

JEWISH RESPONSES TO THE NAZI THREAT, 1933–1939: AN EVALUATION¹

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The Nazi persecution of German Jewry between 1933 and 1939 elicited a strong response from virtually every corner of the Jewish world. Jewish responses were, however, limited by the political and economic weaknesses of diaspora Jewish communities at the time. Lacking a strong-willed defender, the Jewish communities were able to undertake only limited rescue actions. Moreover, even such actions as were undertaken elicited considerable differences of opinion among Jewish leaders and communal activists. This essay elucidates some of the options for action that were available to diaspora Jews in the 1930s, seeking to place the failure to rescue German (and later, European) Jewry into its proper historical and analytical context.

The Nazi rise to power on January 30, 1933, posed a new and significant threat to the security and in the long term the survival of European Jewry. The *Machtergreifung*, however, occurred at a time of intense distress for Jewry throughout Eastern and Central Europe. Notwithstanding all the problems facing world Jewry, its main focus soon was geared toward the imme-

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diate physical threat to the German Jews. As a result, efforts were undertaken by Jewish communities outside the Nazi sphere of influence to defend Jewish rights in the Third Reich. Jewish communities outside the Nazi sphere of influence sought to continue the well-established struggle to defend Jewish rights, for both practical and ideological considerations. Practically, an attack on Jews anywhere would encourage antisemites everywhere to attack Jews, thus creating a snowball effect and broadening the amount of distress among Jews.² Ideologically, such concern dovetailed well with the humanitarian orientation of most diaspora based agencies and offered, in essence, a compelling *raison d'être*.

By and large, Jewish organizations in the diaspora pursued four spheres of activity. The first was the effort to publicize Nazi misdeeds, in the hope of mobilizing public opinion against the Nazis and forcing them to ease their stranglehold on the German Jewish community. Second was the pursuit of legal action at the League of Nations to restrict Nazi excesses. Third was the attempt to use economic warfare to cause the downfall of the Nazi regime. Fourth was the task of finding a safe haven out of the Nazi grasp for Jewish refugees and emigrants.

All of these options were responses to the specific nature of the Nazi threat as perceived by Jews during the 1930s. Not included in these options was the use of violent means against the Nazis, as exemplified by the February 4, 1936, assassination of the Nazi Landleiter (district leader) for Switzerland, Wilhelm Gustloff, by the rabbinical student David Frankfurter, and Herschel Grynszpan's November 7, 1938, attack on Ernst vom Rath, the third secretary of the German embassy in Paris.³ Although daring, these actions could not have an impact on the Nazis, since Jews lacked any military power to follow up the acts of individual assassins. If only for that reason, these were the only two violent anti-Nazi acts by Jews before the outbreak of World War II.

At the time, Jewish leaders argued that anti-Nazi violence worsened, rather than improved, the German Jews' situation. Grynszpan's act resulted in *Kristallnacht*. Even though the pogrom had been planned in advance, the attack was used as "justification" by Nazi propagandists, who played up the "spontaneous" nature of the pogrom.⁴ Similarly, Frankfurter's attack

might have resulted in violent Nazi reprisals; German “revenge” was widely feared by Jews throughout the world at the time. But the Berlin Summer Olympics provided better opportunities for Nazi propaganda and, for the time being at least, the Nazis did not respond violently.

In short, to be successful, Jewish efforts had to have a reasonable chance of ameliorating German Jewry’s plight. As noted above, four such options existed and these will be briefly analyzed here.

Mobilizing Public Opinion

Although historians have been primarily interested in the way in which the press reported the Nazi extermination program, they have also investigated how reports about the Nazi antisemitic program were treated during the earliest years of the Third Reich.⁵ Two questions are relevant: To what extent was the persecution of Jews in Germany reported? What, if any, impact did such reports have on the Nazis’ treatment of Jews?

