ideology. Does this still hold true today?

The answer, it seems to me, is negative. Of course, I do not claim that contemporary religious movements have completely reneged on any ideology expressing their relation to modernity. Movements based upon a comprehensive religious world-view cannot manage without an ideology to crystallize their relationship to the outside

environment upon which it is dependent. Furthermore, a careful examination will reveal that even ultra-Orthodox movements, those that articulated an absolute "no" to modernity and to secularization, have required in the past, and still require today, an ideology that translates that "no" into a tool serving their posture of alienation from the secular environment.[24] Thus the change is to be seen, not in the disappearance of the ideological dimension from these religious movements, but in the choice of the ideology and in the manner of its functioning. We are no longer speaking of religious ideologies that are borrowed from the non-religious environment, undergoing appropriate reworking along the way, and representing certain positive contents of modernity in order to conduct a positive dialogue between them and the values of religion. Rather, one is dealing with exclusivistic religious ideologies defining the religious position in opposition to the secular environment. In other words, the new ideologies express religion vis-a-vis modernity without presenting modernity vis-a-vis religion, their function being to define the borderline beyond which no dialogue may exist.[25] In this respect, one may say that the Orthodox ideologies which function today have straightened themselves in line with the ultra-Orthodox model that had taken shape during the earlier period.

Let us return to the background reflected in Fishman's book. The ideology of the religious kibbutz movement took shape against the background of a historical development which began, as noted, with the Emancipation and the Enlightenment.[26] One of the striking features of the secular-modern cultures which were created at the time was the universal need for a comprehensive philosophical or ideological substitute for religion. It is true that at no stage did any single philosophical or ideological system reach the same status of hegemony as had been enjoyed by Christianity in the West, or by Judaism within the Jewish people, prior to the onset of the modern period. Nevertheless, the assumption that culture embodies within itself a comprehensive and integrated world-view which fashions and unifies man's life environment as a wholistic and integrated "universe," determining his orientation therein and guiding the processes of his creativity and his way of life, was taken from the religious world-view and translated into the language of modern secular humanism by a variety of philosophical approaches and ideologies which sought to fill the function of religion.[27] Their purpose was to unify man's cultural world and to direct his creation and his way of life as a complete whole. From the standpoint of Western religion — Catholic and Protestant Christianity and the various streams of Judaism — this presented a challenge whose significance could only be grasped through means of the tools of

dialectical thinking. They were able to identify the lines of their own image as it was reflected in an altered mirror image, which resembled them so as to reject them as relics of the past, as a first stage of culture, which they would inherit by "elevating" their old contents to a higher level.[28]

This tension between confrontation and similarity presents a complex challenge, alluding to the possibility of continuity hidden behind the visible appearance of rejection of religion as an anachronism. It is clear that traditional religious leadership saw an unprecedented threat in such philosophies. From an Orthodox point of view, there is no greater or more dangerous heresy than a total substitution which claims to fulfill the function of religion better than it does itself.[29] The ultra-Orthodox religious response was therefore the natural and direct reaction most appropriate to the internal logic of a religion that claims for itself absolute truth: namely, that against an all-encompassing heresy one must articulate an all-inclusive "no," and against a general attempt to uproot and to displace oneself one most build a general protective wall. By contrast, modern Orthodoxy cultivated a "second thought" embodying the full dialectic process from "denial of the anti-thesis" to affirmation of the synthesis. The discovery motivating this second thought about modernity was the fact that modern secularism contains within itself certain elements which are positive from the viewpoint of the Jewish people or of religion, and even certain elements corresponding to the highest values of religion itself. It is therefore appropriate to reject the negative elements, to adopt the positive elements, and to propose, in place of those philosophies and ideologies which pretended to be substitutes for religion, a renewed religious alternative which once again places religion above and beyond modern secular philosophy — not through its absolute rejection, but by its interpretation and incorporation using tools borrowed from it itself. This implies that the modern philosophy or ideology, by means of which the attempt to internalize secular values within a religious stance had been carried out, were included as an integral part of the Orthodox religious world-view and way of life.

The most influential and comprehensive models of such syntheses in modern Orthodoxy are those of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch and Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook.[30] In both, there stands out the counter-inversion by which secular philosophy, which originated in the claim to include within itself the sources of religion, is incorporated within the sources of religion. The modern contents, which are internalized by religion by means of dialectical tools, stand out in both, and in both of them there stands out even more a central vital

characteristic of these synthetic philosophies: a teleological understanding of history as a gradual process leading towards redemption which they interpret, in the spirit of modernity, not as a salvation occurring exclusively through means of divine intervention, but as a divine response to human activity.[31] This is a necessary component of the modern Orthodox religious synthesis, not only because it restores the modern historicist reinterpretation of the messianic idea to the realm of religion, but also because the synthetic religious philosophy could not suffice by presenting the attainments of the modern milieu as they are presented within the frameworks of the secular ideologies as the "purpose of history." On the contrary, the present, notwithstanding all its accomplishments, brought about the crisis in religion and elevated the confrontation between it and modernity in all its seriousness. In other words, the historical reality suitable to the synthesis between modern ideology and religion has yet to be formed. It only exists as a vision for the future, its realization being the great task incumbent upon the present generation. Hence, it is only the commitment to its realization that can enable the bearers of these ideologies to "anticipate" the vision and to live it on its way toward realization.

It is against this background that we may understand the great advantage of the religious kibbutz, in terms of both ideology and realization (*hagshamah*). In terms of ideology, it chose to represent the positive values of modernity through the ideology of Zionist-socialist synthesis. It found a Jewish version of modern nationalist ideology in Zionism, while it found in socialism a universal version of Jewish messianism. Utilizing both of these components, it shaped its unique synthesis between Jewish religion, with its specific faith and way of life, and the universal ideals of modernity, within the particular life circle of the Jewish people and in the continuity of its history — that is, through the total affirmation of the consciousness of exclusively Jewish identity and belonging. In terms of realization, the religious kibbutz chose the maximalist national-social path in terms of its demands upon the individual and the community, but this was a path which at the same time demonstrated in practice that it was realistic and not utopian. Within the Zionist-social path of realization of the religious kibbutz, it was possible to both realize the supreme synthesis of religion with the positive values of modernity, and to live it in practice within the framework of a religious community which sought to realize the unifying vision in an all-embracing reality that was being progressively realized. It is possible, of course, that it was this maximalist demand for realization of the religious kibbutz that left it a small, pioneering movement even within the framework of Orthodox religious Zionists, but for those

who were prepared to respond to this demand it created a life environment of a modern religious community which demonstrated the truth of its vision through its concrete attainments. It thereby also came to enjoy a considerable measure of independence, representativeness, and influence.[32]

It appears that this definite advantage of the religious kibbutz may be seen even today. But, paradoxically, it is to be seen today particularly by comparison with the situation of the secular kibbutz, which had in the past served it as an example. The religious kibbutz movement has shown in a striking manner its superior ability to preserve the universal modernistic social values of the kibbutz within the reality brought about following the creation of the State of Israel.[33] It moreover demonstrated that the source of its superior ability to remain loyal to the collective and egalitarian values of the kibbutz lay precisely in the religious dimension which set it apart.[34] However, if we examine the status of the religious kibbutz within the context of Orthodox religious society, including national-religious society, the picture received is rather different. As the vanguard position of ultra-Orthodoxy becomes progressively strengthened, the role and influence of the religious kibbutz as a model is diminished. Moreover, there, too, one may feel the resurgence of that type of ultra-Orthodox idealism that is closed off towards modernity.[35] We therefore need to examine the background of the change which has taken place in the status of the religious kibbutz movement, and of the modernist-socialist ideological influence represented thereby, within the religious public.

