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HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT – THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP

Shmuel Sandler

On 30 January 1986, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat stalked out of his meeting with King Hussein of Jordan, thus publicly demonstrating the strong disagreement between the two regarding how to proceed toward negotiations with Israel. For close observers of the scene, this should not have been a surprise. The rapprochement between Hussein of Jordan and was one of the most significant developments since the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut in September 1982. The two leaders consolidated their alliance on 11 February 1985 with an agreement according Hussein a key role in negotiations concerning the West Bank and Gaza Strip through a combined Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Although this new alliance was condemned

by pro-Syrian factions of the PLO, most inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip welcomed the Hussein-Arafat agreement. This reconciliation raises several questions. Why was Hussein ready to negotiate with the PLO after the latter nearly toppled his regime in 1969-1970? In light of the troubled record between the Palestinian national movement and the Hashemite kingdom, how is the Palestinians' behavior in general and that of those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in particular explained? Why was the PLO ready to compromise one of its most important achievements – the recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people by the Rabat Conference of 1974?

The Hashemite Kingdom and the West Bank

An understanding of Jordan's behavior in the Arab-Israeli context is facilitated by recalling that the Hashemite dynasty is a foreign implant which has ruled over the territory east of the Jordan River since 1922. Brought here by the British from the Arabian Peninsula, their rule was based on British support, subsequently replaced by American military and economic assistance. The Hashemites have always tempered grand territorial ambitions with political realism. While they had designs on the territories west of the Jordan River, they also moderated their aspirations to correspond with their limited military resources. They comprehended the power of Arab nationalism as a driving force, but also recognized its potential threat to the monarchy. Having lost the holy places of Mecca and Medina to the Saudi dynasty, they desired to control Jerusalem. However, major development efforts went into Amman, the basis of their power, while development of the Holy City was downgraded. Finally, while accepting the pan-Arab maxim of Zionist illegitimacy in an Arab region, the Jordanians did not hesitate to negotiate with Zionist representatives when important issues were at stake.

King Abdullah's negotiations with the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) were motivated by his understanding that the Palestinian national movement ultimately presented a greater threat to his throne and territorial ambitions than did the Zionist movement. He felt that Transjordan needed a presence on the west bank of the Jordan River in order to perform forcefully in the arena of regional Arab politics. The Palestinian refusal to negotiate with the Zionists played straight into Abdullah's hands. By 1949, the Palestinians had left their homes in Israel and found themselves with no territorial base or communal structure. On the other hand, Abdullah emerged from the war with a share in western Palestine and control over East Jerusalem. The king paid a personal price for his policies when he was assassinated by a Palestinian in 1950. His legacy was carried on by his grandson, King Hussein, who continued to value Jordan's presence in East Jerusalem and the West Bank despite recurring local demonstrations against the regime and Israeli

reprisals for Palestinian terrorist acts.

Since losing the West Bank and East Jerusalem to Israel in the Six-Day War, King Hussein never abandoned his ambition to return. Despite the reservations of his brother, Crown Prince Hassan, he attempted to maintain Jordanian influence in the region and offered various schemes for the return of the West Bank to his kingdom. Even after the blow of the 1974 Rabat Conference and the defeat of his candidates in the 1976 municipal elections in the cities west of the river, Hussein still waited patiently to be invited to negotiate over the future of the area. In fact, the Likud government and Ariel Sharon may have helped pave the way for this development. Sharon's battle against the PLO, which included the removal of pro-PLO mayors from West Bank towns, the PLO's expulsion from Beirut, and the rejections of the Reagan Plan of 1 September 1982, enabled Jordan to re-emerge as a key player in Palestinian politics. In Israel, the Labor Party's return to power also assisted Hussein's plans. Prime Minister Shimon Peres' belief in the "Jordanian option" placed the king in a strategic position for any possible future negotiations over the territories. However, Hussein, mindful of the fate of his grandfather and that of President Sadat, is a careful player. He is aware that he needs some support from the inhabitants of the territories.

The Position of the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza

West Bank Palestinians have always felt ambivalent towards Jordan. On the one hand, Jordan saved them from Israeli occupation in 1948. Unlike other Arab states, Jordan provided them with citizenship and a home. Many of the Palestinian elite were coopted into the regime. In the post-1967 period, Jordan linked Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip with the Arab world through its "open bridges" policy. Most of the local Palestinian families have relatives in Jordan where the Palestinians comprise a numerical majority. On the other hand, the Jordanian crackdown on the PLO in the 1970-71 civil war and Jordan's continued association with traditional elites in the territories has sullied Jordan in Palestinian eyes.

