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REINVENTING WORLD JEWRY — PART TWO: DIVIDING AND SHARING TASKS AND FUNCTIONS

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[Editor's Note: This two-part *Jerusalem Letter* outlines the institutional and functional basis of the world Jewish polity today and proposes an institutional basis for restructuring the world Jewish arena based on the tasks and functions it must be prepared to undertake. It is based on a larger study, *Reinventing World Jewry*, prepared by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, which was originally commissioned by the Jewish Agency for Israel during the terms of Board of Governors Chairman Mendel Kaplan and Chairman of the Executive Simcha Dinitz. A revised and expanded version of the full study is available from the Jerusalem Center.]

Three Periods

At no time has the modern or contemporary Jewish world had anything like a hierarchy of institutions and organizations or any authoritative

source capable of allocating functions. Rather, the Jewish world has functioned more in the manner of a market. This is part of the special character of Jewish life and is a situation not likely to be altered in the foreseeable future. Nor are there many Jews who would like to alter it, either as a matter of general principle or when their special interests are involved. Nevertheless, as a market, the polity has worked rather well in sorting out tasks and functions, especially in recent years.

Three periods of development can be identified since the emergence of the first outlines of the modern world Jewish polity some 150 years ago. In the first period there were very few institutions and organizations so there was relatively little overlap, even when, in response to the governments of the states in which each was located, they had to be established as separate bodies and could not establish any formal links with similar institu-

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tions in other countries. The second period began when: a) those external restrictions were relaxed, and b) worldwide Jewish mass movements such as the World Zionist Organization, the Bund, or Agudath Israel emerged to absorb Jewish energy, confront common Jewish tasks, mobilize Jews for both, and compete with one another ideologically as well.

The second was the period of the greatest "anarchy" and "duplication." It persisted into the post-World War II period but basically came to an end as authoritative institutions and organizations emerged in the contemporary world to inaugurate the third period, first and foremost among them the State of Israel, but also in major diaspora communities. These institutions and organizations were authoritative within the market, not beyond it, but that was sufficient to lead to something of a sorting out of tasks and responsibilities or of tasks and responsibilities within shared functions. Those are the arrangements and that is the situation that we see around us today. All in all, it is a good beginning. Now is the time for the next steps.

Tensions, Squeak Points, and Conflicts

Where are the tensions, squeak points, and conflicts in this system? On one hand, there seem to be many of them within and between the various bodies. On the other hand, there are remarkably few. If one starts with a model that perfect harmony is both a desired and expected goal, any deviation from it represents some kind of malfunction or at least misfunction. If one assumes that we are still living in reality and that the messianic age is not upon us, then not only are tensions, squeak points and conflicts to be expected, but many are to be welcomed, in a world where any individual's, group's, or institution's knowledge of the truth is at best imperfect and where there are legitimate different and even contradictory or competing interests that require balancing.

The best way that we have found to deal with all of the above is through open, democratic politics. The vast majority of opinion-makers in the world today agree that pluralism is a good thing, but pluralism in all too many quarters has been defined erroneously as "you do your thing and I'll do mine and we will both try to avoid being judgmental about the other." True pluralism recognizes that not only do people have broad rights to claim that they can make legitimate decisions regarding their own lives and how they want to live, but that interests do clash or at the very least function at cross-purposes, that resources are limited and decisions have to be made as to how they will be allocated

in the face of what remains scarcity, where not everything can be done as much as we might wish that it could be. In the realities of an imperfect world, the pluralism of democratic politics has a great deal to recommend it even if, for all except those who enjoy the process, at times it may seem to be wearing, uncomfortable, and even unpleasant.

There are, however, certain principles of democratic politics which must be maintained if democratic politics is to work. Most of the tensions, squeak points and conflicts within the world Jewish polity honestly must be attributed to the working of democratic politics and most of the discomfiture with them has its source in relying upon people for whom the political way is not the one with which they are most comfortable. Still, the only way to deal with such tensions, squeak points and conflicts is on an issue-specific basis because they revolve around legitimate questions and legitimate differences of outlook and opinion. That is one reason why there must always be those whose necessary task it is to harmonize the differing views and interests of the various powers and others who can try to take a longer view of the system in which such tensions, squeak points and conflicts occur to ascertain that decisions are not made and actions taken on the basis of the most short-term of interests but are in harmony with the system itself and will serve to keep it working and, where possible, make it work better.

