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**SPECIAL ISSUE:
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JUDEA AND SAMARIA: BEHIND THE UPRISING

Hillel Frisch

During disturbances in the territories in 1971, Ahmad Halifa wrote an article in Shuun Filastini'ya, an official PLO academic journal, in which he noted that the Gaza Strip was burning while the West Bank was completely placid. The reasons, according to his analysis, were twofold: Jordanian involvement in the West Bank, and a class of notables who did everything they could to pacify the situation for the Israelis. In the Gaza Strip there were no notables and after 1967 the Egyptians took no interest in Gaza, which in many ways they were happy to lose. By 1988, these two conditions that had made it relatively easy for Israel to govern Judea and Samaria no longer existed. The influence of Jordan and that of the notables had all but disappeared.

Jordan's position has been visibly declining since February 1986 when King Hussein tried to garner local support for the termination of his accord with the PLO which had been reached only a year earlier. When he tried to bring to Amman the heads of the clans and the mukhtars of the various villages, some went to Jordan and blessed the King, but did not allow themselves to be identified publicly. Many others did not go at all. For example, on February 12th, a note of congratulations and loyalty to the King from the leaders of a certain village appeared in the Jerusalem Arabic newspaper El Kuds. On the following day the Shabiba (PLO) movement of that village published an announcement in the nationalist press denouncing

those who expressed such loyalties. On the third day there appeared announcements of withdrawals of the leaders' plans to travel to Amman to express support for the King. (The Israeli civil administration later reported that the King was shocked that the Israelis had allowed such PLO penetration of the West Bank to take place.)

Every occupation prefers working through notables. In November-December 1968, after serious demonstrations in Judea and Samaria, Moshe Dayan went to Nablus and convened the five leading families, to whom he pointed out: "Your cousin needs a permit for his business and your grandson wants to study in Jordan, and neither will receive such permits if the disturbances continue." Within a matter of days, the leading families pacified the situation.

Today, Shmuel Goren, the coordinator of operations in the territories, has to revert to licensing in order to renew contact with the population. Only through proof of payment of taxes will driving licenses be renewed or exit permits to Jordan be approved. This implies that all the intermediary relationships that every occupation uses have been lost.

There are a number of reasons for the notables' loss of power. One has to do with the fact that every occupation is illegitimate in the eyes of the population being occupied, so that every notable who interacts with the occupation loses some legitimacy by the mere fact that he acts as an intermediary.

An even more important factor was the effect of working in Israel for tens of thousands of Arab workers from Judea and Samaria. Before 1967, economic life in the West Bank was tightly controlled by the few ruling families and a notable had many economic strings to pull. Once work possibilities opened up in Israel, the power of the notables to control the work patterns of those who were formerly tied to them was substantially weakened.

In the first five years of Israeli rule, the affluence that working in Israel engendered pacified the people, so much so that

PLO literature acknowledged how economic prosperity was buying pacification. But what really occurred in the early 1970s was the tremendous advancement of blue-collar workers employed in Israel, principally from the villages, as compared to the white-collar workers employed within the territories. The last sociological studies done on Judea and Samaria by Israeli academics in the early 1970s clearly showed how the white-collar workers deeply resented this, which led to their relative loss of status within the Arab population.

But after 1974, when the Israeli economy began to stagnate, the blue-collar workers' economic gains gradually eroded. In 1985-86, for the first time in the past two decades, Arabs working in Israel were earning salaries lower than Arabs working in the territories, whereas the differential had been around 50 percent in favor of the former in the early 1970s.

This began to result in a coalition of social groups against the occupation. By the early 1980s there began to appear manifestations of blue-collar resentment. At the same time, white-collar resentment continued to exist because they were operating at unfavorable disadvantages in terms of competition with their Israeli counterparts. Furthermore, the children of the blue-collar workers, who were being educated in large numbers at the newly-established universities in the territories to become a potential white-collar class, found that their work opportunities were extremely limited. Unlike the early 1970s when the blue-collar group could be played off against the white-collar group, the occupation was now failing to satisfy either. In the Gaza Strip the situation is even more extreme. Wages of Gazans working in Israel have actually declined since 1973.