III

At first glance, the immediate reason for the decline in the status of the kibbutz movement as a whole in Israeli society is the far-reaching change that took place in the realm of Zionist fulfillment and the tools needed for it following the creation of the state and the influx of mass immigration that followed. Under the new conditions, the kibbutz movement lost the status of being at the vanguard of Zionist fulfillment which it had enjoyed during the pre-state period. As mentioned, the religious kibbutz was indeed more successful in consecrating its social values as an end in themselves. However, even from its point of view, the change in the status of the kibbutz within the framework of Zionist realization led to a crisis in terms of the effectiveness of its dialogue and influence upon the general Jewish public in the State of Israel, and first and foremost upon the religious public, whether Zionist or non-Zionist. Like its secular

counterpart, the religious kibbutz also reached its full social and settlement development during the period preceding the state and during the first years following its establishment. During that time, the major task of Zionist realization was the creation of an infrastructure of Jewish settlement throughout the Land of Israel. The kibbutz proved itself to be the superior form of settlement. In terms of the religious kibbutz, this meant that the values of modernity, which it had internalized by means of Zionist-socialist ideology, were understood as necessary values for the realization of the collective task of the Jewish people — namely, the creation of an earthly framework for its independent national life in its historic homeland. This meant that the religious kibbutz, through its integrative ideology, and in the dimension of pioneering realization, represented the Zionist consensus as the basis for the unity of the entire Jewish people.

A change took place following the creation of the state. There were some who saw the Zionist enterprise as a completed accomplishment, but even according to that majority who held that the state was not yet the fulfillment of Zionism, and that the demographic, settlement and social framework were still incomplete, the order of priorities and the tools for its realization also changed. The kibbutz no longer seemed the most suitable instrument for settlement in terms of the social-cultural character of the new aliyah, on the one hand, nor to the challenges of urban settlement and a modern, industrial economy, on the other.[36] But from the viewpoint of the religious kibbutz, the fact that it was unable to embody, by its very life-being which blended religion and modernity, a deep value agreement between the religious and secular publics seemed of particular importance. This was due to the fact that, with the alteration in the areas of realization, the entire problem became formulated anew and the general Jewish consensus — to the extent that it still existed or that it was still sought — needed to be embodied in another focus of action and of spiritual creativity.

One should note the following: if, during the period preceding the establishment of the state, it was still possible to unite religious and non-religious movements in a framework of Zionist agreement concerning the demands to establish a framework for national life and to postpone to the future the great polemic concerning the ultimate image of the state of the Jews as a Jewish state,[37] after 1948 this question became the most urgent one in terms of the relationship between the religious and secular publics (and hence in terms of the relationship of the religious public to modern values). Now the state was no longer a future vision, but had become an actual present reality, which needed to be shaped. All other challenges — the

completion of the settlement, economic and social structure, or even the completion of the security framework for the state, important as they might be, declined in priority in the eyes of the entire religious public, including its Zionist component, while the question of the actual Jewish image of the state took on the greatest importance.[38] Clearly, the religious kibbutz was able to make an important contribution of its own to the fashioning of solutions to the issue of the Jewish image of the State of Israel, in the spirit of a modern religious synthesis. Moreover, this contribution could be based in part upon the national-social ideology which had been uniquely its in the past. However, this much was clear in any event: even if the religious kibbutz were to propose its own solution, the area of its realization could not be within the framework of kibbutz life, but beyond it, in the state as a whole. That is, the kibbutz could be included therein as one of its components, but its ideological and social characteristics as kibbutz were no longer, and could not be in the future, the integral model for realization, either from the viewpoint of Jewish religious identity or that of Jewish national identity. It is therefore not surprising that religious ideologies, or other national-religious ones, which sought realization through other, political tools and in other realms of Jewish religious and national expression, now assumed the role of leadership and model.

In other words, the Zionist-socialist ideology of the religious kibbutz no longer functioned as an integrative ideology realized on the overall national plane, one capable of uniting the life of the Jewish people. It was no longer able to resolve the confrontation which had been created within itself. What then is the conclusion to be drawn? Traditional kibbutz ideologues will presumably call for the "correction" or "reformulation" of the religious kibbutz ideology, along with the goals of its realization. However, once one begins to think about the nature of such a possible revision, one encounters an even greater difficulty, reflecting the transformation that has taken place in the national functioning of the religious kibbutz ideology — namely, the profound decline in secular ideologies, which had in the past constituted the challenge to religious thought and way of life, including those from which the religious kibbutz drew its inspiration. Even the Zionist ideology, in its classic, most general formulation, no longer fulfills the function of unifying, of defining orientation, and of defining goals to be realized in practical life as it had done in the past.[39] How much more so the political and social ideologies, ranging from national and nationalistic liberalism, via democratic and constructive socialism, through communism. These ideologies, and the philosophies which provided them with their dimensions of depth and of height, have

declined, and the social and spiritual movements that stood behind them have disappeared,[40] leaving behind pragmatic social-political parties and organizations. True, their leaders still occasionally speak in terms of the earlier symbols and using the old slogans, particularly on festive occasions and on occasions of test at election time, may even attempt to pour new contents into the empty ideological vessels, so as to present some spiritual message. But it would seem that the pragmatic leadership, which is prepared to try anything in times of pressure, does not deceive itself. The ideologies and symbols no longer draw masses of believers prepared to marshall any resources at all to realize them. Thus religious movements, for whom religion continues to be their comprehensive ideology, no longer encounter the modern secular reality through the intermediacy of the latter's comprehensive ideologies, and certainly not through their deeper philosophies. One can no longer speak of a confrontation of religion with a comprehensive secular world-view or with secularism as a well-defined world-view. Instead, religious movements today confront a heterogenous secular public, whose secularism is largely defined, ironically, through their relation to themselves and by their means, as a "non-religious" world-view.[41]

In order to properly understand the ideational-value implications of this new situation, we must go back and define the previous picture more precisely. Close examination will reveal that secular ideologies have not entirely disappeared. Its complete disappearance is impossible, for no political movement which wishes to take responsibility for an overall national situation can function without a policy and a platform that serves the communication between itself and the public of its voters. What happened in practice was that, instead of an imposed framework of traditional ideologies, there was created a variety of partial, pragmatic ideologies representing the material and cultural interests of a wide variety of different groups, circles and social classes within the people, but without developing or transmitting a message of a comprehensive world-view — that is, without any attempt to propose a general image of culture, of overall value orientation, or of a unified vision of the desired future. Thus, in retrospect, secular culture in the State of Israel acquired a pluralistic-heterogenous character, in the sense of a continuum of partial positions and wishes which sought to arrive at a modus vivendi among themselves by means of a struggle following certain political rules of the game. They unite and split, create alliances and separate, clash and compromise. By this means, they create a "cultural world" whose transient image is shaped after the fact rather than by any general unifying vision. One may easily show that one may also include various kinds of religious move-

ments within that self-same reality and by means of those same external rules. These also need ideologies to represent their anticipations and tasks to a divided public arena, but for this purpose they do not need to conduct a general ideological dialogue with secular parties and organizations, because the "code" of relating to the general national field is no longer ideological but purely political and pragmatic.