The first question may be answered by noting the fairly extensive reportage in the world press of the Nazi persecution of German Jewry. Most press reports were accurate and provided a succinct perspective on the brutish application of Nazi antisemitism. After 1933, however, the persecution of German Jews ceased to be front-page news and, with the exception of *Kristallnacht*, would not return to the front pages until after the end of World War II.⁶

A clear differentiation must be made, however, between the general press and the Jewish press. The latter continued to cover the situation extensively throughout the 1930s, slacking off after 1939 because of the cutting of communications when the war broke out, and then resuming extensive (although, again, not always accurate) coverage in 1943 and 1944.⁷ The Jewish press, however, lacked any influence outside the Jewish community. In advocating rescue, therefore, they were limited to preaching to the converted. Influential American papers like the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* largely remained aloof, and neither reported on the persecution of German Jewry extensively in the 1930s nor advocated rescue. At

the same time, almost all the major American newspapers continued to support strict adherence to immigration quotas, in some cases as late as 1948.⁸

In contradistinction to the situation in America, the British press was slightly more forthright in publishing news about Nazi mistreatment of German (and later European) Jewry. Nevertheless, willingness to report the news and advocacy of rescue remained an unbridged chasm in Britain, as in America. Numerous studies have noted the general ambivalence expressed by British politicians toward the rescue issue, reflecting their fear that a Jewish tidal wave would inundate Britain, Palestine, or both.⁹ In both America and Britain, the primary problem was a lack of Jewish influence within the corridors of power, rather than a lack of precise information on Nazi actions. This most singularly demonstrates the weakness of Jewry at the time: the Jews could not turn their communal agenda into the agenda of any country or any discernible group throughout the diaspora.

The Bernheim Petition

Since the Jews lacked a sovereign state, the potential for any independent diplomatic action to prevent or at least mitigate Nazi antisemitism was severely circumscribed. As a result, legal action through the offices of the League of Nations represented the only possible recourse Jews had to obtain redress for Nazi antisemitic discrimination. Eastern European Jews were considered a "national minority," and their rights as members of such had been guaranteed by the League in a series of Minorities Treaties signed with the so-called successor states (Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic Republics) in the years after World War I.¹⁰ It seemed reasonable to assume that Jews in Germany could benefit by using the League to pressure the Nazis into canceling their antisemitic campaign. On this basis, a number of Jewish organizations planned to petition the League for redress. Since Germany had not signed a broad minorities treaty and was thus not bound by any legal precedent, this line of operation proved faulty. Moreover, German Jewry had not been considered, nor did it consider itself, a national minority in the years after the emancipation (1871). As a result, initial efforts to place the

Jewish issue on the League's spring agenda failed, as did efforts to persuade Great Britain to sponsor a pro-Jewish resolution in the League Council.¹¹

At this point a change in tactics became necessary. Although Germany was not a signatory to any of the broad Minorities Treaties, the nation was bound by a little-used provision of the 1922 convention on Upper Silesia signed by Germany and Poland. Five articles of this convention (Articles 66, 67, 75, 80, and 83) promised full equality for all persons living in Upper Silesia, and Article 66 explicitly specified that such protection would be granted "without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion."¹² Basing himself on this convention, Franz Bernheim, a Silesian Jew, approached Nathan Feinberg and Emil Margulies, lawyers for the Comité des Délégations Juives (CDJ, the umbrella organization for all Jewish agencies represented at the League of Nations). Together, the three crafted a petition in Bernheim's name that was presented to the League Council on May 12, 1933.¹³ Despite strong German objections, the League took up the petition, and on May 31 it concluded that Bernheim's protest was valid.¹⁴ Since it was temporarily in Germany's interest to maintain the Silesian convention, the Nazis deferred to the League of Nations on this issue and exempted Silesian Jewry from all antisemitic legislation until 1937 (when the treaty was not renewed).

