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A SPECIAL REPORT

THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS OF 1996: SOME PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS AND FIRST THOUGHTS

Daniel J. Elazar

The Voting and the Campaign / The Peace Process Wins — With Qualifications / The "New Middle East" Fails to Persuade / The Voters Split Their Ballots / The Religious Parties are the Biggest Victors / Centrist Parties Remain Weak, Although Centrist Tendencies Win / The Israeli Arabs Win and Lose / The Left Loses / What About Israel as a Whole?

The Voting and the Campaign

On the 11th of Sivan, 5756, May 29, 1996, a beautiful late spring Jerusalem day, sunny, pleasant, the kind of day when one does not feel the weather, Israelis went to the polls for the fourteenth Knesset elections since 1949 and the first direct elections for head of government. As usual, the day was a national holiday. Friends and neighbors gathered together at their neighborhood polling places to cast their ballots, one slip indicating their choice of party for the Knesset and one slip indicating their choice of person for prime minister.

At our polling place, two doors from the prime minister's official residence, at the Rubin Music Academy, everything went smoothly and the news reports indicated that the same was true for the rest of the country. It was reported that Prime Minister Shimon Peres had received more threats from Jews threatening violence against him that morning and was under heavy guard. Peres himself accused

Habad of being the only ones who had broken the general calm of the election campaign. Otherwise all was quiet.

As in every previous election, the Israelis — Jews, Arabs, Druse; religious, traditional, secular; left, right, or center — demonstrated their maturity and the maturity of their democracy in the way the elections were conducted. It seems that there were even fewer complaints of violations of election rules this time than in previous years, and the complaints that there were, were almost all related to minor technical matters. The country quietly went to the polls in astounding numbers.

There may be no country in the world without compulsory voting where a higher percentage of the voters go to the polls than in Israel. The overall voter turnout was 79.3 percent, with turnout in the Jewish sector exceeding 80 percent. Considering that Israel's automatic registration system continues to include hundreds of thousands

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The Jerusalem Letter is a periodic report intended to objectively clarify and analyze issues of Jewish and Israeli public policy.

ISRAELI ELECTION RESULTS - 1996

Prime Minister: Binyamin Netanyahu	1,501,023 (50.4%)
Shimon Peres	1,471,566 (49.5%)

Knesset: Seats and Percentages (1992 results in parentheses)

Labor	34 (44) seats - 26.8% (34.8%)
Likud	32 (40) seats - 25.1% (30.7%)
Shas	10 (6) seats - 8.5% (5.0%)
National Religious	
Party	9 (6) seats - 7.8% (5.0%)
Meretz	9 (12) seats - 7.4% (9.3%)
Israel B'Aliya	7 (-) seats - 5.7% (-)
Hadash	5 (3) seats - 4.2% (2.5%)
United Torah Judaism	4 (4) seats - 3.2% (3.4%)
The Third Way	4 (-) seats - 3.1% (-)
United Arab List	4 (2) seats - 2.9% (1.6%)
Moledet	2 (3) seats - 2.3% (2.3%)

Election Statistics:

Number of valid votes for prime minister:	2,972,589
Number of invalid votes (mostly blank slips):	148,681
Total number of votes cast:	3,121,270
Number of valid votes for the Knesset:	3,051,592
Number of invalid votes:	67,601
Total number of votes cast:	3,119,195
Voter turnout:	79.3%
Minimum number of votes for election to Knesset:	45,774

Source: Israel Foreign Ministry, URL: <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/>; Israel Television, URL: <http://elections96-malam.macom.co.il/> or <http://indigo.macom.co.il/English/knesset.html>

of people who have left the country and, with the exception of diplomats and sailors abroad, who have to be in Israel in order to vote, there was an over 90 percent turnout of those who physically could vote. Nor are the percentages different among the different groups in the country. All Israelis turn out in essentially the same proportions. In this as in so many other respects, Israel easily sets the standard for the world.

The vote came after a campaign that was also relatively gentlemanly. There was little "below the belt" campaigning by anyone. Perhaps the worst examples were the anti-religious tone of the Meretz campaign which seems to have had some beneficial effect for them among their voters, but which seems to have led to a terrific backlash that hurt Shimon Peres, probably more than any other single factor, excepting the peace issue itself. There was also the not so subtle anti-Arab campaign waged by certain elements

of the right led by Habad who took the lead in distributing stickers saying that Netanyahu was good for the Jews.

