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### THE IMPACT OF THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON ON SOVIET MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY

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The Soviet Strategy: Fostering "Anti-Imperialist Arab unity." The Arab World as Three Camps. Anti-Soviet sentiment in the Middle East. The Lebanese Invasion and the Soviet response to the PLO. Moscow's non-involvement in Lebanon. Loss of Soviet Prestige in the Middle East.

The lack of significant Soviet action during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as the Israeli army soundly defeated both an important Soviet client, the PLO, and Moscow's most important Arab ally, Syria, has aroused a great deal of comment in the West. One group of analysts has attributed the Soviet hesitancy to the succession crisis and former Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev's deteriorating health. Another group has pointed to Soviet logistical difficulties in the conflict, and Soviet unwillingness to deploy troops abroad in the face of significant opposition. Others have contended that Moscow was preoccupied with continuing crises in Poland and Afghanistan, the strategic arms negotiations, and efforts to encourage nuclear freeze forces both in the United States and Western Europe. While there may well be some validity in all of these contentions, it would appear that there is perhaps an even more important reason for the lack of vigorous Soviet action during the Lebanese crisis -- the inability of the Arab states themselves to take coordinated action to aid Syria and the PLO. It should be noted that Moscow has long proclaimed its desire for the Arab world to develop what the Soviets have termed an "anti-imperialist"

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unity, since it is on this basis that Moscow has hoped to score its greatest victories in the region.<sup>1</sup> A discussion of the Soviet leadership's reasons for seeking this "anti-imperialist" Arab unity will set the stage for the analysis of Moscow's actions - or lack thereof - during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

#### THE SOVIET STRATEGY: FOSTERING "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" ARAB UNITY

In its efforts to expand its influence in the Arab world while weakening that of the United States (Moscow has seen the Arab world as a field of zero-sum game competition with the United States), the Soviet leadership faces four main problems. In the first place, the Arab world, and the Middle East as a whole, is riven with so many conflicts (Morocco-Algeria; Syria-Jordan; Libya-Egypt; Syria-Iraq; South Yemen-Oman; Iran-Iraq; Ethiopia-Somalia; and Arab-Israeli to mention only the most important ones) that Moscow faces a difficult problem of choice. If it aids one side, it alienates the other and runs the risk of driving it over to the United States. If it seeks to remain neutral (as in the Iran-Iraq war), it runs the risk of criticism by both sides for lack of support. Only in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict has Moscow sided fully with one side but even here it has given the Arabs far less support than they wanted, a pattern which was to be repeated during Israel's invasion of Lebanon. A second Middle East problem for Moscow lies in the presence of communist parties in the region. Given the fact that almost all the Arab regimes in the area are one-party dictatorships, their leaders view the existence of communist parties as potential or actual competitors for power, and Moscow is seen as the guiding force behind the actions of the Arab communist parties. Thus, as in the Sudan in 1971, or in Iraq in the late 1970s, when a local communist party is involved in a coup d'etat attempt, Moscow is blamed whether or not the Soviet leadership was actually involved in the coup planning; a deterioration of relations between the USSR and the Arab state that was targeted for the coup attempt inevitably occurs. A third problem for Moscow has been the rise of fundamentalist Islam, particularly since 1973. Given the fact that atheism is an important component of Marxism, believing Moslems look with suspicion on the Marxist USSR, and this suspicion is reinforced when Moscow is seen as suppressing a national liberation struggle by Islamic forces in Afghanistan. A fourth problem facing Moscow has been the wealth that has flowed to the Middle East since the 1973 war. This has enabled Arab states either directly, as in the case of Iraq, or indirectly, via Arab loans, as in the case of Syria, to purchase quality economic goods from Western Europe, Japan, or the United States, thereby lessening their economic dependence on Moscow.<sup>2</sup> Finally, of course, Moscow faces competition from the United States, which in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, has been seeking to build an anti-Soviet alignment of states in the Middle East.