This raises another point. Democratic politics does have its own rules of operation which must be adhered to as faithfully as possible for the system to work. These principles and rules include the following:

1. Democratic politics, indeed, democratic life as a whole, is based upon the assumption of moral responsibility, the existence of a modicum of faith in one's fellows, and the extension of both to the exercise of substantial trust among those committed to a particular democratic system or bargain. When any of those three are diminished past certain red lines, the whole system unravels.

2. Those three elements in turn rest upon a sense that the system is based upon rules applied equally or with sufficient equity to all parties within the system so that no one is substantially disadvantaged by them, that equity is maintained, that the system remains open, and its processes remain sufficiently open for all who wish to make the effort to view and understand. So, for example, all political systems involve bargaining, but there is the difference between the "Byzantine" bargaining done as much as possible behind everyone's back and the open bargaining of the democratic process,

so that not only are decisions known but so that they can be judged by sufficient knowledge of the processes through which they were reached and the actors involved in those processes.

An example of this was the conflict between Israel and its Zionist supporters in the diaspora and many of the diaspora community leaders, with the backing of many in their communities, regarding the emigration of Soviet Jews in the 1970s and 1980s. The former insisted that all efforts and Jewish funds be devoted to the aliya of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel while the others held that all Jews should have freedom of choice and that the Jewish people should support their emigration to their lands of choice even if Israel were the nationally preferred designation to be encouraged. However, wherever one stood on this issue, one could perceive it as a legitimate conflict between Jews' different views of the Jewish future which could be legitimately settled only in the political arena, which it was. At first the idea of supporting any Jew to anywhere won out, but then as Jews began to opt for the diaspora, diaspora Jewish communities found out how expensive that was for them so their leadership joined with that of Israel in quiet collusion to send emigres to the Jewish state.

A somewhat different kind of conflict also involving the ex-Soviet Union has been the competition for place on the part of Jewish organizations in an effort to assist the revival of Jewish life. While Israel and the Zionists have taken their stance that in principle Jews in the former Soviet Union should be encouraged to emigrate and not to revive Jewish life locally, their organized arms have recognized the necessity to be involved in the latter task. Meanwhile, the Jewish organizations in the diaspora, particularly the United States, have seen great institutional and public relations opportunities, as well as sharing the common Jewish goals of all, by becoming involved with the new communities in the ex-Soviet republics, so they have moved in, in various ways, often with more publicity than action.

In the meantime, the JDC has seen important new responsibilities for it on the ground in the former Soviet Union, providing the kind of assistance in community building as well as in other rescue and relief ways that have been its specialty. Moreover, all of this is further complicated by the institutional-based conflict between two putative allies: the Lishkat HaKeshet, an arm of the State of Israel, and JAFI. In the meantime, the new local leadership emerging in the ex-Soviet republics have demanded to be treated as independent equals. They appeared at international Jewish gatherings and

were very soon vocal participants, and back home they insisted on their prerogatives in their own communities.


At the present moment, none of these tensions have been resolved and many Jewish organizations outside of the Big Five and their constituents are running around Russia with their own agendas and no apparent interest in coordinating their efforts with others. In part, these tensions will also be resolved in the political arena, but here it may be possible to argue that the introduction of other structures and frameworks will also be helpful, if indeed that is possible.

Hence the first step in making a proper analysis is to distinguish between those tensions, squeak points, and conflicts which are inherent in any democratic or pluralist system and which need to be resolved through the political processes of that system, and those which represent structural or constitutional weaknesses in a particular system. The world Jewish polity is not and probably cannot be structured as a democracy in the fullest sense or even as a democratic state would be, because in the end it is based upon two very different pillars: a state with the boundaries and powers of coercion that it possesses and voluntary Jewish organizations in the diaspora whose adherents and activists come together on a voluntary basis and which has no really enforceable boundaries. In both, some people are more involved than others in the work of the polity, but in Israel Jews are citizens willy-nilly while in the diaspora most who associate with the polity do so out of choice.

Indeed, as the world becomes more open for Jews, so many Jews in both Israel and the diaspora, nominally or potentially within that polity, are unaware of its very existence or even of the existence of its components except in a vague way. Thus we must understand the nature of the polity with which we are working in order to effectively prescribe for its improvement.