It seems self-evident that, from the viewpoint of the Orthodox religious public, a reality which is satisfied to define its secularity by pointing to its own religion is in many respects repellent, alienating, and even frightening. There is a profound mental estrangement between an Orthodox religious line of thought, which seeks a high level of integration and which understands the term pluralism as a synonym for anarchy, and a secular mind-set, for whom "irreligiosity" is understood in the simple sense of the absence of commitment to a unified authority according to whose truths one lives one's way of life. Such an estrangement hardly facilitates communication in the spiritual sphere. From this point of view, it would appear that the religious ideologies were far closer and shared far more of a common language with the great secular ideologies that have declined. On the other hand, the new reality offers a great deal of convenience; even the feeling of mental estrangement, which fosters a criticism that has more than a little bit of arrogance to it, is far easier to deal with than the feeling of the need to confront a world-view that presented itself as a substitute for religion. It seems to be very easy to fit into the modern secular reality, which has no general philosophical or ideological commitments. Today, no religious group is called upon to sacrifice anything beyond those external sacrifices that every group is called upon to make in order to enjoy the accomplishments and services which are the property of all. Certainly, they are not asked to make any spiritual sacrifices.

IV

It is clear that the reality we have described above on the theoretical plane does not remain there. It both shapes a socio-cultural reality and reflects it, in a kind of feed-back. If we wish to understand the processes of thought in depth, we therefore need to examine the social and cultural reality which constitutes both their source and their object. We shall begin, once again, with a value-ideational characteristic expressed in the understanding of the concept of modernity and the manner of its application. We already

noted above that modernity emphasizes deliberate change as an expression of renewal. Has the cultural mentality of modernity changed in this regard? We must respond to this question both in the positive and the negative. The negative answer stems from the tangible fact that the accelerated rate of innovative change, expressing an impulse towards social-cultural attainments shared by nearly all sectors of contemporary society, has so increased that one paradoxically ceases to feel its demand. One might say that change and innovation have become such routine characteristics of reality that it has become a fixed characteristic thereof. Only if change were to cease or to become drastically slowed would we feel it as an unexpected innovation. But perhaps this fact itself expresses a substantive change in the understanding of the significance of accumulated innovation. And indeed: deliberate change in the conditions of life, performed expressly for the sake of change, is itself understood in some sense as an improvement. However, it would seem that improvement can also be understood in various ways. There are improvements in terms of the efficiency of the means of attaining a certain goal; there is improvement in the level of satisfaction of basic human needs and expectations; there is improvement in terms of the ease of life; and there are also fashionable improvements connected with the act of innovation itself, which is defined as a special need characteristic of modernity: the need for variety, for the satisfaction of individual tastes or even caprices, or simply for the prevention of boredom. In all these senses, innovation would appear to be understood as a fixed feature of a culture whose innovations do not necessarily indicate progress, if the concept of progress is understood also to bear a teleological and general ethical-value significance.

This last sentence indicates the substantive difference which has occurred in the understanding of the element of innovation in the concept of modernity. The historicist philosophies and ideologies of modernity have presented the component of innovation, as mentioned, in terms of general progress, in terms of the acquisition of scientific truth, even in terms of technological and administrative efficiency, but first and foremost in terms of the realization of ethical values: justice, autonomy, freedom, creativity, individual self-realization, mutuality in the relationships of social classes, and international peace. However, if we examine the factors that contributed to the decline of belief in these ideologies, we shall find that it flows primarily from the profound disappointment that accumulated during the period between the two world wars and reached its apex during World War II and the Holocaust. No one can challenge the statement that there has been absolute, objectively measurable

progress in science and technology, in the increase in the standard of living in broad sectors of the Western democratic countries, or in the increased level of personal freedom and creative individual self-realization in those societies. But together with that, no one can deny the price of that progress which has taken place in the "developed" countries at the expense of the "undeveloped" ones, which pay the price of that progress and constitute a constant threat against its attainments, both in terms of the endless wars, which have become more and more threatening due to the expression of progress in the production of weapons of destruction and modern means of warfare, or in terms of the dangerous processes of alienation which characterize the mass modern secular societies. Do we thus have progress in the general ethical-value and teleological sense? Is it possible to confirm on its basis the optimistic forecasts of the historicistic ideologies which translated religious messianism into secular language? Is mankind advancing at an ever increasing pace towards the realization of the vision of peace on earth, or is it perhaps moving towards an apocalypse of self-destruction? It is doubtful whether there exists any longer any modernist-secular philosophy or ideology of broad social influence that is willing to present unequivocally optimistic answers to such questions.[42]

This being the case, is it possible to say that the "self-awareness" of modern culture today includes a belief in overall progress by which one may distinguish between those who identify with modernity and those who are outside of it? Can one state, on the basis of criteria accepted by the majority of the bearers of modern culture, that those who do not take upon themselves the changes in belief, ethos, and personal-social norms of behavior that flow from the innovative spirit of modern culture have removed themselves from its midst or remained in a state of backwardness? It is true that there are not a few people, and possibly also a certain type of social elite, that tend to think thus. However, it would seem that for quite some time already they have been unable to argue that they represent a broad general agreement characterizing the "spirit of the time" or the "self-consciousness" of the culture. Certainly, they are no more representative than those religious ideologies which argue against them with great fervor,[43] on the basis of a life experience equally rooted in modernity, that the characteristics of the modern secular social ethos do not express progress, but backsliding and degeneration. The latter, who firmly preserve the ethos and norms of "old-fashioned" religious life and refuse to abandon them, even succeed in persuading not a few within their secular environment that, by every criterion of morality or of a value-purposive way of life, the only truly progressive movement is that of "return" (*teshuvah*) to the

old religious point of departure that has been betrayed: that is, that the only positive vision of the future remaining to humanity, after all the accomplishments of modernity, is to be found in the past.

V

The next characteristic of the social and cultural reality of contemporary modernity we shall need to examine relates to the structural components and fundamental processes of cultural life, in terms of the transmission, functioning, and participation in the processes of creativity. In terms of these aspects as well, the overall image of modern culture seems to have changed in substantial ways from what it was initially; this change likewise carries far-reaching implications for the relation of religion to modernity. Therein, primarily, is to be found the explanation for the success of ultra-Orthodoxy in taking its share in the accomplishments of scientific and technological progress, which are essential for proper existence within a modern environment, without needing to pay an explicit religious price for this.