Two other relatively new and important social characteristics of the population in the territories are its youthfulness and its high level of education. Whereas Arab society in Judea, Samaria and Gaza before 1967 was basically pyramidal, under the

rule of notables, and highly localistic; by the early 1980s it had become a highly educated mass culture through which communications and symbols could flow very easily.

Another factor in the success of the current uprising has to do with the Israeli administration itself. Every national movement seeks to be as strong as possible, but the outcome of the conflict will depend on how strong the other side is. When Moshe Dayan was Defense Minister, the Israeli authorities administered an occupation without being occupiers. His successors made some very substantial mistakes.

In the early 1970s, Dayan and his chief associates took a very active personal interest in the territories. Perhaps Dayan had learned from King Hussein that the rule of an Arab population cannot be left to underlings, but the leader must go out among the public himself. Jordanian television shows how often the King personally goes out among the people and makes contact with them. Dayan was very much in this mold. He was in the territories every week. Yet Dayan's style of politics and his personal interest were absolutely lost after he ceased being Minister of Defense. The whole structure became completely impersonal, left to the bureaucrats and professionals, with the expected results.

Bureaucratization has been accompanied over the past twenty years by a growing and cumbersome legal structure that has straight-jacketed the Israelis from taking the measures that they have to take. All sorts of penalties which operated very effectively during the first ten years of Israeli rule under successive Labor governments have ceased to be employed. For example, in 1967-68, those who demonstrated were whisked over the bridges the next day. In 1988, only a score have been deported, while 5,000 have been interned. There is no relationship between the number of deportations and the level of unrest.

One of the principles of the Israeli civil administration has been non-inter-

vention in the daily lives of the Arab residents of the territories. However, with the destruction of the class of notables and the loss of prestige and status of the Jordanians, non-intervention has meant that the Israelis have become onlookers to the creation of PLO-dominated institutions that contribute to the development of a state within a state. For example, in the 1986 Comptroller's report on the activities of the Israeli civil administration in the territories, it was noted that the staff officer for social services did not bother to register new kindergartens. Yet the PLO has made the establishment of new kindergartens a major goal because they can be the basis for developing an entire school system. In kindergartens they can reach children at a very young age and teach them the things that ought, from their perspective, to be taught. In addition, the whole system can provide jobs for unemployed university graduates.

The PLO in the territories is known by the word al-Munazama -- the organization. This word speaks of the yearning of the Palestinians to be organized, influenced by the previous failure of the Palestinian notables to achieve anything for them. The Palestinians want to confront Israeli organization with an organizational structure of their own. They have developed organizations along the Zionist pattern, wedding the delivery of public services with political mobilization. In addition, their structure is very localistic by design. It is very hard to close down a political organization that operates through kindergartens, and it is especially difficult to close down hundreds of small organizations as opposed to one big one. The Palestinians learned a lesson from the previous high point of Palestinian turbulence in the territories in the late 1970s. Those disturbances were led by two groups organized on a territory-wide basis -- the National Steering Committee and the Committee for Higher Education. They proved relatively easy for the Israeli authorities to close down.

Today the situation is radically different. One organization alone -- the PLO's

Shabiba movement -- is a political movement divided into four major branches: a labor union, a women's organization, a student movement (which is the political locus of the organization), and a youth organization. The youth organization alone has 120 branches in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. All of these organizations are highly interconnected and operate in the local arena, providing the basic pattern for the organizations which are operating in the uprising today.

The youth organization grew in stature by becoming a sort of public works committee for local Arab councils. It forced people to give donations of materials and time and, therefore, when it came before the local village council, it was always able to underbid the private contractors. The organizations also served as local employment offices during times of high seasonal agricultural employment. These organizations also developed medical serv-

ices through Arab hospitals and labor committees which would employ lawyers even for Arab workers working in Israeli factories. These PLO-controlled organizations greatly expanded in the last five years and because of the experience they garnered, they are today leading the uprising.