The Jewish polity is a series of four concentric circles. In the center are those Jews who perceive themselves and act as part of the Jewish polity in what might be called "every day in every way." These range from the elected leaders of the government of Israel to non-Orthodox rabbis in the diaspora to soldiers doing their military service in the Israel Defense Forces who see their task as flowing from the fact that they are not only Israelis but Jews. Surrounding that circle is a second containing those Jews within the boundaries of the State of Israel who have chosen to be active in Jewish affairs. A third circle surrounding the second consists of those who are associated with relevant Jewish institutions and organizations either as members

The Concentric Circles of Contemporary World Jewry



1. Those who perceive themselves and act as part of the Jewish polity in every day and every way.
2. Those Jews within the boundaries of a Jewish polity or who chose to be active in Jewish affairs.
3. Those who are associated with relevant Jewish institutions and organizations.
4. Those recognized or who perceive themselves as Jews.

or as contributors, even though they may not be conscious of the existence of the Jewish polity and its major constituents. They are the ones who appear, ready to be mobilized when a war breaks out or some other crisis occurs. The fourth circle consists of those recognized or who perceive themselves as Jews, whether associated with Jewish institutions and organizations or not. They form a kind of potential force for mobilization. Beyond those four circles there are no clear boundaries but the circles fade out into the non-Jewish world.

In a situation like this built around concentric circles with vague boundaries separating each of them from the others and all of them from the rest of the world, the limits of democracy are to be found in the fact that with the partial exception of those living in the State of Israel, all acts of participation in the world Jewish

polity are entirely voluntary and many people are not even aware enough to know that they could volunteer, nor do they care, seeing the polity as a congeries of separate institutions and organizations rather than a network with its own processes and rules. Thus the processes and the rules must be designed to bring about the most representative results feasible under the circumstances.

Bringing in Other World Bodies

Even in that there are limits imposed by the model and the situation. In a sense this model is parallel to that shown in the figure of the Big Five organizations and the other organizations tied to them (see Part One of this report). That figure shows that on one hand there are close connections within the State of Israel and the Zionist movement and those parts of the organi-

zations that are within either or both. On the other hand, we see a gap in the linking circles that is greatest between the WJC and the JDC and the others. Here we have some indication of where our efforts to change may need to be directed and the connections between those bodies, rather than being towards the center of the circle, come further out through the overlapping memberships of constituent bodies.

The figure showing the Big Five, their constituents and satellites points us in the direction of examining the other players in the world Jewish polity. As the figure reveals, there is a second ring around the Big Five and at least the outlines, probably more, of a third. Both consist primarily of the regional, countrywide and local constituents or satellites of the Big Five, the most powerful of which are the United Jewish Appeal, the United Israel Appeal, and the Council of Jewish Federations, all connected with the local Jewish community federations in the United States. Somewhat less powerful are the representative boards and community-wide Magbiot affiliated with the WJC and KH respectively. They are in principle less powerful because they are less comprehensive, having separated the functions of representation and fundraising in almost all cases. Where there are links between the two, either formal or informal, or through shared leadership, they are often strong relative to their communities as the American Jewish complex, although because their communities are so much smaller they have less weight on the world Jewish scene except insofar as their leaders become the leaders of the WJC or Keren Hayesod.

Ranked slightly below them are the countrywide and local Zionist federations linked to the world Zionist political movements, which are in turn linked to the Israeli political parties within the Zionist camp, meaning the major Jewish parties. Their ranking is slightly lower because in all but two or three communities their countrywide and local influence is so much less and they are not treated as having much power by their Israeli counterparts either. It may be unfortunate that this is the position of the Zionist movement today, but even in such former bastions of Zionism as Latin America and South Africa there has been a continuing decline of the power and position of the Zionist movement and its countrywide and local outlets. Still, they can hardly be dismissed, especially since they play a rather direct role in the work of the Big Five through their representation in the WZO and the connections of their leaders to their respective Israeli political parties.

Thanks to the WZO, a few of the sectoral bodies

are also included more or less in that third circle. Groups such as the World Maccabi Union and the World Sephardi Federation have been brought into the WZO and hence into JAFI, but their leadership mostly confines itself to sectoral issues and tasks both within the Big Five and in their own spheres.

An equally major achievement of the WZO was to bring in the world religious movements beyond the National Religious Party. The Conservative and Reform movements organized Zionist parties of their own and the world synagogue organizations of the major religious movements have become affiliated in other ways. On the surface this seems like a major step toward greater comprehensiveness and linkage in the world Jewish polity through the WZO. In fact, however, the penetration of the sense of affiliation and involvement is confined to the very top of the religious movements' leadership pyramids or to a very narrow sector that extends down out into countrywide and local bases. Nevertheless, the potential is there to expand that feeling of linkage and involvement, though there would be a political price to pay for it on the part of the other components of the network.