To overcome these difficulties, Moscow has evolved one overall strategy--the development of an "anti-imperialist" bloc of states in the Arab world. In Moscow's view these states should bury their internecine rivalries, and join together along with such political organizations as the Arab communist parties

and the PLO, in a united front against what the USSR has called the "linchpin" of Western imperialism in the Middle East - Israel. Under such circumstances it is the Soviet hope that the Arab states would then use their collective pressure against Israel's supporters, especially the United States. The ideal scenario for Moscow, and one which Soviet commentators have frequently referred to, was the situation during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war when virtually all the Arab states supported the war effort against Israel, while also imposing an oil embargo against the United States. As is well known, not only did the oil embargo create domestic difficulties for the United States, it caused serious problems in the NATO alliance, a development that was warmly welcomed by Moscow. Unfortunately for the USSR however, this "anti-imperialist" Arab unity did not survive the 1973 war, although following the Camp David agreements of 1978, most of the Arab states, except for Egypt and its allies, the Sudan and Oman, joined together to both condemn the U.S.-sponsored agreements and isolate Egypt. Nonetheless, even this anti-Camp David unity was soon to dissipate when the old Syrian-Iraqi dispute, which was temporarily cooled as both states opposed Camp David, again erupted; when the Algerian-Moroccan dispute over the former Spanish Sahara increased in intensity; and when the Iran-Iraq war broke out, an event which further split the Arab world as Syria and Libya and, to a lesser extent, the PLO backed Iran, while the other Arab states backed Iraq. The end result of these developments was that on the eve of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Arab world was very badly divided -- and consequently very far from the "anti-imperialist" Arab unity which Moscow had sought to create.

#### THE ARAB WORLD AS THREE CAMPS

Indeed, by June 1982 the Arab world could be seen to be roughly divided into three camps. First there was what might be called the "Peace" camp of Egypt, the Sudan, Oman and Somalia, all of whom were pro-Western (to the point of providing facilities for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)) and also to a greater or lesser degree committed to peace with Israel. On the other extreme there was the so-called Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation composed of Libya, the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria, Algeria and the PLO who were all, at least on paper, opposed to any kind of peace with Israel, and were also following a pro-Soviet line on such issues as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Located between the "Peace" camp and the Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation was the rather amorphous group of Arab states which can be called, for want of a better term, the "Centrists." These states had indicated a willingness to live in peace with Israel (albeit under very stringent terms) and were composed of states that ran the spectrum from being mildly pro-Western (such as Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) to neutralists as in the cases of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and Kuwait. Iraq, before 1978 among the most hostile Arab states to Israel, had moderated its position to that country and by June 1982 could be considered part of the Centrist bloc for this reason as well as because of its improved relationship with the United States.

Given this situation, Moscow's goal was to try to move the Centrist Arab states back toward the Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation into an "anti-imperialist" bloc, much as had existed immediately after Camp David. On the other hand, however, the Soviet leadership had to be concerned about a rapprochement between the Egyptian camp and the Centrists, since this would leave the pro-Soviet Steadfastness Front in an isolated position in the Arab world with its individual components engaged in their own intra-Arab and regional confrontations (Algeria-Morocco; PDRY-Oman; Libya-Egypt; Syria-Iraq; Syria-Jordan; Syria-Israel; and PLO-Israel), a development that would also exacerbate some internal strains within the Steadfastness Front, especially the conflict between Syrian President Hafiz Assad and PLO leader Yasir Arafat.

Consequently, in the early part of 1982, Moscow sought to capitalize on such developments as the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, and U.S. pressure against Libya to rally the Arab world around the USSR's Steadfastness Front clients, but with little success. Similarly, the Soviet leadership sought to exploit the actions of a deranged Israeli who fired into an Arab crowd in the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem to discredit the United States.<sup>3</sup>

#### ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Nonetheless, despite these Soviet efforts, Middle East dynamics were moving in an anti-Soviet direction even before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In the first place, Moscow's client, Libya, was discredited when the anti-Kaddafi forces of Hassan Habre consolidated their control over most of Chad. Secondly, the Morocco-Algerian confrontation over the Spanish Sahara intensified as Morocco signed a major military agreement with the United States in which it provided transit facilities for the U.S. RDF in return for increased shipments of military equipment.<sup>4</sup> In addition, Morocco boycotted meetings of the Organization of African Unity, a pan-African organization which Moscow also hoped could unify on an "anti-imperialist" basis, because some OAU members recognized the Algerian-backed Polisario rebels. Additional problems for Moscow lay in the increasingly severe difficulties that both Syria and the PLO were encountering. In the case of Syria, there was an anti-regime uprising by the Moslem Brotherhood in the city of Hama in February in which as many as 12,000 people are reported to have been killed. Two months later, Syria blocked the Iraqi oil pipeline which ran through Syria, an event which, while weakening Iraq, exacerbated the Syrian-Iraqi conflict and made Moscow's hopes for an "anti-imperialist" Arab unity dim further. Meanwhile the Lebanese-based PLO, already under heavy Syrian pressure, found itself fighting against Shi'ite forces in Southern Lebanon who were protesting PLO activities in their section of the country.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps the greatest problem for Moscow, however, was the gradual rapprochement between Egypt and the Centrist Arabs. Induced in part by the Israeli withdrawal from the last part of the Sinai on April 25, 1982, the rapprochement was accelerated by Iran's success in its war with Iraq as the

Iranians took the offensive and threatened Iraqi territory in the late spring. The Iranian advance frightened the Gulf states who turned both to the United States and to Egypt for support. Iraq had long been a recipient of Egyptian military equipment and had moderated its position toward Egypt as a result,<sup>6</sup> and now other Gulf states moved in the same direction.<sup>7</sup> In any case, by the time of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, there was a clear move toward rapprochement between Egypt and the centrist Arabs. Indeed, a special meeting of the Steadfastness Front took place at the end of May 1982 to try to reverse this trend, as the Front proclaimed its opposition to any normalization of relations with Egypt until it renounced Camp David.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, it was a badly disunited Arab world, whose pro-Soviet members were isolated and whose Centrist states were gradually moving toward a reconciliation with Egypt, which faced Soviet policymakers on the eve of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The invasion itself on June 6, 1982, which had been predicted both by Western and Soviet commentators, clearly came as no surprise. Israel had long proclaimed its desire to rid itself of the PLO artillery which threatened its Northern towns, while the SAM missiles which Syria had emplaced in the Bakaa Valley of Lebanon in April 1981 had also been cited by Israeli spokesmen as targets for destruction.

#### THE LEBANESE INVASION AND THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE PLO

This being the case, it is surprising that there was no contingency planning among Syria, the PLO and Moscow for an invasion. While the lack of coordination between Syria and the PLO can perhaps be explained by the conflict between Assad and Arafat, who feared the Syrian leader was trying to take over the PLO, and the lack of contingency planning between Syria and the USSR may possibly be explained by Moscow's publicly proclaimed unwillingness to extend the provisions of the Soviet-Syrian Treaty to cover Syrian forces in Lebanon<sup>9</sup>, the lack of Soviet-PLO preparation is somewhat surprising. Perhaps Moscow felt that any Israeli invasion would, because of Western and Arab pressure, be at most a repeat of the limited 1978 Litani operation; perhaps Moscow hoped that the PLO, which had frequently proclaimed its readiness for an Israeli assault (Arafat reportedly made an inspection of PLO military positions on June 2nd),<sup>10</sup> could indeed cause so many casualties among the casualty-sensitive Israelis that the invasion would halt after only a few days; or perhaps Moscow simply did not wish to run the risk of too close a military involvement with such a fragmented organization.<sup>11</sup> In any case the lack of prior consultation became quite evident in the first three days of the invasion as Israeli forces, in a three-pronged operation overran PLO positions in South Lebanon and pushed the PLO back to Beirut.

