

JERUSALEM LETTER / VIEWPOINTS

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

No. 266 20 Kislev 5753 / 15 December 1992

THE CANADIAN CONUNDRUM: TWO CONCEPTS OF NATIONHOOD

Berel Rodal

State and Nation in Canada / The Quebecois: Evolution of a *Staatsvolk* / Canadian Federalism: The Personal Principle Versus the Territorial Imperative / Conclusion

[Editor's Note: On October 26, 1992, the people of Canada went to the polls in a referendum on the latest plan to settle the constitutional crisis of that country which has brought Quebec to the border of secession. In a display of petulance against a political leadership united for the plan, anger against Quebec for refusing to be satisfied, or Quebecois anger against the rest of Canada for not giving them more, the proposals, which required approval in all ten provinces, were turned down in six — Quebec itself, one of the Atlantic provinces, and all four of the western provinces.

Canada is another of the multi-ethnic polities that has attempted to resolve its problems of governance through federalism, only to be brought to the edge of dissolution after many years, as part of the revival of radical ethnicity in the Western world. Unlike the situation in Eastern Europe where federation had been imposed upon those countries by totalitarian Communist regimes, Canada, although having a conquest in its past (who doesn't in one way or another), was a coming together of the two founding peoples on the basis of equality 130 years ago and originally was seen as liberating for the

French Canadians. Canada's problems were subsequently exacerbated by the encouragement of multi-culturalism among the many other ethnic groups that have come to that country in the twentieth century.

While the failure of the referendum does not automatically bring about the dissolution of the country — indeed, business as usual has resumed — some accident could now do so easily. In this *Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints*, a major figure in Canadian governmental affairs and an active member of the Jewish community gives us a look at the problems of ethnicity and multi-culturalism in Canada and how they relate to both larger issues.

In the wake of the disintegration of totalitarian imperialism, the world finds itself confronted by two somewhat conflicting conceptions of the nation and the state. The conception prevalent in most of the West is the citizen-state, whereby the territorial state and its constitution define citizenship and rights for the individuals residing within it. This conception of the state is also the official one in much of Africa where the rulers of the post-colonial states are seeking to forge similar political enti-

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ISSN: 0334-4096.

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ties in the face of pervasive tribalism. This is not so in most of the eastern share of the Eurasian land mass beginning somewhere in Central Europe. There the nation existed prior to its embodiment in a state and perhaps without it. As primordial groups based on kinship or ethnic ties, these nations, to protect and give expression to their corporate existence, seek to form states in which they have clear majorities, in which their national language and culture have protected status.

Zionism is of this second form. Indeed, the struggle between Communism and Zionism involved those who sought to universalize society by eliminating that kind of nationalism, which is why Zionism was considered such a threat by the Communist movement. Canada, as a polity, is part and parcel of the Western conception of nationalism, except for Quebec which had developed over the years into an expression of the eastern form. The present struggle in Canada to accommodate both kinds of nationalism within a single federal framework should have much meaning for the Jewish people who are seeking to maintain that kind of state in Israel, though connected with the Western world which leans in the direction of the other kind of statehood. — DJE]

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Canada is undergoing deep political change. Quebec is now formally debating its constitutional future, in a remarkably calm, systematic, and comprehensive way. There is, amongst elites in any event, increasing realization in English-speaking Canada that the country has entered into a process, it would seem irreversible, of self-redefinition.⁽¹⁾ It has been said for some time that Canadians are the only people who regularly pull themselves up by their roots to see if they are still alive. The current debate in Canada, however, is a different one, in tone, context, and in the appreciation of what is at issue.

State and Nation in Canada

The debate in Canada, historically and in particularly sharpened form since 1960, has been fundamentally about ways of thinking about "state and nation," associated very much with themes of consociationalism — power-sharing and accommodation amongst the elites of competing ethnic groups — and the de-territorialization of ethnicity developed in various versions and with different emphases by Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. The experience in Canada appears to be one

in which a minority ethnic group, once able to become a local majority and given a real choice between equality, language and cultural rights in an overarching multi-ethnic state, and majority status and control of its own state and territory, prefers territorial control.