West Bank and Gaza Arabs must weigh the possible return of Jordanian domination against

the maintenance of the status quo and Israeli rule. In the words of Ziad Abu Ziad, a prominent Palestinian journalist, "A PLO-governed state is the first choice of these Arabs, but for many, Jordanian rule is preferable to a continued Israeli presence." A powerful lobby of pro-Jordanians in the territories headed by prominent personalities such as Ma'azuz Al-Masri, former mayor of Nablus and one of the wealthiest men in the territories; Basil Kna'an, of the same city; 'Isam 'Anani, a well known lawyer and businessman; and Rashid Al-Shawa, the former mayor of Gaza, have been propagating the message that time is not in their favor and that it is now necessary "to save what can be saved" amidst the rapid expansion of Israeli settlements in the territories. This means closing ranks with Jordan. While Jordan has strengthened its position, the PLO has weakened.

The PLO

Yasser Arafat of the post-1982, Beirut era is a man who must choose the lesser of two evils. After a series of triumphs in the early 1970s, he now heads a shattered organization. In those early years, the PLO secured the Rabat Declaration by the Arab states, recognition by the United Nations, a landslide in the 1976 municipal elections in the West Bank, and a territorial base in Lebanon, which served as an autonomous territory for launching military attacks on Israel.

Most of these accomplishments have been erased recently. Not only did the PLO lose its territorial base in southern Lebanon, but it emerged as an organization containing many factions controlled by Syria. President Assad, who expelled Arafat from Tripoli, has pledged to replace him as the leader of the PLO.

Meanwhile, Israel considerably weakened the PLO power base in the territories by removing six PLO mayors in Judea and Samaria. Today Zafir Al-Masri, the former deputy mayor of Nablus during Bassam Al-Shaq'a's term in office and a scion of the prominent pro-Jordanian Al-Masri family, has replaced an Israeli official as mayor in Nablus. Other pro-Jordanian candidates are likely to follow suit and to replace Israeli officials in Hebron, Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Jenin, and Qalquilya. The PLO mainstream in the territories has acquiesced

to Al-Masri's appointment, because it was widely supported by the population of the largest city in the territories. *Al Fajr*, the PLO's press organ, even published Al-Masri's first open letter to Ramallah's inhabitants. These factors pushed Arafat to turn to Egypt, a country he had previously condemned for signing a peace treaty with Israel, and to Hussein, whom the Palestinians had once dubbed the "Butcher of Amman."

What does Arafat expect to gain from Egypt and Jordan? First, both countries are on good terms with the United States. Arafat has finally realized that United States recognition is decisive in receiving international legitimacy, despite the anti-American majority at the United Nations. Diplomatic support by the Soviet bloc and third world countries may once have been sufficient to provide the PLO with observer status at the United Nations, but traversing the distance to full membership in the international community requires American recognition. Only Egyptian and Jordanian intercession can persuade the U.S. to recognize the PLO.

Egypt and Jordan are also contiguous to "occupied" Palestine. Cairo and Amman remain the two Arab capitals geographically close to Israel since the PLO has been removed from Lebanon and Syria. Finally, Israel's readiness to negotiate with Jordan over the future of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza promoted the status of Hussein as a representative of Palestinian claims. Growing pressures by local Palestinians to stop Israeli penetration into the heartland of Judea and Samaria forced Arafat to turn to the only Arab leader accepted by the Israeli government as a partner for negotiations. Boycotted by the extremist Arab regimes, a weakened Arafat could no longer ignore the demands made by moderate Arab countries and his Palestinian constituency.

However, Arafat could have adopted a different strategy and greater improved his chances of achieving his goals. The United States has conditioned direct negotiations with the PLO upon acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and Palestinian recognition of Israel's right to exist. Israel has hinted that it will negotiate with the PLO once it changes the Palestinian National Charter which calls for Israel's replacement by a democratic Arab state. Even if Israel were to ignore such a step by the PLO, international pressure would force Israel to

negotiate with them. Thus Arafat could have declared that his organization accepts Israel's legitimacy. This would force both the U.S. and Israel to accept the PLO as a partner in negotiations over the future of the territories and the Palestinian people. Under such circumstances Arafat would not have needed King Hussein to negotiate on his behalf.

