



THE CHANGING FORMS OF INCITEMENT TO TERROR AND VIOLENCE: The Need for a New International Response



Konrad
Adenauer
Stiftung

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
המרכז הירושלמי לענייני ציבור ומדינה (ע"ר)



PALESTINIAN INCITEMENT AND PEACE: AN INSURMOUNTABLE INCOMPATIBILITY*

Joel Fishman

“Everything which exists by nature exists for an end and one cannot grasp its nature without understanding that end.”¹

Incitement to hatred and violence is a weapon of political warfare. Potentially, it is also one of the basic steps in the sequence of stages leading to genocide. As a weapon of political warfare, incitement belongs to the same category as agitation and propaganda. States and insurgent movements that engage in low-intensity conflict, such as asymmetrical warfare, use it in order to advance their ends. Its use provides a reliable indicator of a government’s real motives.

Persistent reports describe the pervasiveness and intensity of Palestinian incitement against Israel. Such acts include the naming of public buildings, sports facilities, and streets after Palestinian terrorists who have murdered Israeli civilians.² A ubiquitous informational environment encompasses the educational system, teaching materials such as textbooks and maps, television, billboards, ceremonial occasions and anniversaries, and the media of popular culture, including websites and crossword puzzles. It conveys messages of hatred and messages honoring Palestinian “martyrs,” killed while perpetrating terror attacks against Israeli civilians that exhort the youth to emulate such “exemplary role models.”³

Despite the fact that the government of Israel has deliberated on the matter at the cabinet level, delivered numerous formal protests, and recently instated an Incitement and Culture of Peace Index,⁴ a widespread lack of appreciation and even denial of the full significance of Israel’s legitimate and substantive grievance persists. For years negotiators have sidestepped the problem of incitement. One reason may be that the destructive effects of incitement are not immediately apparent because they are cumulative. Another may be that the American administration and the European Union stubbornly adhere to the paradigm of the “peace process” and maintain a policy of not holding the Palestinians accountable to fulfill their obligations, while demanding unilateral concessions of Israel.

For example, Natan Sharansky described his great disappointment at the Wye River negotiations of 1998 when the Clinton administration systematically evaded the problem of Palestinian incitement because they feared that they would weaken Arafat and endanger the negotiations. At Wye, Sharansky warned President Clinton about the danger of incitement

but without success.⁵ Another reason may have been that the international bystanders, such as individuals, public figures, churches, NGOs, and governments apply double standards and effectively condone the perpetrators.

In his personal blog and commentary, Ambassador Dore Gold cited the American negotiator, Dennis Ross, who disclosed retrospectively that Palestinian incitement had spoiled the peace process. The following are Ross's views with Gold's commentary:

Dennis Ross...criticized the U.S. for ignoring the issue of Palestinian incitement: "The Palestinians' systematic incitement in their media, an educational system that bred hatred, and the glorification of violence made Israelis feel that their real purpose was not peace."... Ross [according to Gold] is extremely open in explaining the reasons why the U.S. did not deal with the incitement issue. Washington was always afraid of halting the peace process. It did not want to confront Arafat and mistakenly accepted his arguments that he was too weak. But Ross warns that there cannot be successful negotiations if there is one environment at the peace table and another environment in the streets.⁶

Dennis Ross faithfully implemented the official American policy of giving Arafat a free pass and it was good of him to admit this mistake. Looking back, it is evident that this policy did not bring peace closer. Rather, it permitted the situation to deteriorate and ultimately resulted in increased tensions and distrust. If one examines the historical record, it becomes evident that in the political war against Israel, incitement has become a major problem. What remains is to acknowledge the real importance of this problem to which policymakers have turned a blind eye. Not the least, the problem of incitement is closely bound to the issue of the Palestinians' true motives. If they really desire peace, they should be prepared to recognize "the existence of Israel as a truly legitimate entity."⁷

INCITEMENT AS A STEP TOWARD GENOCIDE

It is generally accepted that incitement which is propagated publicly for the purpose of encouraging others to commit an offense is a crime. Incitement to violence and "imminent lawless action" begins with words and ends in violence. Even if a crime has not yet been perpetrated, the gap between the two is small. Incitement is used to single out and target a population group for victimization, and researchers have identified it as a part of the sequence leading to genocide.