The structural change may be seen particularly in relation to three primary foci of the socio-cultural process: the focus of the transmission in the framework of formal schooling, the focus of functional-professional integration, and the focus of general cultural socialization. The focus of formal schooling of course has decisive importance in terms of shaping the individual personality. The process of imparting culture is identified with the process of education, which sustains the continuity of a culture, even as it renews and adapts its models. For this reason, we can easily see those changes that have taken place in the overall image of modern culture by turning our attention to the changes that have taken place in the definition of the educational task, in the structure of educational curricula, in the methods of instruction, and in the understanding of the process of educational socialization within the school. The subject is a very extensive one, and we can only point towards a few major themes. We therefore need to stress, first of all, the primary difference in the definition of the function of schooling: the moving of the emphasis from cultural transmission, in the sense of passing down an overall tradition from one generation to another, to training for "preparation for life" in the vocational sense. The difference between traditional religious education and modern "humanistic" education may already be seen from its inception in the differing understanding of the role of transmission of a tradition from one generation to the next. Nevertheless, even the classical

humanistic school, which was intended to train the elite future leadership of society for its role, also saw their main task in the transmission of the tradition, in the sense of cultural-historical memory. A cultured person was understood to be an educated person: an individual who carries a complex of linguistic, literary, artistic and historical-political baggage of his culture; a person who is able to draw from his memory that which he needs for his full functioning in society. Despite the great importance attached to professional preparation, it appears that they attributed primary importance to the broad cultural baggage which shapes the character and life of the personality. This also constitutes a precondition of proper professional functioning, particularly if one is speaking of those professions which represent the highest directions of creativity and progress of culture.[44] In our day, the change is quite tangible. The task of transmitting a cultural heritage in the general sense continues to enjoy priority in terms of precedence in time (i.e., kindergarten and primary school), but under no circumstance does it do so in terms of the practical value attached to it. Following the initial stages of education, in which the student acquires his basic skills, it is pushed more and more to the margins, until at the higher stages it is replaced entirely by detailed professional training, which is guided by the ideal of focused, functional expertise.[45]

It is clear that this tendency leaves its impression upon the structure of the educational program. In this connection, one should take brief note of two characteristic phenomena: the change in the relationship between the shared core body of knowledge, understood as a general obligation, and the range of professions in which individuals are called upon to become expert according to their choice, and the corresponding change in the relationship between those studies defined as "humanistic," which are concerned with cultural-expressive identity, and those defined as "scientific," which are concerned with accomplishment-oriented functional service, especially in terms of their relation to culture in the instrumental sense. One might say that the clear tendency in the fashioning of curriculum over the course of the entire last generation has been: first — the reduction of the core of common required studies intended to convey a shared cultural identity, and the corresponding expansion of the compass of learning focused upon an ever-narrower group of chosen areas of concentration. Second — an increasing preference of those professions defined as "scientific" over those defined as "humanistic." Moreover, even within those fields designated as "humanistic," the methodological-professional element of instruction is emphasized above the content-value "message," in the

sense that even in the humanistic studies one is not concerned with a direct value message shaping a world-view and way of life.[46]

The implications upon education as a process of socialization that activates contents and applies values in inter-human relationships and in social-creative activity (festivals, ceremonies, gatherings, discussions, etc.) are quite clear. Within the process of formal instruction, these are expressed both in the direct message of the form of instruction and in the indirect and very influential message of the form of organization of instruction (for example, the status of the "home class" as a general social system, as opposed to "tracks" or "majors" based upon specialties and levels of accomplishment). Beyond the process of formal learning, this change may be seen in the fact that social-creative activity is becoming increasingly distant from the traditional modes of activity, both in terms of contents and style, and increasingly stresses the mode of entertainment, based upon activation by professionals, and less and less upon the element of individual contribution expressing in an active way the cultural-traditional "roots" drawn upon by all individuals together.

Let us now turn to the second focus: the integration of individuals in their professional activity. It is quite clear that the changes which have taken place in the educational focus all flow from the constraints imposed by this latter focus. This fact is projected by the constant pressure exerted upon the lower level of the educational system by the system of higher education (the various sorts of colleges and seminaries), from which people pass into various professional functions in the sciences, technology, economics, administration and services. The fundamental assumption is that, following the acquisition of the most basic general skills (such as reading, writing and arithmetic, in the instructional realm, or the ability to develop a series of basic social relations, in the behavioral realm), the young person needs to acquire knowledge and professional expertise in two or three of the increasingly numerous areas of social-cultural activity, so that when the time comes he can choose the profession most appropriate to himself. Thus, the individual profession, requiring the most clearly defined expertise, is the primary axis determining the direction of orientation. It is from it that the individual derives his livelihood, and on its basis that he will build his standing in society, and through it that he will make his active contribution to society and function as a member of a family and of society. As for the other areas of cultural activity: it is assumed that each person will choose a few of these as hobbies, or as areas for passive enjoyment of the professional activity of experts in the field, while all other areas — which are the majority — will effectively remain "dead areas." Everyone needs them and is aware

of them indirectly because they are needed for the effective functioning of the society as a whole, but they do not leave their impression upon the circle of knowledge and activity of the majority of the members of society as individuals. We thus find a multi-tiered cultural structure, in some of which the individual may be involved on different levels of presence, but the integrated complex as a whole remains beyond the field of direct relationship of all the individuals. No person lives in a full manner in all of them.

A multi-tiered structure of this type of course has direct impact upon the education of the personality, as well as upon the processes of socialization pregnant with contents in the family, the community, and in public life generally. It determines to a far-reaching degree the nature of the emotional and ideational messages conveyed by people to one another in all these manners and ways of being together, as parents, as friends, as members of a community, and as citizens. They also determine to a decisive extent the level of wholeness and the degree of stability and cohesiveness of these structures, just as they determine the force of the sense of belonging and identification which the individual receives from them. However, this is an extremely broad issue, whose details we cannot explore in this framework. In terms of our concern, what we have stated above is adequate to concretize the direction of the change which has taken place in the understanding of the cultural personality and its socio-cultural capacity, from the inclusive and integrative classical humanistic ideal to the isolating, compartmentalized, functional-differential approach of our own day.

What then are the implications of the change in the ideal of the cultural personality and his manner of socialization in terms of the relation of religion and modernity? To use colorful language, we might say that the various types of Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox publics can include their compartments into the multi-tiered structure of a cultural "supermarket," just like any other public with a special cultural contents of its own. Thereafter, every individual belonging to these publics may relate to the other compartments in a private way, just like any other individual, whether as a supplier or as a consumer. He may choose for himself that which is most appropriate to himself, both in terms of his own personality and of his religious inclinations. He need not leave the "compartment" he has fixed as his dwelling place, in which are rooted the social, familial, and community relations which carry his religious way of life, in order to do so. His private "outside" excursions for the sake of the activity which assures his livelihood and his status are a small price to pay for a type of adjustment which ought to be defined as a necessity not to be rejected. From his point of view, they are of no

value significance; they do not bring him into an environment which can replace his intimate, all-inclusive life environment, nor is he called upon to sacrifice for their sake any religious value or norm. As mentioned, he is able to choose that which is most appropriate to himself from a range of neutral occupations which do not bring about conflict with the ideological and behavioral commitments stemming from his religious outlook and way of life.

