

**INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY,
NATIONALISM AND UNIVERSALISM IN
THE RELIGIOUS-ZIONIST THOUGHT
OF RABBI MOSHE AVIGDOR AMIEL
AND RABBI BEN-ZION MEIR HAI UZIEL**

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Rabbi Amiel and Rabbi Uziel were outstanding Torah scholars of the twentieth century identified with religious Zionism. Both were universalistic thinkers. Yet while Rabbi Uziel emphasized humanistic Jewish nationalism as a part of the universalistic whole, Rabbi Amiel saw the combination between spiritual individualism and universalism as the core identity, according to the Torah. Rabbi Amiel was a strong critic of all the ideological trends of his day: capitalism and socialism, secular Zionism, and anti-Zionism. Even his own movement fell under his harsh judgment. In contrast, Rabbi Uziel's important contribution was his positive outlook on issues such as the status of women, the authority of the Israeli secular parliament, and the like. Their vision was of a religious Zionism that sees deep commitment to Torah as a basis for creating a just society for everyone, Jews and non-Jews alike.

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Introduction

The study of religious-Zionist thought used to be primarily concerned with the teachings of its major thinkers or currents (R. Reines, R. A. Kook, R. Joseph Dov Soloveitchik, the religious kibbutz, and so forth). Recently there has been a marked tendency to engage in a panoramic examination of the main features of religious-Zionist thought as a whole.¹ At the heart of this essay is a comparative analysis of the teachings of two outstanding personalities from among the thinkers and leaders of religious Zionism in the first half of the twentieth century: R. Amiel and R. Uziel. This specific analysis leads to some general conclusions about the nature of religious-Zionist outlooks and ideology.

R. Amiel (Forjova, 1882-Tel Aviv, 1945), was one of the prominent rabbinical leaders of religious Zionism. The rabbi of major communities (among them Antwerp and Tel Aviv), he was a profound thinker in the realms of *halakhic* thought and Jewish philosophy, and one of the great expounders in his generation. He was also a principal speaker in the assemblies and conventions of the Mizrahi and a fecund publicist who made a significant contribution to the organs of the religious public. His stature and his versatility established him as a leading figure from the 1920s until his death in 1945.

R. Uziel (1880-1953), like R. Amiel, his Ashkenazi colleague (both served together in 1935-1939 as the chief rabbis of Tel Aviv-Jaffa), was one of the greatest rabbinical authorities of religious Zionism. In his capacity as a rabbi (in Tel Aviv and Salonika, and as the *Rishon le-Ziyyon*, the first Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Mandatory Palestine and then of the State of Israel, 1939-1953), in his original *halakhic* rulings, in his philosophical writings, and in his public activity on behalf of social and political causes, R. Uziel made his imprint on the conduct of religious Jewry, and especially on the character of the chief rabbinate in Israel.

Both R. Amiel and R. Uziel were held in high esteem during their lifetime, but with the passage of time they were forgotten, and their ideological doctrines were hardly researched.²

R. Amiel's main virtue was his critical-analytical power, which he applied in his writings on *halakhic* and Jewish thought. As an ideologist, R. Amiel was the strongest critic of religious Zionism ever to emerge from its own circle of rabbinical leaders. However, his power as a critic who re-assessed every detail in the conceptual structure of religious Zionism far exceeded his ability to offer a well crystallized and relevant alternative. In contrast, R.

Uziel was characterized by his unitary and moderate outlook. As a religious-Zionist ideologist, R. Uziel belonged to the mainstream of the Mizrahi, acting as one of its leaders, and as the only religious-Zionist leader who was Sephardi. A comparative discussion of the teachings of R. Amiel and R. Uziel may therefore suggest the difference between the sort of “questions” typical of the former and the sort of “answers” characteristic of the latter.

This essay deals mainly with their overall sociopolitical teachings, as related to their basic assumptions. The last part of the paper explores the implications of their general positions for their religious-Zionist ideology.

The Teachings of R. Amiel and R. Uziel: Conceptual Influences and Basic Assumptions

Rabbi Amiel

R. Amiel’s conceptual world fed on various classical Jewish sources: *halakhah* and *aggadah*, philosophy and kabbalah. However, in his analytic approach, as well as in the contents of his ideas, he was particularly influenced by the Lithuanian school of Jewish learning. R. Amiel’s original attempt to uncover the systematic structure of *halakhic* thought continued the trends of the Telz school—and especially of R. Simeon Shkop—though to some extent it also followed in the footsteps of R. Reines,³ who just like R. Amiel, served as a rabbi in Swieciany. R. Amiel, who strove for a dialectic synthesis of diverse components, was also clearly influenced by salient currents in Western philosophy. In his writings he sometimes spoke in terms of Hegel’s teaching (without mentioning him specifically), and although seemingly opposed to Marxism, he did internalize some of its points. He was particularly affected by Descartes, Kant, and Bergson, as evidenced in his concepts about the nature of human individuality, the relationship between morality and universality, and the importance of intuitive perception.

Precisely because these non-Jewish thinkers had a strong impact on his thinking, R. Amiel’s tendency to differentiate between the Jewish and the non-Jewish world is quite striking. The contrast he insisted on seems to be more appealing to an ultra-Orthodox thinker, whose worldview has nothing to do with alien sources. Furthermore, R. Amiel worked wonders in presenting the

modern Western outlook on the world as typically and originally Jewish. He did so by drawing on two premises.

Spiritual Individualism

In developing his positions, R. Amiel recognized his indebtedness to three philosophical theories of cognition: Descartes' rationalism, the Kantian distinction between a priori and a posteriori, and Bergson's insistence on the importance of intuition. All three join together with an immanent Hasidic outlook. According to R. Amiel, Judaism antedates the Cartesian ontological proof for the existence of God:

"The very fact that I exist and that I have the notion of a totally perfect object, this in itself clearly demonstrates that God exists." However, these things are not at all new. Here is the first tenet of Judaism: "Just as He is, so are you"—namely, the very sense of commitment involved in the "so are you merciful and gracious" implies the "just as He is in the world."⁴

This cognizance is confirmed by intuition (as taught by Bergson). It is with the aid of the latter that the individual acknowledges the truth of the biblical verse (Deut. 32:39): "See now that I am Him." The human "I" derives from the divine "I."⁵ Intuitive perception confirms the divine immanent presence that encompasses Creation and permeates every human being. According to Judaism, individualism is fundamentally spiritual. The following excerpt, which develops this idea, reverberates with kabbalistic-Hasidic notions:

For the sensation of the "I" within the individual is the central point of whatever takes place in his inner being. This sensation of the "I" is an actual perception of the Godhead. For there is only one single "I" in the whole of Creation: the "I am the Lord your God." The perception of our own "I", or ego, is just a tiny morsel of the infinite "I" of the Holy One, blessed be He. Now, and as is explained in tractate Sukkah (53a) about Hillel's saying, "If I am here, everything is here," our cognizance of our inner nature results from our cognizance of the divine inside us.⁶

Sometimes R. Amiel reaches Hasidic conclusions about *bittul ha-yesh*, the annihilation of being and its transformation into nothingness, but in general, his thinking develops in modern individualistic directions.⁷ The centrality of the individual found its

most known philosophical manifestation in Kantian epistemology and ethics. Indeed, Rabbi Amiel often cites Kant, while pointing at the above-mentioned saying of R. Hillel, which, in R. Amiel's opinion, preceded the given philosophical version in terms of both aspects: the cognitive and the moral. The two aspects emerge, respectively, from the following excerpts:

He [Kant–M.H.] used to say, "The world is my own painting." In other words, everything exists because I do. These things are well understood. In fact, a greater and earlier sage—to differentiate between the sacred and the mundane—preceded Kant. Old Hillel used to say: "If I am here, everyone is here; but if I am not here, who is here?" This suggests that the "everything" we see in the world exists only because the "I" (the ego) is here.⁸

The philosopher Kant phrases the categorical imperative as follows: "Abide only by the rule you want to be applicable to everyone." Perhaps this is what old Hillel meant when he said, "If I am here, everyone is here."⁹

In Rabbi Amiel's interpretation, Hillel appears as the precursor of the Cartesian, Kantian, Bergsonian, and kabbalistic orientations, for he pointed to the great value of the individual in relation to existence. It is worth repeating that according to R. Amiel's notion of Judaism, human individuality is clearly spiritual. In particular, his writings suggest the kabbalistic idea that every individual is a microcosm that mirrors the Godhead.¹⁰ Accordingly, Judaism places the individual's liberty at the center of its teaching, whereas paganism centers on enslaving the individual to the high and mighty, and especially to the collective.¹¹ R. Amiel states emphatically: "For all the gods are worshipped by groups, while the One God is revealed first and foremost to the individual."¹² There are a number of conclusions that can be reached from the above:

1. In underlining individualism as one of the major features of Western thought from the Renaissance to our own days, R. Amiel articulates a modern position par excellence.¹³
2. R. Amiel does not disguise his close familiarity with the modern philosophical approaches with which he agrees. However, in the same breath he points out that they are already incorporated in the traditional Jewish world. Charles Liebman lists three modern Orthodox modes of reaction to the encounter between *halakhah* and modernity: (1) *Accommodation*—adjusting tradition to modernity and interpreting it with modernistic tools. This is a particularly modern approach; (2) *Compartmentalization*: distinguishing between two different, incompatible authorities, traditional and mod-

ern; (3) *Expansion and take-over*: pointing out that the values of modernism are already inherent in Jewish tradition. This is a total view, according to which everything is Torah.¹⁴ Now, in his striving toward the totalization of the Torah, R. Amiel clearly belongs to the third category. Nonetheless, in practice, he acts in accordance with the first mode: expounding the old in terms of the new. As already indicated (and as attested by the title of his major work), R. Amiel was one of the great Jewish expounders of the twentieth century, and his entire thought is marked by this interpretive approach. Indeed, homiletic interpretation is the traditional way of internalizing the new without challenging the legitimacy of the old. Such an approach is widely accepted by modern Orthodox thinkers.¹⁵

Unitary Synthesis

According to R. Amiel, Judaism views the unity of God and the unity of creation as interconnected,¹⁶ while paganism introduces a partial perspective:

The essence of paganism springs from a fragmentary outlook, which views each part of nature as a creation in itself, along with its special creator. Now, a fragmentary outlook can give rise only to fragmentary truth, which is the truth of falsehood. Absolute truth relates to everything—and not to mere parts.¹⁷

In Judaism, says R. Amiel, unity is a matter of synthesis. Our whole world is based on pairs: time and place, cause and effect, quantity and quality, affirmation and negation, and so forth.¹⁸ Harmonious unity is found only in the world of emanation (*ibid.*). The world of action is dynamic, Heraclitian: “There is no arrested movement in nature and no standing still in life; Whatever is alive—including nature—is on the move: developing, unfolding, vibrating, agitating, going up and down.”¹⁹ The synthesis formed out of the dialectic fusion of major elements is essential to the world of Judaism:

For Judaism is based on a synthesis within the world of thought and feelings. Just as nature as a whole is a synthesis of day and night, summer and winter, cold and hot...so also does human thought operate according to the principle of thesis-antithesis-synthesis....This is why the Torah is called a song....For what is singing if not the harmony formed by a variety of voices?²⁰

In view of this, it is not surprising to find in Judaism a propensity for triads: the three patriarchs, the three pilgrim festivals, the three daily prayers, and so forth.²¹ The Jewish synthesis does not operate like a middle way (which, as already noted by R. S. R. Hirsch, is the route taken by horses and cattle). Rather, "Judaism cherishes the synthesis that is derived by invoking the primary source, the source through which the extremes are effaced, for it encompasses them and joins them together to form a special whole."²² This notion of a synthetic, dynamic, and dialectic unity has major implications for R. Amiel's sociopolitical teaching and his religious-Zionist conception. Furthermore, in combination with his individualistic perspective of man's spiritual individuality, and by way of conclusion, it leads to a universalistic approach. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, inasmuch as R. Amiel's dialectical approach explicitly feeds on Western philosophy in its development from Heraclitus up to Hegel, he prefers to introduce it as authentically Jewish in its essence and origins.

Rabbi Uziel

In R. Uziel's writings, the impact of Jewish medieval philosophy is easily detectable. He blends together R. Sa'adia Gaon's perception of human nature with the exaltation of Israel—the people and its land—with the teachings of R. Judah Halevi and Nachmanides. In addition, in his basic assumptions he integrates the conceptual world of Maimonides—the thinker who most influenced R. Uziel—with the contributions of the Kabbalah.²³ In contrast to R. Amiel, R. Uziel is not directly influenced by Western philosophy. However, the combined influences of R. Judah Halevi, Nachmanides, and the Kabbalah are not translated into a separatist position with regard to the nations of the world and their culture—a position which stands out in the teaching of R. Amiel, in spite of his actual reliance on Descartes and Kant.

Another contrast between R. Amiel and R. Uziel relates to the influence of secular Jewish thinkers on their teaching. The major figure that emerges here is that of Ahad Ha-Am. Though both of them come to grips with his doctrine and use the terms he coined, it is R. Uziel who feeds directly on Ahad Ha-Am's spiritual Zionism in forming his own conceptions. We will now analyze the basic assumption underlying his teaching.

Organic, Universal Unity

Underlying R. Uziel's teaching is the assumption that all existence is governed by the principle of organic unity. In this point R. Uziel shows affinity with his senior colleague, the former Rabbi of Jaffa, namely, R. Kook. As R. Uziel readily admits:²⁴

I would like to cite from the words of our Rabbi and Luminary, R. A.I.H. Kook, who says...the supreme truth presents to us the general as one single unit. Whatever appears to us as a detail is nothing but a single instance derived from the unified whole.²⁵

In conformity with his unitary perspective, R. Uziel interprets the rabbinical saying that God provides for all creatures, large and small, "from buffalo's horns to nits," as suggesting the existence of divine Providence as well as the organic chain of being. In forming this unitary, organic conception, R. Uziel, just like Rav Kook, is influenced by the Kabbalah. This is manifested not only in his use of kabbalistic terms, but also, perhaps, in the way he forms his basic conceptions.²⁶

According to R. Uziel, such a unitary, organic view expresses profound faith, since "out of the conflicting duality, the believer perceives the absolute unity, regarding the apparent evil as the absolute good."²⁷ The human being is potentially a repentant. Sin is an external power, which takes control over humans.²⁸ Sin is associated with greedy selfishness, while true faith affirms the unity of creation and entails the aspiration to restore the world to its original state, coupled with the recognition that the individual is an integral part of society. Hence repentance is the return of man to his pure self, in unison with the entire chain of being.²⁹

For R. Uziel—and this point is also essential for understanding his sociopolitical and religious-Zionist teaching—the organic, unitary outlook is *necessarily* combined with a universalist approach. The whole of humanity is one single organism, for "the relationship of the individual to society is like the relationship of the individual organs to the general organization of the body. The particular existence of the individual is not isolated from the rest; rather, it is an organic part of the entire being....Human existence is but one single organic body."³⁰ Human solidarity is anchored in the belief in God, which in turn stems from the recognition of "the only One of the world—a recognition that confirms His existence and His absolute unity. It follows that everything becomes united through His unity. This is why the Torah says, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, I am the Lord.' It is in this context

that Hillel said (Shabbat 31a): ‘What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor: that is the whole Torah, while the rest is the commentary thereof; go and learn it’.³¹ R. Uziel’s organic, unitary conception permeates his writings. For him, seeking the truth does not conflict with the love of peace and unity. On the contrary, any love that is not based on truth is insubstantial.³² What stands out in particular is the way he combines truth and peace in the actual functioning of the rabbinical court.³³ The Sabbath, and the festivals too, are meaningful mostly because they govern the social aspects of Jewish life.³⁴ The Sabbath is particularly important. It prefigures the future redemption and “enlightens our understanding” about the unity of God and the harmonious unification of the entire universe, “of which we are only a part, acting in it and affected by it.”³⁵

The next point, which concludes our discussion in this section, is essential for understanding the profound controversy between R. Uziel and R. Amiel regarding Jewish nationalism. According to R. Uziel, the notion of universal unity does not mean abstract universality, within which all human beings are united as individuals. Nor does it suggest *organic* universality, in which the individual is an integral part of humanity as a whole. Rather, existence is a system of partial, organic frameworks brought together in unity with the whole. Hence, the identity of each person is determined by his or her membership in the organic collective.³⁶ R. Uziel’s notion of the collective identity manifests itself in a major area: national identity. This will be elaborated in the next section.