These are the linked bodies. There are others less formally linked, some of whom have informal ties and connections and overlapping leadership with those firmly planted in the network, others of which do not but go their own way, and still others of which not only do not seek such linkage but actually seek to go it alone, often in competition with the network, with varying degrees of success. The first group consists of the other great world and countrywide Jewish organizations that are principally specialists in one sector or another. The second consists of smaller world, regional, and countrywide organizations, all specialists with purposes that are usually more insulated from the politics of world Jewry. The third consists principally of Hassidic organizations such as Chabad and Satmar that for one reason or another reject the mainstream of the world Jewish polity and try to be comprehensive and worldwide in their own right as alternatives. To some extent Agudat Israel falls into that category, though its position is more ambivalent since it is connected closely with the political system of Israel and to the WJC and JDC for their specialized purposes. There is also the Simon Wiesenthal Center which was developed in an effort to become first the leading voice in matters pertaining to the Holocaust and then an independent voice "representing" the Jewish people in matters of anti-Semitism, positions to which it has succeeded to some extent in reaching through

excellent fundraising and public relations skills.

Whatever "anarchy" there may be in the Jewish world today stems from these other bodies to the extent that they "encroach" on the concerns of the mainstream bodies of the polity. Different strategies have to be pursued with regard to each group. In the case of the first group it may be possible to pull them more closely into the network. In the case of the second it may not be worth trying. In the case of the third it may be extremely difficult to pull them into the network *per se*, but partial and ad hoc cooperative arrangements can be made with some of them in certain cases. Since the steps necessary in the case of the second and the third group and perhaps even in the case of the first will involve expenditure of scarce funds, it may not be attractive to those now in the mainstream.

Another way to divide the organizations in these circles is by function. Three major groupings appear to be relevant: the specialists — those that specialize in specific tasks; the partisans — those whose primary mission is to express, mobilize, and provide support from particular political, religious, or ideological positions; and the independents — both multi-functional and transpartisan.

Cut this way, we see a different pattern emerging. Needless to say, the partisan organizations are the main mobilizers of Jewish activity, but some of the functional specialists are better at mobilizing the funding. As to the independents, unless they are at the very top, they tend to be lost among the successful partisan and specialist organizations and institutions.

Recommendations

Our recommendations will encompass five sets of issues: 1) structural; 2) functional; 3) budgetary; 4) coordination; 5) consciousness-raising.

At this stage, we can suggest specifics only in connection with structural issues and can only do so in the following way:

1. Present options and recommendations with regard to structural issues.
2. Recommend the establishment of a representative commission to consider functional issues.
3. Indicate that once the other issues are sufficiently resolved, it will be necessary to recommend appropriate steps to confront budgetary issues.
4. Suggest lines for future development of coordination issues and recommend establishment of a representative commission to consider them in detail.

5. Recommend the development of steps for raising the consciousness of Jews with regard to the world Jewish polity and their places as citizens within it.

1. The most detailed recommendations are with regard to future structural arrangements necessary to improve the organization of the world Jewish polity. Here we have been able to give the matter considerable thought on the basis of our analysis and we suggest several options, each based on a different concept, and make recommendations according to each option. For all of these recommendations, all of the relevant entities will have to review them and negotiate their acceptance together and each will have to work to achieve their implementation.

2. With regard to the functional recommendations, on the basis of our findings we believe that whether by chance or by design, the present distribution of functions is as adequate as any realistic alternative (see Table 2 below), hence we do not recommend any basic changes. At the same time, coordination can certainly be improved, especially with regard to the Commonwealth of Independent States and the former Soviet Union. Moreover, once decisions are made in the structural arena, we recommend a representative commission should be established based upon the knowledgeable people involved in the problem, and that it should further review what is being done and what needs to be done in light of any changes in structure and/or in the field, and recommend what should be done and by whom. Acceptance of their recommendations will need to be by each entity — if not every one, than a majority of them — and all entities will have to be involved in implementation.

3. Our recommendation on budgetary issues is that a select committee be established including the voluntary and professional leaders of the entities involved plus some expert assistance to develop appropriate concepts of budgetary responsibility and to make recommendations for their achievement. Acceptance of those recommendations will essentially be the province of the major entities, those who provide the lion's share of the budget, but implementation will require all entities.

4. Issues of coordination are addressed in general terms in this report. It sets forth a concept of coordination that is essential for a world Jewish polity to function. A representative commission should be appointed at the appropriate time to take that concept in its fullness and from it derive recommendations for concrete steps to achieve greater coordination. Each entity

will have to accept those recommendations and all will have to work together on their implementation.

5. Several recommendations are made with regard to citizenship and consciousness-raising. They will have to be fleshed out by educational experts in conjunction with selected leaders from each entity. All will then have to work together in their implementation. Thus this report should serve as the beginning of a process that will involve those entities that have a place in the world Jewish polity and their leaders in building the "final product" which, as in every other dynamic situation, will undoubtedly continue to develop after it is in place. This process should, however, lead to a new or modified "product" being put in place.