This was a minor victory, but it was a victory nonetheless. The Comité des Délégations Juives planned to carry the victory further by submitting more petitions to the League Council. Feinberg, for instance, spoke of starting a "petition movement," but the campaign did not come to fruition.¹⁵

In part, the long-term failure to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on Nazi Germany reflected the intense disunity of Jewish organizations outside Germany, since they could not agree on a joint anti-Nazi position.¹⁶ The failure of the League of Nations petition campaign to effect a substantive change in Nazi policy also reflects the general weakness of the League, which proved unable to grapple successfully with its most vexatious problems. Additionally, the unwillingness of any country to sponsor the Jewish anti-Nazi campaign demonstrates just how powerless the Jews really were, and offers an early indication of the widespread disinclination to rescue threatened European Jewry.¹⁷

The Boycott

While some Jewish efforts were dedicated to the use of diplomacy for defensive purposes, others attempted to use economic warfare, with the hope of toppling the Nazi regime or at least forcing the Nazis to moderate their antisemitic campaign. A number of anti-Nazi boycott groups sprang up spontaneously among Polish, American, and Palestinian Jews in February and March 1933, in response to the first news of Nazi antisemitic persecution.¹⁸

The difficulty faced was not in declaring a boycott, but in becoming organized and, primarily, in building up sufficient support to make it work. To be successful, the boycott needed to be united and to represent a clear majority of Jewish groups. It also required the support of consumers, Jewish and non-Jewish alike. Despite high hopes, however, the boycott had a limited impact, causing only minor ripples in the German economy. At least four factors must be considered when assessing the boycott's ultimate failure: Jewish disunity; the failure to fully enlist gentile anti-Nazi organizations and businesses; governmental intervention in some countries; and the *Haavara* (Transfer) agreement negotiated between Zionists and the Nazi regime.

While a unified boycott movement might have affected the German economy, unity proved difficult to obtain. The various boycott groups differed among themselves, and some of the most important Jewish organizations including the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and the American Jewish Committee all opposed the idea of boycotting Germany.

There were a variety of arguments both for and against the boycott. At the very least, supporters argued, Jewish honor demanded a boycott.¹⁹ Given what appeared to be the weak state of the German economy, reeling from the catastrophic effects of the depression, a vigorously pursued boycott seemed to have a good chance of success.²⁰ Some thought that the boycott, if combined with diplomatic action, could result either in the collapse of the Nazi regime or, at the minimum, in a mitigating of its antisemitic campaign.²¹

Opponents of the boycott countered that a Jewish-sponsored anti-Nazi boycott would play into antisemitic propaganda, which

had long claimed that there was a worldwide conspiratorial Jewish shadow government. Making Nazism a Jewish issue, as opposed to a nonsectarian one, was seen as unwise, and its scope as too narrow for success. Many Jewish organizations argued that boycotting Germany at a time when friendly relations prevailed would open Jews to accusations of dual loyalty or of warmongering. Opponents of the boycott also feared Nazi retaliation against German Jewry.²² The Board of Deputies of British Jews, for instance, opposed any officially declared Jewish boycott, but did (quietly) support some of the spontaneous boycott groups.²³

We may surmise, however, that the real opposition to the boycott by most Jewish organizations was their aversion toward any public Jewish actions against Nazi Germany. Those opposed to the boycott preferred that Jewish organizations work privately to help German Jewry, and pointed to precedents of quiet *shtadlanut* for persecuted Jewish communities.²⁴

Until World War II the boycott movement in the United States remained largely a sectarian issue, attracting only a small number of non-Jews sympathetic to the plight of German Jewry. Recent evidence has shown that many major corporations including International Telephone and Telegraph and the Chase Manhattan Bank actively assisted the Nazi economy, not only during the 1930s but for the duration of World War II.²⁵ Even within the sphere of non-business groups, the Jewish anti-Nazi boycott aroused little support, and considerable criticism and suspicion. An editorial in the highly influential *Christian Science Monitor*, dated April 4, 1933, may be taken as fairly indicative of the position of the average American: "Hate has begot hate," wrote the editorialist, "bitterness has rebounded in bitterness. Jews outside Germany have brought down trouble upon their fellows within the Reich." This editorial continued by noting that Jewish atrocity stories would be "accepted only by the gullible," and scoring the Jews' "commercial clannishness which often gets them into trouble." In the end, the *Christian Science Monitor* condemned as equally unjustified both the Nazi anti-Jewish boycott and Jewish efforts at self-defense.²⁶

Governmental intervention played a decisive role in deterring the boycott in at least one case, that of Poland. There, the Jewish anti-Nazi boycott enjoyed the support of almost all