System of Government, Nationality, and Society in the Teachings of R. Amiel and R. Uziel

In the area of political thought, thinkers who start with completely opposite assumptions often turn out to be close to each other in their operative conclusions. The modern welfare state was founded through the rapprochement between essentially individualistic-capitalistic liberal currents, which turned to the left and incorporated socialistic elements into their doctrine, and basically collectivist socialistic currents, which turned to the right and incorporated liberal elements. Zionist ideology was particularly influenced by Nahman Sirkin’s and Baer Borokhov’s synthesis of national and socialistic elements, which reached its peak in Berl Katzenelson’s “constructive socialism.”³⁷

R. Amiel's socionational credo has a lot in common with that of R. Uziel. However, as far as the individualism-collectivism polarity is concerned, they are diametrically opposed. R. Amiel places the individual at the heart of his teaching. R. Uziel views the individual in relation to a much broader scheme. This discrepancy gives rise to opposite social and national positions. Furthermore, for each of them, universalism means something different. R. Amiel grounds his universalism in the equal value of each individual, which is not to be trampled by the collective. R. Uziel, on the other hand, speaks of a universal unity that encompasses a variety of collective organisms. Despite these differences, however, the common denominator of universalism is translated into a similar programmatic ideology. The next section will compare the sociopolitical teaching of these two thinkers in reference to some basic issues.

Judaism and Democracy

Rabbi Amiel

Jewish tradition displays a wide range of positions on the proper form of government. In the debate between those who argue, like Maimonides, that monarchy is the most appropriate regime, and those who espouse the democratic-republican ideal, like Abrabanel, R. Amiel clearly belongs to the latter camp. Characteristically, he anchors his democratic teaching in individual liberty. He thus adopts an explicitly liberal position, supported by the individualistic foundation of his religious teaching. Just like Abrabanel in his commentary on the commandment to appoint a king (Deut. 17: 14-16), R. Amiel also draws a comparison between appointing a king and the law concerning a beautiful woman captured in war. However, unlike Abrabanel, what makes him reject monarchy is not the benefit of the community but his concern for individual liberty:

For the monarchy is essentially a symbol of the individual's enslavement to the community. We are attracted to the monarchy only because we want to imitate the other nations: "Make us a king to judge us like all the nations" (I Sam. 8:5). Now, the Torah treated the monarchy as in the case of a beautiful woman captured in battle [wherein the permission is a matter of concession to human failings], aiming to bridle human desire by actually satisfy-

ing the lust, while still imposing on it many restrictions: "But he shall not multiply horses for himself....Neither shall he multiply wives for himself" (Deut. 17: 16-17)....All of this derives from the fact that, generally speaking, the Torah disapproves of the monarchy. For whatever form the latter assumes, it is bound to encroach upon the individual's personal liberty.³⁸

Grounding democracy in an individualistic basis is a modern approach par excellence. The classic democratic notion revolves around a collectivist principle (the rule of the people, the decision of the majority). It is not until democracy combined with the individualistic liberal heritage that the values of freedom and the restriction of government were placed at the center of Western democracy.³⁹ R. Amiel describes the struggle against the monarchy as a long process. It began with the biblical prophets, who battled with the monarchy without attempting to abolish it, and ended with the Pharisees, who fought against the Hasmonean kings and brought about the disintegration of the Hebrew monarchy.⁴⁰ The fact that the struggle of the Pharisees resulted in the loss of political sovereignty, as documented by Josephus Flavius, had no bearing on R. Amiel's position. As far as the struggle between religion and political government is concerned, R. Amiel is closer to Leibowitz's position, as opposed to Spinoza's well-known analysis, which denounces the prophets.⁴¹

R. Amiel distinguishes between three types of liberty: (1) Political liberty: the liberation from foreign rule; (2) Economic liberty: the liberation from being economically dependent on other people; (3) Moral liberty: the liberation from external influences, which have nothing to do with the depth of one's soul. In his opinion, Judaism has incorporated the notion of liberty, particularly in the three pilgrimage festivals. Passover carries the message of freedom in general, but the Exodus is primarily political freedom. Pentecost conveys the importance of spiritual-moral liberty. Succoth, the harvest festival, expresses the economic freedom of the farmer. In any case, the notion of liberty has been internalized in the Jewish people and hence it is only natural that Jews had a leading role in many social revolutions.⁴² Faithful to his system, which associates Jewish concepts with what is good and proper and opposes them to the undesirable reality among the nations of the world, R. Amiel argues that democracy in the twentieth century is but an illusion. Though the revolutions in the eighteenth century abolished the old regime, which was against justice and equity,⁴³ modern democracy also suffers from many flaws. Not being truly egalitarian, it falls short of the original Jewish democracy:

We must also emphasize that our democracy is unlike contemporary democracy. The latter means only servitude, the enslavement of the individual to society, and the enslavement of the minority to the majority. To put it more precisely, it is the enslavement of society and the individual alike to a number of individual demagogues who drag the masses behind them. In contrast, our democracy means absolute equality and equal rights for all the members of the nation, without any exception.⁴⁴

R. Amiel's criticism results from his analysis of democracy in the beginning of the twentieth century, which was far less democratic and liberal than Western democracy as it developed throughout the century. R. Amiel strongly criticizes American trampling capitalism, which he pictures as a jungle where the capitalists reign supreme in the name of democracy. "For even in the truly free republics, whose tradition of liberty goes back decades and hundreds of years, and whose inhabitants are free from the yoke of monarchy, people still have to bear the yoke of the law of the land. Instead of being subjected to one king, they are ruled by many kings: the king of salts, the king of brass, the king of iron, and so forth."⁴⁵ Dismissing modern democracy as deceptive, R. Amiel exalts the Jewish system: "An extremely ideal democracy such as the Jewish one is nonexistent...granting to others all the rights, absolute equality of rights, while burdening ourselves with all the obligations."⁴⁶

Here we come across a basic weakness, which runs throughout R. Amiel's teaching. Although he is very competent in addressing criticism against the concrete reality of his day, or of previous times, he fails to offer a positive alternative. When he describes the nature of Jewish democracy, he does not go beyond an irrelevant homiletic casuistry. Similarly, in writing about equality in Judaism, the evidence he provides seems out of place: "Everybody is allowed to engage in religious slaughtering"; "Everybody is qualified to write a divorce, even the deaf, the insane, and the minors"; "A learned bastard is superior to an ignorant High Priest." Following this "conclusive" evidence, R. Amiel concludes that "our democracy has reached the very limit of what can possibly be imagined."⁴⁷ In contrast, in the following excerpt he addresses a concrete topic which is relevant to the nature of Jewish democracy in the twentieth century:

The Torah spares not only the individuals of the Jewish people. It also spreads its wings on members of the other nations, who came to *find shelter* among us, even if such protection may cause some suffering to the Jewish community as a whole. This is evident in

the laws concerning the stranger. In fact, the Torah does not single out laws that are specifically applicable to the alien residents. It says (Ex. 12:49): "One Torah shall be to him who is homeborn and to the stranger among you."

This law was quite harmful to the affairs of the state. Even in its better days, the Jewish state was small and weak, surrounded by enemies and opponents who for political and religious reasons always sought to destroy and eliminate it. Now, if a small country, surrounded all over by enemies, legislates equal laws for the alien and the citizen, then it undermines its own foundations. Nevertheless, the Torah took this risk in order to ensure *the liberty of these foreign individuals*, who chose to settle down in this small country."⁴⁸

This important passage teaches us a number of important things about R. Amiel's political theory.

1. Liberty and equality are interrelated, being the two basic values of any democratic government.⁴⁹
2. The main test of Jewish democracy lies in its attitude to the non-Jewish minority. As a former resident of anti-Semitic Poland, R. Amiel was naturally concerned with the plight of minorities even as he wrote these things in the 1930s. Nonetheless, his views are particularly relevant to the State of Israel today. In the clash between Orthodox Judaism and liberal democracy in present-day Israel, the attitude toward the Arab minority is a particularly intense issue.⁵⁰ Interestingly, R. Amiel views the biblical *ger* in the literal sense of a non-Jewish resident, or even as a member of a rivaling nation who settled in the Land of Israel. He does not draw on the homiletic interpretations of the sages, which pose difficulties to his democratic notion.⁵¹

Another topic in which R. Amiel's democratic, egalitarian positions are reflected, at least theoretically, concerns the equality between men and women. The biblical verse, "It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a help to match him" (Gen. 2:18) is interpreted by the talmudic sages as follows: If he merits it, she will be his helpmate; if he does not, she will be against him (Yebamot 61a). R. Amiel, however, believes that the literal meaning is closer to the spirit of the Torah: "It is not good if the woman always shares her husband's opinion.... Precisely by being critical of his views and his manners, when they do not match hers, she may cause the truth to become clear."⁵² R. Amiel's egalitarian position clearly derives from his synthetic, dialectical outlook, as discussed in the previous section. This position is further developed in the following excerpt:

The terms of the nuptial contract specify that the spouses should have equal control of their property. Namely, they are both equals; neither of them has the upper hand....Therefore, in Judaism the matrimonial ideal...is equality in rights and obligations in the full sense of these words. Neither spouse has an advantage over the other as far as rights and obligations are concerned.

This excerpt, too, has a couple of points that need to be highlighted:

1. In principle, R. Amiel supports equality between men and women. He grounds his support in the existing *halakhic* laws, without resorting to innovative *halakhic* interpretation. Again, we realize that R. Amiel's strength lies in introducing a democratic line of thought rather than in expressing it in concrete terms. However, the very fact that he points in such a direction is important in itself.
2. In this excerpt, R. Amiel speaks of total equality in obligations and rights. This is in contrast to his above-cited claim that Judaism advocates true democracy because it imposes special obligations on its members, while granting rights to others. What, then is the truly democratic course in his opinion?

Rabbi Uziel

In accordance with his own assumptions, R. Uziel works out a completely different notion of Judaism and democracy. Referring to the question of whether or not the Torah commands the appointment of a king over Israel, R. Uziel follows Maimonides' monarchism, as conveyed in the beginning of *Hilkhot Melakhim*. In the talmudic debate of this issue (*Sanhedrin*, 20b) R. Nehorai says that the section in the Torah that deals with the actions of the king is not a command but rather a prophecy. It was spoken only in anticipation of the future grievance of the Israelites. R. Uziel disputes this view:

But this opinion is exceptional. It is well accepted that three commandments were given to Israel when they entered the land: to appoint a king; to cut off the seed of Amalek; and to build themselves the chosen house. In the opinion of the sages, the opposition of the prophet Samuel resulted from the fact that the Israelites did not make their request in a proper manner....Thus, according to the sages, appointing a king over Israel is obligatory and not optional.⁵³

R. Nehorai himself disapproved of the people's request for monarchy only insofar as it was meant for unfit purposes. In the final analysis, "it is apparent that the Torah law does not object to the kingdom of man as a matter of principle....The Torah opposes tyrannical or political monarchy and objects to a king who dominates his brothers and deviates from the Torah and its code. But a king who is loyal to his people and its Torah is desirable to God."⁵⁴ Now, R. Uziel's comment that the Torah objects to *political* monarchy may strike us as odd. Is there a monarchy that is not political? We will discuss this matter later.

Earlier we noted that R. Amiel anchors his notion of democracy in the individual's liberty. R. Uziel uses the same argument in support of the monarchy. He distinguishes between two types of liberty: liberty that leads to personal responsibility and liberty that promotes licentiousness. The king's rule derives its legitimacy from the need to introduce responsible liberty.

The liberty of the individual and the people entails responsibility that leads to pleasant servitude. Irresponsible liberty, the freedom to follow one's whims arbitrarily, harms and corrupts. Conversely, freedom of choice imposes on the individual a responsibility for himself and for his people, as well as for the Torah of life and the Creator of man. The human being is a political creature and the human collective necessarily requires a leader...(Maimonides' words in *Guide of the Perplexed*). You must appoint a king who will set fear into your hearts.⁵⁵

R. Amiel's distinction between two types of liberty is reminiscent of the distinction drawn by Isaiah Berlin between negative liberty, the liberty *from* something, from external constraints, and positive liberty, the liberty *for* something, the liberty to strive toward self-fulfillment. Berlin, too, argues that there is some relationship between the notion of liberty and the form of government. In his opinion, totalitarian regimes offer their own interpretations of positive liberty, whereas liberal-democratic regimes rest mainly on the notion of negative liberty. The latter endeavor to reduce the intervention of the state and society and let the individuals do as they please, as long as they do not harm others.⁵⁶

Uziel's words reflect the Maimonidean position that underlies his own understanding of the socially desirable form of government. He accepts Maimonides' basic assumption, according to which man is innately a political animal. He also embraces the conclusions that follow from it, in terms of the proper political system and the distinction between political laws and the Torah laws, as presented in the *Guide of the Perplexed* (II, ch. 40).

These are “the very foundation of the science of man,” says R. Uziel. He then adds another factor: “Man is also innately religious, not merely as a member of the collective but also because the particular constitution of his body and soul, which are intertwined, requires the control and guidance of a leadership that will assess and grant to each of these components precisely what it deems necessary for its existence.”⁵⁷

Such control and guidance are provided by the law of the Torah, which places the Torah-abiding king at the head of the state. At this point, again we come across the importance of organic unity, this time in its collectivist-particularistic garb. “The monarchy in Israel,” explains R. Uziel, “is not a kingship of governance but rather a kingship of love. It gathers together the entire people around the throne and its flag; it unites them with their Torah and their land; and it consolidates them into a unified and cohesive whole, which no divisive or destructive force is powerful enough to tear apart or to uproot from its firm foothold.”⁵⁸

Now we can better understand how R. Uziel pictures the nature of the ideal regime according to Judaism. It is a form of government that preserves the real, positive liberty of the individual, along with his relationship to the sociopolitical collective, in a profoundly organic way which conforms to the Torah. The unitary creed establishes a cohesive community and it is only natural that this unified entity should be headed by a leader who is not *political* in the narrow sense of the word. No wonder that R. Uziel sees *Moses* as the ideal king. In his interpretation, the biblical verse, “and he was king in Jerusalem when the heads of the people were gathered” (Deut. 33:5) refers specifically to Moses.⁵⁹

Here we come across the same weakness that we identified in R. Amiel’s doctrine: the presentation of the perfect, ideal Jewish alternative that has never been carried into practice in Jewish life. R. Amiel introduced the most extreme Jewish democracy as an alternative to the current illusionary democracy. R. Uziel extols the ideal of a monarchy governed by a nonpolitical king who abides by the Torah, unites the people through spiritual, organic unity, and contributes to the perfect blending of body and soul in all members of society. This is far from being a concrete political vision. Nonetheless, unlike R. Amiel, R. Uziel works out concrete democratic conceptions. In descending from the heights of the toraitic, monarchic ideal, R. Uziel espouses the democratic tenet of the will of the people and weaves this principle into the basic premise of his doctrine, namely the all-embracing unity of creation. According to R. Papa (Horayot, 11a), the monarchy is he-

editary as long as there is peace in Israel; otherwise, a new king must be elected. R. Uziel interprets this as follows:

Although appointing the monarch is a commandment given to Israel when they entered the land, it is up to them whether to do so or not. As it is written, "and [thou] shalt say: I will set a king over me; then thou mayst appoint a king over thee." The people themselves appoint a king over them and accept his authority. This acceptance of the monarchy also applies to the king's descendants, as long as they are not met with opposition by the people as a whole, or part of it. In other words, it is valid as long as Israel is at peace with each other.⁶⁰

Since all the public posts in Israel are inferred from the monarchy, they too are annulled once they are disputed. Thus, R. Uziel concludes that "this *halakhic* ruling is a basic rule (*binyan av*). It serves as a grave warning for every rabbi and leader in Israel to bear in mind that his claim to authority is valid only as long as there is peace in Israel. Whoever provokes dissention in the Jewish community on his behalf, betrays the trust placed in him. He thus acts counter to the intentions of those whom he represents: the Holy One, blessed be He, who is the God of Peace, and the Jewish people, which is the people of peace."⁶¹ The ideal monarchy is based upon the desire for unity and peace. Hence, when the monarchy does not maintain unity, it loses its right to exist. It follows that the will of the people determines the form of governance. In embracing this view, R. Uziel comes close to the views of R. Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin, who perceived the monarchy as an ideal whose realization is conditional upon popular consent (*Ha'amek Davar*, Deut. 17:14).

