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ISRAEL, IRAN, AND NUCLEAR WAR: A TACTICAL AND LEGAL ASSESSMENT

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Sources of the Iranian Threat to Israel / Calculating the Rationality of Israeli Preemption Against Iran / Israel's Nuclear Options: Retaliation, Counterretaliation, Preemption, Warfighting / Israeli Preemption and International Law: Under a Condition of War, Under a Condition of Peace

Current regional developments on "limited autonomy" notwithstanding, the overriding threat to peace in the Middle East is not Israel's intercommunal conflict with the Palestinians, but Iranian unconventional aggression against Israel. Yet, such aggression, which might also display genocidal intent, could be made more likely by the creation of a Palestinian state.¹ At this time, when the fundamentalist regime in Iran is preparing for an all-destructive war against the Jewish state, a war that could involve nuclear weapons, that regime can and must be constrained by Jerusalem's full resort to protections afforded by the law of nations. As the following discussion makes clear, these protections include defensive or preemptive strikes directed exclusively against Iranian military targets.

Sources of the Iranian Threat to Israel

Israel faces serious and unprecedented danger from Iran! The sources of this danger lie in that revolutionary Islamic regime's development of mass destruction weapons and in its unalterably theologi-

cal commitment to the destruction of the Jewish state. Taken together, this congruence of capabilities and intentions portends nothing less than preparations for a genocidal war in the region, a war that would assuredly have grave consequences for the Middle East, for the United States, and for the world as a whole.

During the past three years, Iran has received several billion dollars worth of arms from North Korea, China, and Czechoslovakia. Among recent purchases from Russia were two squadrons of Mig-29 combat aircraft, numerous T-27 tanks, and three diesel-powered submarines. In April 1992, Iran purchased heavy military hardware, including missiles, from the non-Muslim Republic of Ukraine. Most significantly, Iran has likely acquired *nuclear* weapons and support equipment from the Muslim Republic of Kazakhstan. Transportation of the weapons and weapons components was likely organized via the "good offices" of Turkmenistan.

Iran also has an indigenous nuclear program,

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centered at ten widely-dispersed sites, beginning with Tabriz in the north, continuing through the large installation at Isfahan, and winding up in the nuclear facility at Busheir on the Persian Gulf. Aptly named the "Death Program" by Iran, that country's nuclear ambitions will cost an estimated \$4 billion during 1992-1995. According to Arie Stav, most of the Death Program is directed by Pakistan: "Abdel Kader Khan, responsible for the development of the Pakistani Bomb, is chief adviser to the Iranian Nuclear Energy Commission, and Iranian technicians receive their training in Islamabad."

Theologically, any sort of peace settlement with Israel is seen as an intolerable affront to Islam and as a negation of Iran's Islamic identity. As for territorial compromise over "Palestine," this, too, is out of the question. Because a Muslim land in the heart of *dar al-islam* (the abode of Islam) can only be ruled properly by a Muslim authority, Israel's "usurpation" of any Arab land must be met with *jihad* (holy war). Described by the current Islamic leadership in Teheran as "a cancerous growth in the Middle East," Israel is approached as a *malignancy* not because of its particular policies, but because it is a *Jewish state*. Short of ceasing to exist, therefore, there is absolutely nothing Jerusalem can do to satisfy Iran.

In the words of the fundamentalist publication *al-Da'wa* (The Mission), the status of Israel is identical to the status of the individual Jew. "The race (sic) is corrupt at the root, full of duplicity, and the Muslims have everything to lose in seeking to deal with them; they must be exterminated."

Historically, the Islamic world's orientation to genocide against the Jews has not been limited to idle phrase-making. Even before Israel came into existence, on November 28, 1941, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin, met in Berlin with Adolph Hitler to discuss "the final solution of the Jewish Question." This meeting, which followed Haj Amin's active organization of Muslim SS troops in Bosnia, included the Mufti's promise to aid Germany in the war. Later, after Israel's trial and punishment of Nazi criminal Adolph Eichmann in 1961, Iranian and Arab newspapers treated the mass murderer as a "martyr," and congratulated him for having "conferred a real blessing on humanity" by liquidating six million Jews.