As it happens, the present crisis came upon the country almost unexpectedly, in contradiction to the received wisdom that "modernization and democratization somehow would cause ethnic self-assertion to fade away," that the development of supranational forms of organization would advance the integration of groups and peoples into larger, functional units geared to economic growth. Separatism was written off only a year or two ago: yet today, as a result of the failed attempt to gain Quebec's full and formal assent to the 1982 Constitution Act, Quebec nationalism and the demands for forms of self-rule on the part of aboriginal peoples dominate the Canadian national agenda.

The puzzling thing for many is why there should be talk of the country's being at breaking point, when in fact so little is at issue. There is no clamor for civil rights, no outrage at discrimination and disadvantage. The Canadian policy universe is a quiet one. Canada stands as a model, though an expensive one, of a federation which has managed to combine a high degree of decentralization with harmonized national arrangements governing social policy (health care, income security, and unemployment insurance, for example), financial equalization, and legal rights. Social programs are universally accessible, and portable. Francophone Canadians have been accommodated: their linguistic rights have not only been expanded with the Official Languages Act and bilingualism policies, but up to 50 percent of younger Canadian children in the major centers of English-speaking Canada are enrolled in French-immersion schools. The French language has majority status in Quebec, equal status in New Brunswick, special status in Ontario and minority status in most other provinces. Quebec legislation bans English from signs and storefronts, to assert and protect the status of the French language.

Federal policies to bring French-speaking Canadians into the upper reaches of Canadian government and enterprise, policies introduced by Prime Minister Lester Pearson and further developed by Pierre Trudeau, and continued by every succeeding prime minister, have been highly successful. French-speaking Canadians have held every critical portfolio in Cabinet in recent years, occupy almost a third of all Cabinet posts, and head important Crown Corporations, state enterprises, and national cultural institutions. It is virtually unthink-

able today that a Canadian prime minister would not be bilingual; indeed, the prime minister of Canada has come from Quebec in thirty of the past forty-two years.

There is no suppression of Quebec. There is no food, energy, trade, or faith grievance. I am from Montreal myself, and this gives me something of a vantage point from which to view the mounting paradox of Quebec. From 1960, Quebecois have experienced a growing self-consciousness as a people, and success as a polity. Why is it that when Quebecois, at the height of their self-confidence and enjoying perhaps the highest standing of any community in Canada, and at the height of their role and participation in the Canadian state, when they have coalesced linguistically, culturally, economically, and politically, when there is a drive by English-speaking Canadians to acquire French as a second language, when protections for French-Canadian minorities outside Quebec are in place, when Quebecois have achieved all the spiritual and material things sought since World War II, and when there is acceptance of French-Canadians not as a minority, but as one of the country's majorities and as the majority in Quebec, that the upsurge of separatist and sovereignist feeling should be at its height, with a clear majority seemingly prepared to opt for some form of sovereignty for Quebec?

"Canada" used to designate something fairly clear. One gathers that in Eastern Europe in the 1940s and 1950s, and sometimes in Poland today, the word for "great" in the sense of "wonderful" or "capital!" was "Canada." Nation-building, where it has been successful, as in the United States, has been based on what has been called "voluntary confluence of separate ethnic and cultural mainstreams." This description also characterizes English-speaking Canada, which has come to see the nation and the state in highly pluralistic terms — in terms of ten provinces of disparate size, population and wealth, each marked by a distinct resource endowment and economic base and ethnic and linguistic composition. While there has been a very rapid acculturation to the mainstream English-American commonwealth culture, there is no sense of a cultural or ethnic majority, dominant or otherwise. Canada outside of Quebec is an immigrant society. The proportion of Canadians born outside of the country is considerably higher than in the U.S. The "British," those tracing their ancestry to the British Isles, were less than 40 percent of the Canadian population in the 1981 census, and this proportion would be lower today. In the four western provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia), those of other than British or

French descent outnumber those of British and French combined. The principal source of stress has been seen as economic regionalism, amplified by the imbalance between center and periphery.