Furthermore, in principle R. Uziel adopts the well-known position of R. Nissim of Gerona, according to which the ruling that "*dina de-malkhuta dina*" (the law of the land is the law) is inapplicable to Jewish government in the Land of Israel. Since the Land of Israel belongs to the nation as a whole, the king is not its proprietor. Here, however, R. Uziel makes an abrupt shift to the democratic world. He distinguishes between the *dina de-makhuta dina* based on the king's ownership of the land and the *dina de-malkhuta dina* that is anchored in the authority of the accepted government to legislate laws that bind the public. The important point is the legitimacy of the public as a whole, or most of it:

The state as a whole has the right and the obligation to appoint a supreme governmental leadership that will regulate the economic, social, and political affairs of the state, which are the very foun-

dations of its existence. Therefore, the decisions taken by the heads of the state bind everybody. Those that refuse to abide by them must be punished.⁶²

Here we no longer deal with a theoretical discussion. The subject matter is the decisions of the Knesset in the democratic State of Israel, which does not abide by the law of the Torah. That the Knesset decisions follow the talmudic model of the townspeople is not surprising, since this source is the basis for the medieval communal regulations. In the area of *civil* law the legislation by the community was analogous to the status of the rabbinical court of law and was competent to override *halakhic* rulings in many spheres of life.⁶³ On the basis of the communal regulations, R. Uziel distinguishes between appointed and elected officials. Now, the question whether communal regulations that were accepted by a majority vote can bind the minority was a controversial issue for the *Rishonim*. Most of them supported the rule of the majority, while according to Rabbeinu Tam, if the minority does not accept a communal regulation, the majority cannot impose it on them.⁶⁴ As far as this controversy is concerned, R. Uziel maintains that Rabbeinu Tam takes exception to the majority opinion only in reference to *appointed* officials. As to the *elected* officials, it is as if they were explicitly authorized to enforce the laws that they will issue, provided that these laws were decided upon by a majority of votes. And since these elected officials, according to the terms of their election, are the representatives of the public, it is as if their decision was made with the agreement of everybody by virtue of the manner in which they were elected....In this case, even Rabbeinu Tam would consent...not on account of *dina de-malkhuta*, but rather because of the general consent of the people.⁶⁵

In our discussion of R. Amiel, we pointed out that the encounter between *halakhah* and modernity gave rise to three modern Orthodox positions: accommodation, compartmentalization, and expansion and take-over. R. Uziel expresses the accommodating approach, the most modern orientation. Since some of the Knesset members are *halakhically* defined as transgressors, R. Uziel's willingness to regard the Knesset decisions as analogous to the legislation of an elected body authorized by a rabbinical court emerges as a modern approach par excellence. This approach was not alien to the Sephardi rabbis (the *hakhamim*). According to Zvi Zohar, they were distinguished by their moderate approach, which integrated the old and the new. This is because the Sephardi world was far removed from the processes of eman-

cipation, secularization, and assimilation, and therefore was not threatened by a confrontation between tradition and modernity, as was the case in Europe.⁶⁶

Among the rabbinical authorities with religious-Zionist orientations, R. Uziel and R. Hayyim David Halevy, who followed in his footsteps, stand out in their readiness to adopt modern stands and apply them in their *halakhic* rulings. In the beginning of *Mishpetei Uziel*, his *halakhic* work, R. Uziel states: "In every generation, the conditions of life and the transformation of values, as well as the scientific discoveries and technological inventions, give rise to new questions and problems awaiting a solution. We cannot overlook these questions and say, 'the new is prohibited by the Torah.'"⁶⁷ R. Uziel's daring is demonstrated by the fact that he lists the change in values as one of the factors that must have impact on contemporary *halakhic* ruling in its function as *Torat hayyim*, a teaching that addresses all aspects of life. Hence, it is not surprising to find out that he allowed the testimony of those who are *halakhically* disqualified as witnesses, provided that they are not disqualified because of a suspicion of fraud.⁶⁸ In our days, the conditions of life and the change in values find their truest expression in a democratic system that ensures equality in civil rights. This is what led to R. Uziel's concern with the *halakhic* aspect of the elections. Nonetheless, he was convinced that the elected officials do not have the authority to force a Jew to transgress the religious commandments in areas where the "law of the kingdom" does not apply.⁶⁹

R. Uziel's democratic stands are manifested in the two major problematic areas that were discussed in relation to R. Amiel: the status of non-Jews in a Jewish state and the status of women. As to the non-Jewish residents of Israel, R. Uziel consistently argues that their rights must be equated to those of the Jews. Relying on the same injunction invoked by R. Amiel, he cites a parallel verse: "One Torah and one code there shall be for you and for the stranger that sojourns with you" (Num. 15:16). Similarly, just like R. Amiel, he interprets the verse literally, viewing the *ger*, the "stranger," as the gentile resident. His conclusion is that the Torah "provides equal civil judgment for all the inhabitants of the Land of Israel... We must take care not to put obstacles in the way of anyone. We must not offend the religious and national feelings of any nation, nor deprive any citizen of his or her rights."⁷⁰

As far as the status of women is concerned, R. Uziel supports active and passive suffrage alike, as opposed to R. Kook's well-known position. The reasons he provides in favor of women's

rights to vote and to be elected to public office are largely a rebuttal of R. Kook's objections.⁷¹ Compared to R. Kook, R. Uziel clearly emerges as a modern thinker with a democratic outlook. One must bear in mind that in the beginning of the twentieth century, the attitude toward women's suffrage was indicative of the extent to which a Western sociopolitical system was truly democratic. R. Uziel's arguments in support of women's right to vote derive from a strictly egalitarian and democratic worldview:

The mind cannot endure that women be denied this personal right....In these elections we raise up leaders upon us, and empower our representatives to speak on our behalf, to organize the matters of our *yishuv*, and to levy taxes upon our property. And women, whether directly or indirectly, accept the authority of these elected representatives and obey their decisions and their public and national laws. How then can one pull the rope from both ends—see women as bound to obey those elected—yet deny them the right to elect them? Now, if we argue that they should be excluded from the body of voters because their minds are frivolous...reality does not confirm this....Women are, and have always been, as clear-headed and intelligent as men, capable of negotiating and buying and selling and conducting their affairs in a perfectly satisfactory manner.⁷²

Now, just as a woman is eligible to vote, says R. Uziel, so is she eligible to be elected to any government post, and her sitting side by side with men is not to be considered as a matter of licentiousness.⁷³ A woman can also serve as a judge, if this is acceptable to the public, though by doing so she might neglect the education of her children, and in any case male judges are less sentimental than female judges.⁷⁴ Be that as it may, R. Uziel maintains his principled position: a woman is eligible to hold any public office whatsoever.

Nationalism and Universalism

The clearest distinction between the political teachings of R. Amiel and R. Uziel involves the issue of nationalism in general, and in particular the emergent Jewish nationalism, namely Zionism. Their position on this matter is largely determined by the basic assumptions of their respective religious doctrines. Indeed, this is where the discrepancy between these two modern Orthodox thinkers stands out. One of them is more inclined toward the center while the other leans to the right, favoring the ultra-Orthodox

orientation. Their attitude to the non-Jewish world and to the secular Zionist camp is also reflected in their positions. Yet surprisingly, on major issues concerning the nature of Jewish nationalism and its relation to humanity as a whole, R. Uziel and R. Amiel come close to each other.

To understand the basic dispute between R. Amiel and R. Uziel, one must grasp the significant difference between modern nationalism of "the spring of the nations" whose spokespersons were major national thinkers, such as Mazzini in the middle of the nineteenth century, and nationalism in its more radical, chauvinistic forms, which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and reached its peak with the rise of Fascism in the 1920s and the 1930s. R. Amiel addresses the issue of nationalism by identifying it with chauvinism, such as was familiar to him from Poland and other places in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. When the Nazis rose to power in Germany in the 1930s, it was clear to him where modern nationalism could lead to and consequently he became even more suspicious of nationalism. His repugnance for the increasing secularization brought about by Zionism, which strengthened national identity at the expense of religious identity, only added another dimension to his antagonism. *But at the core of his objection lies the spiritual-individualist premise of his teaching.* In contrast, R. Uziel, like many Zionist thinkers, recognized the positive, authentic side of nationalism. Able to distinguish between different types of nationalism, he was striving for the humanistic kind, which does not operate at the expense of other nations, namely nationalism as manifested in Zionism. In this respect, R. Uziel's writings attest to the great influence exerted on him by Ahad Ha-Am and his national doctrine.⁷⁵

Rabbi Amiel

A firm individualistic outlook necessarily impinges upon a collective identity, just as it can reinforce a universalist identity. The unique value of every human being makes it difficult to group people according to particularistic distinctions. Stoicism, Christianity, and Kant's ethics are the major steps in a development that has reached its peak in our days, when the issue of human rights dominates the liberal Western world.⁷⁶ In contrast, Judaism is distinguished by an immanent tension between nationalistic-particularistic and individualistic-universalistic components. R. Amiel represents a unique position on this issue. In his eyes, Abraham, the Hebrew patriarch, personifies the combination of

individualism and universalism as it emerged in the ancient world, long before the Hellenistic era:

Diogenes is depicted as an extreme individualist who rejected all cultural prohibitions.... Yet precisely this total liberation from all the accepted norms... led him to universalism... prompted him to coin the term *cosmopolitan*, a "citizen of the world." This is how the historians present him, forgetting that more than a thousand years before Diogenes, Abraham our forefather already practiced cosmopolitanism: "Go forth out of your country"—in other words, be a citizen of the world.⁷⁷

Since the belief in God is essentially individualistic, it is natural for it to be manifested in a universalist-cosmopolitan perspective, as opposed to idolatry, which is inherently collectivist-particularistic. "For precisely through extreme individuality we attain cosmopolitanism.... For all the gods are worshiped by the group as a whole, whereas the One God is revealed first and foremost to the individual."⁷⁸

Underlying R. Amiel's approach, as it emerges in the above excerpt, are the two basic assumptions we dealt with: spiritual individualism permeated with divinity, and a synthesis that forms a unified whole, as opposed to a partial perspective. The contrast between the Jewish faith, which is essentially individualistic-universalistic, and collectivist idolatry will come to an end only in the messianic era, which will be celebrated by "a hitherto unmatched international singing."⁷⁹ For the time being, collectivist idolatry finds its expression particularly in the sphere of nationalism: "It seems to us that idolatry went bankrupt... but this is only apparently so.... Modern nationalism is based upon reverence for the high and mighty, before whom one kneels down in worship. Precisely this was the source of idolatry."⁸⁰

Nationalism, then, denies the specific value of the individual as a human being. It demands partiality for a particular group, as opposed to universalism, which unites all the people in a harmonious synthesis. Even worse, nationalism encroaches upon the liberty of every individual who kneels down before the oppressive national power. Nationalism is bound to result in chauvinism.⁸¹ It is also closely associated with materialism. This is why in the context of the sacrifice of Isaac, Abraham's words to his servants, "Stay here with the ass" (Gen. 22) are interpreted by the sages as referring to "a people who resemble an ass." Among the gentiles, nationalism, in its ordinary sense, is a feeling that is characteristic of the ass: "The ox knows his owner and the ass his master's crib" (Isa. 1:3). For the gentiles, the "crib" stands for the homeland,

which provides them with food and nourishment. This has nothing to do with the messiah “riding the ass.”⁸² Judaism, on the other hand, has always striven for universalism. The temple was “a house of prayer for all the nations” where during the Festival of Succot “seventy bulls, as against seventy nations” were offered as a sacrifice. Even the exile of Israel from its land had a universalistic purpose: to make non-Jews affiliate with the Jewish people (Pesahim 27b). It follows that “in Judaism, internationalism is not only an outcome; it is the very foundation of our worldview. Judaism begins and ends with internationalism.”⁸³ R. Amiel’s loathing of materialistic, idolatrous nationalism increased after Hitler’s rise to power. This led to a new motive in his writing: the identification of nationalism with social Darwinism in its most blatant form, as manifested in fascism and nazism:

Nationalism, in its usual sense among the nations, really originates in the feeling of crude selfishness, as found in all living creatures. Every one of them is concerned with its own survival and is engaged in the struggle for existence....In humans, the private “ego” of the animals has its parallel in the ego of the “social animal.” However, the root and principle is the same....Nationalism feeds, first and foremost, not on the “image of God” that is imprinted in the human being, but rather on the corrupting evil that nests within it. It is nourished by hatred for everyone who is not of the same race, or of the same citizenship.⁸⁴

According to R. Amiel, nationalism marks the peak of human demonization. It embodies utmost selfishness and bestiality and is diametrically opposed to the image of God, which is inscribed in every single person. Now, here two questions arise: (1) How are we to understand the nature of the Jewish people throughout history—did it not act in accordance with the national codes applied by the gentiles? (2) What can we say about the *normative* ideal in Judaism—is the people of Israel not a value in itself? In answering these questions, R. Amiel moves away from his extremist position and distinguishes between two types of nationalism: ordinary and universally oriented. The Jewish people has always aspired to wave the banner of universalism. The biblical statement “truly he loves the peoples” (Deut.33:3) celebrates worthy nationalism. Humanity cannot exist by way of abstractions. Cosmopolitanism is a positive value, but it may lead to alienation from one’s own group. Hence, within the universal experience there is still room for nationalism: “The Almighty approves of national life. For, indeed, nationality is the foundation of internationality.

We cannot capture the whole of humanity at a glance. We must relate to our own people.”⁸⁵

It follows that the Hebrew nation has a mission to fulfill. It is called upon to maintain the balance between particularism and collectivism on the one hand, and individualism and universalism on the other hand, while at the same time attempting to reinforce the *latter* aspects. The covenant between the Jewish people and God establishes “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation” (Ex. 19:6), dedicated to spreading the message of universalism. The Jewish festivals begin with Passover, the festival of national liberty. They end in a cycle of universal festivals: Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, along with their individualistic-universalistic import, and Succot, during which sacrifices are offered in the name of *all* the nations of the world. In the same vein, R. Amiel interprets R. Simeon bar Yohai’s statement, “You are called man, but the nations of the world are not called man” (Yebamot 61a) as negating the nationalistic perspective.⁸⁶ He detects Jewish universalism even in an assimilated Jew like Trotsky, since he struggled against Stalin’s socialism. Hence in discussing the uniqueness of Jewish nationalism, R. Amiel makes a transition from a strict denial of all forms of nationalism to embracing humanistic nationalism, which began with Mazzini and had broad repercussions in Zionism.

Rabbi Uziel

The national teaching of R. Uziel is highly influenced by the thought of R. Nachman Krochmal and Ahad Ha-Am. Therefore this section begins with a brief account of their major points. Krochmal opens his discussion on nationalism and Jewish history as follows: “We realize that it was the intention of the divine leadership not to spread out the human race through total separation but to consolidate it into small and large units....The large, well-organized unit is designated a ‘people’ and a ‘nation’. As it says, ‘when the Most High divided to the nations their inheritance’ (Deut. 32:8). It is by the laws of divine leadership that proper social orders were formed one by one within those units...and norms of law and justice emerged.”⁸⁷

According to Krochmal, the nation is an organism that derives its vitality from its inherent spiritual essence. Every nation is characterized by spiritual uniqueness. This is the “spirit of the nation,” a concept which has its roots in German nationalistic thought of the nineteenth century (Fichte, Herder, Hegel). The

spiritual power of the nation determines its culture and the spiritual works it produces, as well as its history. The people of Israel is different from the other nations. As the prophet says, "The portion of Jacob is not like them; for He is the former of all things; and Israel is the tribe of His inheritance" (Jer. 10:15). The Jewish people is the dwelling of "the absolutely spiritual," or "the infinite absolute spirit," which is the *Shekinah* itself, the Divine Presence. By comparison, all the other nations embody only some finite spiritual powers.⁸⁸ This difference has historic consequences. Except for Israel, each nation undergoes a three-stage development of *growth*, *maturity*, and *decline*, which is analogous to the development of the individual person. The initial stage of growth leads to maturity, the stage in which the nation develops its spiritual assets, especially its cultural works. Decline sets in when the finite spirituality decreases and weakens till the nation ceases to exist and its accomplishments are absorbed by the nation that takes its place. While the Jewish people undergoes the same cycle, it is an eternal people, exempt from distinction by virtue of its bonds with the infinite spirit. Therefore, once a triadic period comes to an end, a new one begins. The people of Israel has already undergone three full cycles and is currently in the midst of the fourth one.⁸⁹

Ahad Ha-Am, who considered Krochmal the only original Jewish thinker in the nineteenth century, readily adopted some of his basic premises: the nation as an organism; national uniqueness as manifested in the spiritual assets of the nation; the contribution of nationality to man's development; and the close relationship between Jewish nationalism and its moral, universal mission. He also embraced the broad historical perspective that encompasses the past and the present of the Jewish people—both in its sovereign state and in exile—thus establishing the ongoing continuity of Jewish history. However, as a positivist thinker, Ahad Ha-Am shifted the emphasis from the spiritual-metaphysical roots of the Jewish people to the spiritual works *it produced*. Spiritual nationalism, as perceived by Ahad Ha-Am, views the nation's materialistic aspects—territory, sovereignty, and economic development—as a necessary basis for its spiritual-cultural development in language, literature, and morality. With Ahad Ha-Am, the dichotomy between positivism, which regards the spiritual creations of the nation as a product of historical evolution, and idealism, which sees the driving force of the nation in its spirit, reaches its peak, lending itself to a wide range of scholarly interpretations. Ahad Ha-Am reverses the order established by Krochmal. Instead of ascribing national morality to the divine spirit, he claims that the

Jewish faith itself is the expression of national morality, and, as such, it is the creation of the people. Similar to Krochmal, though, Ahad Ha-Am thinks that what distinguishes the Jewish people is the unique nature of its spirituality. The morality of the prophets, which captures the essence of the Judaic spirit, carries a universal message. The aspiration to improve the individual's life goes hand in hand with the aspiration to improve national life and culminates in the aspiration to redeem humanity – though this is *not* the purpose of Jewish existence. Other conceptions of Ahad Ha-Am will be discussed further on.⁹⁰ For the moment, the foregoing account is sufficient, as it provides the background against which R. Uziel's teaching stands out.