The Peace Process Wins — With Qualifications

Most important, the peace process won. Except for Moledet, the party that emerged two elections ago to advocate "transfer" of the Arab population from west of the Jordan River to other Arab states and which lost one seat even though it kept the same 2.3 percent of the total vote that it received in 1992, no other successful Israeli party or personage campaigned on an anti-peace process platform.

Nor was this just the usual pious endorsement of the desirability of peace. All of the parties accepted the reality and binding character of the Oslo accords. The division was over their implementation and next steps, with the Likud-led national camp and a majority

of the religious camp attacking the Rabin-Peres government for moving ahead without due regard for Israel's security and allowing the Palestinian Authority to get away with actions that were contrary to the agreements made, most especially in the matter of the revocation of the PLO Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel. At the same time, Binyamin Netanyahu, the Likud candidate for prime minister, repeatedly and consistently indicated that a government led by him would accept the accords as binding and move on from there in a more cautious manner that would give the Palestinians full autonomy without sovereign statehood.

At the end of the voting count, the results showed that nearly two-thirds of the Knesset seats went to the parties actively supporting the present peace process in some meaningful way. At the same time, if looked at from another angle, almost as many of the Knesset seats went to parties that supported a more cautious process.

The "New Middle East" Fails to Persuade

The big loser in the polls was Shimon Peres's "New Middle East," a vision that went a few steps too far and produced a reaction against the man and the government that represented it. There is a Hebrew expression, "*tafasta merubeh lo tafasta*," if you try to catch too much you don't catch anything. This seems to have been the case in this election.

Had Peres and his supporters taken a more cautious position and convinced the voters that they were sincere about their caution, they probably would have won, but the combination of extremism in pursuit of their vision of peace, most especially with regard to Syria, a palpably reluctant partner, and their left-wing's pursuit of the dejudaization of the state, snatched victory from them. A careful look at the voting figures shows this much more starkly than the totals. While Netanyahu won over Peres with 50.4 percent of the total vote as against 49.5, taking the Jewish vote alone, Netanyahu won by 11 full percentage points (55.5 to 44.4), a landslide rejection of Peres by the Jewish voters. That was only offset by the landslide vote of the Arab voters for Peres (94.7 to 5.2), but even then, some 17,000 Arabs voted for Netanyahu.

Moreover, Peres and his coalition lost to an opposition that in many ways was not as attractive as they were. There were many comments during the election that, on one hand, the election was the most fateful in Israel's history, but, at the same time, the voters seemed rather withdrawn. To this writer it seemed that most voters saw great weaknesses, albeit very different

ones, in both candidates for the head of the government and in their parties, and that they were forced to make a choice for the lesser evil. Except for some of the young (below voting age) activists on the streets, there was little real enthusiasm for any of the political parties or camps among the great bulk of the voters. They turned out in record numbers but without any feelings of excitement or happiness, rather with feelings of trepidation and hoping for the best.

The Voters Split Their Ballots

From a technical point of view, the new system of casting separate ballots for the head of government and the Knesset seems to have worked without any problems at the polls. Most voters understood the new system and voted accordingly, with evidence of this understanding visible in the way they split their votes. With regard to the Knesset seats, some 45,000 votes were needed to win an initial seat, up about 10 percent over the number of votes needed in 1992.

It seems clear that the two major parties' great losses of Knesset seats, with Labor going down from 44 to 34 and Likud from 40 to 32, came about because the voters recognized that they could split their tickets, voting for either Peres or Netanyahu for head of government and then casting their Knesset vote for a more specialized party of their choice rather than for one of the large, more comprehensive parties. In the end, it was the sectoral parties that won major victories increasing their number of seats in the Knesset.

The Religious Parties are the Biggest Victors

The biggest victors were the religious parties. All told, the religious camp received 23 seats, more than ever before. Shas and the National Religious Party received 19 seats, 7 more than in the previous election, while the United Torah Front, the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox party, held on to its 4 seats.

In the early stages of the campaign, the polls showed Shas dropping from 6 to 3 seats and the others holding their own. Shas's success is a concrete indication of something often ignored by commentators on the Israeli scene who persist in defining the Israeli population as "religious" or "secular." The matter is much more complex than that, especially among the Sephardim who represent Shas's constituency and potential constituency.