In other words: under the hegemony of the classical cultural ideal, integration into modern culture demanded adjustment to a comprehensive cultural ideal, encompassing an alternative educational approach, ethos, manner of professional functioning, cultural way of life, and even of relation to historical belonging. By contrast, in our day there is no comprehensive alternative that is imposed. In the past, this synthesis was required, not only in the ideological realm, but also in those of education, values, character and norms of behavior (*Torah im derekh eretz*), in order to bring about a significant integration, on the functional and creative level, within modern culture. Today, a person may choose Orthodoxy or ultra-Orthodoxy as his primary point of cultural reference, and thereafter choose a profession on the individual level from whatever may be available: tradesman, banker, engineer, computer expert, lawyer, politician, doctor, journalist, and the like: all of them respectable professions representing modern progress in all its glory. However, his profession does not commit him to any alternative world-view or way of life, and does not place him under pressure or temptation to compromise even slightly his religious beliefs, *halakhic* norms or familial-community loyalties.

Nor is the religious person subject to the difficult challenge of criticism on the part of the external environment in which he functions. His non-religious customers or professional colleagues are no more committed than he is to general education and culture. By and large, they are only expert within their own narrow professions, and are attached only to their hobbies. For this reason, he finds no difficulty in defending his beliefs and his way of life to them, even if they are critical towards his views. On the whole, their criticism is not based upon any real knowledge or insight into religion and tradition, nor on any level of theoretical sophistication in the field of philosophy of religion or even the humanistic realm generally. This holds true even for people who have an academic education. He hence considers them as totally lacking in knowledge with regard to his field, just as he is ignorant in theirs. Moreover, he can answer their criticism and even demonstrate a sense of superiority towards his secular environment.

Let us now once again mention the decline of the philosophies and ideologies of modern times, and particularly the change which has taken place in the understanding of the concept of progress. These are striking indications of the fact that modern secular culture conveys to its carriers, far less than it did in the past, a consciousness of superiority in terms of the feeling of belonging, identification, and of the meaningfulness of existence. Secularism today is far more aware of its moral, spiritual and psychological problems, and far more self-critical in terms of all these aspects. It seems that the best of the cultural-expressive creation of modernity in the area of literature, art, and thought express a sense of criticism, of loss of the roots of belonging and identification, and of a growing feeling of alienation. For this reason, the modern-secular environment no longer holds charm over people whose personalities were formed by the integral environment of Orthodox religious education from their earliest childhood. From their point of view, secular society created extremely serious problems, problems to which it is itself aware that it cannot propose any real solutions from its own resources. The convinced religious person emerges even more convinced from every encounter with the secular modern environment (the more Orthodox he is, the stronger he is in this respect). From his point of view, secular society has no significant spiritual message, while his religious society has the correct answers to the problems which were created (thus he believes, in any event) by the casting off of the yoke of religion. One could argue that religious Jews, especially the ultra-Orthodox among them, already believed this from the beginning of the period of the Emancipation. But while this is true, the great difference is anchored in the fact that today they are able to convince, with far greater success, not only themselves and their sons and daughters, but also a not-inconsiderable number of people who were educated in the secular society and who seek the way to return.

In concluding, we ought to turn our attention to the fact that, in terms of the Orthodox, and particularly the ultra-Orthodox public, the phenomenon of return to Judaism (*hazarah be-teshuvah;* literally, "repentance") is of very great importance. While it certainly does not threaten the secular majority, it constitutes a positive change from the point of view of the religious public.[47] It tells it that its religious posture is not only not backward or reactionary, as secular Jews claimed not long ago, but that it is also relevant to modernity. That is, despite the criticism and the opposition, Orthodoxy stands within the modern world in the full sense of the word. We would not be greatly exaggerating were we to argue that the investment of resources and energy in the cultivation of the *teshuvah* movement expresses, in terms of the Orthodox religious community, the need

to receive confirmation from the secular environment of its feeling that it is no longer on the fringes or rearguard of modernity, but that it constitutes a relevant part of modernity, both in term of what it receives from it and in terms of what it may contribute to it. Indeed, according to this religious viewpoint, it is precisely its degree of deviation from "modernity" that indicates the dimensions of the emptiness that has opened up within the secular reality, and of the positive contribution that religion alone is able to provide.

VI

We have thus far provided the basis and explanation for the statement that Orthodox religious society in our time has succeeded in integrating into modern society on its own terms, without needing to openly pay the price of sacrificing those religious values that are sanctified in its eyes. But, finally, we must ask the question as to whether we have thereby presented the entire picture. Beyond the ease of its integration without paying any explicit price, has it not paid a hidden price, of which religious society is unaware because it has succeeded in suppressing it with the help of its indoctrinating ideology? Like every question of evaluation, the answer to this question is also subject to dispute. Most of the religious public will tend to respond in the negative, while most of the secular public will answer in the affirmative. In the opinion of the author of these lines, the opinion of the secular public is the correct one. For the ease of its integration into the modern environment on its own terms, Orthodox society pays a national price, a social-cultural price, as well as a not-inconsiderable religious price.

The national price is expressed in the growing sense of estrangement and the deepening rift within the Jewish people. These things are well known and visible to citizens of the State of Israel. We find ourselves post facto in the midst of an extreme and even violent *kulturkampf*, and feel all its threats and its dangers. In the context of our discussion, two facts in particular need to be stressed. First, the vital will of the Orthodox religious community to incorporate itself within modernity and to demonstrate a relevant presence therein, within the context of an autonomous Jewish society, is weighted with political significance. This is expressed in an effort towards domination that, as is known, goes beyond the sphere of spiritual-educational influence and begins to become clearly coercive.[48] The model of relationships created with the secular- Jewish environment is depicted as a movement that is balanced in two directions: in the creation of Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox communities by means of

separate frameworks that are strongly distinguished from the secular society, on the one hand,[49] and in the attempt to demonstrate its presence in the center of public national life by means of direct manipulative influence upon the foci of power and administration, on the other. It seems to me that this is a most efficient formula for the creation of a split within the people: first it marks off the lines of division, and thereafter it applies extremely strong pressure which, while performed in the name of the ideological demand for uniformity, functions in practice in the direction of confrontation and breakdown. Secondly, on the whole, the Orthodox religious public does not display sensitivity to the dangers to it from the deepening split within the people. It is very much aware today of its accomplishments, its successes, and its increase in power in the historical short-term. Nevertheless, any split within the people harms both of the fragments which are torn from one another, and not only one of them. For this reason, its final "victory" is also liable to be the final failure, manifested in the breakdown of the national base without which it has no existence.