Indeed it must have been clear by as early as the end of the first day of the invasion when Israeli forces pushed by Tyre and drove well past the Litani River, or at least by the second day when the Israeli army had pushed past Sidon and headed toward Damour that this was not to be a repetition of the Litani operation of 1978 when Israel drove only to the Litani River and never captured Tyre.<sup>12</sup> Despite spirited resistance, the PLO forces were unable to

withstand the Israeli attack and rapidly fell back toward Beirut. It is not surprising therefore that Arafat made appeals to Moscow for aid, via the Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon, Aleksander Soldatov, on each of the first four days of the Israeli invasion.<sup>13</sup> While Soldatov was quoted on Beirut radio as saying on June 6th that Moscow "will take all measures inside and outside the Security Council and will also resort to all the means and courses available to it to denounce the aggressors", <sup>14</sup> the USSR was to be rather hesitant in its response to the early stages of the Israeli invasion -- hesitancy that was to be maintained throughout the war. Thus, while *Pravda* noted on June 7th that Syrian President Hafiz Assad had promised Arafat that Syria would not let anyone destroy the Palestinian revolution and that "the Syrian people and troops would fight side by side with the Palestinian warriors", Moscow made no mention of its own troops. Instead, the USSR emphasized the role of the United Nations in stopping the invasion by trying to get the U.N. Security Council to force an Israeli withdrawal. By going to the U.N., Moscow avoided the necessity of direct action, although it was to try to obtain propaganda value from the vetoes cast by the U.S. to protect Israel while also using the Security Council debates to split the U.S. from its NATO allies who were far more critical of Israel. In addition, the official Tass statement on June 8th, although denouncing the Israeli invasion and emphasizing what it termed American complicity in it, contained only general threats, merely warning that the "adventure" may cost Israel and its people dearly and that Israel's aggression could threaten world peace.<sup>15</sup> The USSR's unwillingness to take further action was reflected in the comments of the PLO representative in Moscow, Mohammed Shaer, who in a press conference on June 8th in which he praised the Tass statement, also noted that the USSR would not send troops.<sup>16</sup>

The war heated up further on June 9th as Syria, which despite Assad's pledge to Arafat, was only giving the PLO limited assistance, suddenly found itself involved in a full scale war with Israel in the Bakaa Valley as Israeli planes destroyed the disputed SAM missile emplacements. A major Israeli-Syrian dogfight ensued with Syria losing scores of planes; a series of tank battles also took place. The same day, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who was in New York, met with Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the Political Department of the PLO Executive Committee, and pledged that the USSR would invariably support "the just struggle of the Palestinians".<sup>17</sup> At the same time, a delegation of Arab ambassadors from Jordan, Algeria, Kuwait and Tunisia and the Charge d'Affaires of Lebanon, visited the Soviet Foreign Ministry where they met with Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Viktor Shukatev.<sup>18</sup> Given the increased intensity of the fighting, it is quite possible that the Arab diplomats, who came from both the Steadfastness and Centrist blocs in the Arab world, were calling for more Soviet support against Israel. Indeed, a Kuwaiti broadcast on June 10th went so far as to report that "an extensive Soviet political move was expected within the next twenty-four hours."<sup>19</sup> It is possible that the Arab

demand for increased Soviet activity, and the escalation of the fighting in Lebanon, induced Brezhnev to send a letter to Reagan on June 10th in which the Soviet leader reportedly expresses his concern "that a most serious situation had been created which contained the possibility of wider hostilities."<sup>20</sup> Reagan, however, reportedly responded to the letter by warning of the dangers if outside powers became involved in the war.<sup>21</sup>

Following the loss of one-fifth of its air force, the destruction of its SAM emplacements in Lebanon, and heavy losses to its tank forces, including the highly sophisticated T-72, the Syrians called for a cease fire on June 11th and Moscow may have been pleased that the possibility of wider war was thereby averted. While PLO-Syrian relations were further strained by the fact that Syria agreed to the cease fire while the PLO was still fighting, one day later, with its forces virtually surrounded in Beirut, the PLO also called for a cease fire.