In his writings, R. Uziel often discusses nationalism and Jewish nationalism. The following excerpt suggests how the influences of Krochmal and Ahad Ha-Am fit into his unitary, organic conception:

The people is one single body, closely united with its original soul. The assets of the people: the land and the language, are its field of work and the vehicles of its existence and development. He who denies the principal beliefs and opinions of his people, which reflect the patterns of his original soul, and despises his heritage... is incapable of truly loving his people.⁹¹

R. Uziel's organic nationalism is not biological or racial; it is tied in with the national spirit in its religious connotations. Jewish nationality is unique because of its special affinity with God, who is the Prince of the nation. The spirituality of the Jewish people is manifested in its Torah. Hence, Judaism is not merely a religion, it is the profound, inner expression of Jewish nationality.

Just like Ahad Ha-Am, R. Uziel, too, stresses spiritual creativity as essential to the national experience. However, as far as he is concerned, Jewish nationalism in particular requires adherence to the Judaic beliefs. In Ahad Ha-Am's classical essay, "Avdut be-Tokokh Herut" [Slavery in Freedom], he attacks the assimilationists, who regard Judaism as a creed, rather than as a nationality. The apparent freedom of these Western Jews, says Ahad Ha-Am, disguises moral and mental slavery, which finds its expression in their very notion of the "mission" of Judaism.⁹² In contrast to them, he, as a national Jew, has remained a free man. He then makes an important statement: "I know why I will remain a Jew. I can make any judgment I see fit about the beliefs and opinions handed down to me by my ancestors without fearing that by doing so I will sever the ties between me and my people.... And

this spiritual liberty of mine is something that I am not willing to replace by any rights whatsoever.”⁹³ R. Uziel, on the other hand, states just the opposite: “The love of God is the love of His Torah and the love of His people, which carries this Torah in its heart....This reciprocal love between the Prince of the nation and the soul of the nation, as manifested in the Torah and Israel, which is the body that carries it.”⁹⁴

Like *Ahad Ha-Am*, R. Uziel also regards the literature of the people as the distinct expression of national creativity. Yet for him, the literature of the people is not the ensemble of works produced by various individuals. This kind of literature, which encompasses all spheres of life, can be called human scientific literature. In contrast to it, “the literature of the people is a collective creation.” It incorporates the beliefs and views of the people, its outlooks and ambitions, the teaching of life in all its branches and forms, and the concepts of law and social order, which are justice and integrity, peace, and love. The literature of the people serves as the vehicle that expresses the soul of the nation....It is a true mirror of the soul of the nation, in its past and in its future.⁹⁵ The national literature is written in the language that reflects the character and the culture of the people.⁹⁶

According to R. Uziel, the rabbinical saying that in the Sinai revelation, God “overturned the mountain upon the Israelites like an inverted cask” (*Shabbat* 88a) should not be understood literally. This saying is specifically directed against the way prescribed by *Ahad Ha-Am*, who stated audaciously: “I can make any judgment I see fit about the beliefs and opinions handed down to me by my ancestors.” What our sages meant by this saying is that the spiritual essence of Jewish nationality manifests itself in the acceptance of the divine commandments.⁹⁷ Every nation has its own uniqueness, its own Prince of the nation. The Jewish people is unlike any other nation because it is allied with God. Herein lies the significance of the Sinaitic revelation.⁹⁸

The nation, just like the individual, has an inheritance and a heritage. The inheritance is the entire range of material resources, as bequeathed through previous generations: territory, minerals, industrial plants, and so forth. The heritage of the people is the spiritual treasures handed down from one generation to the next.⁹⁹ The building of the nation is based on three foundations: (1) recognition of the national mission; (2) the unity of action required to accomplish this mission. (3) the existence of a homeland and a sovereign state. Every nation “is a collective unit with a special soul that inhabits within the body of humanity and a special national mission to fulfill in this world.”¹⁰⁰ Awareness of the na-

tional mission entails a belief in the possibility of attaining it against all odds. However, this conviction must be translated into unified activity.¹⁰¹ All of this is conditional upon the existence of an independent country. "Indeed, the people and the land are intrinsically intertwined. A people uprooted from its land is like a blossoming, thickly branched tree that is cut off from its roots."¹⁰²

The people of Israel manifests these features in the most perfect way. It has a unique national mission, which derives its validity from the covenant with God. It believes in its mission and translates it into daily personal and national activities, including the observance of those commandments that can be practiced only in the Land of Israel. However, in contrast to the other nations, there is an inextricable bond between the Jewish people and its land. The people of Israel remained faithful to its land throughout its exile, while the Land of Israel became barren when its rightful owners were gone.¹⁰³ The Jewish people is also different from other nations in that it does not age. It has already gone through three periods (here there is some departure from Krochmal's thought). They are: *the period of formation*—the generation of Moses, the generation of the wilderness; *the period of growth and blossoming*—the conquest of the land under the leadership of Joshua and the settlement; and *the period of enlightenment and action*—the reign of Hizkiyyahu, a time of faith and knowledge of the Torah. In contrast to Krochmal, who observes three cycles of decline and revival, R. Uziel argues that "Hizkiyyahu's generation has never ceased to exist and never will."¹⁰⁴

Thus, it appears that R. Uziel conceives of nationality as a natural organism made of matter and spirit, with the former serving as the foundation of the latter. The people of Israel is a nation in the full sense of the word. In addition, it has its own uniqueness because it cleaves to divine unity. The discrepancy between R. Uziel's national outlook and R. Amiel's anti-national individualism is clear. Yet, the picture is more complex. R. Uziel makes a move that is the opposite of R. Amiel's. R. Amiel makes a transition from universalist individualism to recognizing the validity of nationalism and emphasizing the difference between Jewish nationalism, which is basically universalist, and ordinary, idolatrous nationalism. R. Uziel starts with nationalism, though he, too, distinguishes between two types, represented by Judaism and Rome, respectively:

There are many national forms. But all of them were divided into two general systems: Jewish and Aramaic, or Ceasarea and Jerusalem....National life where state and government are the founda-

tion of nationality, as exemplified by imperialistic Rome, or all-encompassing nationality, imprinted by sanctity, nobility and generosity, majesty and distinction. These two national forms are constantly in conflict...yet when one rises, the other falls.¹⁰⁵

The kind of nationality represented by Judaism is spiritual and universal and uses political life as a means to a higher goal. In contrast to it, national states strive for conquests and are constantly in a state of war, whether actual or potential. This is why, generally speaking, the nations of the world cease to exist, while the Jewish people lives on forever. Therefore the only authentic nationality is that of the Jewish people.¹⁰⁶ As suggested in the Torah, all nations have their boundaries: "When the Most High divided to the nations their inheritance, when he separated the sons of Adam, he set the bounds of the peoples..." (Deut. 32:8-9). In contrast, the people of Israel exceeds all bounds, being governed by harmonious unity: "for the portion of God is His people." All the nations believe that the end justifies the means, while the Jewish people believes that performing a commandment by transgressing the law is in itself a transgression.¹⁰⁷ It is precisely the people of Israel, the very people perceived by others as cosmopolitan and criticized for not being patriotic in its relations with the nations that host it—this very people is the bearer of the universal message about the moral progress of humanity.¹⁰⁸ All the nations "view their life, and their right to exist, from the narrow and limited perspective of their own benefit." Israel, on the other hand, strives to attain the utmost spiritual perfection through which one can ascend to the heights of morality.¹⁰⁹ R. Uziel's universalistic position is also reflected in his *halakhic* ruling on performing autopsies for medical purposes. In his view this practice could be permitted if conducted with proper respect for the dead because of the medical need to save life. He explicitly states that if one were to prohibit autopsies, the same prohibition should apply to non-Jews as well, for they too are created in the image of God.¹¹⁰

Despite the great similarity between R. Amiel and R. Uziel in the way they view Jewish nationality and its universal aspects, one cannot overlook the profound differences between them:

1. R. Amiel, as an extreme individualist, sees nationalism, which is fundamentally collectivist, as idolatrous. R. Uziel, on the other hand, regards it as a natural expression of an organic unity in which the individual is included as an integral part of the collective.

2. R. Uziel objects to nationalism only insofar as it is dominated by political, rather than spiritual aspects and assumes the form of strict chauvinism. This suggests the influence of Ahad Ha-Am. R. Amiel believes that nationality, by its very nature, is bound to result in chauvinism.
3. According to R. Amiel, the sole purpose of the Jewish people as a nation is to strengthen individualism and spiritual universalism. R. Uziel thinks that the task of the Jewish people is to stress authentic nationalism; the Jewish nation is a spiritual organism that *also* strives for the progress of humanity.

Social Justice: Between Capitalism and Socialism

As far as social justice is concerned, R. Amiel and R. Uziel display similar views. Both of them point in the direction of integrating a large number of social components in a system that does not abolish private ownership. The same move characterizes the modern democratic welfare state. What happened is that in practice, liberal individualistic thinkers introduced meaningful social elements into their system, while thinkers who define the human being as a social organism still acknowledged the legitimacy of private ownership.¹¹¹

Rabbi Amiel

R. Amiel, the proclaimed individualist, opposes collectivist frameworks, which are essentially idolatrous. For the same reason he also objects to collectivist socialism:

The Torah was given to free men, not to slaves. Socialism enslaves the individual to society and to the collective, in which every individual is considered only as a member of the group....For the sense of ownership and selfhood is one of the things that marks the superiority of humans over the beasts. This, too, according to the Jewish outlook, derives from the "image of God" imprinted in man.¹¹²

R. Amiel grounds private ownership in spiritual individualism, which is derived from the image of God in man. Collectivist socialism, just like nationalism, is derived from idolatry.

R. Amiel's understanding of various socialistic concepts is very superficial. He identifies socialism with Marxist materialism and associates the latter with Lenin's communism. Hence his unequivocal statement that every form of socialism is terrestrial and materialistic (just like nationalism). In his view, it was the sages, as usual, who saw things in depth. The saying, "‘Mine is yours and yours is mine,’ says the ignoramus" captures the materialistic aspect of socialism.¹¹³ Socialistic justice is a matter of self-interest. The working class is concerned only with its own interests. Communism does not bring about progress; it only leads to greater primitivism.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, capitalism is also objectionable. It is equally based on materialistic selfishness and is basically idolatrous because it involves the worship of the mighty, economically powerful capitalists, who deny the individual's liberty.¹¹⁵ Nonetheless, the way to abolish crude capitalism is not by waging war and causing terror. People must be taught to throw away their gold and silver idols in preparation for the end of days.¹¹⁶

According to biblical historiography, humanity oscillates between extreme capitalism and extreme communism. The generation of the flood was destroyed as a result of the capitalists' oppressive exploitation. It is true that the capitalist master pays his workers. However, he takes advantage of them by not paying them according to their true worth. This is what is meant by the statement, "for the earth is filled with depravity" (Gen. 6:11).¹¹⁷ Significantly, R. Amiel identifies the corrupt generation of the flood with capitalistic oppression. Now the generation of the Tower of Babel, says R. Amiel, moved to the other extreme. It was governed by a communist system in which "the whole earth was of one language and one speech" (Gen. 11:1). Thereafter, once communism crumbled, capitalism got the upper hand. It was embraced by the people of Sodom, who made the most of their selfish individualistic ideology of "mine is mine and yours is yours."¹¹⁸ From the moral viewpoint, says R. Amiel, capitalism is far worse than socialism: "For there might be some ideal, however misleading and unattainable, in 'mine is yours and yours is mine.' Such a system retains some spiritual aspects. Yet what ideal is there in 'mine is mine and yours is yours?' Indeed, this statement encapsulates the situation of those who know only how to fill their stomach and pat their big belly in self-satisfaction, as if to announce, 'peace be upon my soul!'"¹¹⁹

R. Amiel's analysis presents a dialectical process of moving back and forth from capitalism to socialism and vice versa. This analysis originates in his general dialectical viewpoint. Another

interesting point is his insight that abrupt shifts from strict communism to strict capitalism involve a transition to chauvinism.¹²⁰ The recent processes taking place in the former Soviet Union are reminiscent of this analysis.

As expected, the proper alternative proposed by R. Amiel is the synthesis found in Judaism, in this case a combination of private ownership and a comprehensive system of social laws. The prohibition against charging interest prevents a substantial growth of capital, while the laws of the sabbatical year and the Jubilee restrict ownership of the land, the strongest ownership in the Torah world. The reforms that were made over the years—the *prosbul* and the transaction permit—do not indicate progress. On the contrary, they indicate the decline of the generations.¹²¹ The strictly enforced charity laws and the *halakhic* rulings on hiring laborers establish broad legislation that ensures social justice.¹²² Even slavery became so restricted that it was hardly possible to put it into practice. The Hebrew serf, bound to be liberated after a specified period of time, became the “master” of his own master, as suggested by the sages and Maimonides. (“Who buys a Jewish serf is as one that buys a master over himself.”) As for the entire institution of (Canaanite) slavery, which the Torah regards as a given, it became highly restricted, and in any case was frowned upon by the Torah and the prophets.¹²³ To conclude, “Moses our master, from the mouth of God, was the founder of the first *Internationale*. Had people obeyed the laws of this particular *Internationale*, the whole world would have been like paradise.”¹²⁴ Real socialism must be both democratic and universalistic.¹²⁵ The most democratic and universalistic laws are those of the Torah. If the Jewish state comes into being, it can easily base its social system on the Torah, without resorting to Marxism.¹²⁶

Here, too, there emerges the usual weakness inherent in R. Amiel’s thought. He juxtaposes the toraitic ideal with all the unsuccessful alternatives of the Western world in order to demonstrate the superiority of the former. Granted that this account is exaggerated, and that the presentation of Moses as the founder of the *Internationale* is far fetched (and incompatible with R. Amiel’s denial of collectivist socialism), we must concede that the synthesis he envisions between socialism and capitalism is solidly grounded in Jewish sources. The traditional Jewish notions of social justice lend support to the democratic welfare state. What distinguishes R. Amiel’s outlook is that his campaign starts with individualistic premises and concludes with a social-democratic program. During the years in which he composed his writings, this move was just emerging (the New Deal period in the

United States). It culminated in the aftermath of World War II and by now has become widely accepted. Individualistic liberals such as John Rawls and his notion of distributional justice are subject to the criticism that no social communitarian system can be based on individualistic-universalistic foundations. R. Amiel's individualism is anchored in the covenantal Jewish community. The covenant with God entails broad social legislation. Furthermore, R. Amiel's spiritual individualism is essentially different from selfish liberal individualism that is found, for instance, in the original state of affairs behind John Rawls's "screen of ignorance."¹²⁷

Rabbi Uziel

R. Uziel's social thought is not as complex as that of R. Amiel. His conception of organic unity naturally leads to a socially-oriented communitarian approach. According to R. Uziel, the basis for true social concern derives from the belief in God, which makes the individual regard himself as part of the collective: "The individual is an associate in the partnership of human society, for the sake of which he lives and through which he derives benefits. As such, he also becomes the associate of his Maker, the Creator and Provider of the world."¹²⁸ The belief in God obligates the believer to impose law and justice in the world. In this sense, faith is stronger than any ordinary social teaching: "All of the social theories cannot provide man with the same degree of absolute justice as embodied in the brief injunction "Let thy brother live with you" (Lev. 25:36). Human life must be governed by brotherly relations, whereby everyone lives and lets live, or rather, lives in order to vitalize everything to the best of one's ability."¹²⁹

The profound connection between faith in God and social sensitivity finds its expression in the various religious commandments. The sabbaths and the festivals are particularly important in strengthening this connection: "The sabbaths and the festivals are days of peace and call upon man to absolute social peace. The partitions separating one person from another, dividing the rich from the poor, fall down. On these days we proclaim freedom and tranquility for every person and every living creature."¹³⁰ On the Sabbath the Jew is commanded to cheer the hearts of the poor, the orphans and the widows. The Sabbath does not obliterate class differences but it educates, reducing social gaps. This is mainly because it symbolizes the creation of the world and the existence of God. The Sabbath "enlightens our minds, making us recognize

not only the unity of God but also the harmonious unity of the entire world. For we are part of this unity; we act within it and we are affected by it."¹³¹ It is this perception of harmonious unity, rather than superficial political moves, which can give rise to human solidarity.