As defined at the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, the essence of this crime against humanity is the "intent to destroy" a hated group. In Iran, such intent has been displayed not only

against the Jews in Israel, but also against the country's own Baha'i community. Indeed, rarely has genocidal intent been more unambiguously expressed as when Hujjatu'l-Islam Qazai, president of the revolutionary court in Shiraz, Iran, justified total destruction of the Baha'i:

The Iranian nation has determined to establish the government of God on earth. Therefore, it cannot tolerate the perverted Baha'i who are instruments of Satan and the followers of the devil and of the super powers and their agents....It is absolutely certain that in the Islamic Republic of Iran there is no place for Baha'i and Baha'ism....Before it is too late the Baha'is should recant Baha'ism, which is condemned by reason and logic. Otherwise, the day will come when the Islamic nation will deal with them in accordance with its religious obligations, as it has dealt with other hypocrites....The Muslim nation will, God willing, fulfill the prayer of Noah [from the Koran]: "And Noah said, Lord, leave not a single family of Infidels on the Earth: For if Thou leave them, they will beguile Thy servants and will beget only sinners, infidels."

To implement its genocidal strategy of annihilation against Israel, Iran is already at war with the Jewish state, an insurgent war utilizing the Hizbullah surrogate organization in the Bekaa (Lebanon). Representing the active terror arm of Iran, Hizbullah is an extremist Islamic force animated only by the path of "armed struggle." Informed observers currently estimate its strength at four "brigades," totalling about 1,000 armed men.

Iran is also behind the marked escalation in Hamas terrorism against Israeli targets. Although, historically, Iran has favored the Palestinian Islamic Jihad — a staunchly pro-Shiite organization — a new tilt toward Hamas took place after the second Gulf War. Recently, the Hamas-Iran relationship was strengthened by a \$30 million grant from Teheran. Moreover, Hamas has been exploring avenues of cooperation with Hizbullah, with the latter now preparing to establish a Hamas liaison office in southern Lebanon.

But for Iran, terrorist attacks upon Israel are only an opening salvo of a much greater war, a "softening" strategy that weakens the Jewish state for subsequent direct assaults. Such assaults, if Iran is left to its own devices, unhindered and unopposed, might well exhibit chemical or even nuclear forms of aggression. Because massive and unconventional first strikes against Israel

could prevent altogether an unacceptably damaging reprisal, Israel may *soon* have no choice but strike first itself.

Calculating the Rationality of Israeli Preemption Against Iran

But would preemption against Iran be tactically cost-effective? This, of course, would depend upon a number of critical variables, including: (a) the expected probability of Iranian first-strikes; (b) the expected disutility of Iranian first-strikes (itself dependent upon the nature of Iranian weaponry, projected Iranian targeting doctrine, and multiplication/dispersion/hardening of Israeli nuclear forces); (c) the expected schedule of Iranian unconventional weapons deployment; (d) the expected efficiency of Iranian active defenses over time (anti-tactical ballistic missile system developments); (e) the expected efficiency of Israeli active defenses over time; (f) the expected efficiency of Israeli hard-target counterforce operations over time; (g) the expected reactions of other regional enemies (e.g., Syria); and (h) the expected world community reactions to Israeli preemptions. Reduced to its essential dimensions, Israel's dilemma is this: Should it plan for anticipatory self-defense attacks against Iranian unconventional forces at all, and — if it should — precisely *when* should these attacks be mounted? Where it is assumed that Iran will only be adding to its chemical/biological/nuclear arsenals, and that these additions will make effective Israeli preemptions more and more problematic, rational strategy would seem to compel Jerusalem to act defensively *as soon as possible*. If, however, it is assumed that there will be no significant enlargement/deployment of Iranian unconventional weapons over time, this *may* suggest a diminished rationale for Israel to strike first. Critical considerations here would include Israeli assumptions about Iranian rationality, expectations about the costs to Israel of Iranian aggression in the near term; comparisons of the costs to Israel of Iranian near-term aggression with those of Iranian reprisals to Israeli preemption; and the projected efficacy over time of Israeli and Iranian anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) operations.