#### MOSCOW'S NON-INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON

With the worst of the fighting apparently now over, Moscow had to decide its next moves. Hitherto the USSR had acted in a manner which then U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig had publicly called "encouragingly cautious."<sup>22</sup> In truth, Moscow's options did not look too promising. In the first place, from a purely military standpoint there were serious obstacles to any commitment of Soviet troops to the conflict. While in the past decade, the USSR had committed its troops and/or those of surrogates such as Cuba to Third World conflicts no less than three times (Angola in 1976; Ethiopia in 1978 and Afghanistan in 1979), in each case the opponent was not a significant military power, with a first-rate air force, a highly trained army, and possessing the latest in military technology some of which was supplied by the United States. In addition, given U.S. President Ronald Reagan's statement that outside powers should not intervene in the conflict, the Soviet leadership could not be sure that the U.S. would not actively intervene if Soviet troops entered the fighting. Third, the destruction of Syria's SAM missiles and its most modern tank, the T-72, in battles with the Israelis, along with eighty-six Syrian planes, had to give Moscow pause since these were the same weapons on which the defense of the USSR was based and because Soviet military equipment was a prime export commodity earning the USSR billions of dollars a year in hard currency.<sup>23</sup> Finally, it should also not be overlooked that the destruction of the SAM system in the Bekaa Valley, and, by implication, Israel's ability to similarly destroy the SAMs located in Syrian territory meant that Israel had virtual complete air supremacy in the region of the fighting -- a significant deterrent to any major Soviet operation.

This having been said, there were still a number of things Moscow could have done that it did not do, especially the airlifting of elements of an airborne division to Syria, and the dispatch of "volunteers" via Syria to aid the PLO in areas of Lebanon such as Tripoli to which the Israeli army had not yet penetrated. Both moves would have been seen as major deterrents to further

Israeli activity and would have been a demonstration to the Arabs as a whole that Moscow was indeed aiding them -- and a reinforcement of the position of Moscow's Steadfastness Front allies. Such moves, however, entailed serious risks of involvement in the fighting and the possible escalation into a super-power confrontation as indeed occurred during the 1973 war. In 1973 Moscow, by actively supplying the Arabs during the fighting and openly threatening armed intervention in the later stage of the war when Israel had successfully gone on the offensive, had been willing to take such risks.<sup>24</sup> In 1982, even when its strategic power had increased markedly vis-a-vis the United States, Moscow was to prove unwilling to risk an escalation of the fighting. In seeking to explain Soviet behavior, one can point to one major difference between 1973 and 1982. In 1973, the Arabs were united behind Cairo and Damascus in their war effort against U.S. influence in the region. In 1982, however, the Arabs were so disunited that they proved unable to even call a summit conference to take action against Israel during the war. It must have seemed to Moscow that the bulk of the Arab world, unhappy with Syria because of its backing of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, were not going to rally behind the Syrian regime of Hafiz Assad or, for the matter, behind the PLO which many distrusted.<sup>25</sup> In addition, given the increasingly severe Iranian military threat against Iraq and the Arab Gulf states as a whole, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council allies were not about to place an oil embargo on the United States to whom they might have to turn for protection against Iran, especially at a time when an oil glut was forcing down prices. Under these circumstances Moscow evidently decided that if the Arabs were not going to help themselves, Moscow was not going to take any risks to help them. Nonetheless, as a superpower eager to have a hand in developments throughout the world and especially in the Middle East, (a region, Soviet leaders frequently reminded the world, in "close proximity to the southern borders of the USSR"), Moscow had to at least give the appearance that it was taking an active role as events developed. They felt particularly compelled since the United States was sending its Middle East trouble shooter Philip Habib to try to peacefully end the Beirut siege. Should Habib's efforts prove successful, this would further enhance U.S. diplomatic credibility in the region while reinforcing the view of the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat that the United States held "99 percent of the cards in the late Arab-Israeli dispute." Moscow, therefore, adopted a two-tiered diplomatic approach. On the one hand it issued a series of warnings to Israel about the consequences of its actions in Lebanon, and sought wherever possible to link the United States to the Israeli invasion so as to discredit American diplomatic efforts to end the Lebanese crisis. On the other hand it also began to openly appeal to the Arabs to unite so as to confront the Israelis. These essentially rhetorical reactions, however, disappointed the USSR's allies in the Middle East and greatly weakened the Soviet position in the region.