The Quebecois, however, did not and do not now see themselves as part of the "voluntary confluence of separate ethnic and cultural mainstreams" making up Canada. They long saw themselves as the only real Canadians, denied both partnership in the colonization and westward expansion of the country and their communal/cultural rights outside their heartland in Quebec. Quebec's evolution since 1960, the year of the "Quiet Revolution," has been truly radical. It is a remarkable story of a society's transformation from a defensive minority sheltering in a linguistic and cultural enclave, to a self-confident majority and, in its own terms, a distinctive "nation," ready if it wishes to assume control of its own national state, seen as "the expression and instrument of its rebirth."(2)

The Quebecois: Evolution of a *Staatsvolk*

The present-day French-speaking majority in Quebec — about 83 percent of the population of the province — are the descendants of the roughly 60,000 French settlers in New France at the time of the British conquest in 1760 who remained. The French/Catholics (Canadiens, and then Quebecois) protected their cultural distinctness by jealous maintenance of their autonomy for nearly two centuries, sheltering from the English and North American mainstream, seen as secular, materialistic, superficial, and corrupting. The 1774 Quebec Act, and Confederation in 1867 confirmed and strengthened the French/Catholic community's authority to order those activities critical to the maintenance of societal and cultural distinctness — a different regime for education, marriage and family law, social welfare, land tenure and inheritance, and so on. Lord Durham in fact in 1839 warned of the dangers being stored for the future, of "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state," and advocated a policy of assimilation, advice which was not taken.

The French-Canadian mission was "*la survivance*," based in some measure on belief in a morally superior special vocation. In the words of a Bishop Paquet, in 1902,

As for those of us who believe in God, in a wise, good, and powerful God, we know how this goodness, wisdom, and power are revealed in the government of nations; how the Maker of All Things has created different races with varied tastes and aptitudes; and also how, within the hierarchy of societies and empires, He has assigned to each one of these races a distinct role of its

own....Not only is there a vocation for peoples but in addition some of these peoples have the honor of being called to a kind of priesthood....We have the privilege of being entrusted with this social priesthood granted only to select peoples....This religious and civilizing mission is the true vocation and the special vocation of the French race in America....Our mission is less to handle capital than to stimulate ideas; less to light the furnaces of factories than to maintain and spread the glowing fires of religion and thought, and to help them cast their light into the distance.(3)

A host of other influences on French Canada, however, grew increasingly important. There was large-scale migration to New England, and to other parts of Canada. The World War II industrial effort brought large numbers of French-Canadians from rural areas into Montreal, into industry, and into closer contact with the worlds of commerce and English. Political corruption and the sense of economic deprivation, greater ease to travel and study abroad, decolonization and the creation of new states, notably the State of Israel and Francophone states in Africa, television,(4) all contributed to the decline of the old regime. The 1960 election of a reforming Liberal Party broke the mold.

The new Quebec government saw itself as having to build in a short time and in a coordinated way much that had been built up gradually and incrementally over many years in other provinces and societies. It saw its role not as that of local administration, but as the transformation of Quebecois society. The period — marked by the Kennedy presidency in the United States — was one of belief in activism and in social progress under state and political auspices. Modernization began with secularization. The Church had been the matrix of social institutions in French-speaking Quebec. Education, family law, social affairs, hospitals, savings institutions, and trade unions had been ordered under confessional auspices. State institutions were strengthened or created to assume responsibilities in these areas, which brought the social and educational institutions of non-French-speaking and non-Catholic populations under the purview of the state and French-Canadians for the first time.

The Quebec state, which recruited the best and brightest to politics and government to build the new Quebec, became extremely active in the policy, regulatory, and entrepreneurial domains. The slogan and rhetoric was that of "*maitre chez nous*." The view was that economic circumstances and imperatives powerfully shaped one's way of living and thinking; that French-Canadians, at the bottom of the economic heap, had

little control of their economic destiny; and that remaining in an economically inert cultural enclave out of phase with conditions outside the community's boundaries would accelerate rather than protect French-Canadians from enfeeblement and assimilation. Nationalization of Quebec's Hydro-electric power utilities gave French-Canadians the opportunity to manage and direct major enterprises. Hydro remains a critical element to this day: Lavalin and SNC, Quebec engineering firms operating internationally, were created by and remain direct beneficiaries of Hydro policies and activities.