Why has Arafat rejected such an obvious political strategy? Why has the PLO rejected calls to abandon its national charter or at least accept Resolutions 242 and 338? Why does Arafat prefer to turn to the Hashemite dynasty and endanger all his accomplishments rather than accept the reality of Israel's political existence?

Israel's most authoritative expert on the PLO, Yehoshafat Harkabi, once remarked that the PLO is not an organization with a charter but rather a charter with an organization. The national covenant became an institution of its own, and, to a large extent, it represents Palestinian identity more than the PLO. It is part of the Middle East tragedy that Palestinian identity is based on the negation of the existence of another people with attachment to the same territory. In addition, the charter has an underlying function. The PLO is an umbrella organization encompassing groups with competing ideological orientations, leadership and bureaucracies. Several of these organizations were established by rival Arab countries and are still funded by them. In time, it became clear that their only common denominator is the Palestinian National Charter. Arafat, who could not abandon the document when he was the unchallenged Palestinian authority, cannot possibly do it now when he is a weakened and controversial leader. At present, Arafat is not even capable of accepting the U.N. resolutions, which would still be a far cry from abandoning the Palestinian Covenant.

A Historical Perspective

Arafat's behavior in the mid-1980s can be compared to that of the Mufti Haj Amin Al-Husaini in the late 1930s and 1940s following the Arab uprising in Mandatory Palestine. Faced then with the growing power of the Jewish community and the need to reevaluate Palestinian strategy, the Mufti invited the Arab countries to intervene on their behalf and

represent their interests, rather than trying to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Zionists. The Arab states responded to this appeal, but abused the Palestinians. During their military campaign against Israel in 1948-49, they urged the Arab population to leave Palestine until they could return as victors. After their defeat, these states refused to form a Palestinian state in the areas of Palestine still in Arab hands. These states abolished the communal structure of the Palestinians, leaving them in refugee camps instead of absorbing them. The Hashemite dynasty played a central role in obliterating the Palestinian entity.

It seemed that the PLO had learned not to rely on the Arab states. The demand to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people seemed to be a turning point in PLO history. In reality, Palestinian behavior has not changed. By their consistent rejection of Israeli legitimacy, the Palestinian leadership has demonstrated that it has not freed itself from the ideological burden that paralyzed the Palestinian movement. When faced with the choice between accepting Israeli legitimacy or turning to the Arab states for assistance, Arafat chose the latter.

Arafat undoubtedly realizes that calling upon his Arab brethren has a price tag. He knows that he may be sacrificing all of his accomplishments of the last two decades. This may be the reason for his hesitation, which has resulted in squabbling and fiascos like the Achille Lauro affair. Both Hussein and Arafat realize that their cooperation is only tactical and that in the long run they will have to confront each other. Each leader would like to outplay the other and avoid compromising basic interests. While Hussein would like to repeat his grandfather's successes, it is Arafat's desire to avoid a replay. The tragedy implicit in this self-serving alliance is that the real victims of this bargaining process will once again be the Palestinian people.

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PLO AND DRUGS

Michael Danby

In the *Australia-Israel Review* (2 September 1985), Dr. John Laffin, an expert on Middle Eastern affairs and publisher of *Middle East and Mediterranean Outlook*, presented the background to the Australian Federal Police bust of a drug ring trafficking \$40 million of cannabis resin. Dr. Laffin explained that while the Abu Mussa (Syrian-controlled) faction of the PLO was probably involved in this particular incident in Australia, other factions of the PLO may also be involved in laundering drugs through this part of the world. The PLO, which has experienced a significant reduction in its income since its expulsion from Beirut in July 1982, has become heavily involved in drug trafficking. In South Lebanon, extortion, port taxes, fees for training international terrorists and the PLO infrastructure earned Arafat \$350-\$400 million a year. This independent source of revenue was eliminated by the Israeli army's successful drive against the PLO in 1982.