Prof. Jeffrey Herf, this generation's leading authority on the subject of Nazi German propaganda, pointed out the importance of a regime's public message and explains why incitement must be taken seriously. He wrote:

I want to underscore the importance of Nazism's public record. For amid the lies and in the absence of proper names and specific places, Nazi leaders and propagandists spoke in public to millions of people in a more blunt, forthright, and perversely honest manner about their intentions toward the Jews than many officials and journalists at the time as well as historians have since acknowledged. Not only did the Nazis mean what they said when it came to their plans for European Jewry, they said what they meant in print and on the radio, reaching hundreds of thousands of readers and millions of listeners. In public discourse they did so without the euphemisms that became so famous in postwar analysis of the language of totalitarianism.⁸

Herf's observations confirm Hannah Arendt's earlier finding that totalitarian dictatorships are remarkably outspoken in proclaiming their true intentions. She wrote that, "In order not to overestimate the importance of the propaganda lies one should recall the much more numerous instances in which Hitler was completely sincere and brutally unequivocal in the definition of the movement's true aims, but they were simply not acknowledged by a public unprepared for such consistency."⁹ This dynamic involved two parties: the Nazi-German Führer and those who refused or were unable to grasp what he actually said.¹⁰

To use Herf's formulation, incitement provides the means for translating hatred into an interpretive framework.¹¹ The Nuremberg Tribunal formally recognized this relationship when on October 1, 1946, it sentenced the publisher of anti-Semitic children's books and editor of *Der Stürmer*, Julius Streicher, to death by hanging. Its conviction and sentencing to seven years' imprisonment of the chief of the Reich Press Office, Otto Dietrich, may have had more far-reaching implications:

Though the court recognized that Goebbels was able at times to influence the ministry's press directives, Dietrich's role was central. The [press] directives "were not mere political polemics...aimless expressions of anti-Semitism, and they were not designed only to unite the German people in the war effort. Their clear and expressed purpose was to enrage Germans against Jews, to justify measures taken and to be taken against them, and to subdue any doubts which might arise as to the justice of measures of racial persecution to which the Jews were to be subjected." The court found that in issuing them, "Dietrich consciously implemented, and by furnishing excuses and justifications, participated in the crimes against humanity regarding the Jews," and it thus found him guilty. The judgment marked the first time since the development of mass communication that a decision maker had been held accountable for the use of the press to incite hatred linked to genocide.¹²

Similarly, incitement has been identified as the central catalyst for the genocidal crimes which took place in Rwanda.¹³ Not the least, the United Nations' Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has identified direct and public incitement as a crime in its own right, even when it does not result in genocide. Robert Cryer, professor of international and criminal law at the University of Birmingham, explained the nature of this crime:

Direct and public incitement to commit genocide is criminalized in Article III(c) of the 1948 Genocide Convention. A provision akin to Article III(c) can be found in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 25(3)(e)). Incitement is one of a limited group of crimes related to genocide (the others are attempts at genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide) which do not require the commission of one of the genocidal acts set out in Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Incitement, attempt and conspiracy are crimes in themselves. As none of these offenses require an act of genocide to be committed, they are referred to as inchoate (incomplete) crimes. Their incompleteness does not change the fact that they are criminal.¹⁴

Scholars in the relatively new field of genocide studies have also recognized the danger of incitement. Gregory H. Stanton, president of Genocide Watch, described what he termed "The Eight Stages of Genocide" in a 1996 briefing paper which he originally presented at the American State Department. According to Stanton, there are eight identifiable stages

to genocide:

- 1) Classification
- 2) Symbolization
- 3) Dehumanization
- 4) Organization
- 5) Polarization
- 6) Preparation
- 7) Extermination
- 8) Denial¹⁵

Incitement belongs to stage 3, which Stanton described as Dehumanization. Based on concrete historical experience, Stanton's description offers a chillingly accurate description of Palestinian incitement today:

One denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it are equated with animals [such as apes and pigs], vermin, insects or diseases. Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on the radio, television or internet is used to vilify the victim group. In combating this dehumanization, incitement to genocide should not be confused with protected speech. Genocidal societies lack constitutional protection for countervailing speech, and should be treated differently than democracies. Local and international leaders should condemn the use of hate speech and make it culturally unacceptable. Leaders who incite to genocide should be banned from international travel and have their foreign finances frozen. Hate radio stations should be shut down, and hate propaganda banned. Hate crimes and atrocities should be promptly punished.¹⁶

During the 1980s, the Information Department of the Jewish Agency launched a campaign to bring about the repeal of UNGA 3379, the "Zionism is Racism" resolution. In this endeavor, the agency published several studies probing the dimensions of the problem. As part of this effort, Dr. Ehud Sprinzak, at the time an associate professor at the Hebrew University, described the effective meaning of delegitimization. He explained that the distinguishing characteristic of the new defamation campaign against Israel (and the new anti-Semitism) was a process of *dehumanization*, which, when brought to its logical conclusion, would deny to Israelis and Jews the commonly accepted human rights. His central thesis was that a "*qualitative change ushered in the anti-Zionism of the 70s, a change arising from the fact that Zionism has ceased being an object of delegitimation and had become an object of dehumanization*" (italics in original).¹⁷ Sprinzak described the delegitimization process in terms which can easily be placed within Stanton's framework. Further, the ultimate stage of the process he describes may not necessarily be genocide, but rather "politicide," a term which Yehoshafat Harkabi coined some years ago:

Delegitimization is a process involving ideological and symbolic manipulation. As a result of this process an accepted political entity, recognized as having a right to exist, is transformed into an unacceptable one without such a right... When delegitimization is achieved...the political entity that has been under attack comes to be seen not only as misguided and wrong, but as altogether undeserving of

existence.... In sum, a process of delegitimization occurs only when a political entity, previously held to be legitimate, loses that status as a result of a chain of events over time. Only at the end of that process has the entity lost its right to exist.¹⁸

The incitement process also provides the foundation for the campaign of delegitimization against Israel as well as the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign.¹⁹ As applied to the BDS movement, Anthony Julius has explained that the call to boycott Israel in the UK really meant a form of discrimination.²⁰ Similarly, a background briefing paper which the CRIF published on the BDS initiative cites the judgment of the European Court of the Rights of Man of July 16, 2009, ruling that the boycott of a French mayor preventing the sale of Israeli food products in the municipal cafeteria represented “incitement to an act of discrimination.”²¹

INCITEMENT AS A TOOL OF ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE: THE STRATEGIC AND CULTURAL DIMENSION

A regime may use incitement as a weapon of war in order to prepare its own population for combat, to divert the attention of the public from its own shortcomings, and to persuade it that demands for long-term sacrifices will ultimately be rewarded. In addition, incitement has a parallel role: to develop and mobilize active political support from abroad, which may result in aggressive political interference in favor of a cause. Effectively, this is part of a larger strategy intended to compensate for military weakness and drive the Palestinian question to the top of the world’s political agenda.

One must appreciate the broader cultural assumptions behind a strategy which makes use of incitement (and terror, for the same matter) to achieve its ends. The strategy of fighting and negotiating is based on the assumption that war (usually between states but also among peoples) is the natural state of affairs.²² If the armed struggle must continue until the ultimate goals are achieved, then the real goal of negotiations, whose purpose is commonly understood to be the conclusion of hostilities, is completely transformed. Those who have adopted a long-range program of conquest do not consider a peaceful conclusion of hostilities to be the ultimate purpose of peace talks. Here is the cultural “disconnect” with Western values. For those who engage in protracted conflict, “peacemaking” becomes a means of deception in order to gain advantage in the form of delays, recognition, and unreciprocated concessions.²³

Not the least, a belligerent may use the actual meeting between sides as a means of undermining the legitimacy of an adversary. This method belongs to an approach known as “fighting and negotiating,”²⁴ which during the last century, the Red Chinese and later the North Vietnamese put to good use. The classical example of this method is Lenin’s decision to accept the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918 between the Central Powers and the newly founded Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Most importantly, this arrangement took Russia out of the First World War and gave the Bolsheviks time to consolidate the new revolution. The terms of this treaty were absolutely draconian but Lenin never intended to implement them.²⁵