Jewish political parties, a degree of unity almost unprecedented in Polish Jewish history in the interwar years. Nevertheless, the Polish government unilaterally suppressed the boycott organization by banning its publicity, in a gesture of friendship toward the Reich after the signing of the German-Polish nonaggression pact on January 26, 1934.²⁷

Finally, an apparent factor in the failure of the boycott, at least in Palestine, was the *Haavara* (Transfer) agreement. The subject of much debate at the time, *Haavara* is still the source of considerable recrimination. Although relevant to diaspora Jewish responses to the Nazis, the *Haavara* agreement requires more detailed discussion.²⁸

Yet, it cannot be said unequivocally that a more forcefully pursued boycott would have succeeded. Jews simply did not possess sufficient economic power to adversely effect German exports in any country (except, perhaps, Poland). In stark contrast, Jews received almost no support for their boycott: Neither from consumers nor from retailers.²⁹ R.H. Macy's, for example, stated its intention in principle to comply with the boycott, but only after all orders for German goods made before March 1, 1933 were completed.³⁰ It is too much to expect that a minority group composing a few percents of a population could radically effect imports to that country. Then, too, the actual state of the German economy must be kept in mind. During the 1930s, Germany appeared to be on the verge of economic collapse, and Nazi leaders played up this weakness. Since World War II, however, historians have concluded that the German economy, although seriously affected by the depression, was stronger than most contemporaries realized. It follows, then, that Nazi statements regarding the economy should be dismissed as propaganda designed to justify the draconian economic measures that the Nazis applied. A few statistics may help to place the historical reality into context. Between 1932 and 1936, at the height of Nazi economic propaganda, Germany's Gross National Product grew by 43 percent (from RM58 Billion to RM83 Billion) while unemployment fell by 71 percent (from a height of 5,600,000 to 1,600,000).³¹

Economic growth, not the stagnation that Nazi propagandists portrayed and the boycotters hoped to play upon, was the order of the day in German exports as well. In 1929 Germany had

a positive trade balance of only RM36,000,000. By 1932 at the height of the depression Germany's positive trade balance grew to RM1,072,000,000. And while the balance of trade fell from that height to "only" RM667 Million in 1933 (and actually went negative by RM284 Million in 1934), by 1936 Germany's balance of trade was still in the black by RM550 Million.³² The reason for this reality was that Germany's export economy was protected, in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, by a series of forty clearing agreements that replaced foreign currency payments (for German imports from the relevant countries) with barter (via the export of equivalent values in German goods).³³

The Jewish anti-Nazi boycott continued, with only minimal results, until the outbreak of World War II, when the boycott became non-sectarian. Again, however, the boycott seems to shine a spotlight on Jewish powerlessness during the Holocaust era, and portrays a picture of world Jewry vastly different from that painted by the Nazis. "International finance Jewry" could not, it turned out, wage a successful economic campaign against its premier foe.

Aid to Refugees

Less glamorous than either the petition campaign or the boycott was the day-to-day work needed to help the ever-swelling numbers of German Jews who left the country. At least 278,000 German Jews left Germany before the outbreak of World War II. A further 118,000 Austrian Jews left between the *Anschluss* and the outbreak of the war. Together, they represented 52.7 percent of the 1933 Jewish population of what eventually became the Grossreich.³⁴ These figures must be further subdivided into two groups: those Jews leaving between 1933 and 1937 (175,000 persons in all), and those leaving in 1938 or 1939 (103,000, not counting Jews from Austria). At least 35,000 of the former group remained in continental Europe, with the other 140,000 seeking refuge elsewhere, primarily in Palestine and the United States.

The international climate these refugees encountered was anything but friendly. As a result of continued economic dislocations caused by the depression, few countries sought penniless

refugees, while only a handful of countries actively sought immigrants at all. Given the highly antisemitic world environment of the 1930s, finding refuge became all the more difficult. Two examples should suffice to explain the problems experienced by Jews escaping Germany.