#### LOSS OF SOVIET PRESTIGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Thus because the USSR did not provide any meaningful political or military assistance to the PLO or Syrian fighting forces in Lebanon, Moscow's utility as



an ally to Arab world clients must have become somewhat suspect. While the USSR had continually appealed to the Arabs to unite during the invasion so that the Arab world as a whole could confront Israel, the lack of Arab unity did not, in the eyes of many Arabs, absolve Moscow of the responsibility of aiding its Arab allies. Secondly, the poor performance of Soviet weaponry in Syrian hands further lowered Soviet prestige. Middle Easterners with memories of the 1973 war could only remember how Soviet commentators had drawn positive comparisons between Soviet and American weaponry as operated by Arabs and Israelis in that conflict. In 1982, the only comparisons that could be drawn were negative ones, despite extensive Soviet efforts to show that Soviet weaponry had worked well. Finally, Moscow had invested a significant amount of its prestige in a series of warnings to the United States not to commit its forces to Lebanon. Washington's apparent disregard of the Soviet threats, and Moscow's unwillingness to back them up, further lowered Soviet prestige in the region. Indeed, the spectacle of Brezhnev going from a stern warning to Reagan against sending U.S. troops to Lebanon on July 8, 1982 to a position of virtually begging Reagan to save the PLO and West Beirut in early August, illustrated both the growing impotence of the USSR and the fact that the U.S. was the dominant outside power in the region.

Changes in the Arab political configuration as a result of the war also had a negative effect on Soviet prestige in the region. The pro-Moscow Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation, already in a weakened position before the invasion, suffered a possibly fatal blow. Not only did none of the Steadfastness Front members provide aid to the PLO and Syria, but the PLO could not have been happy with Syria's lack of assistance at the start of the war, or its agreeing to a cease fire while the PLO was still fighting the Israelis. Similarly Libya's call from a position far from the battlefield for the Palestinians to martyr themselves in Beirut, could only have been deeply resented by the PLO. The end result of this process has been the noticeable weakening of the Steadfastness Front as evidenced both by the Front's inability to prevent a modified form of the Fahd Plan from being adopted at the Fez Summit of 1982 (the Steadfastness Front had torpedoed the Fahd Plan at the 1981 Fez Summit) and by Arafat's ambiguously announced willingness to enter into a confederation with Jordan, one of the Steadfastness Front member Syria's main enemies, once an independent Palestinian state came into being. The fact that the Reagan Plan called for a similar kind of federation (albeit between Jordan and an autonomous Palestinian entity and not an independent Palestinian state), was yet another blow to Moscow as it seemed that the PLO, or at least Arafat's Fatah, was moving from the Steadfastness Front to the Centrist camp in Arab politics, even as the Centrists, concerned about the growing military threat of Iran, and conscious of the dominant political role of the United States in Middle East affairs, were moving toward the Egyptian camp in Arab politics.

To be sure, Moscow tried a number of tactics to regain the diplomatic initiative. Thus in the early stages of the war, Soviet commentators linked the Israeli invasion to American support and characterized it as a direct result of Camp David. Similarly, Moscow sought to exploit the massacres in Sabra and Shatilla to discredit the United States. Yet another Soviet diplomatic ploy was the preparation of a new Middle East peace plan which was modeled on the Arab Fez plan. Nonetheless, by the end of 1982, it was clearly the Reagan Plan, and not the Soviet plan, which carried the most diplomatic weight in the Arab world, as Brezhnev's successor, Yuri Andropov, discerned during his meetings with an Arab ministerial delegation in December 1982.

In evaluating Soviet policy actions during the course of the war, whether they involved warnings to the United States or Israel, efforts to encourage Arab unity, defending the quality of Soviet weaponry, or preparing a new peace plan, it is clear that Soviet policy toward the war was a highly reactive one in which the Soviet leaders sought to cope with a situation which they simply could not control. Indeed, the reactive nature of Soviet policy during the war is yet another indication of how far its influence has dropped in the Middle East.

Thus, in the short run at least, Moscow has suffered a major blow to its Middle East position as a result of the war. Given the fluidity of Arab alignments, however, and the difficulties which the United States has already encountered in its efforts to arrange a troop withdrawal from Lebanon, the period of U.S. diplomatic supremacy in the Middle East may be short-lived. Nonetheless, as a result of Moscow's lack of support to its Arab clients during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, it may be some time before Soviet credibility is restored to the point that Moscow again becomes a major actor in Middle Eastern politics. Indeed, the Soviet supplying SAM-5s to Syria and its recent warnings to Israel seem aimed at rebuilding the Soviet position in the region. Whether the supply of Soviet missiles, or the ambiguous Soviet warning to Israel on March 30, 1983, will be sufficient to restore Soviet influence in the region with the absence of concrete Soviet aid in case war breaks out, remains to be seen.