The Quebec government opted out of several major federal programs, preferring to develop its own. Quebec developed mandates, expertise, appetites, and capacities in areas much broader than in other provinces. Canada developed a public contributory pension system: Quebec created its own, investing the funds in the Caisse de depot,(5) which became Quebec's state capital fund and an engine for the creation of a distinct Quebecois financial and corporate structure and elite.

The "Quiet Revolution" led to the creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the "B&B" Commission) in 1963, which warned that Canada, unconscious of the fact, was in crisis, and proposed that if Quebec was to be challenged, Canada needed to become a more credible national center for French-Canadians. The Commissioners advocated wider recognition of "cultural dualism" and a vastly expanded acceptance of and space for French-Canadians in Canada at large — in concrete terms, the acceptance and institutionalization of equal partnership and full participation of French-Canadians in political and economic decision-making in Canada; policies for the protection of the French language and culture; and bilingualism.

Canadian Federalism: The Personal Principle Versus the Territorial Imperative

Pierre Trudeau strongly opposed the focus on the Quebec state while a law professor and activist intellectual in Montreal, rejecting the link between ethnicity and territoriality, a link which he saw as leading to illiberalism. The ideal was the multinational, pluralist state. As prime minister of Canada after 1968, he forcefully articulated a stance and policy which went beyond the removal of discrimination and irritants and the containment and accommodation of Quebec's demands for increased autonomy. Trudeau's policy was specifically to depoliticize ethnicity, to separate the concepts of the ethnically-determined "nation" and the "state," and to strengthen the Canadian state as a liber-

al, secular, pluralistic polity better able to serve the interests of justice for all citizens, ensure equitable prosperity, and provide the space and scope needed to preserve French-speaking Canadians' language and culture.

Trudeau's dominance on the federal scene, in large measure due to the forcefulness, clarity, and consistency of his vision and approach, made the debate in Canada a dramatically clear conflict of alternative visions of the state and ethnicity, though the terms may have been obscured by the stresses, over the same period, of Canadian regionalism, and the waxing and waning of the intensity of nationalism within the Quebecois population. Trudeau amplified and sharpened the focal points of conflict with Quebecois nationalism. Trudeau's was the "Western" territorial approach, where it is the state which is at the base of the nation, and where nationality is a matter of citizenship and residence. For the Quebecois, it is the nation that is at the base of the state, though citizenship would remain a matter of territoriality and residence in the Quebec state in which the Quebecois are the *Staatsvolk*, the ethnic group that defines the state, constitutes its core, and provides its elite and culture. The centerpiece of Trudeau's vision and political arrangement was citizenship, individual rights, and uniform entitlements across Canada, a regime in which no one should be subjected to territorial majority rule and relegated to dependent minority status with respect to basic political and cultural rights. The French-English dualism of Trudeau's conception followed the logic of Renner-Bauer's "personal principle." The French-English dualism of Quebec's conception was that of Quebec and the rest of Canada, and the essence of Quebec's quest was control of a Quebecois state.

Quebec, for its part, meanwhile proceeded with the transformation and "Francization" of Quebec society. Bill 101 made French the language of work in Quebec, and opened enterprise, its upper reaches in particular, to Francophones and the products of Quebec's new educational and managerial system. The rise of a successful middle class under the auspices of the state has been a development of central importance. The best and brightest were now attracted to business schools (and engineering, with the growth of Hydro and related enterprises), in place of the previously traditional careers in the clergy, law, and public administration. With the defeat of Quebec's 1980 referendum on sovereignty,(6) the focus shifted sharply to the economic sphere, with the objective of completing the building of a distinct and independent Quebec economy, one

which would advance the reality of autonomy and reduce the population's fear of sovereignty. This post-referendum agenda was happily congruent with the climate of the 1980s. There was concerted action to build a much stronger Quebecois corporate base, to put Quebec's fiscal house in order, to strengthen Quebec's self-sustaining network of financial institutions (the base of which were the *caisses populaires*, (7) and the Caisse de depot); and to decrease dependency on and economic ties with Ottawa and the rest of Canada, a development greatly helped by negotiation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, of which Quebec was the strongest provincial proponent.