It is important to understand that while there is an overarching committee of the major organizations -- a coalition of the PLO and the Islamic fundamentalists -- which is guiding the uprising, they are not a body that Israel can negotiate with. These are political organizations that are affiliated to hostile organizations outside of Israel. They hold to the idea that one cannot negotiate with the occupation, that under the occupation they are in so subordinate a position that there is nothing to negotiate. In their view, that is to be left to the leadership outside the territories.

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JORDAN: THE QUIET PALESTINIANS

Andrea Salomon

Approximately 2,590,000 Palestinians reside in Jordan under the rule of the Hashemite monarchy. They comprise 70 percent of the total Jordanian population. Many of these Palestinians were born west of the Jordan river in the same cities that have been the centers of the Palestinian intifada -- the Arabic word for uprising. Yet this, the largest concentration of Palestinians outside of Israeli rule, a population that daily watches the continued violence on their television screens, have not risen up in solidarity with their Palestinian

brethren, or for that matter to express any nationalistic desires of their own.

Equally quiet in regard to this Palestinian population is King Hussein. The King has not alluded to the existence of any Palestinian nationalistic activity brewing within his borders, nor has he expressed any fears that a fraction of Jordan's two-and-a-half million Palestinians may take to the streets, threatening his kingdom's peace and order.

According to Deborah Amos, the American National Public Radio correspondent

in Amman for the past three years, despite the low profile of the Jordanian Palestinians, the King is acutely sensitive to their presence and knows it can be politically damaging to ignore them. Since Black September in 1970, when thousands of Palestinians were massacred by the Jordanian army during the last Palestinian uprising against the monarch, the King has made a series of strategic political moves in order to appease and integrate the Palestinian population.

The King has appointed several Palestinian cabinet ministers and a Palestinian foreign minister, Taher Al-Masri. Many Palestinians have attained respected status in the Jordanian private and public sectors, positions which the Palestinians use as vehicles to air their likes and dislikes to the government. "Without a doubt," said Amos, "there exists a powerful Palestinian lobby in Amman."

Despite the full Jordanian citizenship long since granted to the Palestinians, they remain Palestinians at heart. Many wear a gold charm of Palestine around their neck as an expression of their identity, and they try to instill in their children a mental picture of the houses west of the river which they abandoned in 1948, and even the trees in the back yard, explained Amos during an interview in East Jerusalem's American Colony Hotel.

She added that even if the Palestinians chose to completely disown their identity, the Jordanians would never let them. When the political atmosphere is calm, there is no visible rift between the two groups. But in times of tension, for example when the King cut off all ties with the PLO, the subjects of the Hashemite Kingdom were once again reminded who are Jordanians and who are Palestinians.

This dual Palestinian-Jordanian identity poses a gnawing problem for Hussein because he knows that if the Palestinians do not become integrated into Jordanian society, the greater the chances of an uprising, either in solidarity with the intifada or against his regime.

The level of Palestinian nationalism is the highest in the refugee camps where the level of integration into Jordanian society is the lowest. The King has offered tax incentives and financial support to those who are willing to move from the camps into the city. The residents of the camps have flatly refused. "People cling to the camps in order to keep up the feeling that their condition is only temporary and that they will soon be returning to their permanent home in Palestine," Amos said. Secondly, their entire social life is built around the refugee camps, and despite the poor living conditions, they have no desire to leave their friends and community.

As a result of the King's failure to entice the remaining Palestinians out of the refugee camps, a new election law was recently enacted which gives each refugee camp its own representative in parliament. Yet for many of these Palestinians, this law generates an ideological conflict: they reason that if the PLO is their sole representative, how can they also have direct representation in Jordan's parliament?

So the question remains: if the Palestinians are so intent upon preserving their Palestinian identity, why have they not risen up in solidarity with their relatives in the West Bank and Gaza? And why have they not caught the nationalistic spirit and demonstratively expressed their own desires for a Palestinian state?