Structural Options

Regarding the structural options, let us first summarize the conditions which the options have to reflect:

We have already identified the government of the State of Israel as the most powerful of the five organizations, controlling a politically sovereign state with all that entails, a budget incredibly larger than the total expenditures of all the rest, raised by taxation enforced by law, a growing share of the Jewish population of the world, and an ideology of centrality reinforced by appropriate beliefs as to Israel's centrality at present and its likely greater centrality in the future. On the other hand, as a politically sovereign state under present world conditions, Israel cannot serve the Jewish people in all of its needs to the satisfaction of all Jews. It has already been demonstrated that world Jewry cannot be mobilized unless it has a share of the action. It cannot have that share only through a functioning state which properly guards its political independence to the point where it has no room for seriously influential representation from the diaspora, even on the part of the Jews whom it considers part of its basic constituency.

By the same token, the World Jewish Congress cannot perform this integrating function even if it were totally rebuilt as an organization. It is the farthest removed from the other four in terms of its structure and functions and is essentially limited to representation and negotiation on issues of Jewish foreign policy. It is the least represented among the Big Five in other areas and has by far the smallest budget. It needs to clearly establish the role as the convener of the country representative boards and their equivalents for Jewish political self-defense.

The World Zionist Organization is part of the Jewish Agency because in its entire history, it could not become the single or major representative of the

Jewish people that it sought to be and is now far weaker as an organization than it was in the late 1920s or even the early 1970s.

Even the Joint Distribution Committee, whose budget is slightly more than a tenth of that of JAFI, would be inappropriate in playing that integrative role. First of all, not only are the State of Israel and JAFI, which includes the WZO, far larger than the JDC, but the JDC is strictly an American organization and its voluntary leadership cannot be considered representative of the rest of world Jewry and certainly not of the State of Israel. If that were changed to make it more representative, it would suffer from the same problems as JAFI. Moreover, should the JAFI budget be shifted, in part, to the JDC, an appropriate enlarged structure would have to be established to manage it, probably including many of the same people who staff the structure of JAFI today.

This leaves the Jewish Agency for Israel. It has by far the largest budget of any voluntary Jewish organization in the world and, after the State of Israel, the largest Jewish budget. It is the only body that is broadly representative, including senior Israeli politicians and community leaders from the diaspora. Although it does not formally include as many of the representative organizations designed to represent the Jews to the world as does the WJC, many such representatives have entered JAFI on the WZO side of the partnership. Thus the only potential candidate for playing the lead role in the world Jewish polity is JAFI unless there were to be a very substantial restructuring of organized world Jewry, designed from "on high" yet acceptable to bodies that clearly have their own purposes, interests, and the means to maintain themselves.

Our first recommendation, then, is that we recognize JAFI's critical position at the nexus of the world Jewish network and play to its strengths in whatever is done, recognizing that JAFI is the principal body around which to leverage the rest of the network into more effective operations.

Option 1: Continue Incremental Development

One way to do that is to continue down the incrementalist path with more deliberate efforts on the basis of formal plans to develop the world Jewish polity. Had this been done earlier, it is very likely that such plans would have been resisted and had little success. Working on the kind of ad hoc, incrementalist basis that world Jewry has followed until now has led to substantial and often unrecognized progress. Had no World Zionist Organization been established in 1897,

it is unlikely that the State of Israel would have been achieved. The establishment of the state in 1948 was clearly a prerequisite for what has developed worldwide by giving the Jewish people an anchor, a power position from which they could make other subsequent choices which not only focused their attention but inspired them to contribute to undertake a level of voluntary activity not seen elsewhere in the world. That includes the raising of the substantial funds which, although we know that they represent only a fraction of the potential available, still represent a level of voluntary contributions not heretofore seen. Moreover, a viable sense of successful Jewish peoplehood was a direct result of the Zionist enterprise.

Meanwhile, the great migration of the Jewish people coupled with the destruction of the older European centers led most of the Jewish world, certainly all of its principal parts, to make a new beginning on an essentially equal basis to rebuild their local and country-wide communities. The consolidation of these new Jewries in the interwar and the first postwar generations was a necessary preparatory step for beginning to develop world Jewish institutions. It was also during that period that the JDC, JAFI, WJC, Keren Hayesod, UIA, CJF, UJA, and most of the federations in the United States were founded. Moreover, in many of the older communities, representative boards or the equivalent were also founded during this period. At the same time there was developed a slowly growing congeries of organizations and institutions for relief and redevelopment purposes in the diaspora and to fund the development of the Jewish people in the Land of Israel and then in the state.