TIME—THE FOURTH DIMENSION: ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE AND THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF INCITEMENT

Our discussion of incitement and its place in protracted conflict indicates the centrality of the time dimension in the Palestinian strategy. No less important is the need to appreciate the meaning of *historical time*. In his classical essay, “The *Longue Durée*,” the eminent French historian, Fernand Braudel, explained the meaning of “historical time.” He explained that there were “two poles of time, the instant and the *longue durée*.”²⁶ According to Braudel, there are things which move quickly, those which move slowly, and those which do not move at all. In this scheme, individual events are ephemeral, just like “fireflies in the night.” For him, “the short time span is the most capricious and the most delusive of all.”²⁷ In contrast, developments which take place over the long term, such as the building of societies and social structures, have transcendent value from which it is possible to derive solid knowledge. “For nothing is more important, nothing comes closer to the crux of social reality, than this living, intimate, infinitely repeated opposition between the instant of time and that time which flows slowly.”²⁸ Braudel thus considered that history *sur la longue durée* offered more useful information than *l’histoire événemential*, history based on individual events. History over the long term has a broader basis which makes it possible to understand “the preeminent role of the history of institutions, of religions, of civilizations.”²⁹ In the discussion which follows we shall also consider the type of political environment for which the propagation of incitement to hatred and violence is an essential need.

This brings us to a discussion of the main principle of asymmetric warfare. According to Mao Tse-Tung, “the basic principle of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy.”³⁰ That means that for the Palestinians to prevail, they need only stay in existence and persevere in their struggle to destroy Israel. If terror and violence become impractical in the medium term, then permanent political incitement and propaganda become an essential alternative in order to keep the conflict going.

In this perspective, one must understand the centrality of the fourth dimension—time—in Palestinian strategic thinking. The length of time which they are prepared to allocate in order to achieve their goals is endless. During the early 1970s, the PLO took the advice of the North Vietnamese and adopted the Strategy of Stages, or of “Phased Goals.” The Vietnamese counseled the PLO to work for their goals in phases, and thus conceal their real purpose, while projecting the appearance of moderation.³¹

It is within this perspective, making use of time, even over generations, that one may grasp the real intent (and consistency) of Arafat and his organization. During a visit to Venezuela in 1980, he declared: “Peace for us means the destruction of Israel. We are preparing for an all-out war, a war which will last for generations.... We shall not rest until the day when we return to our home, and until we destroy Israel.... The destruction of Israel is the goal of our struggle, and the guidelines of that struggle have remained firm since the establishment of Fatah in 1965.”³²

Similarly, Thomas Friedman, in *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, noted this special sense of time when he quoted Abu Jihad (Khalil Wazir). When asked why he refused to come to terms with Israel, he declared “we will not be squeezed by time.”³³ Friedman also cited Arafat who declared in his *Playboy* interview of September 1988 that the Palestinians would be willing

to wait as long as it takes. “The Vietnamese took 35 years of continuous war. The Algerians, 150; the Rhodesians, about 100; the Saudis. 500. But from the beginning we believed that sooner or later, we would achieve our goals, because we are WITH the tide of history, while Israel is AGAINST it.”³⁴

The late Feisal Hussein, whom the mainstream media designated as a “moderate,” carefully reflected on the place of time in the Palestinian strategy. He drew a sophisticated distinction between types of time, ranging from short spans to the long term. The following statement is taken from Hussein’s last interview published in June 2001. His declaration is perfectly consistent with those of Khalil Wazir and Yasser Arafat:

You are dragging me into talking about what we refer to as our “strategic” goals and our “political” goals, or the *phased goals* [author’s emphasis]. The “strategic” goals are the “higher goals,” the “long-term goals,” or the “unwavering goals,” the goals that are based on solid pan-Arab historic rights and principles. Whereas the “political” goals are those goals which were set for a temporary timeframe, considering the [constraints of] the existing international system, the balance of power, our own abilities, and other considerations which “vary” from time to time.

When we are asking all the Palestinian forces and factions to look at the Oslo Agreement and at other agreements as “temporary” procedures, or phased goals, this means that *we are ambushing the Israelis and cheating them* [author’s emphasis]....