According to a *New York Post* report (2 March 2, 1983), the decision to increase the PLO's revenue by smuggling drugs was taken in Algiers on 20 February 1983, at a secret session of the PLO financial committee, chaired by Yasser Arafat. Through its covert international network, the organization is well equipped to deal in Lebanese hashish, estimated by officials of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to be worth \$2 billion a year. Dr. Grant Wardlaw, the Australian anti-terror expert on ABC radio, explained (16 August) that the growing and shipping of drugs was done with Syrian army connivance and assisted by eastern bloc distributors (probably the notorious KINTEX corporation, the official Bulgarian export agency). Furthermore media reports of the PLO-drugs nexus have been extensively aired abroad.

* The PLO was involved in smuggling heroin into Sweden, according to the Swedish newspaper, *Expression* (9 July 1982), which

reported that PLO personnel supplied heroin and protection to the smugglers while they were in Beirut.

* Egyptian officials foiled an attempt by Palestinian terrorist organizations to smuggle drugs into Egypt via the Sinai Peninsula, according to the Egyptian weekly *October* (19 September).

* Five members of one PLO faction were convicted in a British court of smuggling drugs (4 1/2 tons of cannabis resin) and buying guns. The haul, the greatest seized in Western Europe, was, according to the *London Times* negotiated by the PLO in early 1984, *Australian* (18 August).

Moreover, a top U.S. DEA investigator told Daniel Cattelain of the French Channel 2 Program that since spring 1984, Lebanon has become a new intermediary for traffic in heroin and cocaine. The drugs arrive by new routes from Latin America mainly from Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.

"We are talking about drugs whose entry to the United States via Florida, private airports in Texas, Atlantic ports, etc., we have managed to block. The Mafia has completely revamped its strategy, aided by terrorist groups operating as its praetorian guard. More and more, terrorist leaders have become godfathers in the directorates of organized crime. For political reasons, they thought of utilizing their Lebanese/Palestinian comrades. Instead of going from South America to North America through dangerous routes, drugs are sent to the Middle East. There, in exchange for narco-dollars and weapons, the Palestinians or the Shi'ite terrorists send them on - via Tripoli in northern Lebanon - to Cyprus, to Crete, to Greece, to Italy, to Marseille, etc. In this manner, drugs reach the United States the long way round, but through new and, so far, safe channels. . . ."

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ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN EGYPT AND ITS IMPACT ON PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM

Hillel Frisch

Ever since the Israeli dismissal of the pro-Palestinian mayors in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza in 1982, West Bank academics and students who are leaders in the Palestinian movement are casting worrisome glances at Egypt. They are anxiously following the campaign being waged by Egyptian Muslim fundamentalists to repeal a liberal marriage law that is part of a wider struggle to impose Islamic law in the Arab world's most populous country. In fact, recently there was an attempt by the Egyptian government to ban the classic, *One Thousand and One Nights*, due to fundamentalist pressure. However, the move was quashed by the courts.

A fundamentalist victory so close to home could pose a grave danger to the Palestinian national movement. Islamic fundamentalism has made substantial inroads in the territories during the past decade to the consternation of the nationalists who thought they had achieved a monopoly over the Palestinian issue and its politics. Muslim fundamentalists bitterly oppose local Arab nationalism. They believe in the establishment of one Muslim nation embracing Arab and non-Arab Muslims alike. The espousal of an Arab nation, or, worse still, of a separate Palestinian Arab state is anathema to Islamic fundamentalists who reject all bonds or divisions that are not based on faith.

The link between Egyptian fundamentalism and Arab Palestine is the Gaza Strip, the densely populated area of land occupied by the Egyptians between 1948 and 1967. Of its 500,000 inhabitants, over two-thirds are refugees from the 1948 War or their descendants. Most of them live in ten large refugee camps.

Fifteen years ago, Gaza, particularly its refugee camps, was a center of terrorist activity led by the various factions affiliated with the PLO. Today organized terror has been virtually wiped out by the Israelis, and the strongest political current is Islamic fundamentalism. Most of the terrorist groups uncovered in recent years have been linked to or financed by extremist groups in Egypt and Jordan.

As in Egypt, Islamic fundamentalism is strongest in the high schools and colleges. In the 1984 student council elections at the Islamic University in Gaza, the *Kutla Islamiyya* (Islamic Bloc) ran uncontested while the PLO factions, deeply divided among themselves, abstained. In the most recent elections, they garnered 76.9 percent of the vote in the women's college, and 65.1 percent in the men's. In addition, both the

administration and the faculty of the university take an openly hostile to against Arab nationalism.