The strategic aim was long-term viability based on an internationally competitive, Quebecois-owned and run outward-looking private sector, helped by the state. Observers have commented on how Japan-like the process of state-building has been, a process marked by a high degree of concertation and commonality between business and government. The nominally federalist Quebec Liberals continued in this vein when they replaced the Parti Quebecois in office in 1985: Comprehensive, ambitious blueprints for Quebec's economic future were commissioned. A special, privileged regime was put in place for Quebec's indigenous financial institutions.

The combination of this process of transformation with English Canada's rejection or lack of comprehension of Quebec's concept of duality appears to have created a consensus on sovereignty in Quebec (current polls suggest a majority in the order of 75 percent for some form of sovereignty), though not on its content, means to achieve it, and willingness to absorb the costs which may be involved in bringing it about.

The paradox, again, is that Quebec has managed to achieve all that it has under the existing constitution, and under the aegis of a supple, accommodating federalism. Why the thrust to sovereignty, whether defined as "renewed federalism" or full independence?

The key element is Quebec's sense of distinctiveness, buttressed by the creation of a successful and autonomous society, and allied to a sense of historical grievance; the memory of subordinate status and insults; demographic strength and vulnerability; the sense that on the larger issues, Quebec thinks and feels differently from English Canada; and the attrition of over 25 years of discussion of constitutional change. What is seen as English Canada's refusal, in the rejection last year of the Meech Lake Accord,(8) to acknowledge even the basic proposition that Quebec is indeed a distinct society, has clearly, for the present at least, served to

fuse these elements in the minds of the majority of Quebecois.

Quebec distinctiveness seems all too obvious to Quebecois, whether comparing English Canada's and Quebec's legal systems, municipal and provincial institutions, corps intermediaires, arts, literature, educational systems, social and health care networks, religious institutions, financial institutions, language, or political culture. To Quebecois, Canadian provinces seem in all or most essential respects like U.S. states — except for Quebec.

The general sense in Quebec is very much one of an internal process, one in which Quebec is, as it were, communing with itself. There is little knowledge or cognizance of an "English-Canada" seen as at once amorphous, yet rejecting and culturally and demographically threatening. In the new circumstances, there is renewed, perhaps deepened, opposition to the 1982 Constitution Act and the values it enshrines — to strengthen an encompassing pan-Canadian citizenship and political identity, a non-provincial/regional sense of Canada, embodied in the reform and the provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The concerns are both material and symbolic. Quebecois are concerned about the declining weight and therefore weakening influence of both Quebec and French-Canadians in Canada. French Canadians are now about 25 percent of Canada's population (6.3 million with French as their mother tongue out of 25.3 million in 1986), concentrated nearly 90 percent in Quebec, where they constitute 83 percent of the population. The highest French-Canadian share in another province is some 30 percent in New Brunswick (numbering some 217,000); the highest number, 330,000, in Ontario (under 4 percent of Ontario's population). There are fewer French-speaking Canadians than "allophones" (persons of a mother tongue other than English or French) in every province but Nova Scotia and tiny Prince Edward Island. There is an acute sense of a precarious status as a French-speaking island and culture in an English-speaking sea. The Quebecois view has been that without the application of state power, special protection and unilingualism, the reality would be domination by those speaking English. There is alarm that secularization and modernization have reduced Quebec's birthrate from one of the highest in the world to the lowest in Canada, and that 51 percent of children in the Montreal school system are today "allophones," with a clear and strong preference for

adaptation to the North American continental, English-speaking mainstream. Eighty-five percent of immigrants assimilate into the English-speaking community.