Social solidarity is reinforced by the sabbatical year. Here, too, there is an obvious affinity between the religious and social aspects of Jewish life. The commandment to observe the sabbatical year consists of three major elements: (1) *Release of soil*—expropriation of the individual's ownership of the land; (2) *Strengthening the belief and trust in God*—who provides for the individual's needs; (3) *Release of debts*—even if the debtor is willing to pay, the creditor is not allowed to get back his money. These three elements are interrelated:

These three commandments are united by one single intent, namely to establish equality between all the people—whether they are poor or rich, debtors or creditors—and to abolish the mastery of one person over another, which is the cause of sin....The commandments of the sabbatical year are designed to improve the human world from a social point of view. This is one of the purposes of the commandment of the Torah: to remove the burden and bring peace into society, the state and the nation.¹³²

In contrast to R. Amiel, the polemicist, R. Uziel does not attack capitalism and socialism. Nonetheless, one can detect his sympathy with the social democratic world, which strives for greater social solidarity while at the same time acknowledging the validity of private ownership. R. Uziel stresses the importance of *yishuvo shel olam*, the development of society in the broadest sense of the term.¹³³ The laborer must work to the best of his ability, not just because it is his duty to serve his employer, but also out of the conviction that by doing his work he participates in the universal labor of building and production.¹³⁴ The employer, on his part, must treat his workers with respect and generosity, relating to them as his equals.¹³⁵ Since the correct approach is to establish respectful relations between employers and workers, and since work toward *yishuvo shel olam* (toward the "civilization of the world"), namely, the advancement of humanity, is highly valuable, it is preferable to avoid strikes. It is recommendable to establish a court of law where labor disputes will be settled through the arbitration of a professional team of *halakhists*, economists, and experts in labor relations.¹³⁶ The employer must take care to protect the worker and compensate him when the need arises. The wages must allow for a decent livelihood.¹³⁷

In his rulings, R. Uziel translates the biblical and *halakhic* principles of social justice into practical reality.

R. Amiel and R. Uziel as Religious-Zionist Ideologists

Political ideology is a system of ideas about the desirable ordering of society and the methods of obtaining it. Political ideology connects the past, the present, and the future. It is anchored in reality, to which it returns in order to preserve it, modify it, or change it radically.¹³⁸ This section focuses on how the religious outlooks and sociopolitical conceptions of R. Amiel and R. Uziel shaped their positions as the leading ideologists of the religious-Zionist camp in the first half of the twentieth century.

Rabbi Amiel

As already mentioned, R. Amiel was a harsh critic of the various ideologies that emerged in the twentieth century. He was also critical of the major contemporary currents of thought in the Jewish world. He disapproved of the emancipationists, who considered Judaism strictly as a creed. He attacked the Zionist thinkers, who viewed Judaism exclusively as a nationality. He found fault with the ultra-Orthodox who opposed Zionism. He also had serious complaints against his own camp. In the final analysis however, and in spite of his ultra-Orthodox tendencies, R. Amiel is definitely a religious-Zionist thinker. This conclusion is based on two considerations: (1) R. Amiel tended to interpret tradition in modern terms; (2) Despite his reservations, he supported the Zionist program and attached great importance to the contribution of religious Zionism to this enterprise. Let us now briefly examine his criticism of the various currents *in view of* his religious premises and political outlooks.

The Anti-Zionist Currents: R. Amiel targets his polemics on three groups: (1) the assimilationists, including the Reform Jews; (2) the disciples of R. S. R. Hirsch, who subscribed to the ideal of *Torah im Derekh Erez*; (3) the ultra-Orthodox leadership of Agudat Yisrael. He saw the root of the problem in the movement of the Enlightenment, from Mendelssohn onwards, which led to the perception that Judaism is a *religion* and not *Torat hayyim*, a teaching that embraces the totality of life.

The product of this era was the well-known slogan, "Act like a human in your dealings with the world and like a Jew at home."...How far removed is this from authentic Judaism, the Judaism of *Torat hayyim*....This led the Jews to imitate the gentiles in all of their ways and from this followed crude, plain assimilation.¹³⁹

R. Amiel's two basic premises, the harmonious synthesis of reality and universal individualism in its Judaic form, stand out in this excerpt. The separation between Jewishness and humanism creates a split personality. Moreover, this is an arbitrary distinction. Judaism reinforces both individualism and universalism. In contrast to the universally oriented Jewish nationality, through which the *people* carries the universal message of the Torah, the Berlin Enlightenment led to assimilation by insisting that Judaism carries a strictly religious message of universalism. In this way, the adherents of the Enlightenment posed a real threat to the uniqueness of Jewish identity.¹⁴⁰ This compartmentalization, which leads to a separation between national identity and religious identity, penetrated also into modern Orthodox Jewry. Such arbitrary division (in contrast to harmonious synthesis), kills the soul of Judaism. It strengthens the affinity with German culture and consequently weakens the attachment to the Torah.¹⁴¹ Though the Orthodox Jews in Germany were still attached to Zion and Jerusalem, these sentiments were overpowered by their involvement with European culture ("*Adam be-Zetekha*") and by their German patriotism.¹⁴²

Here R. Amiel touches upon a very important point. The secular ramifications of the Protestant ethos are particularly problematic for Judaism.¹⁴³ The separation of religion from public life is particularly harmful to Judaism, where religion plays a public role and is accorded a public status. Interestingly, these views are voiced by the very thinkers who came up with modern individualistic notions that are the by-product of individualistic Protestantism and its influence on Western philosophy (Locke, Kant).

According to R. Amiel, it is no coincidence that Agudat Yisrael emerged mainly through the initiative of R. S.R. Hirsch's disciples. His criticism surprisingly echoes the message of Ahad Ha-Am:

Wherever we turn, we see only fossilization and stagnation....The soul of the Book is absent and nowadays we are indeed not the people of the book but the people that carries books....The salvation of Judaism will not come through the desiccated Orthodoxy.¹⁴⁴

The anti-Zionism of R. Hirsch's disciples was inspired by the German spirit of the Enlightenment and the resultant assimilative trends, which weakened their Jewish *national* roots.¹⁴⁵ In contrast to them, the ultra-Orthodox in Eastern Europe were influenced by the exilic spirit in their own reality. Exile offends the human feelings and the national sentiments of the Jews. It caused them to imitate their non-Jewish surroundings out of self-disparagement. In the absence of a national center, national sentiments are dormant. The atmosphere of the ghetto produced a ghetto psychology of a twisted mind and meek soul, as well as a frail body. Agudat Yisrael mirrors this exilic spirit.¹⁴⁶

R. Amiel's criticism is not unusual for a Zionist thinker. It suggests the influence of Ahad Ha-Am, which also finds its way into the concepts applied by R. Amiel.¹⁴⁷ As the opponent of secular Zionism, R. Amiel regarded Ahad Ha-Am as a dangerous adversary. Nevertheless, he adopted the Zionist criticism of the ultra-Orthodox world.

It is noteworthy that R. Amiel's criticism of *all* the contemporary non-Zionist trends springs from his premises about human nature of man and the importance of forming a synthesis of opposites (rather than compartmentalizing reality). The character of the Jewish people and its profound affinity with humanity at large are incompatible with the kind of restriction that would weaken national revival.

The Zionist World: The Zionist world, too, says R. Amiel, tends to compartmentalize Jewish reality. However, instead of viewing Judaism as a creed and nothing else, the Zionists insist that Judaism is exclusively a nationality. This, too, is the outcome of the Enlightenment and assimilation: "The Zionists, just like the assimilationists, found no other translation for our concept of Torah than the word *religion*... While for all other nations, religion is merely a matter of form, for us the Torah is a matter of substance."¹⁴⁸ As a product of the Berlin Enlightenment, which separates between the person and the Jew, Herzl inverted Ahad Ha-Am's slogan. He stated: "Act like a Jew in your dealings with the world and like a human being at home." For him Jewish identity is associated with the Land of Israel and the Hebrew language, but not with contents of Judaism.¹⁴⁹ Herzl's formula, according to which Zionism is neutral on religious questions, contradicts the core of Judaism as it was already defined by R. Saadia Gaon: "The Jewish people is a nation by virtue of its [religious] teachings."¹⁵⁰

A much stronger criticism springs from R. Amiel's tendency to demonize nationalism in general. In their attempts to imitate

European nationalism, Herzl and his colleagues regard Judaism strictly as a nationality. Therefore Zionism also nurtures the national demon. Our nationalism, “far from feeding on the ‘image of God’ in humans, is nourished by the corrupting evil within them, namely, by hatred to anybody who is not of the same race or citizenship.”¹⁵¹ This is why Herzl’s Zionism stresses the anti-Semitic problem. In comparison, truly Jewish nationalism does not feed on chauvinistic hatred. It is sustained by universal love for every one.¹⁵² The kind of Zionism R. Amiel envisions does not strive to “normalize” the Jewish nation by using the other nations as its frame of reference. On the contrary, it aims “to restore the world” in a universalistic manner, in accordance with the premise that every individual is created in the image of God.¹⁵³

Characteristically, R. Amiel strongly criticizes attitudes with which he is not quite familiar. The resemblance between Herzl’s writings and the supposedly demonic aspirations of political Zionism is tenuous. Nonetheless, here as elsewhere R. Amiel brings into focus some problematic points. Political Zionism is *capable* of assuming chauvinistic forms. Religious Zionism alone—through its universalistic, humanistic trends—can prevent the deterioration of Zionism into oppressive chauvinism. R. Amiel proved to be loyal to his principles. In 1938, in retaliation for Arab terrorism, the E.Z.L (*Irgun Zeva’i Le’ummi*) dissident underground organization killed innocent Arabs. The Zionist leadership responded by adopting a policy of restraint based upon national considerations. R. Amiel’s response was unequivocal:

“Thou shalt not murder” [must be obeyed] unconditionally and without any exception. “Thou shalt not murder” because the Torah says (Gen. 9:6), “whoever sheds man’s blood by man shall his own blood be shed; for in the image of God made He man”—every man. We must have drastically deteriorated if in order to explain the injustice of shedding the blood of those who did us no harm we have to invoke the policy of restraint, instead of citing the injunction “thou shalt not murder.” How offensive are these utilitarian explanations!¹⁵⁴

R. Amiel draws on the individualistic-universalistic outlook of the sages: “Therefore *man* was created single in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single soul to perish upon the world, scripture interprets it to him as though he had caused a whole *world* to perish.”¹⁵⁵ R. Amiel does not cite the later version of this saying, in which “the world” is replaced by “Israel.” This is understandable in view of his philosophy, which distinguishes between ordinary nationality and Jewish, universalist national-

ity.¹⁵⁶ In any case, his firm stand is fascinating precisely because of his affinity with the Revisionist camp.

R. Amiel's attitude toward Ahad Ha-Am's spiritual Zionism is far more complex. He was influenced by Ahad Ha-Am, but had reservations about the nature of the spiritual center he had in mind. According to Ahad Ha-Am, the national center creates spirituality, while according to the religious-Zionist conception as presented by R. Amiel, it is spirituality that creates the center: "In short, Ahad Ha-Am's spiritual center is oriented toward the spirit of the nation, while our spiritual center is oriented toward the divine spirit."¹⁵⁷ Nonetheless, Ahad Ha-Am "merely" distorts Jewish history, while political Zionism wipes it out. Only "those taken captive among the gentiles" can be satisfied with a "safe haven" for the Jews. A Jewish state that does not serve as a spiritual center is bound to sever the ties between its Jewish citizens and the diaspora Jews.¹⁵⁸ Despite all the differences, R. Amiel is close to Ahad Ha-Am even on this point.¹⁵⁹

R. Amiel addresses his criticism to other Zionist ideologies as well. He labels socialist Zionism "the left side." Apparently his notion of Zionism as a combination of crude nationality, socialism, and blatant secularization is what makes him credit Zionism with this dubious epithet, along with its kabbalistic connotations. He also finds fault with Revisionist ideology on account of its overemphasis of nationalistic issues.

Religious Zionism: In view of the above, and in light of R. Amiel's premise of synthetic unity, his conclusion is clear: only religious Zionism is capable of pointing at the proper Zionist way. Religious Zionism must form a real synthesis between Zionism and religion. Such a synthesis will be centered around the Torah and will ensure that the young trainees of religious Zionism are not torn by ambivalence in the face of contemporary reality.¹⁶⁰ Religious Judaism derives its strength from three foundations: God, the Torah, and Israel. It does not tolerate neutrality about religion.¹⁶¹ The separation between religion and state emerges from Christianity and has no place in Judaism. The State of Israel will not survive if it considers religion a private matter.¹⁶² Religious Zionism must reject the negative aspects of the exile, while adopting its positive aspects: moral sensitivity, the strengthening of individualism and universalism, and the opposition to political tyranny.¹⁶³ Religious Zionism must establish an ultra-Orthodox Zionist federation that will neither belittle itself before secular Zionism, as is the actual practice of religious Zionism, nor separate itself from the public at large, as does Agudat Yisrael. It should move toward a cooperative partnership on a basis of parity

with the other Zionist factions.¹⁶⁴ The Mizrahi must operate as the spiritual center of the nation, while striving to work hand in hand with Agudat Yisrael. Characteristically, R. Amiel is more competent at addressing criticism than at outlining a practical program. Indeed, his way proved to be unsuccessful. Neither the highly increased independence of religious Zionism following the Yom Kippur War nor present-day ultra-Orthodox nationalistic trends follows in the footsteps of R. Amiel, who viewed religious Zionism as the focus of a Torah-oriented nationalism infused with individualistic and universalistic orientations.

Rabbi Uziel

R. Uziel was a Zionist thinker par excellence and an ardent supporter of the Mizrahi. For him the Zionist premises fit in with the classical Jewish sources. Characteristically, he adopts a modern approach and strives for unity and harmony. In this respect he differs from R. Amiel, who was opposed to secular Zionism and was also critical of religious Zionism from within the camp. Another difference between the two is chronological: R. Uziel's major contemplative work was written in the aftermath of the Holocaust and after the foundation of the State of Israel. He perceived these events in messianic terms, believing that the process of redemption was gaining momentum.

R. Uziel's national outlooks blend with his notion of organic unity and are reflected in his religious-Zionist ideology. He attached great importance to the Jewish national renaissance. Whereas R. Amiel acknowledged both the negative and positive aspects of the exile, R. Uziel internalized the Zionist rejection of the exilic traits. According to him, the major national characteristics are as follows:

1. *The Hebrew Language*: Throughout his writings, R. Uziel consistently emphasized the importance of the Hebrew language. He was born and bred in the Old City of Jerusalem to a Sephardi rabbinical family, and apparently his roots blended easily with the new Zionist spirit. R. Uziel made a strenuous effort to prove that the language spoken by the founding fathers of the nation was the same as the original language of the Torah.¹⁶⁵ There is a trace of polemic in his statement that they used Hebrew for everyday conversation. In accordance with his view that the national language reflects the character and culture of the people, R. Uziel argues that Hebrew has always been the language of the Jewish people.

Using the terms coined by Ahad Ha-Am, R. Uziel dismissed the view that the Hebrew script of the Torah (the "Assyrian" script) had originated in the Babylonian captivity. If this is the case, then this script is but a symbol of the exile, an expression of "slavery in the midst of freedom," which is incompatible with national revival and messianic redemption.¹⁶⁶ What he says about those who returned to Zion at the time of the Second Temple is equally true of the return to Zion in the beginning of the twentieth century: "The national sentiments inspired the people to shake off any trace of the curse of the exile and to restore their original script...removing all signs of the servile exilic imitation and going back to authentic Judaism, one of whose most important features is the script that is sanctified by the nation."¹⁶⁷ In 1912, R. Uziel introduced his program in his address accepting the appointment as the Sephardi chief rabbi of Jaffa, his first rabbinical position. He said: "One language will be spoken by all of us at home and in the street, in the towns and in the fields. This is the language of the Torah, which is also the language of prophecy and the language of the Mishnah. Indeed, everyone will be fluent in this language."¹⁶⁸ Again, we notice that R. Uziel eliminates the distinction between Hebrew as a holy language and as an everyday language. In 1921, upon assuming the position of chief rabbi of Salonika, he insisted on the importance of reviving the Hebrew language.¹⁶⁹ In his missive to the leadership of the Alliance Israelite Universelle help organization, he stated again that Hebrew should be introduced as the language of instruction in the diaspora. When Hebrew is used as a language for everyday purposes, he stressed, it will unify the Jewish people all around the world.

R. Uziel opened his *halakhic* work *Mishpetei Uziel* by posing the question about whether it was permissible to introduce the Sephardi pronunciation of Hebrew into the synagogue (instead of the customary Ashkenazi pronunciation). R. A.I.H. Kook banned this practice, arguing that it counters the biblical injunction, "do not forsake the teaching of your mother" (Prov. 1:8). R. Uziel approved of this innovation in view of the fact that as an everyday language, Hebrew was indeed spoken with a Sephardi pronunciation.¹⁷⁰ It follows that R. Uziel recognized the need to strengthen the status of Hebrew both as a holy language and as a language used for everyday purposes.