There are very few truly secular Sephardim. The vast majority are in some way traditional. Indeed, there is a whole population in Israel, particularly among the Sephardim, who put on *tefillin* every morning, attend

synagogue every Shabbat, but then drive their cars to visit their families, to the soccer games, or to the beach. These people were extremely upset by the hardline secularism of Meretz and the left-wing of the Labor party since, as one of them put it, "our Jewishness is in our souls," and they reject all assaults upon the Jewishness of the Jewish state.

Shas has been successful all along by appealing to that population and their needs. For example, the State Religious schools, long dominated by the Ashkenazi-led National Religious Party, have refused to accept the children of Sephardi parents who do not live fully according to the canons of Ashkenazi Orthodoxy, effectively forcing them into the general State schools and hence into an areligious education in an anti-religious environment. In response to this situation, Shas came along and established El HaMaayan, their educational movement to provide after school supplementary classes and training for those children in Judaism, of course as Shas understands it, thus providing a needed valuable and much appreciated service to tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of Israeli families.

Moreover, since the religious patterns of ultra-Orthodox Sephardim allow more room for interaction among people of different degrees of belief and observance, the ultra-Orthodox Shas leadership could easily reach out to the traditional Shas voters and gain their support reciprocally. One need only contrast Ashkenazi and Sephardi synagogues in Israel to see that reality in action. It is not that the Ashkenazim are not "pluralistic." There are appropriate Ashkenazi congregations for every nuance of Ashkenazi religious belief and observance, but each congregation is homogeneous in relation to its particular nuance. Just the contrary occurs in Sephardi congregations where every congregation is a mixture of worshippers ranging from ultra-Orthodox to minimally traditional who come together to celebrate the same liturgy and religious calendar.

The NRP attracted the equivalent voters especially from among the Ashkenazim, including those who defined themselves as religious but who had never before voted for a religious party and those who defined themselves as secular but who were concerned about the preservation of Jewish tradition in the Jewish state.

In my opinion, this resounding victory was a direct reaction to the intensely anti-religious atmosphere that seemed to pervade the Rabin-Peres government, although neither Rabin nor Peres intentionally fostered that atmosphere and, indeed, Peres, unlike Rabin, made serious efforts to eliminate the sense of it. The fact that

Meretz was Labor's principal coalition partner and was given control of the Ministries of Education and Culture and Communications, where Amnon Rubinstein and Shulamit Aloni either pressed for or presided over major steps to both publicly and quietly eliminate signs of Israel as a Jewish state, was seen as an enormous threat not only to those who were themselves religiously Orthodox but to many Jews who, whatever their own beliefs and practices, felt that Israel's whole *raison d'être* was in peril.

This was intensified by Labor's Minister of Religions, Shimon Shitreet, who in a rather oafish way took steps to recognize and foster non-Orthodox forms of Judaism and to bring them within the institutions of the state's religious establishment, steps that the vast majority of Israelis, whether Orthodox or not, do not understand or accept. Even secular Israelis, unless they have ideological reasons for wanting to hit at the Orthodox establishment, are not interested in non-Orthodox forms of Judaism. The synagogues to which they do not go are Orthodox.

The coup de grace was the Meretz election campaign which emphasized what that party saw as the need to further reduce the role of Judaism in the formal functioning of the state. The result was a backlash. Many Sephardim who are religiously traditional and had shifted to Likud after 1977, moved to support Shas, and many Ashkenazim who are sympathetic to Jewish religious tradition voted NRP. Even more important, many religiously Orthodox, who in the past had voted for one or the other of the major parties, apparently voted this time for a religious party out of concern, even fear, for the direction that Israeli society was taking under the Labor government, thus increasing the polarization and sectoral voting. In the past, the religious parties were never able to obtain more than half of the potential religious vote in the country. This time, they seemed to have won a major share of it.

All this no doubt seems strange to voters in many Western, particularly English-speaking, countries where religion and politics, when mixed, are mixed in different ways, mostly because of the differences between Christianity and Judaism (or Christianity and Islam, for that matter) and the tradition of Western liberal democracy that has grown up out of that difference over the past 300 years. The vote for the religious parties was certainly not a vote to turn Israel into a theocracy or even a *halakhic* state. Everybody here, except the extreme left, understands that.