Although it had an otherwise liberal and tolerant reputation regarding Jews, Holland attempted to keep Jewish (and, to a lesser degree, non-Jewish) refugees from remaining in the country. No impediments were initially placed on refugees who used Holland as a transit point, but after 1934 the Dutch made concerted efforts to keep Jewish refugees (except for select individuals possessing economic assets in Holland) out of the country altogether, and to make the residence of those who did enter the country as brief as possible.³⁵ In 1939 the Dutch set up a central detention center for illegal Jewish immigrants in the town of Westerbork.³⁶ Again, the basis of this policy was an effort to convince Jewish refugees to use Holland only as a transit point.

Canada's policy on Jewish refugees was even simpler, and was considerably less sympathetic. For the entire period from 1933 to 1939 (and well into the 1940s), Canada's doors were closed to refugees, and especially to Jewish refugees from Germany. Restrictive Canadian immigration laws were tightened throughout the 1930s to the extent that, by 1938, it was virtually impossible for European Jews to enter Canada. As late as 1945 a government official, when asked how many Jewish refugees Canada was willing to accept, could declare: "None is too many."³⁷

Even in the few lands where immigration was possible, such as South America, only individuals with specific skills, primarily medical professionals, were actively sought.³⁸ When asylum was found, the refugees invariably needed much financial aid to build their new lives. Legislation enacted by the Weimar Republic on August 8, 1931, in the aftermath of the great inflation (1923-1924), had strictly controlled the export of capital from Germany.³⁹ As a result, Jews leaving Germany (except via the *Haavara* agreement) were virtually reduced to penury. The economic impact of this legislation seems to explain, in part, the unwillingness of many already established German Jews to emigrate: they feared abandoning a lifetime's work to seek the

new and unknown. As long as Nazi anti-Jewish policy remained tolerable, they hoped to muddle through.⁴⁰

The need to help German Jews reestablish themselves reinforced the need for philanthropic work to help Jews trying to emigrate from Eastern Europe. Jewish philanthropies, especially international aid organizations such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), had been severely hurt by the depression. Their finances had been cut back between 1929 and 1932; in 1933 the JDC had not yet fully recovered its financial position. Nor had other philanthropic agencies, which often relied on the JDC for their funding.⁴¹ The German Jewish crisis forced the different philanthropic agencies to pool their resources, minimally, by joining united committees to establish rescue priorities and financial goals.⁴² Such financial difficulties would continue to plague refugee aid efforts throughout the Nazi era. Thus, for example, the Jewish community of Sidon reported that there was an opening for some refugees in Lebanon, for which it was collecting funds but for which outside financing would also be needed.⁴³ The Jews of Egypt, among the first to protest Nazi antisemitism, unsuccessfully sought to gain entry permits for 1,000 Jewish professionals in the summer of 1933.⁴⁴

Slightly more successful were efforts in Europe, although these tended to concentrate on philanthropy rather than resettlement. The European campaigns were able to capitalize on the immediacy of the need because of the proximity of the events, and thus raised considerable sums of money, especially in 1933 and 1934. Since numerous German Jewish refugees were already in other countries, an added sense of urgency animated the fund-raisers, both in Europe and elsewhere.⁴⁵

While a detailed picture of the European rescue front during the 1930s is clearly needed, the situation may be summarized as follows: Refugee funds existed in almost every country. It appears, paradoxically, that the most successful fund-raising drives were in precisely those countries that attempted to exclude Jewish refugees, notably Sweden and Switzerland.⁴⁶ On the other hand, Italian Jewry also collected the considerable sum of 600,000 lire (\$30,000) between January and July of 1933.⁴⁷ Other Jewish communities collected lesser amounts, but experienced difficulty in turning the monies to any practical use owing to

local currency transfer restrictions. A case in point was the Jewish community of Bulgaria, whose entire collection effort was jeopardized by the government's unwillingness to allow export of capital.⁴⁸

As may be expected, most of the money for relief work came from the United States and Great Britain. Zionist and non-Zionist fund-raisers discovered the crucial importance of American Jewry. Thus, in 1930 and 1931 Keren ha-Yesod collected a total of £P327,293 (\$1,636,465), of which £P61,291 (\$306,455), or 19 percent, came from the United States.⁴⁹ In 1933 a special effort was made to collect funds for refugee relief. Although this effort accomplished much, the sums collected never fully equaled what was needed.⁵⁰