The social-cultural price is expressed in the forced internalization of several of the most striking structural ills of modern secularism. This is particularly true in the political realm. Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox religious society has adopted — true, without needing to violate any of the *halakhic* norms which are sanctified in its eyes — the political and administrative-institutional ethos of its secular environment. This fact carries ethical implications that are well known, first of all, in the style of relations with the external environment, but also towards the religious society itself. Moreover, it seems that the internalization of the vulgar ethos of the mass secular street with its numerous maladies does not end there. The Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox religious public is undergoing structural changes that touch directly upon family and communal relationships. Deep splits are created, and the influx of influences of the low secular street has become greater at the same time as the free flow of certain forms of more elevated secular-cultural creativity are prevented. Indeed, this last remark leads us to the most significant negative phenomenon in terms of cultural price: the mode of easy integration into a multi-tiered "supermarket" is also a means of internalizing the renegement upon the quest for integrality, for the multi-facetedness and richness of a full cultural world. The problematics which characterized the product of modern secular education characterizes, in parallel and with even greater force, contemporary religious education, which by its very nature tends to be monolithic: one-sided erudition in a specific area understood as the goal, coupled with profound ignorance in other fields, which

likewise pertain directly to the immediate close life environment; one-track spiritual activity and creativity directed towards one horizon alone, which entirely silences the full development and expression of the personality in other fields of creation. By this means, spiritual-religious activity itself becomes impoverished, even though one is more intensely devoted to it, because spiritual creativity — as distinct from purely instrumental creativity — draws upon and is enriched by the entire complex.

The religious price paid is the sum total of all these prices, in terms of their influence upon the breadth and depth of thoughts, feelings and experiences expressed in a religious way of life, in Torah study, and in fulfillment of the *mitzvot*. Once one examines the matter on this plane, it becomes clear in all simplicity that greater ease, in the sense of lack of pressure to confront lofty challenges on the ethical-religious plane, on the existential-religious plane, and in the scientific and ideological-philosophical plane, is itself the greatest difficulty of all, precisely because it is not noticed. In the absence of a lofty spiritual challenge or, to be more precise: in the absence of a vital existential impulse to take on the existing challenges, to define and confront them in a creative manner, the life of the spirit becomes cheapened. If religiosity is, among other things, a form of spiritual life, than its shallowness is the most serious price that religion can pay in exchange for ease.

* * *

These, then, are the issues awaiting a far-seeing religious leadership which carries a general spiritual-national responsibility. If enlightened Orthodox movements such as the religious kibbutz wonder where they can continue today to make the pioneering and unifying spiritual contribution for which they have been so outstanding in the past, they must reorient themselves and turn their gaze upon these issues and their challenge.

Notes

1. The standard definition of modernity: "behaving according to the new time, newness, a manner appropriate to the latest fashion; modernity is recognized in a person's manner of dress, in his outlook, in his way of life" (Even Shoshan, *Milon Hadash*) [New Dictionary].
2. The change which has taken place in the understanding of the concept of modernity since World War II relates, on the one hand, to the

transition from an industrial society to a "technological" society and, on the other hand, to the existential change implied in man's relation to his environment and to himself. It is expressed in the routine use of the expression "post-modernism" in academic literature. See Victor K. Ferkiss, *Technological Man;* the Myth and the Reality (New York, 1970), Ch. 4. See also Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society* (New York, 1961).

3. Secularization, in the sense of the drive to realize man's earthly destiny as ruler of his environment, while developing his full natural potential, is a central sign of the distinction between "traditional society" — in which religion is central — and modern society. See R.J.Z. Werblowsky, *Beyond Tradition and Modernity* (London, 1976), pp. 1-21.
4. The definition of modern society is basically required in order to distinguish it from the traditional-religious society which preceded it and was displaced by it (see s.v. "Modern Society" [Heb.], in *Enzeqlopedyah le-Made'i ha-Hevrah*, II, pp. 406-409). It is therefore clear that, from its point of view, attachment to the old tradition is a sign of backwardness, while the attempt to return to it — one of reaction. Indeed, such evaluations characterize the philosophies and ideologies of modernism from the beginning of the Haskalah period, and are exacerbated in revolutionary movements, especially Marxism.
5. Menahem Friedman characterizes and explains this transformation in his significant article: "'The Market Model' and Religious Extremism" [Heb.]: "I contend that it was not by chance that the phenomenon of *humrot* ('stringencies') developed in the religious world specifically since the 1950s. It emerged against the background of the uprooting of traditional religious Jewry from its traditional 'scenery' in Eastern Europe to the open modern societies of the West. Here this Judaism found itself in the situation of a 'marketplace,' a situation in which every Jew, like every other citizen, could express his religiosity as he wished..." (in Menahem Kahana, ed., *Be-hevlei Mesoret u-Temurah* [Rehovot: Kivunim, 1990], p. 95). The present paper is essentially an attempt on my part to analyze the background and significance of the above key sociological-historical statement more extensively and in more general terms.
6. Werblowsky's above-mentioned book discusses the renewed confrontation of all three religions — Christianity, Judaism and Islam — with the phenomena of secularization and modernity from the unique theological view-point of each one of them (for the discussion of Islam, see Ch. 4, pp. 61-83). On more recent developments in fundamentalist Islam, see Barry Rubin, "Seeds of a Post-Khomeini Era," *Survey of Jewish Affairs* (1989), pp. 68-83; R. Hrair Dekemejean, *Islam in Revolution* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985). See also Raphael Israeli, "Sadat in the Shadow of Khomeini" [Heb.], *Gesher* 25:3-4 (1980):41-50.

7. This phenomenon may be seen not only on the folk level, but also among intellectuals. See Simon Krauss, "The Return to Religion Among Jews in the Soviet Union" [Heb.], *Gesher* 31:1 (1985):80-89.
8. See Eliezer Schweid, *Ha-Yahadut veha-Tarbut ha-Hilonit* (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad, 1981), Introduction, pp. 9-27.
9. See Yeshayahu (Charles) Leibman, ed., *Lihyot be-Yahad: Yahasei Dati'im-Hiloni'im be-Hevrah ha-Yisraelit* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1990), Introduction, pp. 9-14.
10. Newspapers and journals have written extensively in recent years about the "Haredization" to be discovered within broad circles of modern Orthodoxy, especially among the younger generation and in educational institutions. The model of the Haredi yeshiva is increasingly accepted as the ideal model of religiosity, and its influence penetrates as well to the educational networks of religious Zionism, particularly by means of teachers from ultra-Orthodox yeshivot. Tracing and documentation of this phenomenon, particularly within the frameworks of religious education, appeared extensively in the news-magazine *'Emdah* and in the ongoing publications of the movement Ne'emanei Torah va-Avodah.
11. For a profound analysis of this problem, see Ruth Gabizon, ed., *Herut ha-Mazpun veha-Dat* (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim, 1990), especially the article by Ariel Rosen-Zevi, "Halakhah and Secular Reality" [Heb.], pp. 155-206.
12. Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig and Bernard Susser, *Public Life in Israel and the Diaspora* (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1981); see also George Gershon Krantzler, "Changes in the Orthodox Camp in America" [Heb.], *Gesher* 25:1-2 (1979):123-132.
13. See *Lihyot be-Yahad, op. cit.*, Introduction.
14. Movement from the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox communities into the open secular society has of course not ceased, and even appears to be greater from a numerical viewpoint than the phenomenon of "Return" (*teshuvah*). However, it is not measured because it does not seem significant. It is clear that this phenomenon is rendered insignificant by the great difference in the level of birth rate between the religious and the non-religious public.
15. This was a kind of axiom of progressive secularist ideology. For a succinct summary of the discussion on this subject, see Yehezkel Kaufmann, *Golah ve-Nekhar* (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 246-264. We must emphasize that Kaufmann himself disagreed with the assumption that religion would in the future be completely negated and disappear.
16. The transition from defensiveness to aggressiveness can be seen on different levels in the political-partisan realm as a policy directed towards augmenting religious influence in the social realm (especially in the movement of "Teshuvah," organized by the religious society), and of course in newspaper columns and polemical writing.