The religious party leaders have reiterated that they had no intentions of moving any government that they

would join in that direction. They reiterated that they only have two interests: (1) to strengthen the Jewish character of the state, which in concrete terms means that what Americans have come to call "the public square" will remain infused with Jewish symbols and some actions, as it has been since the beginning of the Zionist enterprise, and to have the educational system serving Israel's Jewish population teach the Jewish heritage in appropriate ways; and (2) to see to it that the material and educational interests of the religious population are taken care of, that is to say, that adequate housing and benefits available to all citizens also be made available to those in the ultra-Orthodox community and that state support be available for the various forms of general and Jewish education that the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox desire, in the same way that such support is made available to other segments of Israel's educational system. Especially in the second respect, the religious parties should be seen as representing the legitimate interests of a large segment of Israel's population, just like any other segment with legitimate interests.

In more strictly political matters, there is no monolithic religious view. Indeed, well over half of the religious vote, perhaps over two-thirds, is centrist with regard to the peace process, very much committed to its continuation, albeit with greater caution on Israel's part. That is why, even before the elections, Israeli pundits saw the religious bloc as able to go with either prime ministerial candidate when it came to the formation of a new government. On the peace issue, they include the religious bloc among the centrist parties.

Centrist Parties Remain Weak, Although Centrist Tendencies Win

As usual, the non-religious centrist parties had difficulties in the election, although centrist tendencies won. The two parties that were considered centrist were the Third Way, a breakaway from the Labor camp over the issue of whether or not Israel should retain the Golan in any peace settlement, and Israel B'Aliya, the party of olim (immigrants) from the former Soviet Union led by Natan Sharansky, which appealed principally to the olim who were new voters. The former won 4 seats and the latter, 7. The 4 seats were predicted but, considering the way the Third Way movement started, have to be classified as a disappointing finish. Most of the initial leaders of the Third Way, in the end, could not bring themselves to leave their homes in the Labor party and withdrew when the issue came to a head, moving Avigdor Kahalani, a war hero relatively

new to politics and not strongly identified with Labor, into the party leadership. They waged a fight to convince Israeli voters to support the center but the fight that they waged seemed to most of those voters to be too "parve"; that is to say, they did not make the centrist position forceful enough to attract Israeli voters who seem to have a penchant for sharper stands even when the voters' overall tendency is to the center. This somewhat ambivalent situation has consistently weakened the power of centrist parties to attract voters throughout the history of the state.

Israel B'Aliya, on the other hand, did surprisingly well. It is unclear at this point whether these were basically dissatisfied olim or whether Sharansky served as a major drawing card. There is no question that Sharansky is an imposing figure. In fact, had he campaigned more broadly as a candidate for general Israeli, not only immigrant, voters, he might have done even better since he rightly gives the impression of having as much leadership stature as Peres and, at the same time, shows the kind of solidity that helped Netanyahu to defeat Peres's "visions." If his Hebrew improves, Sharansky could turn out to be an important contender for even higher office in the future, probably for the good.

In the meantime, nobody quite knows what his party will do. As its leaders have already indicated, their principal issues are to deal with the problems of the olim. Hence they can go with either major party in a coalition. Sharansky will be a reassuring figure in either government.

The Israeli Arabs Win and Lose

The Israeli Arabs both won and lost. Obviously, they feel that they lost with Peres's loss. On the other hand, they clearly established themselves as an important voting bloc in Israeli politics that must be considered as such in political campaigns from now on. Their vote continues to be divided between predominantly Arab parties and mainstream ones, and it is clear that their vote counted for both Meretz and the Labor party this time. They will probably continue to increase their political power.

The Left Loses

Israel's left lost in this election. Although Meretz was filled with self-congratulation the morning after when it received 9 seats as compared to the earliest polls which showed it receiving as few as a third of that number, it was still down from the 12 that it had won in 1992. Meretz voters returned to the Meretz fold for

the same polarizing reasons that so many religious voters voted for religious parties this time. That is to say, they are the hardline ideological secularists or advocates of making Israel neutral in matters relating to Jewish religion and culture. They see Jewish culture as well as Jewish religion as incidental to a much more important (to them) European cultural heritage rather than as central to Israeli life.

The continued strength of Meretz is another sign of polarization within the country. Many of the people who were attracted to it were probably attracted by hard-core, anti-Judaism feelings or by even stronger sentiments than other Jewish voters for the continuation of the Peres peace process, but in the end this was not quite enough. We will see what happens to them when they are in the opposition.

There is no way of knowing how much Labor lost because of voter repudiation of its left wing. While by no means the majority, visible left-wing Knesset members were high enough on the party list to be reelected to the Knesset, even with the party's great loss. One can only speculate about that. Ironically, since they are among the younger leadership, they will probably inherit the party if there are changes in the aftermath of this election.