Even in the West Bank, with its large secular population and small but influential Christian community, the fundamentalists have made substantial inroads. In Muslim Hebron, the fundamentalists dominated the local university elections last year. At Al-Najah National University in Nablus, they comprise the second largest student faction. They even managed to force the dismissal of a lecturer who suggested in an academic article that the Quran was written by man. The establishment of three Islamic law colleges in Judea and Samaria in the past decade has also boosted fundamentalist ranks and respectability.

Fundamentalists have gained ground while the internecine fighting between PLO factions continues. Opposition to fundamentalism has been mounted by PLO leftist factions, including the Palestinian Communists, who are the fundamentalists' prime target. Confronting the fundamentalists, though, has been difficult; most of these leftist factions are headed by Christian Arabs, a minority in an Arab society comprised of over 90 percent Muslims. The leftists take great pains to distinguish between Islam, for which they claim respect, and Islamic fundamentalism, which they claim is rejected by the majority of Muslims in the West Bank. Meanwhile, the PLO mainstream is attempting to establish a dialogue with the fundamentalists. Its East Jerusalem newspaper, *Al-Fajr*, has recently begun carrying Islamic Bloc announcements.

To the nationalistic West Bank academics and student activists, the struggle against the fundamentalists is a fight over a way of life, not just a political battle. These academics have made the most of the semi-freedom of speech and inquiry available to them under Israeli rule. Many tasted full freedom while studying in Western universities. They have no intention of fighting for Palestinian independence in order to live under theocratic oppression. After all, under Israeli occupation not only can they read *One Thousand and One Nights*, but they can also pick up a copy of *Lady Chatterly's Lover*.

Hillel Frisch is co-author with Shmuel Sandler of Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank (Lexington Books).

SURVEY OF RECENT LITERATURE

The Little Triangle: Transformation of a Region, by Avshalom Shmuelo, Itzhak Shnell, Arnon Sofer, Monograph Series on the Middle East No. 3, Haifa, University of Haifa-The Jewish-Arab Center-Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 1985, 122 pages (Hebrew with English synopsis).

The "Little Triangle" is a region thirty miles long and three miles wide on the border that once divided Israel and Jordan. This strip straddles the Sharon, Israel's narrow coastal region north of Tel Aviv, and Arab dominated Samaria. The inhabitants live in one of the most sensitive geopolitical areas in the country. In the 1984 Israeli general elections, Arab residents of this area voted overwhelmingly for the two anti-Zionist parties. Thirty-six percent voted for Hadash, a popular front dominated by the Israel Communist Party, and 30 percent voted for the new Progressive List for Peace. The triangle had the lowest voter turnout in Israel; six percent lower than the average participation rate of Israeli Arabs. The low participation is attributed partly to a growing minority of young Arabs who refuse on ideological grounds to vote in Israeli elections. All of these factors demonstrate the importance of a study of the area and its inhabitants.

This monograph, written by three Israeli geographers, provides extensive geographic analysis of the region. It is based on five years of research and over seven thousand interviews conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Its seven chapters relate a story of rapid transformation in all realms. Demographically, the population of the region more than quadrupled from 31,000 in 1949 to 130,000 in 1983. In agriculture, mechanization has replaced manual labor, and traditional crops have given way to substantial diversification, including strawberries, sub-tropical fruits, and greenhouse vegetables which maximize utilization of dwindling land reserves. Acreage has diminished as more and more land is allocated for housing.

The urbanization of the Little Triangle is a feature characterizing at various degrees of intensity twenty-one out of twenty-seven of the Arab villages that make up the region. This was marked recently by the elevation of Um

Al-Fahum, a town on the northern limits of the Little Triangle, to the highest municipal status. The authors correctly note that this form of urbanization is different from most contemporary settlement patterns in the third world, or, for that matter, former patterns in the Western world. The urbanization of the Triangle is local; there is no outmigration to the cities. Instead, because of the proximity to Israel's major metropolitan region, there is substantial commuting. There is proportionally more commuting in the northern section of the area than in the center and southern sections which are better endowed with good farm land and where a higher percentage remain farmers. On the whole, over 50 percent of the work force is employed in the Jewish sector. Occupational patterns in the Little Triangle are also different. In most third world countries undergoing rapid modernization, peasants are proletarianized; in the Little Triangle, they simultaneously were proletarianized and became bourgeoisie. While the percentage of agricultural workers dropped from 40.1 percent to 11.1 percent between 1960-1979, those employed in services jumped from 22.8 to 46.6 percent. This sector swelled to provide services to an increasingly affluent local population as well as to adjacent Jewish towns and cities.