2. *Pioneering, cultivating the land, productivity*: The transition from unproductive economic pursuits to productive farming seemed to R. Uziel to be one of the greatest accomplishments of the Zionist enterprise. He perceived the Zionist settlement in Eretz Yisrael as consonant with the spirit of the sages and their

recommendation to combine the study Torah with the father's obligation to teach his son a trade.¹⁷¹ The sages frowned upon commerce, though they recognized its necessity. They believed that "the merchant does not produce anything; he supports himself by the work of others and is bound to get involved in swindling and fraud."¹⁷² They approved only of the productive merchant, whose endeavors are agriculturally and industrially beneficial.¹⁷³ On the other hand, "within the bounds of labor, a special place is occupied by agriculture and the cultivation of the soil, which leads to growth and to the uncovering of the abundant treasures hidden in the land, awaiting the hands of the industrious person. Furthermore, agriculture is one of the ways in which man cleaves to God and emulates Him."¹⁷⁴ Commenting on the much-criticized Jewish involvement in mercantile dealings, he said: "It is not our fault that we are tradesmen and peddlers, and not farmers and industry workers. We did not choose this occupation nor did we want it.... We were constrained to become tradesmen and peddlers."¹⁷⁵ In 1919, when R. Uziel summed up the pioneers' settlement project, he emphasized that their efforts marked the beginning of the redemption of the land. The redemption of the Jews, however, will take place when Torah and labor will blend harmoniously.¹⁷⁶ In contrast to R. A.I.H. Kook, R. Uziel is not ambivalent about the secular pioneers.¹⁷⁷ In his eyes, they are the builders of the country.¹⁷⁸ Their readiness to make tremendous sacrifices springs from their faith in the redemption of Eretz Yisrael and from their love for the people of Israel and the Land of Israel.¹⁷⁹ The rebuilding of the country by the pioneering enterprise restores the national dignity of the Jewish people.¹⁸⁰ R. Uziel considered Jewish labor highly valuable and believed it should be promoted even at the cost of raising the wages of the Jewish laborer.¹⁸¹

3. *Yishuv Eretz Yisrael*: In R. Uziel's eyes, the Land of Israel must be reclaimed mainly through agricultural settlement. The Jewish people cannot be redeemed without redeeming its land: "The people and the land form one single, inseparable body, like the flame that blazes in the embers."¹⁸² R. Uziel's approval of the pioneers' endeavors derives from the traditional views concerning the centrality of the Land of Israel, in particular those of R. Judah Halevi and Nachmanides. The Land of Israel is not a homeland in the ordinary sense of the word. Rather, it is the birthplace of the Jewish soul. Eretz Yisrael has always been the central point toward which the whole nation gravitated and the deep attachment to the Land of Israel is what sustained the Jewish people in the exile.¹⁸³ The inheritance of the land entails the obligation to make it a source of livelihood for all Jews.¹⁸⁴ Following the Balfour

Declaration, R. Uziel was convinced that the Land of Israel would be conquered “not by the sword and the spear...but by virtue of our rightful claim and our just labor. With the donations of the people we shall purchase our land, and through work we shall make it blossom.”¹⁸⁵ He spoke in different terms after experiencing the Arab riots and the War of Independence. For him, the defeat of the Arabs and the termination of the British Mandate were the miraculous fulfillment of the prophecy that the Land of Israel would disgorge those who defile it.¹⁸⁶ He also praised the pioneers for their devotion to the land and their efforts to cultivate it and defend it.¹⁸⁷

The importance of *yishuv Erez Yisrael*, as it is reflected in the pioneering experience, finds its expression also in R. Uziel’s *halakhic* rulings. He approved of the use of grafted citrons (those grown in Israel) during the festival of Succot in conformity with the commandment of *yishuv Erez Yisrael* and in support of the pioneers. As he explained,

The *halakhah* does not give priority to the fruits of the Land of Israel. However, because of *hibbat ha-aretz*, “the love of the Land of Israel,” and because of the religious commandment to settle the land, it is a *mitzvah* to glorify the citrons grown in the Land of Israel. For in this way we lend support to those laboring to settle the land.¹⁸⁸

Similarly, he permitted—under certain conditions—milking cows on the Sabbath in order to relieve the suffering of the beasts and to spare the settlers’ families unnecessary loss of money:

The dairy branch in our country is one of the foundations of the farm, with hundreds, and perhaps even thousands, of families earning a living or supplementing their income through it. Banning the milking of the cows on the Sabbath would cause them great suffering, by loss of milk and sometimes even the death of the milch cows. This may lead to the ruin of whole families whose only source of livelihood is the dairy farm, as well as to the destruction of those settlements that depend on the dairy farm for their survival.¹⁸⁹

This responsum also suggests the connection between R. Uziel’s religious-Zionist ideology and his *halakhic* rulings.¹⁹⁰

4. *The attitude toward the Arabs*: The connection between nationality and universality in R. Uziel’s national humanistic thought is reflected in his consistent position on the Arab problem. Throughout his life, R. Uziel was opposed to harming the

innocent. He regarded the Zionist enterprise as moral in its ambition to return the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, provided that it does not dispossess the Arabs and impinge on their rights.

As we have seen, the unitary-universalistic premise underlying R. Uziel's thought leads him to introduce peace as a major value. In his opinion, striving for peace must take place even during war. For the Torah says (Deut. 20:10): "When you come near to a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace to it." He then concludes as follows:

If in time of war we are ordered to proclaim peace and behave kindly, all the more so in time of peace. For then it is our obligation to seek peace, and follow the ways of peace and love, applying them to every man created in the image of God.¹⁹¹

In 1919, R. Uziel addressed the assembly of the rabbis of Eretz Yisrael, calling for true peace with the Arabs. "Israel, the people of peace," he said in his opening speech, "has never wanted to profit from the destruction of others and never will."¹⁹² He said similar things in his radio address in honor of his installation as the Chief Rabbi of the Land of Israel (1939). While conceding that the development of the Land of Israel through the Zionist settlement was an indication that the land belongs to the Jewish people, he made a special appeal to the Arab population as follows: "We sincerely stretch our hand to you in peace and say: the land is spread out before us, and we shall work it with joined hands. We shall cultivate it, we shall uncover its treasures, and we shall dwell in it as brothers together."¹⁹³

The acceleration of the national struggle between the years 1919 and 1939 had no effect on R. Uziel's stance. Invoking the absolute prohibition, "Thou shalt not kill," R. Uziel, just like R. Amiel, strongly opposed the retaliatory actions of the Jewish underground organizations against the innocent. In July 1938, R. Uziel attended the convention organized by the national institutions and joined R. Herzog in condemning the hostilities against the Arabs. The Torah, he said, commands us "that innocent blood be not shed in thy land" (Deut. 19:10). This suggests that "one should not kill others with his own hands or cause bloodshed in the Holy Land. For the land is defiled when it absorbs innocent blood, and one should not taint the holy name of the Jewish people and its glory by shedding the blood of the innocent."¹⁹⁴

The appeasing note of R. Uziel's utterances persisted even after the War of Independence and the establishment of the State of Israel. In speaking of the newly founded state, R. Uziel argued

that the character of the political system had to mirror the unique spiritual and moral character of the Jewish people. From this he concluded the following:

Neither we nor our descendents for ever and ever intend to enforce the commandments of the Torah on the peoples inhabiting our country. We shall not discriminate against them nor shall we violate their liberty, offend their religious feelings, or harm their sacred places, whether those of the past or those that will be established in the future. This is not only because we are bound by the terms and conditions imposed on us by the UN Assembly. We shall do so out of our own conviction and according to our moral conscience, which is our ancestral legacy, and on account of the commandment of the Torah, which obliges us to promote love and respect, equality of rights, and religious and national liberty for every nation and every individual that inhabits our country peacefully and loyally.¹⁹⁵

It follows that not only did R. Uziel recognize that the Arabs were entitled to civic equality and political and religious liberty; he also acknowledged their national rights (“their religious and national liberty”) *within the framework* of the State of Israel. R. Uziel did not indicate what specifically he meant by this. On the other hand, his view that the fleeing of the Arabs during the War of Independence was an act of Providence, designed to enable the Jewish people to settle in the Land of Israel, was incompatible with his insistence that the rights of the Arabs must not be violated. The fact that he was oblivious to the depth of the problem does not remove the discrepancy between his national, universalistic vision and the problematic reality.

5. *The role of religious Zionism:* As previously noted, R. Amiel was a harsh critic of the “day of small things” of religious Zionism, as compared to the possibilities of a broad, synthetic doctrine. R. Uziel is not that blatantly critical. He acknowledges the merits of the religious-Zionist enterprise under the leadership of the Mizrahi. On the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the Mizrahi, both R. Amiel and R. Uziel published articles devoted to this occasion. A comparison of their articles illustrates the difference between them. R. Uziel opens his article by solemnly stating: “The month of Adar this year marks the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the federation the Mizrahi...by the *gaon* of Israel, the energetic and enterprising Isaac Jacob Reines, of blessed memory, in whose great wisdom and clear understanding....”¹⁹⁶ In contrast to him, R. Amiel opens his own, adjacent article with characteristic sarcasm: “Almost every five

years the Mizrahi celebrates an anniversary. We recall the twenty-fifth anniversary, the thirtieth anniversary, and the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Mizrahi. The Mizrahi is very fond of anniversaries.¹⁹⁷

In the same address, R. Uziel celebrates R. Rienes' enterprise in two areas: the foundation and management of the yeshivah in Lida and the foundation of the Mizrahi federation. The two areas blend: strengthening the study of Torah goes hand in hand with strengthening the awareness of the national goal. The common denominator is, as usual, the unitary basis: "the concentration and unification of the whole nation into a solid unit, which is the basic nucleus out of which all activities diverge."¹⁹⁸ R. Uziel is pleased with the success of the Mizrahi in contributing to the redemption of the people of Israel and to the settlement in the Land of Israel. He finds the combination of *Torah va-avodah*, "Torah and labor," within the Ha-Po'el ha-Mizrahi particularly commendable.¹⁹⁹ Unlike his colleague, R. Uziel approved of the cooperation between the religious and the secular sectors. He shared R. Reines' view that with respect to joint national activity, the individual's religious beliefs do not matter. Furthermore, Zionist activity began precisely with those who distanced themselves from Judaism. Their enterprise marks the beginning of their repentance. Establishing positive relations with the secular Jews will only strengthen the unity of the nation.²⁰⁰

R. Uziel believed that the Mizrahi had to play a major role in strengthening the spiritual unity of the Jewish nation by promoting the spiritual center in the Land of Israel. In proposing this idea, he was obviously influenced by Ahad Ha-Am, though he pursued the religious-national direction. Redemption requires national unity that revolves around a central point. The essential task of the Mizrahi is not diplomatic work, but rather engaging in the endeavor to unite the nation through language, faith, and the Torah.²⁰¹

R. Uziel believed that the religious center in the Land of Israel, just like the enterprise of Mattityahu the Hasmonean, would thwart the growing assimilatory trends.²⁰² The fear of assimilation is a major factor in his *halakhic* rulings on mixed marriages and the children born into them.²⁰³ His position on this issue is encapsulated in the following statement: "I must admit that I am apprehensive about any Jewish soul that might succumb to assimilation among the gentiles. I feel it is my duty to open a gate of repentance to as many as possible and save them from this danger."²⁰⁴ From the viewpoint of the collective, solidifying the ties between religion and nationality around the spiritual center in the Land of

Israel is the best way to fight against assimilation and to strengthen Jewish unity. This is precisely the task of religious Zionism.

The affinity between religion and nationality is also essential, in his opinion, for maintaining moral standards in the course of the struggle for national redemption. Other nations “wrapped themselves in a mantle of religion to spread the seeds of everlasting hostility and hatred among the nations and cause bloodshed.”²⁰⁵ In contrast, “the Torah of Israel, all of whose paths are ways of peace, calls for peace and love toward its people and toward all those created in the image of God. This task is assigned to the rabbis and they want to perform it faithfully.”²⁰⁶

A religious-Zionist with messianic orientations, R. Uziel believed that in his lifetime the process of redemption was at its height. This position, which is clearly reflected in his statements following the Balfour Declaration, reached its consummation after the establishment of the State of Israel. He perceived the victory in the War of Independence, as well as the ingathering of the exiles, as the clear signs of redemption. It is in precisely this context that one ought to understand his position on the issue of religion and state in general and the renewal of the Sanhedrin in particular. In his view, the separation of religion and state is not possible, “for the foundation of the state is intrinsically intertwined with the renaissance of the Torah.”²⁰⁷ However, the renewal of the Torah is possible only if Jewish law serves as the basis of the emergent state. R. Uziel believes that in order to complete the process of redemption, the Sanhedrin must be reestablished. “In this way,” he declares, “we shall fulfill the purpose of redemption as defined by Isaiah (1:26): ‘I will restore your judges as at the first.’ We shall thus anticipate the final redemption, which will be marked by the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the restoration of the throne of the house of David. May it happen soon, in our days, Amen.”²⁰⁸

In order to understand R. Uziel’s outlook on reinstating the Jewish law as the basis of the Israeli legal system, we must bear in mind several crucial points. Firstly, for R. Uziel the Torah is *torat hayyim*, a teaching that addresses all aspects of social and national life. Secondly, he believes that in facing the many questions of life, we must adopt a broad perspective. This will enable us, by inferring one thing from the other, to find “a just solution and a straight way in all our paths in life—in our personal life, family life, and national life, in our social and political life, and in the life of the social person in his relations with the creation and cosmic existence....By using our freedom of choice, under-

standing, and judgment, we must seek a straight and sound bridge through which to pass...for our own good and for the good of humanity as a whole."²⁰⁹ In order to pursue the straight way in life, one must recognize that "it is not in heaven" (Deut. 30:12). This biblical verse, which serves as a validation of the Oral Law (*Baba Mezi'a* 59b, s.v. *Tanuro shel Aakhnai*), is interpreted by R. Uziel as suggesting that the Torah finds its expression in *yishuvo shel olam*, in civilizing this world. This task requires broad scientific knowledge, profound understanding of the social, political, and judicial systems, and knowledge of the ways of God, whose purpose is to bring unity and peace.²¹⁰ Such versatility is especially vital for the religious judges. The *posek* must not only excel in the knowledge of Torah and display personal virtues; he must also possess a broad scientific knowledge and exercise judicial openness. He ought to understand that the Torah is a dynamic teaching of life and that its supreme goal is to strengthen national unity.²¹¹

R. Uziel presents a philosophy of *halakhah* and jurisprudence according to which the decider must make his judgments from a broad social, national, and universal perspective. Comprehensive knowledge of the conditions of life in all their depth and profound understanding of life in its fullness are indispensable when the decider cannot say, "Let's bring a book and look this up."²¹² The fear of certain rabbinical authorities to introduce *halakhic* innovation distances them from the source of life. A decider needs to apply broad-mindedness and sober judgment.²¹³ Indeed, as a *halakhist*, R. Uziel acted according to the criteria he demanded others apply. However, in his opinion only the restoration of the Sanhedrin would make it possible to exercise *halakhic* openness whose legitimacy is broadly accepted. This is the only way to strengthen national unity in Israel through the *halakhah*. The founding of the Sanhedrin should be the jewel in the crown of the religious-Zionist enterprise.

Concluding Remarks

A comparative analysis of the sociopolitical thought of R. Amiel and R. Uziel can help us make some general statements about religious-Zionist thought in the first half of the twentieth century. These focus on four major aspects: (1) Orthodoxy and modernity; (2) the attitude toward secularization and secular Jews; (3) democratic stands; (4) religious Zionism and Messianism.

1. *Orthodoxy and Modernity*: R. Amiel and R. Uziel, just like other religious-Zionist thinkers, introduced a “new midrash” of the traditional sources *in light of* modern trends of thought. All the same, they were well aware that the reality they faced was part of a multitude of worlds.²¹⁴ The extent to which their interpretation was innovative seems to suggest how deep was the gap between the worlds. R. Uziel felt free to integrate the medieval concepts of Maimonides, Nachmanides, R. Judah Halevi, and the Kabbalah with modern nationalistic and democratic notions. In contrast to him, R. Amiel *interpreted* the traditional sources in terms of the new Western spirit, which he ostensibly dismissed. Aviezer Ravitzky lists various modes of reaction to the encounter between Orthodoxy and modernity. They are: *coexistence* (R. S.R. Hirsch); *harmony* (R. Kook); *synthesis* (the religious kibbutz); *dialectics* (R. Soloveitchik); and *neutralizing* one of the components (Leibowitz). The responses of R. Amiel and R. Uziel seem to be within this range, but they are difficult to pinpoint. Indeed, reality proves to be much more complex than this schema. The same applies to Liebman’s model. While it is true that R. Amiel was more inclined to expand the meaning of the sacred texts, in practice he attempted to accommodate traditional Jewish values to the modern spirit. As for R. Uziel, although he deliberately modified traditional Jewish notions in light of modern concepts (such as those of Ahad Ha-Am), he also produced a new midrash that expands traditional *halakhic* notions. It is also noteworthy that most of the rabbis associated with religious Zionism display a dual approach. They tend to adopt modern ideas in their philosophical thought, but in the sphere of *halakhic* ruling they are reluctant to introduce broad innovations (R. Kook stands for the position of the majority, whereas R. Hirschensohn is representative of the minority). Thus, the “new midrash” is mainly, but not exclusively, theological-political. R. Amiel’s position seems to confirm these general conclusions. As for R. Uziel, things are not that simple. His innovative approach has more to do with his *halakhic* ruling than with his philosophical teaching, which is dominated by Jewish medieval currents of thought.