In Great Britain, efforts to aid refugees culminated in the creation of a united organization, the Central British Fund for German Jewish Relief (CBF), which began operation on May 18, 1933. The CBF was organized by a distinguished committee of sponsors, including Chief Rabbi Joseph Herman Hertz, Haham Moses Gaster, Lord Reading, Lionel de Rothschild, Chaim Weizmann, and Nahum Sokolow.⁵¹ CBF also sponsored the Conference for Relief of German Jewry, which met in London between October 29 and November 1, 1933. Represented at the conference were all the European activists working on behalf of German Jewish refugees; their discussions centered on the coordination of activities and on the high hopes assigned to the newly appointed League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, James G. McDonald.⁵²

By 1939 it was clear that German Jewry, and the remainder of European Jewry as well, had been abandoned to their fate. During World War II European Jewry was thus ground to dust between the twin millstones of Nazi antisemitism and Allied apathy. Tragically, in its hour of need, European Jewry could find neither savior nor safe haven. Powerless to effect their fate, Jews both inside and outside of Europe could only watch with horror at the unfolding tragedy and prepare for the denouement of the war on Jewry that Hitler had started.

Conclusion

In light of the above, it may be fairly stated that Jewish activity on behalf of German Jewry in the 1930s failed. The public did not become aware of the emerging threat to Jewish lives, and indeed was largely unaware of the murder of European Jewry. Although the Bernheim petition succeeded in temporarily halting the persecution of part of Silesian Jewry, it did nothing for the bulk of German Jews. Moreover, after the treaty was cancelled in 1937 even that defense was no longer available. The boycott did not appreciably effect the German economy and thus did not result in the downfall of the Third Reich. Finally, aid to refugees was only partial. Even if only German Jewry is considered, the result of refugee aid activity throughout the 1930s was inadequate. Only half of German (and Austrian) Jewry was rescued. When the immediate need to rescue the nearly six million Jews in Eastern Europe is added to the evaluation, the evidence of failure becomes even more apparent. The reality of failure, however, must be understood in context. There can be no doubt that the Jewish leadership at the time wanted to rescue European Jewry, but lacked the means to carry out the massive program needed to do so. The fact that Jews did not make the fundamental decisions even in the Yishuv regarding immigration must always be considered when evaluating the searing experience of the Holocaust.

Where the Nazis created a myth of an all-powerful Jewish enemy that had to be eliminated for the sake of Germany's future, the reality was that Jewry was politically powerless and racked by intense internal dissensions. It is easy after the fact to criticize the contemporary Jewish leadership. A number of authors have attempted to use the Holocaust as an example of the failure of the Jewish establishment to properly assess foreign threats to Jewish survival. These authors claim, in effect, that all of European Jewry could have been saved had the Jewish leadership only behaved "properly."⁵³ The evidence presented here, however, does not sustain such a conclusion at least for the experience of the 1930s.

To be sure, there were failures of omission and commission by Jewish leaders. In particular, some leaders refused to abandon tactics that had been rendered obsolete by the Nazi perse-

cution of German Jewry. They continued to rely on good will rather than political action for too long, hoping to kindle a humanitarian spirit in the democracies' conduct of foreign affairs. The sad reality was that many of these leaders saw themselves as having no other option. World Jewry could not wield its political power, since it had none. The Bernheim Petition, the boycott, and the experience of aiding Jewish refugees prove just how powerless Jews really were.