Israel's decision on preemption must take into careful account the relative vulnerability and size of its own and Iranian nuclear weapons and associated command and control systems, with particular reference to projections over time. All nuclear powers are *not* the same. There *are* important differences between such powers based not only upon yield and destructiveness,

but also upon size/durability/survivability. Recalling Leo Szilard's phrase about nuclear powers equipped only with "the sting of the bee" (the bee dies after it has stung), Israel's inclination to strike first would be greatest where Iran is limited to "bee sting" nuclear capacity and Israel is *not* so limited. Iran's preemption option, therefore, would be most compelling where Israel displays "bee sting" capacity and Iran is not so limited. This means, among other things, that Jerusalem must now do what it can to: (a) ensure that Iran is prevented from *ever* achieving more than a "bee sting" nuclear capability; and (b) ensure that Israel is prevented from *ever* being reduced to a "bee sting" status.

It is possible, of course, that Israel could find itself with only a "bee sting" capacity and discover that Iran has developed beyond such limitations. Here the rationality of Israeli preemption could not be ruled out, in spite of Israel's marked strategic inferiority, especially if an Iranian first-strike is expected with a high degree of probability. Although the costs of such an Israeli preemption would, by definition, be overwhelming, they might be *less overwhelming* than the costs of not preempting. Similarly, if Iran should find itself with only a "bee sting" capacity and recognize that Israel is not so constrained (a far more plausible scenario than the above), it might decide — quite rationally — to strike first. Expecting an Israeli preemption under such conditions of relative inferiority, Iran would anticipate extraordinary harms, but possibly *less* extraordinary than the expected harms of not striking first.

Ironically, Jerusalem's inclination to strike first could also be affected by the steps taken by Iran to guard against preemption. Should Israel refrain too long from striking first, Iran is apt to implement protective measures that would post additional hazards to the Jewish state. These measures could involve the attachment of "hair trigger" launch mechanisms to nuclear weapon systems, and/or the adoption of "launch-on-warning" policies, possibly coupled with predelegations of launch authority.

Optimally, Israel would do everything possible to prevent such measures from being installed in the first place, especially because of the expanded risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks against its armaments and populations. Yet, if such measures become a *fait accompli*, Jerusalem might still calculate that a preemptive strike would be cost-effective. This is because the expected Iranian retaliation, however damaging, might still appear *more tolerable* than the expected conse-

quences of Iranian first-strikes (strikes most likely occasioned by the failure of "anti-preemption" measures).

More than any other factor, perhaps, the *expected rationality* of Iranian decision-makers will figure in Israeli judgments on the preemption option. If, after all, these leaders were expected to strike at Israel with unconventional forces irrespective of anticipated Israeli counterstrikes, deterrence (by definition) would be immobilized. This means that Iranian strikes could be expected even if Iran understood that Israel had "successfully" deployed its own nuclear weapons in altogether survivable modes, that Israel's weapons were altogether capable of penetrating Iranian active defenses, and that Israel's leaders were altogether willing to retaliate.

Faced with an irrational adversary in Iran, Israel would have no choice but to abandon reliance on traditional models of nuclear deterrence. Here, preemption would become obligatory; the only questions would center on matters of timing, targeting, and configuration of ordnance. Needless to say, the initial judgment concerning Iranian definitions of "unacceptable damage" would have to be made with great care.

The United States may soon recognize Israel's precarious position and take decisive steps to reduce Iranian preparations for renewed aggression. Failing such steps, Israel may conclude that prompt non-nuclear preemption, as a peremptory expression of "anticipatory self-defense" in international law, is the only way to protect itself. Preemption may in fact be the best available legal means of reducing the risk of regional nuclear war.

Israel's Nuclear Options

There is a lesson in all this for Israel's enemies and friends: the real danger to peace in the Middle East is not intercommunal conflict with the Palestinians, but war, and it is in Teheran — not Jerusalem — that war is being prepared. Should these preparations continue at a rate that remains ominous for essential Israeli security, Israel will almost certainly have to strike first itself. Should the United States seek genuine stability for the region, it will have to avoid treating Iran as it once dealt with Iraq. Jerusalem cannot base its survival upon the wise ways of Washington geopolitics.