Our ultimate goal is [still] the liberation of all historical Palestine from the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] Sea, even if this means that the conflict will last for another thousand years or for many generations.³⁵

It should be noted that Feisal Hussein’s appreciation of time, over the short and long term, as a component of strategy is closely bound to absolute maximalist goals combined with a corresponding approach which views warfare as being continuous. In retrospect, the existence of this statement has proved painful for certain Israelis, because during the period which preceded Oslo, Feisal Hussein used his considerable talent and his family’s prestige to cultivate support in Israel for the Oslo agreements. Working with Israeli “peace activists,” his objective was to shift the Israeli consensus in support of an agreement with the Palestinians.³⁶ But, as he proudly admitted, such endeavors were part of a larger and commonly understood strategy of deception.

Thomas Friedman explained that Yasser Arafat’s major accomplishment as a leader was to deliver the Palestinians from oblivion to the “Land of Prime Time.”³⁷ In the absence of any Israeli counter-challenge, Arafat was able to create the illusion that the Palestinians had a real moral claim, that they had suffered unjustly and that it was the obligation of men of good will to set things right.

When in the late 1980s Friedman first presented this interpretation, he argued that Arafat’s approach was unsustainable.³⁸ Over a decade later and with some disappointment, Friedman again identified the same policy when the Palestinians brought about the breakdown of the Camp David talks and began the Second Intifada. In his *New York Times* op-ed entitled “Arafat’s War,” Friedman formulated the sequel to this interpretation by demonstrating that Arafat consistently opted for the “Land of Prime Time” over a practical solution. He wrote that after the breakdown of Camp David II and the fact that

President Clinton assigned guilt to the Palestinian side,

Mr. Arafat had a dilemma: make some compromises, build on Mr. Barak's opening bid and try to get it closer to 100 percent—and regain the moral high ground that way—or provoke the Israelis into brutalizing Palestinians again, and regain the moral high ground that way. Mr. Arafat chose the latter. So instead of responding to Mr. Barak's peacemaking overture, he and his boys responded to Ariel Sharon's peace-destroying provocation. In short, the Palestinians could not deal with Barak, so they had to turn him into Sharon. And they did.³⁹

It should also be noted that the Palestinians, with the support of their allies, notably Iran, employed the same approach at the World Conference against Racism (WCAR) 2001 which took place in Durban. There, they hijacked the agenda and prevented less organized groups with genuine grievances, such as the descendants of slaves who were brought involuntarily to the Western Hemisphere, from receiving a fair hearing.⁴⁰

Using continuous incitement, combined with diplomacy, intimidation, and violence, the Palestinians have achieved considerable success, gaining recognition and propagating the belief that Israel did not deserve to exist. The essence of this initiative and the concrete steps toward its practical implementation may be found in the NGO Declaration of the Durban Conference.⁴¹ At the same time, it should be noted, many Western policymakers prefer to believe that all men share Western values of decency and fair play, and to seek refuge in false analogies, avoid hard choices, and split the difference where possible. It is much easier for them. The threat of terror also may have intimidated them, along with outside pressure and personal inducements. A reasonable and "businesslike" approach may be suited for the West, where it is assumed that both sides share the same "core values." But what if they do not? The case of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas is such an exception because they maintain a political and religious culture committed to death and martyrdom and wiping out the infidel.

During the 1950s, Bernard Lewis observed that the concept of perpetual conflict was closely associated with certain religious and political belief systems. In his view, this was a cultural problem, and in an article which now would be considered politically incorrect, he observed that both Islam and Leninism shared the same "aggressive fanaticism."