Notes

1. This essay is based on a chapter of my unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: "The Yishuv in the Shadow of the Holocaust: Palestinian Jewry and the Emerging Nazi Threat, 1933-1939," City University of New York Graduate School, 1992. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Professors Howard L. Adelson and Robert M. Seltzer for their kind assistance at every stage of this project.
2. For an example of this logic, see Bernard D. Weinryb, *Jewish Emancipation under Attack* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1942), chs. 2-4.
3. David Frankfurter, *The First of the Nazi Fighters* (Tel Aviv: Reshafim Press, 1984) (Hebrew).
4. Cf. Rita Thalmann and Emmanuel Feinermann, *Crystal Night 9-10 November 1938* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974).
5. Deborah E. Lipstadt, *Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933-1945* (New York: Free Press, 1986).
6. The *New York Times*, for example, buried the 12 December 1942 report that 2,000,000 Jews had already been murdered by the Nazis on page 31; many other papers, however, did not even publish the report. Cf. Lipstadt, *Beyond Belief*, pp. 162-176.
7. Lipstadt, *Beyond Belief*, does not specifically deal with the Jewish press and the subject of coverage of Holocaust-related issues in the American Jewish communal press still requires systematic elucidation.
8. Leonard Dinnerstein, *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 1-8.
9. Andrew Sharf, *The British Press and Jews Under Nazi Rule* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). More data on the difficulties experienced in finding a refuge are provided below and in Edelheit, "Yishuv," ch. 4.

10. Cf. Oscar I. Janowsky, *The Jews and Minority Rights* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. 379–382.
11. Nathan Feinberg, *Ha-Maavak Ha-Yehudi Neged Hitler al Bamat Hever Ha-Leumim* (The Jewish Struggle Against Hitler at the League of Nations) (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1957), pp. 31–32, 35.
12. “The Bernheim Petition to the League of Nations,” *American Jewish Yearbook* (hereafter, *AJYB*), vol. 35 (1934/1935):74.
13. *Ha’arets*, 18 May 1933, p. 1.
14. *Ha’arets*, 1 June 1933, p. 1.
15. Feinberg, *Ha-Maavak Ha-Yehudi*, p. 43.
16. Feinberg, *Ha-Maavak Ha-Yehudi*, p. 27.
17. For recent evaluations of Jewish rescue efforts, see Yehuda Bauer, “Jewish Foreign Policy during the Holocaust,” *Midstream*, vol. 30, no. 10 (December 1984):22–25; Henry L. Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970), ch. 10; and Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939–1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1979), pp. 345–357.
18. Protocols of the Jewish Agency Executive, 9 April 1933, Central Zionist Archive (hereafter CZA) S100/14, pp. 5/3651–6/3652; *Ha’arets*, 23 March 1933, p. 1, 26 March 1933, p. 1, 27 March 1933, p. 1, and 28 March 1933, p. 1. For a history of the American Jewish anti-Nazi boycott movement, see Moshe Gottlieb, *American Anti-Nazi Resistance, 1933–1941: An Historical Analysis* (New York: Ktav, 1971).
19. Cf. Walter Citrine “Boycott Most Useful Weapon Against Dangers of Nazism,” *Anti-Nazi Economic Bulletin*, vol. 3, no. 7 (October 1936):1; and Abba Hillel Silver “Why We Boycott Germany,” *Anti-Nazi Economic Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 4 (May 1934):4.
20. There had been a number of highly publicized successful boycotts that could serve as a precedent for the anti-Nazi boycotters. For one example of a successful but limited boycott, see Edwin Black “The Anti-Ford Boycott,” *Midstream*, vol. 32, no. 1 (January 1986):39–41.
21. Joseph Tenenbaum, “Review of Three Years of the Anti-Nazi Boycott, 1936,” CZA A209/139, pp. 7–9.
22. Regarding the position of the American Jewish Committee, see *Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the American Jewish Committee* (New York: The Committee, 1934), pp. 43–44.