2. *The Attitude toward Secularization and the Secular Jews*: A remarkable feature of religious Zionism is its tendency to disregard, or underestimate, the autonomous existence of secular Jews.²¹⁵ It is against this background that one should view the attitude toward the secular Zionists as penitents who have “returned” to their people and eventually are bound to “return” to their religion as well. In the first half of this century, two outstanding religious-Zionist rabbis took this approach: R. Reines and R. Kook.

Similarly, it emerges from the teaching of R. Uziel. This is not true of R. Amiel. A strong opponent of secular Zionism, he was well aware of its power. His ultra-Orthodox bent and his willingness to cooperate with Agudat Yisrael were motivated by this sharp awareness. In current reality, quite a large number of those who belong to the national ultra-Orthodox faction are of the same conviction.

3. *Democratic Stands*: The teachings of R. Amiel and R. Uziel suggest the democratic possibilities that were open to religious Zionism in the spheres of equality of civic rights, the attitude toward minorities, and universalistic orientations. However, these possibilities were hardly put into practice by religious Zionism. Thus it emerges that in spite of the leading position of R. Amiel and R. Uziel in the religious-Zionist camp, they had no impact on its practical program. It is true there were others who strove toward similar goals, such as R. Hirschensohn, or thinkers with no formal *halakhic* qualifications, such as Eliezer Goldman and Eliezer Berkowitz (Leibowitz is problematic). Yet these personalities are not comparable with R. Uziel and R. Amiel, who were major rabbis in the religious-Zionist world and who were held in high esteem in this camp during their lifetimes.

4. *Religious Zionism and Messianism*: In the research literature, it is customary to distinguish between two types of religious-Zionists: the messianic current (*mevasrei Ziyyon*, R. Kook) and the pragmatic strand (R. Reines and R. Soloveitchik).²¹⁶ R. Uziel clearly belongs to the messianic current, but his messianism is different in many respects from messianism in its more conventional forms. He tends toward the kind of realistic and universalistic messianism that is advocated by Maimonides at the end of *Hilkhot Melakhim*. As for R. Amiel, it is difficult to pinpoint his thought on this matter. He did not relate to religious Zionism in terms of messianic redemption. Nevertheless, he believed that religious Zionism must lead to the fulfillment of the individualistic-universalistic vision of Judaism, which carries a distinct messianic message.

The foregoing inductive analysis seems to suggest that the dichotomous typology poses some real difficulties.

Notes

1. See, for example: Eliezer Don Yihye, "Tefisot shel ha-Ziyyonut ba-Hagut ha-Yehudit ha-Ortodoksit" [Zionist outlooks in Jewish Or-

- thodox Thought], *Ha-Ziyyonut* 9 (1984): 55-93; Aviezer Ravitzky, *Ha-Kez ha-Meguleh u-Medinat Ha-Yehudim* [Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Radicalism] (Tel Aviv, 1993); Dov Schwartz, *Emunah al Parashat Derakhim: Bein Ra'ayon le-Ma'aseh ba-Ziyyonut ha-Datit* [The Theology of the Religious Zionist Movement] (Tel Aviv, 1996).
2. On Rabbi Amiel see, for example, Geulah Bat-Yehuda, "Moshe Avigdor Amiel," in Y. Raphael (ed.), *Enziklopediya shel ha-Ziyyonut ha-Datit* [Encyclopedia of Religious Zionism] (Jerusalem, 1972), vol. 4, pp. 189-98; Rabbi K. P. Techorash, *Mishnat ha-Rav Amiel ba-Halakhah u-ba-Aggadah*, intro. by Y. Raphael (Jerusalem, 1943); *idem.*, *Mishnat ha-Rav Amiel ba-Mahshavah u-ba-Yahadut* (Tel Aviv, 1942). For a more scholarly analysis of various issues that come up in R. Amiel's teaching, see Don Yihye and Schwartz (*supra*, note 1). On R. Amiel's ultra-Orthodox worldview, see Zvi Zohar, "Al Basis ha-Yahadut ha-Toranit ha-Shleimah: Pulmuso shel ha-Rav Amiel neged ha-Haskalah, ha-Hiloniyyut, ha-Le'umiyyut, ha-Mizrahi ve-ha-Aggudah" in Nahem Ilan (ed.), *A Good Eye—A Jubilee Book in honor of Tova Ilan*, (Tel-Aviv, 1999) pp. 313-348. On R. Uziel's outlooks and activities, see Geulah Bat-Yehudah, "Rabbi Uziel," *Encyclopedia of Religious Zionism* (see *supra*, note 2), pp. 171-84; Shabtai Don Yihye, *Ha-Rav Ben-Zion Hai Uziel, Hayyav u-Mishnato* (Jerusalem, 1955); R. Hayyim David Ha-Levi, *Toldotav u-Mif'alo ha-Sifrutit shel Maran ha-Rav Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel* (Jerusalem, 1979). The scholarly research on Rabbi Uziel has recently accelerated. The following articles explore various areas of his activity and thought: R. Hayyim David Ha-Levi, "Pesikat Halakhah ve-Ahavat Yisrael be-Mishnat ha-Gaon Maran ha-Rav B. Z. Uziel," *Niv ha-Midrashiyyah* 20-21 (1988/89): 55-69; Yaakov Ha-Dani, "Ha-Rav Ben-Zion Uziel ke-Manhig Medini (Jaffa, 1912-1939)," in *ibid.*: 239-68; Shalom Ratzabi, "Ziyyonut, Yahadut, ve-Eretz Yisrael be-Haguto shel ha-Rishon le-Ziyyon, Ha-Rav Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel," *Pe'amim* 73 (Autumn, 1998): 60-83; Zvi Zohar, "Ahrayut ha-Knesset le-Izzuv ha-Halakhah—Iyyun be-Ma'amaro shel ha-Rav Uziel 'Be-Hagdarat Pesulei Eudt'," in Menachem Moutner, Avi Sagi, and Ronen Shamir (eds.), *Rav-Tarbutiyyut bi-Medinah Demokratit vi-Yehudit* [Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State]. The Ariel Rozen-Zvi Memorial Book (Tel Aviv, 1998), pp. 309-29; Marc D. Angel, "The Grand Religious View of Rabbi Ben-Zion Uziel," *Tradition* 30:1 (1995): 38-48. I am indebted to Zvi Zohar for our conversations on this matter.
 3. Rabbi Amiel's first systematic *halakhic* work is *Darkhei Moshe*, parts 1, 2 (Warsaw, 1931), which contains a programmatic and systematic essay entitled "Darkah shel Torah." His great, unprecedented work on *halakhic* thinking is *Ha-Midot le-Heiker ha-Halakhah*, parts 1, 2 (1939; reprinted Jerusalem, 1972, 1973), whose introduction, "Mavo le-Heiker ha-Halakhah," is a work in

- itself. R. Amiel pursues the directions taken by the Telz rabbis in such classic works as *Shi'urei Halakhah* and *Shi'urei Da'at* by R. Joseph Leib Bloch and *Sharei Yashar* by R. Simeon Shkop. Various concepts applied by R. Amiel form part of R. Reines' world. See, for example, Isaac Jacob Reines, *Sefer ha-Arakhim* (New York, 1926) and *Hotam Tokhnit* (Jerusalem, 1934).
4. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah: Pirkei Histaklut be-Mahut ha-Yahadut* (Jerusalem, 1943; reprinted New York, 1980), p. 12.
 5. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, p. 12.
 6. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, *Hegyonot el Ammi*, (Jerusalem, 1936), part 1, p. 31. See Schwartz, *Emunah al Parashat Derakhim*, chapter 2.
 7. On the negation of being in Hasidic teaching, see Rivkah Schatz-Oppenheimer, *Ha-Hasidut ke-Mistikah* (Jerusalem, 1988); Yoram Jacobson, *Torata shel ha-Hasidut* (Tel Aviv, 1985). Schwartz, *Emunah al Parashat Derakhim* stresses the acosmic tendencies in R. Amiel's teaching (p. 81, note 4). In my opinion, acosmism is not a major component in R. Amiel's thought, for he places the individual and his or her ability at the center of human existence.
 8. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 1 (Warsaw, 1926), pp. 177-78.
 9. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, p. 71.
 10. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 3, pp. 186-87.
 11. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, pp. 216-17.
 12. Amiel, *Hegyonot el Ammi*, part 1, p. 26.
 13. On this point see Jack Crittenden, *Beyond Individualism* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
 14. Charles Liebman, "Hitpathut ha-Neo-Masortiyut be-Kerev Yehudim Ortodoksiyyim be-Yisrael," *Megamot* 27 (1984): 229-50, and many other studies.
 15. Moshe Sokol, "How do Modern Jewish Thinkers interpret Religious Texts," *Modern Judaism* 13, 1 (1993): 42-43. Rabbi So-loveitchik serves as a representative example of a modern Orthodox expounder. See Pinhas Peli, "Ha-Derush be-Hagut ha-Rav So-loveitchik: Metodah o-Mahut?" *Da'at* 4 (Winter 1980): 111-28.
 16. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 3, pp. 179-80.
 17. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 2, p. 211.
 18. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, p. 51.
 19. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 3, p. 208.
 20. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, pp. 189-95.
 21. Amiel, *Hegyonot el Ammi*, part 1, pp. 176-77.
 22. *Ibid.*, pp. 177-78.
 23. Rabbi Uziel's major philosophical work is *Hegyonei Uziel*, in two parts (reprinted Jerusalem, 1993). His major essay on Maimonides is entitled "Ha-Posek be-Yisrael." See Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel* (Tel Aviv, 1939), pp. 378-91. In the beginning of *Hegyonei Uziel*, the author says the following about the Kabbalah: "Truly, I must confess that I have not studied this hidden

- wisdom and have no knowledge of it. In fact, this hidden wisdom is not to be communicated in public, but only from a master to his disciple, by whispering" (*Hegyonei Uziel*, introduction, no page numbers). Some take this statement literally. Shalom Ratzabi argues that R. Uziel, as a rationalist who was strongly influenced by Maimonides, deliberately tried to avoid basing his religious and national worldview on the Kabbalah. See Ratzabi (*supra*, note 2), p. 66. The reality, however, is completely different. This matter requires a separate discussion.
24. On Rav Kook's unitary, organic conception, see Nahum Arieli, "Integrazia be-Haguto shel ha-Rav Kook: Behinot be-Gishato ha-Ma'asit la-Hevrah ve-la-Tarbut," in Binyamin Ish Shalom and Shalom Rosenberg (eds.), *Yovel Orot* (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 129-52.
 25. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, pp. 186-87.
 26. The issue of how kabbalistic concepts are related to contents originating from other sources emerges even in the context of the teachings of R. Soloveitchik. See, in particular, Lawrence Kaplan, "Motivim Kabbalyim be-Haguto shel ha-Rav Soloveitchik: Mashma'utiyyim o-Itturiyyim," in Avi Sagi (ed.), *Emunah bi-Zemanim Mishtanim: Al Mishnato shel ha-Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik* (Jerusalem, 1997), pp. 75-93. See also Rivkah Horowitz's paper, in *ibid.*, pp. 45-74.
 27. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 1, p. 199.
 28. *Mikhmannei Uziel*, pp. 189-90.
 29. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-86.
 30. *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, p. 93.
 31. *Ibid.*, part 2, p. 94.
 32. *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, p. 33.
 33. R. Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel, "Din u-Mishpat," *Sinai* 17 (1945): 107-12.
 34. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, pp. 141-42.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
 36. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, p. 93.
 37. On the closeness between the liberal democrats and the social democrats, see Bernard Susser, *Political Ideology in the Modern World* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995), ch. 4. On the combination of socialism and nationalism in Zionism, see Eliezer Schweid, *Jewish Thought in the Twentieth Century* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), ch. 4.
 38. R. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, "Ha-Zedek ha-Soziali ve-ha-Zedek ha-Mishpati ve-ha-Musari Shelano," in R. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, R. Zalman Barukh Rabinkov, and Rabbi Dr. Eliyyahu Yung, *Bein Adam la-Havero: Masekhet Yahasei Enosh ba-Yahadut* (Jerusalem, 1985), p. 36.
 39. On the various democratic approaches see David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). On the distinction between democracy and liberalism see Giovanni Sartori,

- The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (New York: Chatham House, 1987).
40. Amiel, *Ha-Zedek ha-Soziali*, pp. 37-38.
 41. Benedictus de Spinoza, *Theological-Political Treatise* (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1998), chs. 17, 18. For Leibowitz's position see, e.g., Yeshayahu Leibowitz, *Sihot al Pirkei Avot ve-al ha-Rambam* (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1979), chs. 7-8.
 42. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 2, p. 174. On the contribution of Jews to the notion of liberty, see Michael Walzer, *Exodus and Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
 43. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 3, p. 159.
 44. Amiel, *Ha-Zedek ha-Soziali*, p. 51.
 45. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 2, p. 173.
 46. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, p. 240.
 47. Amiel, *Ha-Zedek ha-Soziali*, pp. 51-52.
 48. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37 (emphasis mine-M.H.).
 49. On the problematic connection between liberty and equality in modern democracy see Sartori (*supra*, note 39), chs. 12, 13. On the complex relationship between democracy and equality, see also Frank Bealey, *Democracy in the Contemporary World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), ch. 5.
 50. Charles S. Liebman, "Attitudes toward Democracy among Israeli Religious Leaders," in Edy Kaufman, Shekri B. Abed and Robert L. Rothstein (eds.), *Democracy, Peace and the Israel-Palestinians Conflict* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reiner, 1993), pp. 137-44.
 51. On this point, see Ernst Simon, "The Neighbour (*Rea*) Whom We Should Love," in Marvin Fox (ed.), *Modern Jewish Ethics* (Ohio: State University Press, 1975), pp. 29-56.
 52. Amiel, *Hegyonot el Ammi*, part 1, p. 240.
 53. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, pp. 113-14.
 54. *Ibid.*
 55. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, pp. 264-65.
 56. Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
 57. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 1, pp. 84-85.
 58. Uziel, *Mikhmannei*, p. 367.
 59. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, p. 114.
 60. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, p. 422.
 61. *Ibid.*
 62. R. Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel, *Yesodot din Malkhut be-Yisrael u-ba-Ammim*, in R. Sha'ul Yisraeli (ed.), *Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah*, nos. 5-6 (1953/54), p. 16. On the various approaches to *dina demalkhuta* and their relation to popular consent, see Shemuel Shilo, *Dina de-Malkhuta Dina* (Jerusalem, 1975), ch. 4.
 63. On communal regulations see Menahem Elon, *Ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri—Toldotav, Mekorotav, Ekronotav* (Jerusalem, 1973), vol. 2, p. 19. On the implications of the medieval communal world for our own