Perhaps ironically, Peres and Labor also lost votes among the Israeli Arabs because of their anger at the civilian casualties in Lebanon caused by Israel's recent operation there, which undoubtedly was launched in part to demonstrate that Peres would stand firm on matters of Israel's security in the face of the widespread feeling in the Jewish sector that he was "soft" on security issues.

In the end, Peres, who was twice Israel's prime minister, the first time by rotation and the second as a result of assassination, demonstrated once again that he cannot persuade the majority of the Israeli electorate to support him for that office. Netanyahu, much younger (at age 46 he is the youngest person ever to be elected prime minister of Israel) and with much less political experience, continued his uncanny ability to be a winner, showing in the process that he continues to have the ability to choose the essential task, focus on it, and achieve it, which has been the story of his career.

From the reports to the moment, Israel's left-leaning elites in the governing and talking classes still do not have the vaguest idea of what happened. Nor do they understand what the likely consequences are. Instead, they see all of their old bogeymen raising their heads in ways that more objective analysts do not.

What About Israel as a Whole?

In the last analysis, Israel both won and lost things in this election. In the largest sense, in the conduct of the election Israel won, but by now that should not be in the least unusual since Israeli elections have in general been victories for democracy and sobriety. In more specific ways, Israel may have lost something. The polarization has resulted not only in the better political representation of more groups in Israeli society, but the further separation of secular and religious Jews into separate camps with fewer crosscutting political ties. The success of immigrant or "ethnic" parties, which is another form of polarization, also needs to be noted. The long range implications of this may turn out to be problematic in their own way.

Israeli politics and parties have grouped themselves into three camps — labor, civil or national, and religious — since the 1920s. Those camps were once considerably stronger, but they continue to hold even today. Many of us thought that there would be more crossovers from camp to camp in this election. Instead, there was a certain return of voters who had earlier shifted from the religious to the national camp back to the religious camp. While the issues were not addressed in terms of the camps and a substantial percentage of those voters new to Israeli politics did not see their identity in one camp or another, surprisingly, the old division still holds much more than anticipated. At the same time, it continues to erode at the peripheries.

One result of the elections may be to move the country closer to electoral reform with elections to the Knesset changed to some combination of the district and proportional representation systems to allow the major parties to regain their positions while at the same time not disenfranchising the sectoral vote, which has now become much more difficult given the composition of the Fourteenth Knesset. A preliminary look at the details of the election results suggests that such a change may have become more possible as electoral divisions may have manifested themselves territorially more than in any previous election. One can see the rough basic divisions that have emerged. Along the coast from the middle of Tel Aviv northward to the edge of Netanya there is a strong concentration of Labor support. From Netanya to Hadera, Netanyahu received over 60 percent. Further to the north around Haifa, Labor also won. From the middle of Tel Aviv southward almost to Eilat there is a strong concentration of Likud support, while in the mountain interior of the country, including Jerusalem, there is the strongest

concentration of support for the religious parties that extends westward to Tel Aviv's northeastern suburbs. This is a very gross calculation but it shows roughly that it may be more possible today to draw districts where all the various groups in Israeli society can find places to compete in territorial-based elections.

It is also the case that this is a very difficult election to explain to Israel's friends in the Western and other parts of the world who have seen Peres as a heroic peacemaker and now see him rejected and seemingly repudiated. Nor is the victory of the religious camp easy for outsiders to understand, seeing it less as a reflection of the Israeli public's desire to maintain the integrity of the Jewish-Zionist vision of Israel, and mistakenly as a vote for fundamentalism and religious coercion. In part this is because that is the way the story is reported to them by the media. This writer's experience with a good cross-section of journalists sent to cover the election once again suggests that most media people, especially those from the outside, come to a task like this with rather strong preconceptions which few are willing to have challenged. As in all parts of the world, those preconceptions rarely, if ever, have a sympathetic place for either religious or nationalist sentiments. Israeli commentators and Israel's friends abroad have their work cut out for them to explain that this election did not repudiate the Israeli consensus about peace, Zionism, Jewishness and democracy, but rather contributed to its restoration.