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Footnotes

1. For recent analyses of Soviet policy in the Middle East see Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, Third edition, (New York: Praeger, 1982); Yaacov Ro'j (ed.), *The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East* (London: Croom Helm, 1979); and Adeed Dawisha and Karen Kawisha (eds.), *The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982).
2. Whether the current oil glut, and the weakening financial positions of a number of Arab states, will enhance the attractiveness of Soviet economic assistance and that remains to be seen.
3. *Izvestia*, April 15, 1982.
4. For Moscow's highly negative reaction to this development, see the Moscow Radio Arab language broadcast on May 28, 1982, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: The Soviet Union (hereafter *FBIS:USSR*), June 1, 1982, p. H-3.
5. For a description of the increasingly severe problems facing the PLO in Lebanon on the eve of the war, see David Butler, "In the Same Trench", *The Middle East*, June 1982, p. 6. See also his report, "Shi'ites in Beirut Clashes", *The Middle East*, February 1982, p. 14.
6. Cf remarks by Taha Ramadan, First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Baghdad Radio, June 1, 1982, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Middle East and Africa (hereafter *FBIS:MEA*), June 2, 1981, p. E-2.
7. In addition, the Moroccan Foreign Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, paid a visit to Cairo on June 7, 1982 thus further ending Egypt's ostracism, as did Egyptian President Mubarak's attendance at the funeral of King Khalid of Saudi Arabia later that month.
8. Cf *Pravda*, May 26, 1982.
9. Cf Robert O. Freedman, "Soviet Policy Toward Syria Since Camp David", *Middle East Review*, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-2 (Fall 1981/Winter 1982), pp. 28-30.
10. Cf *Voice of Palestine*, June 2, 1982, cited in *FBIS:MEA*, June 3, 1982, p. E-1.
11. For a detailed analysis of the difficulties inherent in the Soviet-PLO relationship, see Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization* (New York: Praeger, 1980).

12. For Israeli military analyses of the war see *Israel Defense Forces Journal* Vol. 1, No. 2 (December 1982), pp. 11-28; and Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. 339-359. For a view from the Palestinian side see the special issue of the *Journal of Palestine Studies* (No. 44/45) (Summer/Fall 1982) devoted to the war, especially the chronology, pp. 135-192.
13. Cf *Voice of Palestine*, June 7, 1982 (FBIS:MEA, June 8, 1982, p. A-2); June 9 (FBIS:MEA, p. ii) and June 10 (FBIS:MEA, p. A-3).
14. *Voice of Lebanon*, June 6, 1982 (FBIS:MEA, June 7, 1982, p. G-9).
15. *Pravda*, June 8, 1982.
16. Tass, June 8, 1982 (FBIS:MEA, June 9, 1982, p. H-2) and AP report in *New York Times*, June 9, 1982.
17. Tass, June 9, 1982 (FBIS:USSR, June 9, 1982, p. H-1).
18. Tass, June 9, 1982 (FBIS:USSR, June 10, 1982, p. A-1).
19. KUNA, Kuwait, June 10, 1982 (FBIS:MEA, June 11, 1982, p. A-1).
20. Cf report by David Shipler, *New York Times*, June 30, 1982, citing Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin, who also said he had received two messages from Moscow asking Israel not to hit the Soviet Embassy in Beirut.
21. Cf report by Hedrick Smith, *New York Times*, June 11, 1982.
22. Haig interview on ABC program "This Week With David Brinkley", June 13, 1982, reprinted in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Nos. 44/45 (Summer/Fall 1982), p. 330.
23. For an analysis of the economic benefits to Moscow of arms sales, see Anrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 78-80.
24. For the best analysis of Soviet strategy during the war, see Galia Golan, *Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977).