Still it was not until the 1970s that real steps could be taken to develop effective worldwide institutions that were truly multi-country or that substantial attention could be turned to those organizations and institutions that existed and relations among them strengthened on a coordinated basis. What we have now has developed incrementally out of the foregoing experiences. It is not without tensions and problems, but assigned tasks are fulfilled and there is a reasonable amount of coordination. What is absent is a higher level of effectiveness where there is overlapping, and a lack of planning for the future which may or may not be possible.

Allowing things to develop on an incremental basis, then, is not unreasonable to avoid conflicts and will allow more people to achieve leadership positions and to specialize according to their interests and capabilities. They may not even cost appreciably more money, although presumably there are some savings to be

gained through more coordination because it will spare the Jewish people the cost of maintaining the additional organizations that are inevitable under such circumstances. Even that is not certain since we now know that what might seem to be possible savings gained from consolidation of organizations are lost because other organizations have to become larger to take over their responsibilities and thus cost more, and not only a little bit. Larger organizations not only mean more staff and operating costs but also lead inevitably to more complex structures, and those who are entrusted with managing those structures require larger salaries and stronger support staffs for increased responsibilities. So even what are apparently obvious savings are not in any respect guaranteed.

At the present time there are coordinating committees linking the institutions and organizations involved where there is a perceived need. One step might be to increase their number and give them more teeth. This could be done as part of incremental development. At the very least, there should be committees appointed by JAFI and every other organization within the network to enhance coordination in practical ways and it must be a very high level committee.

Option 2: A Leadership Council for the Big Five

A second option would be to establish a leadership council involving the presidents of the four leading organizations and an equivalent figure from Israel, that can meet whenever is necessary to coordinate activities and whose unanimous decisions would be binding on all five organizations. The council should have a limited but well defined sphere of jurisdiction, with a very small secretariat preferably located within the office of the secretary general of JAFI. The permanent members of the council should be able to delegate participation in meetings to appropriate senior officials of their organizations, either other ministers, or other officers, or directors-general. The directors-general themselves should form a parallel body which can meet more regularly. This option would allow incremental developments to continue to take place under monitored conditions and could provide for a greater measure of coordination and planning.

Option 3: Establish an Assembly of Major World Jewish Bodies

This option would be modeled after the United Nations. It would have three principal governing institutions. First would be an assembly of all the major Jewish world organizations. All organizations

would be treated equally. They would meet once a year and discuss problems of worldwide Jewish concern and would recommend courses of action. The Assembly would be the equivalent of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The second body would be a leadership council equivalent to the UN Security Council. The five major organizations would be permanent members and a limited number of other members of the Assembly would be selected for set terms from different categories of organizations. Each category would have to agree among themselves as to who would be represented when. Each of the five permanent members could have, perhaps, limited veto powers that could suspend action on certain measures (e.g., a suspensive veto able to delay action for a year). This body would make actual decisions that would have to pass it with an appropriate majority, including the five current members and a majority of the rotating members. The five permanent members acting unanimously would have a veto. The third institution would be the secretariat, headed by a secretary general with a small staff to undertake the business of the world body.

Option 4: Broaden JAFI

JAFI is undergoing a process of additional reorganization at this time, designed to expand the membership in each of its governing bodies to include other groups from the Jewish world. A fourth option would be to expand the JAFI governing institutions so as to include those organizations left out at present. Right now, the State of Israel and the World Zionist Organization are represented as are the fundraising organizations and, through them, community representatives of those countries such as the United States and Canada. The JDC and the WJC are not formally represented although they are indirectly represented by voluntary leaders who are otherwise appointed. It would be necessary to include them in the JAFI Executive as well as on the Board of Governors and the Assembly. Other organizations could be included in the Assembly and/or the Board of Governors. This would strengthen the appropriate existing institution and include the others within it. The question is, can they achieve any discipline, even voluntary discipline among the member organizations, and will the others accept JAFI's role in all of this. If they would, this would move along the whole process of building a world Jewish polity substantially.