One explanation may be found in their social and economic complacency, particularly among those living outside of the refugee camps. "They are beginning to look around the Arab world and see they have a better life in Jordan than they can have anywhere else," says Amos, "and they do not want to threaten this."

However Amos firmly stated that the main reason for their lack of action, both in the past and present, is the entire society's strict adherence to Jordanian law which clearly forbids public demonstrations. The Palestinians have learned that a direct challenge to this law means a direct

confrontation with the brutal, deadly force of the Jordanian army.

However, with a population that large, and still growing, Hussein realizes that a military threat will not keep these people docile forever, and therefore the King must be very careful. This perhaps explains why the notorious CBS news report of the two Arabs in Nablus being beaten by Israeli soldiers was aired in Jordan, but with the more violent parts completely censored out. "The government was afraid that every Palestinian would get off the couch and march right down to the Allenby Bridge," Amos said. The government is well aware that the situation in the administered territories is very upsetting and frustrating for its Palestinian population because they often see their friends and relatives on television, and feel powerless to do anything about it.

Amos said the King's fear of escalating Palestinian frustration also accounts for the government's renewal of ties with the PLO. Recently, for the first time in two years, the PLO held a press conference in Amman. Amos feels it is a sign that Hussein is beginning to see what the implications of the uprising might mean for him with regard to his Palestinian population at home, and that it is only wise that he once again comes to terms with the PLO.

The existence of frustrated Palestinian nationalism, she said, also explains why the King has almost always been in motion in the peace process -- even if that motion seems to be leading to an obvious dead end: "Hussein must look active so that his Palestinian population will not start complaining that he is not working for their cause." Now with the intifada, the King is working overtime. Amos could not give a clear-cut answer on what effect the

uprising has had on Jordan because she has been in Israel since the violence began in mid-December. But she did say that before the uprising, the general consensus among the Palestinians was that they wanted their own state for five minutes and then a confederation with Jordan.

Even with the existence of a Palestinian state, she continued, in general, the only Palestinians who would be willing to move there would be those living in the refugee camps, because they have the least to lose. Amos then drew the analogy between Palestinian Jordanians and American Jews: "They would like to have a passport for Palestine but they don't necessarily want to live there."

Hussein's greatest concern at this point, Amos believes, is that the situation will become totally destabilized, and that he would be unable to prevent an influx of Palestinians into the East Bank. The Jordanian economy already lacks the capacity to absorb the Palestinian workers returning from the Arab Gulf states, let alone from the administered territories. If there is economic instability, then he fears that an increasingly dissatisfied Palestinian population will join the intifada for what they perceive as a means to a better end. Hussein only has to look at the situation in the territories to get a fairly accurate picture of what could feasibly happen in his own backyard.

In the meantime, still firmly controlling his population, the King is busy with the international peace process, keeping as many doors open to as many political actors as possible. The King has no choice right now, Amos concluded, because he knows as much as the Israeli government what to expect tomorrow.

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LEBANON: THE SOUTHERN SECURITY ZONE THREE YEARS AFTER THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

Lt. Col. (Res.) Alexander Sella

When the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from Lebanon in May 1985, a decision was made by the Israeli government to guarantee the security of a strip of territory in South Lebanon in conjunction with friendly Lebanese forces, as the IDF had done before Operation Peace for Galilee (1982). The purpose of the Security Zone is to provide relative security and quiet for Israel's north. To achieve this, an area must be held that can protect itself from terrorist activity, as well as prevent acts of aggression along the Israeli border.

The Security Zone encompasses a population that has cooperated with Israel against Palestinian terror in the past. This mixed population includes Christians, Druse and Shi'ites, who are a majority in the zone. The borders of the Security Zone were not established out of purely military considerations of topography, but rather from a wish to create an area whose residents would identify and be involved with Israel. This explains the fact that the zone, which extends from 4 to 20 kilometers from the Israel border along a length of 120 kilometers, cannot act as a barrier to prevent Katyusha rockets from hitting Israel. In addition, since 1985, Jezzine, a Christian enclave in the midst of Druse territory north of the Security Zone, has remained under South Lebanese Army (SLA) protection.