Bilingualism and *le rayonnement du francais*, promoted as pan-Canadian, may well have changed English-Canada more than French-Canada. While it created acceptance for the "French fact" across Canada, and to a certain degree has become part of English Canada's sense of national identity, it has been minimized in Quebec to the extent it was seen as an aspect of a policy which involves denial of special status for Quebec and the legitimacy of the Quebecois approach to "state" and "nation."

Canada, then, is at a defining moment in its history, one turning on the potency of symbols and interests, but also on the meanings to attach to terms, and the consequences which attach to such meanings. With the evolution of opinion following the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord, both Quebec parties are territorial and "sovereignist." The Parti Quebecois, currently ahead in the opinion polls, is for classical independence. The governing Liberal Party, traditionally though conditionally federalist, is presently committed to the achievement of political autonomy, involving the "exclusive, discretionary, and total control" of most areas of governmental activity. Canada represents a partnership to be reformed "on the basis of free and voluntary association of the participating states," in the language of the Report of the Liberal Party's Committee on the Constitution. Quebec would assume exclusive jurisdictional authority in a very wide range of areas of activity, including powers germane to its "national economic development," including investment, industrial policy, R&D, and corporations. Responsibility for foreign relations would be allocated on the basis of which government held jurisdictional authority for the field in question domestically. Quebec would obtain jurisdiction in any field not specifically allocated, as it would in the great majority of fields allocated. The federal government, at least as regards Quebec, would have exclusive powers in only four areas — currency, customs, defense, and financial equalization — with new rules to determine how Quebec participates in formulating policy and arriving at decisions federally in these areas. The Charter of Rights would be limited in its application to Quebec, and decisions of Quebec courts could not be appealed in the Canadian Supreme Court. English-speaking Canada is unlikely to recognize federalism or indeed a country in any of this.

Conclusion

Canada, then, is something of a battlefield on which Renner-Bauer's ideas have been and continue to be tested in fairly clear form. The Quebecois preference has been to achieve, retain, and expand their control of their own territorial state, and not to be satisfied with equality, language and cultural rights in an overarching multi-ethnic state. The hope is that the consequence of the developments of the last thirty years will not be the fragmentation of Canada into two or more independent states, but new arrangements which will accommodate the existence and needs of the "distinct societies" cohabiting in the Canadian community without enfeebling pluralism and the Canadian state itself. While there is preparedness in English-speaking Canada to contemplate and undertake significant reform, including forms of decentralization to accommodate regional diversity, there is also a growing realization that accommodating two majorities is one thing, but two concepts of nationality and statehood are quite another.

There are, of course, also considerable interests at issue, interests which, it is hoped, will induce compromise. Confederation is nearly 125 years old, and Canada's is the world's eighth largest economy. There is no legal or constitutional process for the dismantling of the confederation, and the breakup of the country would not be a simple matter. The choices to be made in the coming years are thus likely to provide a still more decisive test of the relative power of prudential judgment, on the one hand, and the appeal of nationalism, on the other.

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Notes

* The views expressed by the author are his own and are not necessarily those of the Government of Canada.

1. A serviceable enough though awkward and incomplete term to denote "Canada other than Quebec." There is much discomfort in the domestic debate about the terms to be used to refer to this Canada: "English-Canada" is dated, misleading, and gives offense to the very large numbers of Canadians of other ethnic and national origins. No one today would use the term "French-Canada" to denote Quebec.

2. Thomas J. Courchene, submission to Quebec's La Commission sur l'avenir politique et constitutionnel du Quebec. I am indebted in what follows on the chronology of developments in Quebec after 1960 to Professor Courchene's work, among other sources.

3. Monseigneur L.A. Paquet: "A Sermon on the Vocation of the French Race in America" [1902], cited Ramsay Cook, *French Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto, 1969), pp. 153-154.

4. Radio-Canada — the French-language service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation — has played a central and continuing role in developing and communicating a distinctive and specific Quebecois identity, spirit, culture — and politics. Seventy percent of Francophones in Quebec watch French-language television programming; the audience for Radio-Canada programming outside Quebec is under five percent at any given time.