Option 5: Strengthen the Representational Base of the World Jewish Polity

Option five is predicated on the adoption of option three or four with a system of representation based on countries and upon any existing organizations. This system would involve one or another or some combination of two systems. The countrywide Jewish communities in the world would be represented with the number of representatives from each based on their Jewish population. For example, for the Assembly there could be one representative per 50,000 Jews or major fraction thereof. Under this arrangement, in an Assembly of at least 300 members, American Jewry would have approximately 108 representatives, Israel 84, the United Kingdom 6, France 12, South Africa 2, Australia 2, and so on. Additional representatives could be allocated in three bases: fundraising achievements, a special bonus for Israel, and a bonus for a regional organization and cooperation. In other words, if the Jewish communities of the various republics that formerly comprise the Soviet Union and now comprising the CIS would come together in a single organization including their countrywide organizations, they would get some appropriate increase in their collective representation. The same would be true for the members of the European Community. If we assume a ten percent bonus for each, we would still have a smaller assembly than at present, no more than 350-400 members including fractional numbers. So we could actually lower the threshold of representation if we wished. Similar formulas could be devised for the Board of Governors. Within the larger country delegations, local communities and organizations could be represented with appropriate formulas. It would still be possible to maintain the division between the WZO, UJA and Keren Hayesod plus JDC and WJC, if deemed desirable. Representation could be broadened and the formula could include representation of organizations as well.

Under either of the Jewish Agency-centered options, JAFI's role has to be expanded to at least provide some kind of financial support for the functions of the other Big Five organizations in such a way that would guarantee the appropriate primacy of the organization in its proper sphere(s). Thus JDC would retain primary responsibility for relief and rehabilitation, WJC primary responsibility for the fight against anti-Semitism, with other Jewish problems "allocated" to the appropriate

functional bodies.

Functional, Budgetary, and Coordinative Recommendations

The functions of the world Jewish polity should be those matters of worldwide concern to the Jewish people or those aspects of Jewish concerns that have a worldwide or substantial multi-country dimension. Most of them are identified among the eleven listed earlier. In an immediate sense, very little needs to be done to change this list. However, there does need to be a reordering of some of the priorities on it.

For the moment, for example, the development of Israel is becoming more a responsibility of the government of Israel and private enterprise within the state or outside of it and seems likely to need less public investment. Indeed, the public bodies engaged in developmental tasks in the past often give the appearance of looking around for new projects of dubious economic and even less aesthetic or environmental value in order to keep themselves alive. Since Israel has been the subject of a substantial push from diaspora Jewry, especially American Jewry, toward privatization, it would be a mistake for primarily diaspora-funded Jewish public bodies to insist on playing a greater role in development efforts than is warranted for the sake of self-preservation, especially since the major public role, that of planning and developing infrastructure and maintaining certain environmental and social controls, is best, and indeed can only be undertaken by the government of Israel.

Relief and rescue operations, on the other hand, will continue to be a Jewish people-wide responsibility, subject to new considerations, the extent to which such operations will be needed at any given time, and the ability of the various instrumentalities of the Jewish people to coordinate their activities and share in the effort. There a major effort must be made to improve the present situation. It is to be hoped that any restructuring of the world Jewish polity would have that in mind as one of its principal objectives.

One of the few functional areas to which the major institutions of the world Jewish polity have given too little support in recent decades and even less than in an earlier period culminating in the 1950s, is that of Jewish culture and higher education. This is partly because other tasks have been more urgent, partly because the leaders of the world Jewish polity after 1970 have not always been as capable as they could or should be in appreciating the importance of Jewish culture and higher education. It has taken them more

than a little time to realize that there is a role for the world Jewish polity to play in improving Jewish education at lower levels and even there much needs to be done to appropriately define and delineate the worldwide functions of the world Jewish polity in connection with pre-school, elementary, and secondary Jewish education.

Even less has been done with regard to higher or tertiary Jewish education and culture. In a sense this is ironic because those are the two functions that are most appropriately worldwide in scope and lend themselves to worldwide efforts because local and country-wide efforts, except in a very few Jewish communities, have been too weak in and of themselves or relying on their own resources. It is true that certain limited efforts have been made within the world Jewish polity, whether in connection with the establishment, support, and governance of the universities in Israel or with organizations such as the World Union for Jewish Studies, the International Center for the University Teaching of Jewish Civilization, or the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture. All except the last, however, have been initiatives from outside of the mainstream of the world Jewish polity. The first has never acquired the recognition it should have from the polity's leaders, the second at one point had a modest amount of recognition but has not been supported appropriately, even in consideration of the limited resources available, while the third was essentially a one-time effort that continues to exist on the momentum of that effort but is constantly being reduced in significance for budgetary reasons alone. Some of the slack has been taken up by private bodies, especially private foundations, Jewish organizations on a local or country-wide basis or outside of the Big Five in the world arena, or even by non-Jewish sources. But this is not adequate and more of an effort must be made on the part of the mainstream institutions of the world Jewish polity themselves if that polity is to be more than simply a congeries of institutions concerned with Jewish survival and will also be concerned with the quality of Jewish life.