See on this Amnon Levi, "Ultra-Orthodox Journalism and the Secular Society in Israel" [Heb.], in *Lihyot be-Yahad, op. cit.*, pp. 30-54.

17. One must remember that the struggle over the emancipation of the Jews was carried on in wake of the clearly defined demand by the authorities that Jews alter the cultural modality of their personality, as expressed in their external appearance, norms and manner of social behavior, as well as in their professional and general education. A fundamental and general change in the perception and nature of Jewish education was therefore the precondition of emancipation, and was hence part of the programmatic basis for the Haskalah movement. See Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto; The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation (1770-1870)* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973).

18. Evidently, already during the period of the struggle for emancipation, it became clear that the European powers displayed greater tolerance towards Orthodox Jews, who did not struggle for equal rights, than towards those Jews who demanded of the liberal-modern state that it apply its principles toward them consistently. In this respect, Orthodox Jewry already succeeded then in receiving some partial benefit from liberalism, even though they did not accept it as a principle which needed to direct its own way of life within Jewish society. In this way, the emphasis upon separatism passed from the non-Jewish environment to the conflict with the non-Orthodox Jewish milieu — a situation that persists in practice until this day.

19. One ought to emphasize here, of course, the difference between the background of the Emancipation in Europe and in the United States. In effect, the nationalistic approaches which were dominant in Europe withdrew in the pluralistic direction only after World War II, while in the United States the openness to various types of ethnic cultures and religious creeds was far greater from the very beginning, and grew following the change from the policy of the "melting pot" towards a pluralistic policy in the process of acculturation.

20. This potential was revealed post facto in pre-state Palestine and in Zionism in relation to the independent frameworks of the religious public. While it is true that the thing was performed under pressure, the elements of the "status quo" were already laid in the 1930s under the pressure of Zionist realization.

21. The tendency of the veteran secular public in Palestine was, as mentioned, towards uniformity, both in relation to the religious public prior to the creation of the state, as well as in relation to the mass immigration following its establishment. There was a declared "melting pot" policy which sought to negate the previous cultural identities of the immigrants and to assimilate them within the Hebrew\Eretz Yisrael cultural framework of the prestate period. It is clear, in retrospect, that the culture of the veteran society in the State of Israel was altered both by the absorption of mass aliyah and by the strengthening of Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox religious society be-

yond recognition. However, it seems that the process has not yet been studied in depth.

22. Aryeh Fishman, *Bein Dat le-Ideologyah: Yahadut u-Modernizazyah be-Kibbutz ha-Dati* (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1990).

23. See *ibid.*, Part II: "The Mother Movements in Orthodox Judaism," pp. 31-77.

24. As typical examples of the most influential ultra-Orthodox ideologues, we may mention Rabbi Akiva Yosef Schlesinger (especially in *Lev ha-'Ivri*), Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman (especially in *'Iqveta de-Meshiha*), and Rabbi D.B. Toresh (*Bar Hadya o Halom Herzl*).

25. A particularly characteristic phenomenon that is indicative of the change in this direction is the manner in which the teachings of Rabbi A.I. Kook are interpreted today by most of the students of Yeshivat Merkaz HaRav. Rabbi Kook's thought took shape through the deliberate effort to bring about dialogue on the highest spiritual level with the secular world-views that had influenced the Jewish people, whereas his disciples' exegesis sees this very statement as a dangerous distortion. This was recently expressed in a crude way in the polemic conducted within the religious press (including the National Religious daily *Hazofe*) against the book by Binyamin Ish-Shalom, *Ha-Rav Kook: Bein Razionalism le-Mistiqah* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1990).

26. On intellectual development in wake of the Emancipation, see Max Wiener, *Judische Religion in Zeitalter der Emanzipation* (Berlin, 1924); Michael Mayer, *Confrontation with Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); E. Schweid, *Toldot ha-Hagut ha-Yehudit be-'Et ha-Hadashah; ha-Me'ah ha-tesha'-'Esreh* (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad; Jerusalem: Keter, 1978).

27. This refers to comprehensive philosophical teachings, such as those of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant and his disciples, and especially Hegel and his disciples, both of the Right and the Left, and the most striking of them — Karl Marx. See Samuel Hugo Bergman, *Toldot ha-Filosofiah ha-Hadashah mi-tequfat ha-Haskalah 'ad Emmanuel Kant, ve-shitot be-filosofiah shele-ahar Kant* (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1979).

28. This is the significance of Kant's attempt to present "religion within the limits of reason alone," and more strongly the attempt by Hegel to present his idealistic philosophy as a dialectical elevation of religion to the plane of reason. The first to introduce this approach into Jewish thought was Nahman Krochmal, in his *Moreh Nevukhei ha-Zeman* ("Guide for the Perplexed of Our Time"). He thereby became the father of the philosophy of religion of the Reform movement. See Eliezer Schweid, *Toldot Ha-Hagut ha-Yehudit be-'et ha-Hadashah, op. cit.*, Ch. 5, pp. 172-201.

29. See Eliezer Schweid, *Bein Ortodoqziah le-Humanism Dati* (Jerusalem: Mossad Van Leer, 1977).

30. See Eliezer Schweid, "Two Neo-Orthodox Responses to Secularization; Part I: Samson Raphael Hirsch," *Immanuel* 19 (1984/85):107-117; "Part II: Rabbi Abraham I. Kook," *ibid.*, 20 (1986):107-117.

31. This approach impressed the stamp of modernity upon religious Zionism, and already appears, as is known, among the "forerunners" of religious Zionism, Rabbis Alkalai and Kalischer. One should note that the polemic between religious Zionism, which already at the very outset related in a certain positive way to modernity, and ultra-Orthodoxy, which opposed Zionism, was indeed focused around this statement. See Ehud Luz, *Maqbilim Nifgashim* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1985), Part II, Ch. 2, pp. 55-95. See especially, on the relation to the idea of Hibbat Zion among the ultra-Orthodox leadership, pp. 69-79.
32. See A. Fishman, *Bein Dat le-Ideologyah, op. cit.*, Part III: "The Religious Kibbutz."
33. The advantage of the religious kibbutz over the secular kibbutz as a collective value-oriented society has been demonstrated in recent years in wake of the serious socio-economic crisis which the majority of the kibbutz movement is now undergoing. The adherence to traditional kibbutz values, both in terms of its policy of investment and of developing its economy, and in the preservation of the principle of self-labor, prevented the financial complications which sent an extremely severe shock through the economy of the general kibbutz movement. But the economic shock also brought to the surface the processes of breakdown in relation to the egalitarian-collective nature of the kibbutz. One may state that such processes have not thus far been manifested in the religious kibbutz.
34. The secular kibbutz also managed to preserve its character as a collective community through its quasi-religious belief in a social and national (Zionist-socialist) vision. From this point of view, the kibbutz originally had clearly religious characteristics, expressed in the manner in which the kibbutz world-view conveyed significance upon its way of life, demanding many personal sacrifices. Hence, the decline of its ideology and the wearing away of faith in the vision of the kibbutz rendered the sacrifices required by an egalitarian-communal way of life intolerable. But it seems natural that the religious kibbutz succeeded in preserving the religious spirit of collective communitarianism more than did the secular kibbutz. There has been intense discussion of this problematic in kibbutz publications over the past decade. See especially the periodical *Shedemot*, and parallel to that the monthly of the religious kibbutz movement, *'Amudim*.
35. The issue of the influence of ultra-Orthodox yeshivah idealism particularly occupies the educators of the religious kibbutz movement, and the subject has risen for discussion in recent years in almost every issue of *'Amudim*, the religious kibbutz journal.
36. As they did not come from the same ideological-socialist background as characterized European Jewish immigration (especially that from Eastern Europe), the collectivist idea seemed alien and repellent, especially in the eyes of those people who formed the mass immigrations which came to Israel following the establishment of the state. To this must be added the fact that the economic-settlement task shifted