5. The Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec invests various Quebec public pension and insurance funds. It is one of the largest financial institutions in North America. Its assets are currently in the order of \$40 billion.

6. The government sought a mandate for "sovereignty-association": political sovereignty in economic association with Canada. The *No* side prevailed by a 60-40 margin. Eighty percent of those eligible to vote participated. There continues to be disagreement as to whether or not there was a majority in favor amongst Francophones.

7. Indigenous Quebecois savings and loan cooperatives. Assets are \$49 billion; membership is in the order of five million.

8. The intergovernmental agreement to secure Quebec's full and formal assent to the 1982 Constitution Act. In fact, the Accord was ratified by the Parliament of Canada and by the legislatures of eight (of ten) of Canada's provinces, representing some 95.1 percent of the population.

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Resisting Reform: A Policy Analysis of the Israeli Health Care Delivery System

Gerald Steinberg and Etta Bick

On a per-capita basis, Israel has the largest number of physicians in the world, and as a percent of GNP, its spending on health care is comparable to Western Europe. Nevertheless, the system is characterized by chronic overspending; frequent strikes and work stoppages by physicians, nurses and other personnel; and long waiting periods for diagnostic and surgical procedures. The disjuncture between resources and level of services is a clear indication of inefficiency in management and organizational failure.

Over three-quarters of the Israeli population is insured by and receives primary care from the Histadrut's Kupat Holim Clalit (KHC; General Sick Fund), and this organization is examined in detail. Also analyzed are the structure and operations of the other major health service providers, including the government hospitals operated by the Ministry of Health, and the smaller sick funds and private providers. In addition, for the first time, the changing role of Israeli health consumers is considered.

Many commissions have been formed to recommend changes in the health care system, and many reports and recommendations have been issued, but with little impact. This study sought to understand the sources of this resistance to change and recommends measures based on this analysis.

Contents: The Structure of Medical Care in Israel; The Ministry of Health; The KHC and the Histadrut; Structural Causes of the Crisis in the KHC; The KHC and the Government; Complexity and Centralization in the KHC; The History of Reform Efforts in the KHC; Reducing Surgical Queues: A Case Study; Alternatives to Public Medicine: The Private Sector; Conclusions and Recommendations.

Co-published with University Press of America 1992, 245 pages, Hardcover \$44.00.

A Double Bond: The Constitutional Documents of American Jewry

Edited by Daniel J. Elazar, Jonathan Sarna and Rela Geffen Monson

While the United States Constitution is justly celebrated, Jewish organizational and synagogue constitutions are usually relegated to the bottom drawer, to be taken out only when fine points of procedure have to be clarified. Nevertheless, looking at these constitutions comparatively and over time reveals a great deal about how Jews have adapted themselves and their institutions to American society, while at the same time trying to maintain their relationship with the Jewish political tradition.

This volume is a joint effort of the Center for the Study of the American Jewish Experience of the Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion and the Center for Jewish Community Studies of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

Part I discusses the overall content of the constitutional documents and the values exemplified by them. Part II applies content analysis to specific genres of constitutions in order to illuminate small parts of American Jewish history. Part III includes examples of constitutional documents of synagogues, major Jewish organizations, federations, and immigrant associations, reflecting the several eras in American Jewish history.

Contents: Part I — The Constitutional Documents of Contemporary Jewry: An Introduction to the Field — Daniel J. Elazar; What is American about the Constitutional Documents of American Jewry? — Jonathan D. Sarna; What is Jewish about the Constitutional Documents of American Jewry? — Rela Geffen Monson; Part II — “That Will Make You a Good Member”: The Rewards of Reading the Constitutions of Jewish Immigrant Associations — Hannah Kliger; Yemenite Jews on American Soil: Community Organization and Constitutional Documents — Nitza Druyan; Part III — Synagogue Constitutions; Constitutions of Major Jewish Organizations; Constitutions of Jewish Federations; Constitutions of Landsmanschaften and Family Associations.

Co-published with University Press of America 1992, 479 pages, Hardcover \$62.50.