Israel's enemies and friends must understand that there *are* conditions wherein Jerusalem might decide to actually use its nuclear weapons. Faced with what would be perceived as imminent destruction of the Third Commonwealth, Israel's leaders would likely do

whatever is needed to endure, including a resort to nuclear retaliation, nuclear counterretaliation, nuclear preemption, and nuclear warfighting.

Nuclear Retaliation

Should Iran launch a nuclear first-strike against Israel, Jerusalem would certainly respond, to the extent possible, with a nuclear retaliatory strike. If Iranian first-strikes were to involve other forms of unconventional weapons — i.e., chemical and/or biological weapons — Israel *might* launch a nuclear reprisal (depending, in large measure, upon Jerusalem's expectations of follow-on aggression and on its associated calculations of comparative damage-limitation). If Israel absorbed a massive conventional attack, a nuclear retaliation could not be ruled out, especially if: (a) the aggressor were perceived to hold nuclear and/or other unconventional weapons in reserve; and/or (b) Israel's leaders were to believe that non-nuclear retaliations could not prevent destruction of the Third Commonwealth. A nuclear retaliation by Israel could be ruled out only in circumstances where enemy aggression was clearly conventional, "typical" (i.e., consistent with previous instances of Arab attacks in degree and intent), and hard-target directed.

Nuclear Counterretaliation

Should Israel feel compelled to preempt enemy aggression with conventional weapons, the target state(s) response would largely determine Jerusalem's next moves. If this response were in any way nuclear, Israel would assuredly resort to nuclear counterretaliation. If this retaliation were to involve chemical and/or biological weapons, Israel might also feel pressed to take the escalatory initiative (again, depending upon Jerusalem's judgments of enemy intent and its calculations of essential damage-limitation). Should the Iranian response to Israel's preemption be limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is most unlikely that the Jewish state would move on to nuclear counterretaliations. If, however, the enemy conventional retaliation was all-out and directed toward civilian populations as well as to military targets, an Israeli nuclear counterretaliation could not be ruled out. It would appear that such a counterretaliation *could* be ruled out only if the enemy conventional retaliation were entirely proportionate to Israel's preemption, confined exclusively to Israeli hard-targets, circumscribed by the jurisprudential limits of military necessity, and accompanied by explicit assurances of non-escalatory intent.

Nuclear Preemption

It is extremely unlikely that Israel would ever decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. Although circumstances might arise wherein such a strike would be perfectly *rational* (i.e., the prospective benefits of the strike would outweigh the prospective costs), it is implausible that Israel would allow itself to reach these circumstances. Moreover, unless the nuclear weapons involved were used in a fashion consistent with the authoritative expectations of the laws of war — the limits of discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity — this form of preemption would clearly represent an egregious violation of international law. And even if such consistency were possible, the psychological/political impact on the world community would be negative and far-reaching. It follows that an Israeli nuclear preemption could be expected only: (a) where Israel's enemies in Iran had acquired nuclear and/or other unconventional weapons judged capable of destroying the Third Commonwealth; (b) where these enemies had made clear that their intentions paralleled their capabilities; (c) where these enemies were believed ready to begin a "countdown to launch"; and (d) where Jerusalem believed that Israeli non-nuclear preemptions could not achieve minimum levels of damage-limitation (i.e., levels consistent with the preservation of the Third Commonwealth).

Nuclear Warfighting

Should nuclear weapons be introduced into the conflict between Israel and Iran, either by the Jewish state or by Teheran, nuclear warfighting, at one level or another, would ensue. This would hold true as long as: (a) enemy first-strikes against Israel would not destroy Jerusalem's second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy retaliations for Israeli conventional preemption would not destroy Jerusalem's nuclear counterretaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons would not destroy Iranian second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for enemy conventional first-strikes would not destroy Iranian nuclear counterretaliatory capability. It follows, from the standpoint of Israel's strategic requirements, that Jerusalem should now ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b) above, and the unlikelihood of (c) and (d).

In assessing the reasonableness/cost effectiveness of this counterforce strategy for Israel, it is important to first identify and clarify assumptions about Iranian inclinations to strike first and about associated Iranian intentions to strike all-at-once or in stages. For exam-

ple, should Israel assume that Iran is apt to strike first *and* to strike in an unlimited fashion (i.e., to fire all nuclear warheads immediately), Israeli counterforce-targeted warheads, used in retaliation, would hit only empty silos/launchers. It follows, in such circumstances, that Israel's only rational application of counterforce doctrine should be to strike first itself.