23. Cf. Nana Sagi, "The Response of the Jewish Public in Britain to the Persecution of Jews in the Third Reich in the Years 1930-1939," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Hebrew University, 1982, pp. 98-115.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 432-437; and Naomi W. Cohen, *Not Free to Desist* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1972), pp. 162-166.
25. Charles Higham, *Trading With the Enemy* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983). Higham's book is written in the form of an expose and does not attempt to evaluate the importance of corporate collaboration with the Nazis in economic terms.
26. "Healing Hatred," *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 April 1933, cited in *Dimensions: A Journal of Holocaust Studies*, vol. 4, no. 3 (1989):11.
27. Interview with Rav Zorach Warhaftig, 30 July 1991 (notes in author's possession). Although Rav Warhaftig compiled a systematic study of the anti-Nazi boycott for the American Jewish Congress in 1943, the manuscript has never been published. Warhaftig's files on the boycott are held in the Yad Vashem Archive P/20 and in the Israel State Archives (hereafter ISA). Cf. Zorach Warhaftig, *Palit ve-Sarid be-Yeme ha-Shoa* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1984), ch. 2.
28. Cf. Edelheit, "Yishuv," ch. 5.
29. On non-cooperation by consumers, see "Minutes of a Meeting of the Boycott Committee of the American Jewish Congress," 22 February 1934; on retailers, see *ibid.*, 15 February 1934, ISA GL 8586/1.
30. "Minutes of a Meeting of the Boycott Committee of the American Jewish Congress," 1 March 1933, ISA GL 8586/1.
31. Abraham Barkai, *Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, Policy* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1990), p. 250.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 254-255.
33. Tenenbaum, "Review," pp. 3-5.
34. *AJYB*, vol. 36 (1934/1935):376-382.
35. Dan Michman, "The Committee for Jewish Refugees in Holland (1933-1940)," *Yad Vashem Studies*, vol. 14 (1981):205-232. It is interesting to note that Dutch Jewry was not active in an anti-Nazi boycott.
36. Westerbork eventually was taken over by the Nazis and became a transit camp for the deportation of Dutch Jews. Cf. Jacob Boas, *Boulevard des Miseries: The Story of Transit Camp Westerbork* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985).

37. Cf. Irving Abella and Harold Troper, *None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948* (New York: Random House, 1982), ch. 2.
38. Cf. Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: A History of Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 135-141.
39. Bruno Blau, *Das Ausnahmerecht für die Juden in deutschland, 1933-1945*, 3rd ed. (Dusseldorf: Verlag Allgemeine Wochenzeitung der Juden in Deutschland, 1965), p. 117.
40. Marrus, *The Unwanted*, pp. 212-213.
41. Yehuda Bauer, *American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939-1945* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1981), ch. 1.
42. Weizmann to American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 3 November 1933, in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Series A: Letters*, vol. 16 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 111-112.
43. "Sidon Jewish Community to the Joint Committee to Settle German Jews in Eretz-Israel," 1 June 1933, CZA J/14/1/II.
44. "Szold to League to Fight Antisemitism," 31 July 1933; "Joint Committee to the Alexandria Jewish Community," 2 August 1933, CZA J14/1/II.
45. "Bericht Über die Lage der Jüdischen Flüchtlinge aus Deutschland in den verscheidenen Länder, die Tätigkeit verscheidener Hilfs-Comités, etc.," n.d., CZA J14/1/IV.
46. "Weizmann to Ehrenpreis," 8 February 1934, CZA L18/117; and "Weizmann to Braunschweig," 8 May 1934, CZA L13/35.
47. "Tshernowitz to Szold," 29 July 1933, CZA J14/1/III; and "Weizmann to Nahon," 4 October 1933, cited in *Letters*, vol. 16, pp. 61-62.
48. "Bulgarian Jewish Community to Joint Committee," 25 July 1933, CZA J14/1/III.
49. *Jewish Agency Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 6 (28 April 1931):8; and vol. 2, no. 2 (4 November 1931):6.
50. See, for example, "Weizmann to Beck," 9 January 1936, CZA S53/331/II.
51. Joan Steibel, "The Central British Fund for World Jewish Relief," *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, vol. 27 (1978/1980):51-60.
52. "Weizmann to Laski," 20 October 1933 and 24 October 1933, cited in *Letters*, vol. 15, pp. 84, 99.

53. The list of such accusatory works includes, inter alia: Ben Hecht, *Perfidy* (New York: Messner, 1961); Saul S. Friedman, *No Haven for the Oppressed* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973); Shabettai B. Bet-Zvi, *Ha-Zionut ha-Post Ugandit ba-Mashber ha-Shoa* (Tel Aviv: Bronfmann's Agency, 1977); Eli Matz, "Political Actions vs. Personal Relations," *Midstream*, vol. 27, no. 4 (April 1981):41-48; Seymour Finger, ed., *American Jewry During the Holocaust: A Report Sponsored by the American Jewish Commission on the Holocaust* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985); and Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993).