from emphasis upon agricultural development to emphasis upon modern industrial development.

37. At the basis of the creation of the "status quo" there lay the well-known assumption of Herzl at the First Zionist Congress that "Zionism has no interest in religion." That is, it does not involve itself in matters of Jewish education and the religious way of life. It leaves these to the rabbis, and focuses upon the political struggle of the Jewish people to renew its life in its land. Rabbi Reines, together with the leadership of the Mizrachi, adopted this principle (despite the opposition of Rabbi Kook), by which the concern of Zionism was limited to the creation of the material basis for Jewish national life. They saw the basis for the cooperation between religious and non-religious people in the realization of Zionism, and relied upon this in their struggle against the demand of Ahad Haam and his followers to introduce an educational plank as a central clause in the Zionist platform. When, in the final analysis, members of the "democratic fraction," who advocated "Spiritual Zionism," succeeded in introducing the education clause at the Tenth Zionist Congress, this led to a deep crisis which ended in the compromise granting a framework of autonomous activity to each camp. See Ehud Luz, *Maqbilim Nifgashim*, *op. cit.*, Ch. 5, pp. 187-213.

38. This change found most striking and dramatic practical expression immediately upon the establishment of the state (see Yoel Rappel, "Relations between Religious and Non-Religious During the First Year of Independence" [Heb.], in Mordecai Naor, ed., *Shanah Rishonah le-'Azma'ut* [Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1980], pp. 127-143), but it was raised and concretized in the polemic that broke out in 1950 concerning the constitution for the State of Israel. The fact that it was (and still is) impossible to arrive at an agreement concerning a constitution due to the firm religious position concerning this matter determined in effect the beginning of the struggle concerning the actual Jewish image of the State of Israel, and the meaning of the concept "Jewish state" in practice, as a central topic illustrative of religious-secular relations in the State of Israel. From here on in, the social and political conflict continued around the image of the Jewish "public street" in the state, and that of "religious legislation."

39. It is true that Zionism constitutes the framework for the "national consensus" of the Jewish public in the State of Israel, and in this respect nearly all of the parties are partners to it. It also constitutes the framework for relations between the Jewish people and the State of Israel. However, in terms of "national consensus," the Zionist ideology acquired a more general sense of a positive relationship to the State of Israel and recognition of its centrality in the life of the Jewish people. When one speaks of the attitude towards various issues concerning the shaping of the economic, social, cultural and political life of the Jewish people and the State of Israel, the discussion does not develop within the framework of the Zionist movement or on the basis of its platform. This may be seen especially in the reformulation

of the platform of the Zionist Organization at the "Jerusalem Congress" following the establishment of the state, as well as in the secondary status of the Zionist Organization within the State of Israel. See Moshe Davis, ed., *Zionism in Transition* (New York: Herzl Press, 1980).

40. At the basis of these things lies the distinction between a spiritual movement and a political party. Most of the political parties in the Jewish Yishuv (settlement) prior to the establishment of the state represented spiritual movements which presented an overall world-view and way of life through a crystallized ideology and educational system. This phenomenon disappeared by degree following the creation of the state, without openly stating this. It seems that this fact indeed found open expression in the public debate which broke out in the Labor Party concerning the changes demanded by part of the younger leadership both in the ideological manifesto of the party and in its symbols.

41. See Eliezer Schweid, "The Transfigurations of Secularism in the Jewish People" [Heb.], in *Midrash de-Had Yoma* 4 (Bet Yatir: Hotsa'at Bet Yatir, 1986), pp. 19-45.

42. See Raymond Aron, *Progress and Disillusion; the Dialectics of Modern Society* (London, 1968).

43. This approach finds expression primarily in the relationship of Orthodox theology to the question of theodicy vis-a-vis the Holocaust. The crux of the dilemma is transferred from God to man, pointing towards the failure stemming from the arrogance of human sovereignty that characterizes modernity. In this respect, there is a common denominator between a "centrist" Orthodox rabbi such as Immanuel Jakobovitz (see "Religious Responses to the Holocaust," *L'Eylah* [1988], pp. 2-7) and most ultra-Orthodox rabbis (see Rabbis Yoel Schwartz and Yitzhak Goldstein, in *ha- Shoah* [Jerusalem: Devar Yerushalayim, 1987]).

44. This guiding educational ideal is described in H.Y. Roth, *Ha-Hinukh ve-'Erkei ha-Adam* (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1949), esp. Chs. 6-7. It is superfluous to add that this book was written through confrontation with the changing tendencies in the understanding of education in Europe and in Israel.

45. See Shevah Eden, ed., *'Al Tokhniyot ha-Limudim ha-Hadashot* (Jerusalem, n.d.). Particularly characteristic are the articles by Aaron Yadlin, "The Change in the Development of Educational Programs" [Heb.], and Shevah Eden, "New Educational Programs, Principles and Processes" [Heb.]. A more comprehensive theoretical examination of the change and its significance appears in Orit Ikhilov, "Technotronics or Consciousness 3" [Heb.], in David Nevo, ed., *Ha-Ma'aseh ha-Hinukhi: 'Iyyun u-Mehqar* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University School of Education, 1978), pp. 407-420.

46. This matter is not openly declared as an educational ideology, but is embodied in the methodological-research direction of high school

instruction, which imitates academic instruction, and is intended in practice as preparation for university studies.

47. See Janet Aviad, "From Protest to Return: Contemporary Teshuva," *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 16 (Summer 1980):71-82; cf. Saul Meisles, *Hazarah be-Teshuvah* (Ramat Gan: Masada, 1984).

48. There is, of course, a substantive difference between the type of relations that come about in a Jewish environment in one's own state and that created in a non-Jewish milieu in the diaspora. Nevertheless, the split between Orthodoxy and the other streams and movements in the Jewish people is deepening in the diaspora as well, although there it does not acquire quite such aggressive expression.

49. The process of segregation of religious society in Israel in its own frameworks has deepened since the creation of the State of Israel. One is speaking not only of a separate educational system, and not only of a system of religious services, but of separate residential neighborhoods and settlements, from which there follows a considerable degree of separation in places of employment. Even regular army service is increasingly performed within special units.