If, for whatever reason, Israel were to reject the first-strike option, given the above assumptions there would be no reason to opt for counterforce. Indeed, from the standpoint of compelling intra-war deterrence, a countervalue strategy could prove substantially more purposeful under such conditions. Of course, should Israeli analysts assume that Iran is apt to strike first *and* to strike in a limited fashion, holding some significant measure of nuclear firepower in reserve for follow-on strikes, Israeli counterforce-targeted warheads, used in retaliation, could have meaningful damage-limiting benefits. Here, counterforce operations would serve both an Israeli preemption or, should Israel decide, for whatever reason, not to preempt, an Israeli retaliatory strike. Moreover, should an Israeli first-strike be intentionally limited, perhaps because it would be coupled with a guarantee of no further destruction in exchange for an end to hostilities, such operations could serve an Israeli counter-retaliatory strike. This is the case because Israel's attempt at intra-war deterrence could fail, occasioning the need for follow-on strikes to produce essential damage-limitation.

One would expect, in this regard, that Israel will want to develop precision low-yield warheads that could reduce collateral damage to acceptable levels, and hypervelocity warheads that would overcome active defenses. In the United States, during fiscal year 1992, Department of Energy scientists were already in the first phase of design work on such nuclear weapons, which would be aircraft-carried. The U.S. is also continuing work on other categories of nuclear weapons that could be adapted to Israel's particular needs: tactical and strategic radio-frequency weapons. These are nuclear warheads tailored to produce as much electromagnetic pulse as possible, destroying electronics and communications over wide areas.

Israel's security and survival are essential to American interests in the region. It follows that Washington should enlarge areas of cooperation with Jerusalem, especially on state-of-the-art offensive and defensive weapons systems. Moreover, having learned from the Gulf War that national security requires computer security, both countries should share technology on the

protection of sensitive military information in government computer systems. Such sharing would have a dual purpose: (1) protection of U.S. and Israeli military computer systems; and (2) penetration of Iranian military computer systems.

Israel is now only a few years away from producing submarine-launched cruise missiles. Once deployed, such weapons, if disclosed, could ensure the survivability/invulnerability of Jerusalem's nuclear deterrent. At the same time, even a secure second-strike force would not inhibit an irrational aggressor from striking first. This means that Israel cannot preclude the preemption option against Iran and that it must prepare for the possible exercise of this option *before* Teheran embarks upon full-scale nuclear deployment. The only way in which Israel could choose, correctly, to rely entirely on deterrence — rejecting the preemption option altogether — would be if: (a) Iran were judged to be a conclusively rational adversary, and/or (b) Israel were judged to have a 100 percent effective anti-tactical ballistic missile capability. It should come as little surprise that both of these judgments are exceedingly improbable.

Israeli Preemption and International Law

"All time," says T.S. Eliot, "is unredeemable." Understood in terms of Israel's current posture vis-a-vis Iran, the poet's wisdom suggests that Jerusalem now follow its own indispensable security requirements within the settled expectations of international law. Although such advice may sound harsh or even narrowly self-centered, it can be ignored only at the risk of much greater harshness directed against the Jewish state, harshness and harms in violation of every basic human right.

International society is not a suicide pact! As long as the government in Iran remains openly committed to the genocidal destruction of Israel, Jerusalem has both the right and the *obligation* to endure. From the standpoint of international law, an Israeli preemption could be altogether permissible under both conditions of war and conditions of peace.

Preemption Under a Condition of War

Should Israel choose to argue for the permissibility of preemption on the assumption that a state of war obtains between Israel and Iran (a perfectly reasonable assumption because Iran maintains steadfastly that this is the nature of Iran-Israel relations, and because Iran's position meets current legal requirements), it could not

correctly be charged with aggression. Here, the permissibility of Israel's use of force would need to be measured only according to the standards of *jus in bello*, or justice in war. As a state of war already exists, the associated standards of *jus ad bellum*, or justice of war, would not apply.