- days see *idem.*, "Samkhut ve-Otzmah ba-Kehilah ha-Yehudit," in Daniel Elazar (ed.), *Am ve-Edah* (Jerusalem, 1984), pp. 220-35.
64. On this point, see M. Elon (*supra*, note 63), p. 500ff. See also Yaakov Blidstein, "Yahid ve-Rabbim be-Hilkhot Zibbur bi-Yemei ha-Beinayyim," in *Am ve-Edah* (*supra*, note 63), pp. 246-73.
 65. Uziel, *Yesodot Din ha-Malkhut*, p. 17.
 66. Zvi Zohar, *Masoret u-Temurah: Hitmodedut Hakhmei Yisrael be-Mizrayim u-be-Suriah im Etgarei ha-Modernizaziah 1880-1920* (Jerusalem, 1993). See the comparison he draws between the rabbis in Egypt and Syria and their approach to modernity. See also *idem.*, "Traditional Flexibility and Modern Strictness: Two Halakhic Positions on Women's Suffrage," in Harvey E. Goldberg (ed.), *Sephardi and Middle Eastern Jewries: History and Culture in the Modern Era* (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 119-33. See particularly pp. 129-31.
 67. R. Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel, *Mishpetei Uziel*, part 1: Orah Hayyim and Yore De'a (Tel Aviv, 1935), Introduction.
 68. For Rabbi Uziel's position on those disqualified to testify, along with its implications for the status of the Knesset, see Z. Zohar (*supra*, note 2).
 69. R. Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel, *Piskei Uziel bi-She'elot ha-Zeman* (Jerusalem, 1977), nos. 41, 42.
 70. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, p. 437.
 71. Regarding this issue see Menahem Friedman, *Hevrah ve-Dat: Ha-Ortodoksiah ha-Lo Ziyyonit be-Eretz Yisrael* (Jerusalem, 1978), chs. 6, 7. On the discrepancy between the positions of the Sephardic and Ashkenazi rabbis with respect to this issue see Hayyim Avraham, *Hanhagat ha-Sefaradim bi-Yerushalayim ve-Yahaseihah im ha-Mosadot ha-Merkaziyyim shel ha-Yishuv bi-Tekufat ha-Shilton ha-Beriti 1918-1948* (Tel Aviv University: Ph.D. dissertation, 1984), ch. 3. For a comparative analysis of the respective positions of Rav Kook and Rabbi Uziel, see Zohar, *Masoret u-Temurah*
 72. Uziel, *Piskei Uziel*, p. 229.
 73. *Ibid.*, pp. 230-34.
 74. *Ibid.*, no. 43.
 75. There is extensive literature on modern nationalism. For two known scholars of opposite schools of thought, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Antony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (New York: Blackwell, 1986). For the recent combination of liberal democracy and nationalism, with an emphasis on multicultural tendencies, see Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Will Kimlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995). On Mazzini's humanistic nationalism, see Yaakov Talmon, *Ha-Meshihiyyut ha-Mediti* (Tel Aviv, 1965), vol. 2, ch. 3. On the relationship between psychological, spiritual, and intellectual motivations and the nationalistic directions in European

- thought, see Isaiah Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity* (London: Murray, 1990), esp. pp. 223-45. On two types of nationalism in Europe see Yaakov Talmon, *Ahdut ve-Yihud* (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1965), pp. 19-58.
76. On the relationship between individualism and universalism in the liberal world see D.J. Mannig, *Liberalism* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1973); Anthony H. Birch, *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy* (London: Routledge, 1993), chs. 7, 8.
 77. Amiel, *Hegyonot el Ammi*, part 2, p. 26.
 78. Amiel, *Hegyonot el Ammi*, p. 27.
 79. Amiel, *Ha-Zedek ha-Soziali*, p. 70.
 80. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 2, p. 39.
 81. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
 82. Amiel, *Ha-Zedek ha-Soziali*, p. 71.
 83. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.
 84. R. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, *Ha-Yesodot ha-Idiologiyyim shel ha-Mizrahi* (Warsaw, 1934), p. 18. This highly important programmatic lecture was delivered by R. Amiel at the Mizrahi World Convention in Cracow, in the month of Av, 1933. A detailed, overly critical analysis of this lecture appears in Zvi Zohar, "Al Besis ha-Yahadut ha-Toranit" (*supra*, note 2).
 85. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 2, p. 36.
 86. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, p. 243.
 87. R. Nachman Krochmal, *Moreh Nevukhei ha-Zeman* [Guide of the Perplexed of the Time], Leopold (Yom Tov Lippmann) Zunz (ed.), in *Kitvei Rabbi Nachman Krochmal*, S. Rabinowitz (ed.), (Berlin, 1924), p. 34. On Krochmal's system see Rabinowitz's introduction, *ibid.*, pp. 17-238, esp. pp. 99-125. See also Eliezer Schweid, *Toledot he-Hagut ha-Yehudit ba-Eit ha-Hadashah*, (Jerusalem, 1978), ch. 5; Nathan Rotenstreich, *Ha-Mahshavah ha-Yehudit ba-Eit ha-Hadashah*, (Tel Aviv, 1987), vol. 1, pp. 52-70. On the transition from Krochmal's notion of the metaphysical "spirit of the nation" to the new directions in Zionism, see p. 222ff. On the relationship between Krochmal's national teaching and that of Ahad Ha-Am, see Yehiel Alfred Gotchlak, *Ahad Ha-Am ve-ha-Ru'ah ha-Le'umi* (Jerusalem, 1992), chs. 5, 6.
 88. Krochmal, *Moreh Nevukhei ha-Zeman*, pp. 34-35.
 89. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38, 40-41. A detailed historical review of the historical processes governing the Jewish people is found in sections 8-10.
 90. Ahad Ha-Am has never managed to write the systematic work he envisioned on Jewish national morality. His main ideas on nationalism and on the uniqueness of the Jewish people are to be found in the following essays of *Al Parashat Derakhim* (Berlin, 1921), parts 1-4: "Heshbon ha-Nefesh," "Job and Prometheus," "Ha-Adam ba-Ohel," "Hikkui ve-Hitbolelut," "Ha-Musar ha-Le'ummi," "Kohen ve-Navi," "Shinnui ha-Arakhim," "Basar va-Ru'ah," and "Al Shte ha-Se'ipim." On his national teaching, see Aryeh Simon and Yo-

- seph Eliyyahu Heller, *Ahad Ha-Am: Ha-ish, Po'alo ve-Torato* (Jerusalem, 1956), chs. 2-4; Gotshlak, *Ahad Ha-Am ve-ha-Ru'ah ha-Le'umi*, chs. 3, 6, 7. On his life and career, see Simon and Heller, *Ahad Ha-Am*, part 1; Steven Zipperstein, *Elusive Prophet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
91. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 1, p. 295.
 92. *Ahad Ha-Am*, "Avdut be-Tokh Herut," in *Al Parashat Derakhim*, part 1.
 93. *Ibid.*, the last lines of the essay.
 94. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, p. 296.
 95. *Ibid.*, p. 297.
 96. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, p. 9.
 97. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 1, p. 299.
 98. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, p. 286.
 99. R. Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel, *Derashot Uziel al Masekhet Avot* (Jerusalem, 1998), pp. 15-18.
 100. Uziel, *Michmannei Uziel*, p. 293.
 101. *Ibid.*, pp. 293-305.
 102. *Ibid.*, p. 422.
 103. *Ibid.*, pp. 292-305.
 104. *Ibid.*, pp. 490-91.
 105. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, pp. 121-22.
 106. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
 107. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-24.
 108. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-27.
 109. Uziel, *Michmannei Uziel*, pp. 286-87.
 110. Uziel, *Piskei Uziel*, p. 178.
 111. See Susser (*supra*, note 37), ch. 4.
 112. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, pp. 94-95.
 113. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.
 114. Amiel, *Ha-Zedek ha-Soziali*, pp. 56-58.
 115. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-69.
 116. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 3, pp. 100-101.
 117. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
 118. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
 119. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.
 120. Amiel, *Hegyonot el Ammi*, part 2, p. 79.
 121. Amiel, *Ha-Zedek ha-Soziali*, pp. 62-65.
 122. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29, 77.
 123. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-76.
 124. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
 125. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
 126. *Ibid.*, p. 77, and Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 1, pp. 164-65.
 127. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973, 1990). Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
 128. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, p. 38
 129. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 1, p. 206.

130. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, p. 141.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
132. *Ibid.*, pp. 226-27.
133. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, p. 37.
134. Uziel, *Piskei Uziel*, no. 46, p. 250.
135. *Ibid.*, p. 249.
136. *Ibid.*, pp. 252-53.
137. *Ibid.*, no. 47, 48.
138. Christerson M. Reo, *Ideologies and Modern Politics* (London: Nelson, 1972).
139. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, pp. 270-71.
140. Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 3, pp. 96, 94.
141. Amiel, *Ha-Yesodot ha-Ideologyyim*, pp. 20-22.
142. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, p. 273; Amiel, *Derashot el Ammi*, part 3, p. 89.
143. The connection between the Protestant spirit and the modern world is acknowledged by the sociologists of religion following Max Weber. On the relationship between modernity and secularization, see Peter L. Berger, *Facing up to Modernity* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chs. 6, 14. On the various directions along which religious thinkers come to grips with the modern spirit see, *idem.*, *The Heretical Imperative* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1970).
144. Moshe Avidgor Amiel, "Tehiyat ha-Torah," *Hamizrahi*, No. 23 (28 May 1919), p. 6. Apparently, the allusion to "the ass that carries books" conveys a stronger criticism than Ahad Ha-Am's in his protest against the petrification of Judaism. The connection to Ahad Ha-Am is quite clear. Ahad Ha-Am ("Torah she-ba-Lev," in *Al Parashat Derakhim*, part 1), speaks of the need to resuscitate the heart of the Jewish people in order for Israel to become once again "the people of the book." Despite the differences between R. Amiel's notion of the "restoration of the Torah" and Ahad Ha-Am's notion of the "resuscitation of the heart," one can detect modern, Zionist directions in R. Amiel's statement.
145. Moshe Avidgor Amiel, "Ha-'Mizrahi' ve-ha-'Agudah,'" *Hamizrahi* No. 25 (11 June 1919), p. 5.
146. Moshe Avidgor Amiel, "Ha-Galut ve-ha-Ge'ulah," a series of essays, *Hamizrahi*, nos. 47, 49, 50, 54 (1920).
147. The emphasis on the importance of a "national center" for liberating Judaism from the exilic world originates, more than anything, in Ahad Ha-Am's spiritual Zionism. This influence stands out in the way R. Amiel tackles the problem of "imitation out of self-disparagement." See especially "Avdut be-Tokh Herut" and "Hik-kui ve-Hitbolelut" (Ahad Ha-Am, *Al Parashat Derakhim*, part 1).
148. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, p. 283.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 286.
150. *Ibid.*, p. 282. Here, as in other issues, there is a close proximity between R. Amiel, the sharp critic of Zionism from within the religious Zionist camp, and Isaac Breuer, the anti-Zionist "Zionist,"

- who was R. Hirsch's grandson and the prominent ideologue of Agudat Yisrael. See Isaac Breuer, *Ziyyunei Derekh* (Tel Aviv, 1956); *idem.*, *Moriyyah: Yesodot ha-Hinukh ha-Le'umi ha-Torati* (Jerusalem, 1955). On Breuer, see Rivkah Horowitz (ed.), *Yitzhak Breuer: Iyyunim be-Mishnato* (Ramat-Gan, 1988).
151. Amiel, *Ha-Yesodot ha-Ideologiyyim*, p. 18.
 152. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
 153. Amiel, *Li-Nevukhei ha-Tekufah*, pp. 287-92.
 154. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, "Ha-'Me'ora'ot' ve-ha-'Havlagah,'" *Ha-zofeh*, 21 July 1938, p. 3.
 155. Maimonides, *Hilkhot Sanhedrin*, ch. 12:3. (italics mine—M.H).
 156. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, "Od al ha-Me'oraot ve-ha-Havlagah," *Ha-zofeh*, 27 July 1938. On this point see Eliezer Don Yihye, "Dat ve-Terror Politi, Ha-Yahadut ha-Datit u-Pe'ulot ha-Tagmul bi-Tekufat ha-Me'ora'ot," *Ha-Ziyyonut*, 17 (1923): 155-90. On the cited saying, see Ephraim E. Urbach, *Me'Olamam shel Hakhamim* (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 561-79.
 157. R. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, "Mah Anu?" *Ha-Tor*, no. 15 (14 September 1932), pp. 3-4.
 158. R. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, *Ha-Be'ayot ha-Ruhaniyyot she-ba-Ziyyonut: Le-Beirur ha-Mazav ha-Ruhani ba-Aretz* (Tel Aviv, 1937), p. 26.
 159. In our days, there is renewed interest in reviving the thinking of Ahad Ha-Am on the relationship between Israel and the diaspora and on Jewish identity. Eliezer Schweid is the leading thinker who follows this direction. See his work, *Ha-Ziyyonut she-Aharei ha-Ziyyonut* (Jerusalem, 1996), pp. 198-213.
 160. Amiel, *Ha-Be'ayot ha-Ruhaniyyot*, chaps. 9-10.
 161. R. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, "Ha-Ziyyonut ve-ha-Yahadut," parts 1, 2, *Hamizrahi*, nos. 29, 31 (July 1919).
 162. Amiel, *Ha-Be'ayot ha-Ruhaniyyot*, pp. 22, 24.
 163. Amiel, "Ha-Galut ve-ha-Ge'ulah."
 164. Amiel, "Ha-Galut ve-ha-Ge'ulah," pp. 46-47.
 165. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, pp. 4-5.
 166. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.
 167. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
 168. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
 169. *Ibid.*, p. 351.
 170. Uziel, *Piskei Uziel*, no. 1.
 171. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, p. 456.
 172. *Ibid.*, p. 457.
 173. *Ibid.*, p. 457.
 174. *Ibid.*, p. 426.
 175. *Ibid.*, p. 457.
 176. *Ibid.*, pp. 429-60.
 177. On R. Uziel's positive attitude toward Zionism, see Ratzabi (*supra*, note 2).
 178. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, p. 343.

179. *Ibid.*, p. 498.
180. *Ibid.*, p. 468. R. Kook's ambivalence toward the secular pioneers can be detected in his eulogy for the fallen pioneers. See R. Abraham Isaac Ha-Cohen Kook, "Al Bamoteinu Halalim," in *Ma'amrei ha-RaAY'aH*, Elisha Aviner (ed.), (Jerusalem, 1984), pp. 89-93. As in relation to other issues briefly discussed in the present article (the status of women, the Sephardi pronunciation), R. Uziel's openness to modernism and secular Zionism stands out in the face of R. Kook's positions.
181. Uziel, *Piskei Uziel*, no. 48.
182. *Ibid.*, p. 493.
183. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, pp. 31-32.
184. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 1, p. 92.
185. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, p. 495.
186. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, pp. 140-41.
187. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 1, p. 95.
188. Uziel, *Mishpetei Uziel*, part 1, no. 22, p. 98.
189. *Ibid.*, no. 20, p. 87.
190. On this matter, see the article written by R. Hayyim David Ha-Levi (*supra*, note 2).
191. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, p. 98.
192. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, p. 330.
193. *Ibid.*, p. 429.
194. R. Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel, "Ve-Lo Yishapekh Dam be-Kerev Arzekha," in R. Benjamin and Jacob Peterzeil (eds.), *Neged ha-Terror* (Jerusalem, 1979), cited in Eliezer Don Yihye, "Dat ve-Terror Politi," p. 163.
195. R. Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel, "Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah," *Sinai* 22 (1948): 119.
196. R. Ben Zion Meir Hai Uziel, "Yovel ha-Arba'im le-Yissud ha-Mizrahi," *Ba-Mishor*, nos. 102, 103, 104 (13 March 1942), p. 2.
197. R. Moshe Avigdor Amiel, "Le-Bikkoret Darkenu," in *ibid.*, p. 3.
198. Uziel, "Yovel ha-Arba'im le-Yissud ha-Mizrahi."
199. Uziel, "Yovel ha-Arba'im le-Yissud ha-Mizrahi," p. 6.
200. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 1, pp. 301-302. For R. Reines' position on this matter see Eliezer Don Yihye, "Ideologiyah u-Mediniyyut ba-Ziyyonut ha-Datit: Haguto ha-Ziyyonit shel ha-Rav Reines u-Mediniyyut ha-'Mizrahi' be-Hanagato," *Ha-Ziyyonut* 8 (1983): 103-46.
201. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, pp. 526-27.
202. *Ibid.*, pp. 248-49.
203. Uziel, *Piskei Uziel*, no. 61ff.
204. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
205. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, p. 523.
206. *Ibid.*, p. 523.
207. Uziel, "Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah," p. 122.
208. Uziel, "Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah," p. 125.
209. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, part 2, pp. 103-104.

210. Uziel, *Hegyonei Uziel*, pp. 108-109.
211. Uziel, *Mikhmannei Uziel*, pp. 374-76.
212. Uziel, *Mishpetei Uziel*, Orah Hayyim, Preface, p. ix.
213. Uziel, *Mishpetei Uziel*, intro. to part 2: *Even ha-Ezer*, p. vii.
214. Aviezer Ravitzky, "Hadash min ha-Torah? Al ha-Ortodoksiyyah ve-al ha-Moderna," in *Emanah bi-Zemanin Mishtanim* (*supra*, note 26), pp. 451-52 (and see *supra*, note 15).
215. Dov Schwartz, "Mishanto shel ha-Rav Soloveitchik bi-Re'i he-Hagut ha-Ziyyonit: Ha-Hillun ve-ha-Medinah," in Avi Sagi (ed.), *Emanah bi-Zemna'im Mishtanim*, pp. 124-28.
216. See Ravitzky, *Ha-Kez ha-Meguleh u-Medinat Ha-Yehudim* (*supra*, note 1), ch. 1; Michael Zvi Nehorai, "Le-Mahutah shel ha-Ziyyonut ha-Datit: Iyyun be-Mishnoteihem shel ha-Rav Reines ve-ha-Rav Kook," in Mordecai Eliav (ed.), *Bi-Shevilei ha-Tehiyyah: Mehakrim ba-Ziyyonut ha-Datit*, vol. 3 (Ramat Gan, 1989), pp. 11-24.