Israeli Assistance to the Local Population

A program of Israeli assistance to the local civilian population has been operating in the area since the early 1970s. The medical network serving local residents has at its core the hospitals in Marjayoun and Bint-Jbeil. Agricultural experts assist the



New York Times

local farmers. Substantial resources have been invested in developing irrigation systems and rural roads, which allows intensive cultivation of existing farmland.

Points of transfer have been opened between the Security Zone and Lebanon to permit daily economic and personal contact between residents of the north and south, thereby preventing exclusive economic reliance on Israel. A seaport has been established at Ras Nakura with regular maritime service to the Christian zone in Beirut. This port is essential for the Christian population, since all points of transfer between north and south, with the single exception of Jezzine, pass through Shi'ite Moslem areas controlled by Amal

and Hizbullah. The port is used primarily for family visits and trade, but serves also as an invaluable safety valve for social and economic pressures inside the zone, as many refugees have used it to return to the north.

The South Lebanese Army

The South Lebanese Army, under the command of General Antoine Lahad, a Christian, differs markedly from the forces under Major Hadad which had operated before 1982, in its structure, methods and preparedness. The SLA today is a fighting unit which emulates the IDF.

At its inception, SLA soldiers were posted close to home to increase their motivation. This policy was intended to create an awareness of the relationship between their service and the safety and well-being of their families and villages. In addition, the SLA's relative proportions were maintained at 10 percent Druse, 25 percent Shi'ite, and the remainder Christian. This proportion has today shifted in favor of the Shi'ite elements in the military framework. The combination of communal mix, service close to home, and continuous training by Israeli military personnel has created the present formation of 3,000 regular soldiers (including Jezion), divided into platoons and battalions, that can assist each other in their activities throughout the Security Zone without necessarily being tied to their home villages.

The security activities of the SLA include manning frontline posts, which are often the targets of direct terrorist attacks. They also patrol the routes between these outposts, as well as inside the Security Zone, to ensure safe passage for local civilians. Beyond these activities, troops sometimes operate beyond the zone in search and pursuit of terrorists in villages to the north, operations which are backed by SLA artillery and tank units.

Due to attacks directed against the SLA and the many casualties inflicted at the outset (the SLA has suffered 130 killed

and 300 wounded to date), there have been times when the SLA's ability to withstand such casualties was in question. Yet the SLA's staying power has met the test of time.

The SLA should not be viewed as a force able to independently engage larger regular military forces such as the Lebanese or Syrian armies. It is a local force, able to maintain a reasonable level of security against the repeated attempts of terrorist organizations to act in South Lebanon.

With the support of IDF forces based in Israel, the SLA has effectively foiled daily terrorist operations aimed against both it and Israel. An additional characteristic of the SLA is its ability to initiate anti-terrorist activities using its own small units and thereby preventing dozens of infiltrations into the Security Zone.

The Changing Enemy

The enemy that the Security Zone was designed to block before Operation Peace for Galilee was primarily Palestinian. Today the composition of enemy forces has changed and now includes four major elements:

1) The Palestinians regard the Security Zone as a barrier to their ultimate objective -- Israel. The Palestinians in Lebanon maintain an independent operational capability against Israel and the weakening of the Security Zone remains a major goal. They will cooperate with any Lebanese faction willing to allow their presence in Lebanon and their actions against the Security Zone and Israel. Current evaluations set the number of Palestinian combatants in South Lebanon at 10,000.