This supremely intolerant perspective may be found both in the Islamic and Leninist traditions which divide the world into opposing camps. According to Islam, the world is divided into *Dar al-Islam* [the House of Islam] and *Dar al-Harb* [the House of War]. In classical Islamic teaching, everything that is outside *Dar al-Islam* belongs to *Dar al-Harb*. Similarly, Lenin argued that a state of war would prevail until socialism achieved its ultimate victory over capitalism.⁴² Bernard Lewis likened the two views: "The traditional Islamic division of the world into the House of Islam and the House of War, two necessarily opposed groups, of which the first has the collective obligation of perpetual struggle against the second, also has obvious parallels in the Communist view of world affairs. There again, the content of belief is utterly different, but the aggressive fanaticism of the believer is the same."⁴³

THE NEED OF NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES TO FOMENT INCITEMENT

Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer distinguish between “fear societies” and democracies:

Fear regimes use methods of coercion in order to stay in power. Incitement serves an important need for the non-democratic state whose society is governed by means of fear. One of the oldest and most effective is the creation of external enemies. Non-democratic leaders make use of external enemies, real and imagined, to retard the natural process of alienation and even at times reverse it. The pool of true believers is maintained and double-thinkers may occasionally be transformed back into loyalists.⁴⁴

Within this perspective, “the external policies of the regime become an extension of the regime’s constant effort to maintain internal stability.”⁴⁵ Palestinian incitement against Israel, Israelis, and “the Jews,” both domestically and abroad, fulfills this need. It would be a serious mistake to assume that incitement is limited by the geographical bounds of the Palestinian Authority. They export it wholesale.

Sharansky and Dermer noted that democracies do not engage in incitement, while totalitarian regimes use fear to manage their populations. It follows, therefore, that the form of government is a matter of critical importance. The correlation of the form of government and its policy goals has been known since antiquity.

According to Aristotle, the ancient Greek philosopher and founder of the field of political science (384–322 BCE), each type of government possesses an organization and structure in keeping with its purpose. This organization is its constitution.⁴⁶ It should be noted that, in its original meaning, a constitution need not be a written document. According to Aristotle, there is a clear relationship between the purpose of a constitution and the nature of the *politeia*, the city-state to which it belongs.⁴⁷ For example, under a democracy the people are sovereign, and in an oligarchy, the few. The ultimate purpose, or *telos*, of a democracy is to make the “good life” available to its citizens, affording them the opportunity to live a life of virtue or excellence, and this represents the link between politics and ethics.⁴⁸ To achieve its purpose, a democracy needs peace. For a democracy, war is necessary as the means of attaining goals compatible with the purpose of its form of government.⁴⁹ Thus, one makes war in order to achieve peace. War as an end in itself is considered unworthy.

In contrast, Aristotle wrote disapprovingly that, “In Sparta, for instance, and in Crete the system of education and most of the laws are framed with a general view to war.”⁵⁰ In his view, the militaristic Spartans possessed a bad constitution and poor lawgivers.⁵¹

According to Aristotle, the system of education and the laws must conform with the nature of the constitution in order to assure its continuity:

The greatest, however, of all the means we have mentioned for ensuring the stability of constitutions—but one which is nowadays generally neglected—is the education of citizens in the spirit of their constitution. There is no advantage in the best of laws, even when they are sanctioned by general civic consent, if the citizens themselves have not been attuned, by the force of habit and the influence of teaching, to the right constitutional temper—which will be the temper of democracy

where the laws are democratic, and where they are oligarchical will they be that of oligarchy. If an individual can lack self-control, so can a city.⁵²

Following this logic, the form of government of the Palestinian Authority may be described as a type of oligarchy whose purpose is war against Israel.⁵³ Indeed, its educational system is consistent with this bellicose goal. Within this context one may understand the refusal of the Palestinian Authority to engage in “education for peace” and to prepare its public for the eventuality that a compromise solution with Israel will require giving up some of its long-held maximalist views. For the Palestinian Authority, a policy of incitement is more expedient.

The purpose of this regime, which Bernard Lewis once described as a “corrupt tyranny,”⁵⁴ is to wage a war, namely to destroy Israel, the Jewish state—no matter how long it takes. Its leaders consider deception and the “armed struggle” as the legitimate means by which they can achieve their goals and have adapted their educational system to fill the younger generation with hatred and the desire to perpetrate terrorist acts. The great constitutional differences between the state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority are reflected in their political structure and end-goals. This basic divergence represents a structural and existential incompatibility.