Preemption Under a Condition of Peace

Should Israel choose to argue for the permissibility of preemption on the assumption that a state of peace obtains between Israel and Iran (an assumption that might derive from tactical concern in Jerusalem that the alternative assumption could prove to be a "double-edged sword," providing Iran with a jurisprudentially-persuasive defense against the charge of aggression), it could also be acting well within the rules of international law. Here, Israel's use of preemptive force would meet the expectations of anticipatory self-defense under international law. These expectations would not apply if a state of war were assumed to exist, because the principle of anticipatory self-defense is defined as a measure of self-help *short of war*. Of course, even where a state of peace is assumed and anticipatory self-defense strikes are undertaken, the rules of "just means" apply. This indicates, *inter alia*, that whatever the jurisprudential rationale of an Israeli preemption according to the standards of "just cause," Jerusalem's use of defensive force must satisfy the norms of humanitarian international law.

To date, Israel's arguments for preemption appear to have rested upon assumptions of a state of peace with pertinent Arab states. The reason for such assumptions is likely a tactical concern that acknowledgment of a condition of war could have been abused by these enemy states, allowing them to launch aggressive attacks against Israel that would be explained away as permissible. Expressing resorts to force in an ongoing/protracted war, these attacks would allegedly fall outside the definitional boundaries of aggression under international law. Yet, even if Israel were to change these assumptions vis-a-vis Iran, that state could argue, however unreasonably, that its own first-strikes against the Jewish state were an instance of anticipatory self-defense. It follows that the prospect of legal abuse of the right to use force by Israel's enemies, including Iran, exists under both an assumed state of war and an assumed state of peace, and that Jerusalem would enjoy no particular jurisprudential advantage from making one assumption or the other.

"Just wars," we learn from Grotius, "arise from our

love of the innocent." Recognizing this, the State of Israel — now facing a growing threat of unconventional aggression from Iran — may soon have to consider exercising the preemption option. Founded upon the imperative to protect its innocent civilian populations from new forms of genocide, such an option could surely meet the test of a "just war." Although international law would be operating most successfully by preventing all uses of force between these states, Israel cannot base its very survival on the assumption of Iranian nonaggression. As the foregoing argument has made clear, the law of nations does not require any state to wait passively for its own annihilation. Regarding Israel and its safety from catastrophic attack, this law acknowledges that preemptive strikes against Iran — whether under assumed conditions of war or peace — could be not only permissible, but distinctly law-enforcing.

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Note

1. This *Jerusalem Letter* does not explore the particular connections between creation of a Palestinian state and Israel's vulnerability to Iranian attack. For anyone who might be interested in such an exploration, see: Louis Rene Beres, "A Palestinian State and Israel's Nuclear Strategy," *Crossroads: An International Socio-political Journal*, No. 31 (1991):97-104; Louis Rene Beres,

"The Question of Palestine and Israel's Nuclear Strategy," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 4 (October-December 1991):451-460; Louis Rene Beres, "Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 1991):227-234; Louis Rene Beres, "A Palestinian State: Implications for Israel's Security and the Possibility of Nuclear War," *Bulletin of the Jerusalem Institute for Western Defence*, Vol. 4, Bulletin No. 3 (October 1991):3-10; Louis Rene Beres, *Israeli Security and Nuclear Weapons*, PSIS Occasional Papers, No. 1 (1990), Geneva, Graduate Institute of International Studies; and Louis Rene Beres, "After the Gulf War: Israel, 'Palestine,' and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Middle East," *Strategic Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (Fall 1991):48-55.

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THE PUBLICATION OF

Fundamentalist Islam and Israel: Essays in Interpretation

Raphael Israeli

This book provides an in-depth account and analysis of Islamic fundamentalism today, a powerful religious movement having the most far-reaching goals, and how it has an impact on Israel's relations with the Arab and Islamic worlds. Of special interest is Chapter 7, "The Charter of Allah," which contains a complete English translation by the author of the platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). What Dr. Israeli has to say is important not only for Israelis but for the whole Western world, which now confronts revivalist Islam, not only in the Middle East but in Europe itself, and even in such far-flung fragments of European civilization as the United States and Australia. While the West has yet to learn how to deal with this movement, this book should be a great help in developing a proper understanding and a proper strategy to do so.

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