2) The Amal organization, which was the sole Shi'ite representative until the appearance of the Hizbullah, sees the zone as part of its natural sphere of influence. Since the Security Zone is primarily Shi'ite, Amal hopes to openly challenge and ultimately gain control of the territory, after securing Israel's retreat and the dissolution of the zone. To maintain its

standing with the Shi'ite youth, Amal is active against the Security Zone. However, it has not as yet initiated action against Israel. It is estimated that Amal has 17,000 fighters in South Lebanon and is, therefore, the largest and best organized force in the South.

3) Hizbullah is a pro-Iranian organization which sees the Shi'ites in South Lebanon as an extension of the Iranian revolution. The conquest of Israel and the city of Jerusalem have been declared major objectives of this revolution. Hizbullah sees the Security Zone as a stumbling block in its way to striking at Israel. It initiates and coordinates actions with the Palestinians and any other faction which could advance the Shi'ite revolution and strike at Israel.

During the past two years, Hizbullah has been eroding Amal's status and influence, aided by Iranian funds and a revolutionary doctrine which attracts many younger Shi'ites. The organization's financial resources and the extensive aid it provides the local Shi'ite population have allowed Hizbullah to gain power, challenge Amal, and become the standard-bearer of the Shi'ite revolution. Current estimates hold that Hizbullah is able to raise 5,000 fighters in the South, in addition to those in training bases in the Syrian-controlled Bek'a Valley.

4) The Syrians are the single dominant factor behind all actions initiated against the Security Zone. Their goal is to turn the struggle against the zone and the SLA into an objective around which it can unify the activities of all the forces in Lebanon. Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, headed by General Razi Kanan, funds and supports the Palestinians, the Hizbullah and other organizations such as the Syrian Popular Party (PPS), all willing to attack the Security Zone and Israel in line with Syrian interests.

Local Political and Military Leadership

Elements of local, village-based, ethnic leadership were already in existence when

the Security Zone was established. With the consolidation of zone boundaries and the establishment of the South Lebanese Army, two leadership components have become notable.

The first, the civilian administration, is based on communal religious leaders who, together with local businessmen, serve on the various regional committees working to solve day-to-day problems in cooperation with the SLA and Israel.

The second, the military leadership, is centered around General Antoine Lahad, whose authority is recognized by the civilian leadership. Lahad coordinates and directs the ethnic leadership in the Security Zone, while the military force, which includes elements of all communal groups, is the symbol for communal unity in the South.

Unlike other parts of Lebanon, there is cooperation between the three communal groups in the Security Zone. In addition, younger elements from the villages and the army are being integrated into the traditional leadership in the South, a factor which further enhances cooperation among the various elements in the population.

However the residents in the South are influenced as well by the communal leadership residing outside the Security Zone. The Christians and Shi'ites identify with their leaders in Beirut as their communal and political representatives in Lebanon, as do the Druse with their clan in the Lebanese mountains. Yet due to their physical and military separation from the rest of Lebanon, this influence is clearly limited.

IDF and UNIFIL Involvement

IDF involvement in the Security Zone is centered on training the South Lebanese Army, from basic training through officer's courses. In addition, the IDF stands ready to assist the SLA in the event of large-scale assaults on SLA outposts. In general, as the SLA has become a significant force in the area, the IDF's involvement has decreased. IDF involvement, however, remains vital to the continued existence

and functioning of the SLA.

By contrast, the United Nations force (UNIFIL) suffers from great friction with both the SLA and the various terrorist organizations. Its attempt to act as a buffer between opposing factions has resulted in heavy casualties for UNIFIL. Overall, however, UNIFIL's activities to prevent infiltration attempts are viewed as an additional factor which helps to limit terrorist operations in the region.

A View to the Future

During the three years of its consolidation, the Security Zone seems to have become a permanent feature of the border

between Israel and Lebanon. As long as massive Israeli support for the SLA continues, its existence is assured. It is no secret that the common interest which gave birth to the Security Zone is a permanent and consistent interest on Israel's part. As long as the current situation continues in Lebanon, with the civil war, Syrian involvement and ethnic factional fighting, all of which do not permit the establishment of a strong central government which can assume responsibility for safety and security in the South, the future existence of the Security Zone is assured.

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