INCITEMENT AND CONTEMPORARY REALITY

Despite the fact that on December 14, 1998, Yasser Arafat staged a festive display in Gaza for the benefit of President Clinton, the Palestinian Authority neither annulled nor disavowed those articles of their fundamental law, the Palestinian Charter, which call for the destruction of Israel.⁵⁵ According to Sharansky and Dermer, “Arafat’s speech declaring the change of the charter was as vague as possible, and the ‘vote’ was an orchestrated raising of hands that collapsed into applause for the ‘Great Leader and Teacher.’ The whole thing was a charade.”⁵⁶ This explains why Palestinian leaders recently rejected out of hand recognition of Israel as the Jewish state.⁵⁷

Researchers who have dealt with the history of the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have referred to issues such as the disposition of Jerusalem or the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees as the “deal-breaker.”⁵⁸ With good will, these issues could find a solution. The problem of incitement, however, is of a much greater order. Because of the reality behind it, incitement is the real “deal-breaker.” One side wants peace, while the other does not. That is the difference. It is not the type of misunderstanding which can be remedied by closing one’s eyes, as President Shimon Peres once recommended.⁵⁹ The ultimate purpose of each people, each society, and their leadership are basically incompatible.

At present, the continuation of incitement indicates that essentially there is no real prospect of achieving a stable, long-term arrangement through the political process. Although it is fashionable from time to time to speak of the “window of opportunity,” and to demand that only Israel seize the opportunity by making large, unreciprocated concessions, such exhortations reflect the impatience of the Western approach and its cultural weakness. This is a cultural and political misperception. If we may borrow from the language of Fernand Braudel, belief in the idea of a window of opportunity is just “a bet on the irreplaceable value of the present moment.”⁶⁰ Such bets usually do not pay off, particularly if the other side is not terribly interested in locking in its gains but prefers to play for larger, long-term stakes.

THE LONG-TERM REMEDY

During the 1980s and well before the Oslo negotiations, some optimists anticipated that the new Palestinian Authority would become the first Arab democracy in the region to possess the institutions of modern, transparent self-government. In his monograph, *Ivory Towers on Sand*, Martin Kramer reported that the “Palestinian exception” was one of the paradigms prevailing in American academic circles.⁶¹ The Palestinians “were believed to have a vibrant ‘civil society,’ both inside and outside Palestine. They had representative institutions, unions, and associations. Their leaders were accountable. Allow them self-rule, and the Palestinians would prove that the Arab world could sustain democracy.”⁶² Time has shown that this was an illusion. Sadly, however, the Israeli leadership of the time failed to grasp that it had an interest in advancing the cause of democracy under the new Palestinian Authority.⁶³

An examination of the current state of affairs raises the question: what happened to the peace which the Oslo Accords were supposed to bring? The Palestinian Authority, which many hoped would be committed to democracy and become a good neighbor, has turned into a corrupt, authoritarian Middle Eastern regime which plunged its own population into war and has taken a high toll of innocent Israeli civilians. Through an understanding of the Palestinian Authority’s structure, one may appreciate how far it has become incapable of building the type of peace which obtains between two healthy democracies, “the democratic peace.”⁶⁴ This was considered to be the ideal goal of the “peace process,” but now, no one even mentions it.

What should the remedy be? As we have demonstrated above, the problem of Palestinian incitement is rooted in the structure of the present Palestinian government and the way it views its purpose and strategic goal. Effective reform, therefore, must be the result of structural transformation. This means reconstituting political and social relationships, laws, and education along democratic lines in a manner which will conform to a change of purpose that embodies democracy and peaceful goals. This means changing a state’s constitution, written and unwritten. As Samuel Huntington once stated, the issue is not about regime existence but regime change.⁶⁵

The transitions to democracy which resulted from the Allied military interventions of the Second World War as well as the collapse of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe (the Third Wave) were cataclysmic, but numerous others have been peaceful. According to Huntington, from 1974 to 1990, thirty transitions to democracy took place in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.⁶⁶ Since then, this number has increased. As of 2001, Larry Diamond counted 121 democracies.⁶⁷

If we wish to look twenty years ahead, we should look backward to ascertain what has remained constant. One thing is clear: Israel cannot settle the Arabs’ grievance to their satisfaction without committing political suicide. As Yehoshafat Harkabi wrote in 1977, “The Arabs can present their case in simplistic slogans. At most they have to conceal their grievance, the redress of which in their version would be a matter of justice, as an *unlimited* grievance, which the opponent cannot redress to their liking and yet stay alive.”⁶⁸ This is the constant.