Netanyahu, who waited until the final vote was in before claiming a victory that was almost surely his by Thursday morning, has begun by taking all the right steps, contacting either directly or through aides the Palestinian Authority, King Hussein of Jordan, President Bill Clinton, and President Mubarak of Egypt to reassure them that his government intends to move ahead with the peace process. The Arab leaders have responded in kind, emphasizing that agreements are matters between governments, not individuals or parties. For the moment, however, all of that is in abeyance as a new government needs to be formed, although these tasks will certainly command center stage in the immediate future.

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Daniel J. Elazar is President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and co-editor of the "Israel at the Polls" series of books analyzing Israeli elections since 1977. The latest in the series, *Israel at the Polls 1996*, is now in preparation.

Members of the Israeli Knesset - 1996 (Provisional list)

Labor - 34 Seats

Shimon Peres
Uzi Baram
Ehud Barak
Binyamin Ben-Eliezer
Haim Ramon
Avraham Shochat
Nissim Zvili
Ephraim Sneh
Dalia Itzik
Ori Orr
Yossi Beilin
Shevach Weiss
Rafi Elul
Rafael Edri
Hagai Merom
Yossi Katz
Nawaf Massalha
Eliahu Ben-Menachem
Elie Goldschmidt
David Libai
Raanan Cohen
Amir Peretz
Moshe Shahal
Sofia Landver
Ophir Pines
Shalom Simhon
Yael Dayan
Micha Goldman
Adisu Massala
Saleh Tareef
Avi Yehezkel
Yona Yahav
Ephraim Oshaya
Shlomo Ben-Ami

Likud-Gesher-Tzomet - 32 Seats

Binyamin Netanyahu
David Levy (Gesher)
Rafael Eitan (Tzomet)
Yitzhak Mordechai
Ariel Sharon
Moshe Katzav
Ze'ev Binyamin Begin
Modi Zandberg (Tzomet)
David Magen (Gesher)
Ehud Olmert
Dan Meridor

Likud-Gesher-Tzomet (continued)

Tzachi Hanegbi
 Uzi Landau
 Maxim Levy (Gesher)
 Haim Dayan (Tzomet)
 Limor Livnat
 Michael Eitan
 Silvan Shalom
 Gideon Ezra
 Moshe Peled (Tzomet)
 Michael Kleiner (Gesher)
 Meir Sheerit
 Eliyahu Ben-Elissar
 Dan Tichon
 Naomi Blumenthal
 Yehoshua Matza
 Abraham Herschson
 David Re'em
 Ze'ev Boim
 Yehuda Lankri (Gesher)
 Pinhas Badash (Tzomet)
 Shaul Amor

Shas - 10 Seats

Arie Deri
 Arie Gamliel
 Rafael Pinhassi
 Shlomo Benizri
 Eliyahu Yishai
 Yitzhak Cohen
 David Azulai
 David Tal
 Nissim Dahan
 Yitzhak Vaknin

National Religious Party - 9 Seats

Zevulun Hammer
 Shaul Yahalom
 Yitzhak Levy
 Yigal Bibi
 Zvi Handel
 Hanan Porat
 Shmaryahu Ben-Zur
 Avraham Stern
 Avner Hai-Shaki

Meretz - 9 Seats

Yossi Sarid (CRM)
 Chaim Oron (Mapam)

Amnon Rubinstein (Shinui)
 Ran Cohen (CRM)
 Dedi Zucker (CRM)
 Anat Maor (Mapam)
 Avraham Poraz (Shinui)
 Naomi Hazan (CRM)
 Walid Haj Yihya Zadek (Mapam)

Israel B'Aliyah - 7 Seats

Natan Sharansky
 Michael Nudelman
 Yuli Edelshtein
 Yuri Stern
 Marina Solotkin
 Zvi Weinberg
 Roman Bronfman

Hadash (DFPE) - 5 Seats

Hashem Mahameed
 Saleh Salim
 Tamar Goghansky
 Azmi Beshara
 Ahmed Sa'ad

The Third Way - 4 Seats

Avigdor Kahalani
 Yehuda Harel
 Emmanuel Zismann
 Alexander Lubotzki

United Arab List - 4 Seats

Abd el-Malek Dahamsha
 Abd el-Wahab Darawsha
 Taleb Alsana
 Tawfiq Khatib

United Torah Judaism - 4 Seats

Meir Porush
 Avraham Ravitz
 Shmuel Halpert
 Moshe Gafni

Moledet - 2 Seats

Rehav'am Zeevi
 Binyamin Alon

Source: Israel Central Election Committee via Israel
 Television, URL: <http://elections96-malam.macom.co.il/>