The penultimate chapter on planning presents a less engaging picture. Because of the persistence of traditional attitudes to land ownership, family and *hamula* (clan) rivalry, and an inability of the authorities to address themselves to the special problems of the Arab sector, this expansion often took tortuous routes. Only six of the Little Triangle towns and villages have authorized master plans; illegal building is rampant and little is done to solve the pressing infrastructural problems, such as sewage disposal.

It is now the task of an interdisciplinary team of anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists to continue to study and analyze the problems of the Little Triangle where these three geographers left off. One valuable starting point would be to do a content analysis of the thousands of interviews conducted by the authors of the present monograph and evaluate the changes that can be made there.

**DATA BASE: ELECTION RESULTS OF FOUR
PALESTINIAN UNIVERSITIES IN THE TERRITORIES**

The only free elections in the Palestinian community take place in the Palestinian universities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Student wings of Palestinian organizations inside and outside the territories compete for control over powerful student councils. These elections evoke widespread interest; election results are headline news in both the local and foreign Palestinian press. The four largest and most important institutions of higher learning in the territories recently held their elections. They are Islamic University in Gaza (4,400 students), Al-Najah National University in Nablus (3,300 students), Hebron University (2,400), and Birzeit University near Ramallah (2,300)

Three student factions representing four Palestinian organizations competed at Birzeit and Hebron Universities. The Shabiba movements, affiliated with Fatah, the largest faction in the PLO; the Al-Itihad w'al-Taqadum, a coalition representing the Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian Communist Party; and the Kutla Islamiyya (the Islamic Bloc) a Muslim fundamentalist and anti-nationalist organization. At the Islamic University in Gaza and in Al-Najah in Nablus, the Popular Front's Jab'at'l-'Aml ran alone with the Communists conspicuously absent. In Al-Najah University alone, Al-Wahda, a group affiliated with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (a leftist faction in the PLO) ran for election.

The electoral system allows students to vote for candidates for specific offices. Each party offers it list of candiates. The majority of students vote according to party list, although they are at liberty to pick and choose fully. Thus, the leading party in each case won all the seats on the university's student council. The percentage breakdown of the vote is revealing.

A detailed analysis of these elections will appear in the next issue.

ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY – 17 November 1985

Men's College

Student Factions	No. of Votes	Percent
1. Al-Kutla Al-Islamiyya (Moslem Brotherhood)	1369	65.1
2. Harakat'l-Shabiba (Fatah)	569	27.1
3. Jab'at'l-'Aml (Popular Front)	164	7.8
TOTAL VOTES	2102	100.0

Women's College

1. Al-Kutla Al-Islamiyya	884	75.4
2. Harakat'l-Shabiba	231	19.7
3. Jab'at'l-'Aml	58	5.0
TOTAL VOTES	1173	100.0

The Al-Kutla Al-Islamiyya wins all nine seats in each of the councils.

HEBRON UNIVERSITY – 16 December 1985

Student Factions	No. of Votes	Percent
1. Harakat'l-Shabiba	788	50.0
2. Al-Kutla Al-Islamiyya	688	43.6
3. Al-Itihad w'al Taqadum	101	6.4
TOTAL VOTES	1577	100.0

The Shabiba movement wins all nine seats on the Student Council.

AL-NAJAH NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

8 January 1985

Student Factions	No. of Votes	Percent
1. Harakat'l-Shabiba	1511	49.3
2. Al-Kutla Al-Islamiyya	1154	37.7
3. Jab'at'l-'Aml	308	10.1
4. Al-Wahda (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine)	92	3.0

TOTAL VOTES 3065 100.0

The Shabiba movement wins all eleven seats on the Student Council.

BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY – 16 December 1985

Student Factions	No. of Votes	Percent
1. Harakat'l-Shabiba	735	36.8
2. Al-Itihad w'al-Taqadum (Popular Front and Communists)	693	34.7
3. Al-Kutla Al-Islamiyya	568	28.5
TOTAL VOTES	1996	100.0

The Shabiba movement wins all nine seats on the Student Council.