JAFI in particular could take a more active role in higher education and culture and should. The WZO used to and indeed in the 1970s launched a number of major initiatives in the higher education and cultural spheres. Most if not all have since perished because of changes in leadership whose interests have differed and reductions in available funding. If WZO no longer has the funds to undertake these tasks, then JAFI must. The JDC could expand its role as provider of seed

Table 2

DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS IN THE WORLD JEWISH POLITY

Functions	Is now	Should be
Relief and Rescue	GOI*, JAFI, JDC	Same
Defense (Physical and Anti-Semitism)	GOI, WJC	Same
Education	GOI, JAFI, JDC, WZO	Same
Culture	GOI, WZO	GOI, JAFI, JDC, WZO, WJC
Social Welfare	GOI, JAFI, JDC	Same
Building Israel's Economy (Development)	GOI, JAFI, JDC, WZO	Same
Religious	GOI, JAFI, JDC, WZO	Same
Interest Aggregation	GOI, WZO, WJC	Same

*GOI - Government of Israel

money in these areas. Here the WJC could take on a major new area of responsibility that would give it additional purpose.

Our second recommendation is to *establish a task force* of professionals and voluntary leaders, with a few knowledgeable academics to *determine what is not being done under the present system and what needs to be done, or needs to be done better*. Because we see the many places and situations where various institutions and organizations are rubbing against each other, what we might call "squeak points," and we see how so many decisions are made on a political (not necessarily a partisan but not according to any "objective" standards either) basis, we assume that there are truly problematic areas of operations or functions not undertaken. However, these are feelings, frequently born out of frustration. We do not really know if there are such problems.

In recent years, research that we have undertaken in related areas and in political science, public administration, and economics on equivalent topics, indicates that these major problems are normal problems of power and prestige that manifest themselves in any political arena and which occur between departments within organizations, perhaps less visibly, as well as between organizations and institutions where they

become more visible because they are more exposed. These are matters of cultural rather than structural change and maybe even personality change in some cases, if they are subject to change at all. Certain kinds of structures will tend to minimize them and others to maximize them, but we find little or no evidence of either kind of structural impact in this case, especially since in many cases these political, cultural and personality-based tensions and squeak points are given a certain added meaning or momentum because of real ideological differences which, however papered over by a certain rhetoric of partnership, still do exist and are very real.

This task force will need to look not only at the functional questions per se, but also at budgetary issues and issues of coordination that accompany them. How will we pay for what we do? How much should we pay for different functions, at least in what proportions? And given the fact that different bodies will be involved in administering the same functions or providing the same services, how are they best coordinated?

In a sense this can only be done once the structural relationship has been agreed upon and the appropriate bodies buy into it. In part, however, even these structural arrangements may depend upon certain guidelines for the functional, budgetary, and coordinative frameworks.

Consciousness-Raising

A serious effort must be made to *develop a sense of citizenship in the world Jewish polity among Jews*. This must be done not only by placing a greater emphasis on Jewish education, but especially by emphasizing civic education including more knowledge about how the world Jewish polity and its components work. It should be presented in such a way that it will generate a sense of excitement about it and interest in being part of it.

More effort needs to be put into *fostering personal connections and communications across the world Jewish polity*. This includes support for "Israel Experience" programs of all kinds and for all ages. It also includes investment in improving the global Jewish computer network, a global television network, and global satellite communications, among other things.

How to Proceed

After a series of consultations with the principals involved, essentially the Big Five plus whatever representatives of their constituents and affiliates they want to bring in, a working conference on the future of the world Jewish polity should be called at which time there should be review of this report and a discussion of the options presented. The conference should be held in Jerusalem, preferably in July 1996, perhaps following the Jewish Agency Assembly. Invited should be the leaders of the various principal organizations, academic

specialists, and various other civic and economic leaders or activists of the Jewish people. The number should be kept limited so that the group will have a chance to have serious discussions and an exchange of views, hopefully with the point of reaching some kind of consensus as to how to proceed further.

There should then be a period in which the representatives of the various bodies involved should have a chance to discuss the results of the conference with their respective bodies in preparation for a larger congress or assembly to be called by the President of Israel, thereby lending it the authority of the state for what should be the first concrete, formal steps toward whatever kind of reconstitutive act will emerge. That congress should be broader-based, with representatives from all the relevant countries, communities and organizations. At that point, if the congress produces acceptable results, such meetings and negotiations as are necessary can be pursued through the usual manner.

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