The Palestinians derive considerable benefit from a policy of fomenting incitement, domestically and abroad, making political capital from a festering sore. Using this method over an extended time-frame, they have driven their maximalist demands to the top of the world’s agenda. Likewise, by going through the motions of negotiating, creating crises and

impasses and bringing external pressure to bear on Israel, they have succeeded in pocketing valuable unreciprocated concessions. Unless they are stopped, the present leadership of the Palestinian Authority will continue to pursue an essentially criminal strategy of incitement, and with time, the stakes will grow higher.

The State of Israel has a real interest in the type of neighbor it has on its doorstep. While we must remember that “more tears are shed over *answered prayers* than unanswered ones,” regime change in the Palestinian Authority may be the optimal solution. It would certainly be the basic first step in assuring “the good life” and the benefits of peace to both peoples and to the region.

Joel Fishman is a historian and fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is the editor of the *Jewish Political Studies Review*. Fishman has published on political warfare, paying special attention to the cultural environment in which it is waged. He received his doctorate in modern European history from Columbia University and has carried out post-doctoral studies at the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation in Amsterdam. He was the first scholar to write on the postwar history of Dutch Jewry. Fishman served as chairman of the Center for Research on Dutch Jewry (at the Hebrew University) and is a member of the board of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East.

ENDNOTES

- * This chapter is a revised and fuller version of the article, “Palestinian Incitement: The Real ‘Deal-Breaker,’” which first appeared in the *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 5, 1 (2011): 41-57, <http://israelcfr.com/documents/5-1/5-1-3-JoelFishman.pdf>.
- 1 R. F. Stalley, “Introduction,” Aristotle, *Politics*, ed. R. F. Stalley, trans. Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), xi.
- 2 For a compendium of examples of recent Palestinian incitement, see: Itamar Marcus and Nan Jacques Zilberdik, *Deception: Betraying the Peace Process; Palestinian Authority non-recognition of Israel, hate incitement and promotion of violence during the 2010 peace talks and through 2011* (Jerusalem: PMW, 2012). See also the website for Palestinian Media Watch: <http://www.palwatch.org/>.
- 3 This is the term of Prof. Robert Wistrich who wrote extensively about official Palestinian incitement in the chapter of his book, “The ‘Liberation’ of Palestine,” *A Lethal Obsession* (New York: Random House, 2010), 684-730. For additional background information on the subject, see: Dore Gold, “Where Is the Issue of Education for Peace in the Olmert-Abbas Initiative?,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, September 25, 2007; *ibid.*, Gold, “Why Incitement Is Ignored,” August 22, 2010; Justus Reid Weiner and Noam Wasserman, “ Hamas’ Determination to Perpetuate the Israeli Palestinian Conflict: The Critical Role of Hate Indoctrination,” *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, no. 545, August 1, 2006.
- 4 See, for example, Prime Minister’s Media Adviser, “PM Netanyahu’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” Sunday, January 10, 2010. On this occasion, the prime minister spoke clearly: “... incitement continues in the Palestinian media and education system; in its official media outlets and in the schools under its supervision. These serious actions represent a harsh violation of the Palestinians’ international obligation to prevent incitement. I say to the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority: Stop the incitement. This is not how peace is made. Peace is made by educating towards reconciliation, by encouraging good neighborly relations and by developing mutual respect. Therefore, the cessation of

Palestinian incitement is a necessary condition, not for entering into discussions, but so that we may complete them in a way that will bring about genuine peace between our two peoples.”`

- 5 Natan Sharansky with Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 172-173. According to Yossef Bodansky, who served as director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare from 1988 to 2004, the policy of the Clinton administration was not to hold Arafat accountable for terror and incitement. This resulted in exacerbating the conflict, which ultimately produced a security threat to the United States. See: Yossef Bodansky, *The High Cost of Peace: How Washington's Middle East Policy Left America Vulnerable to Terrorism* (Roseville, CA: Prima, 2002).
- 6 Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2004), 769, as cited by Gold, "Why Incitement Is Ignored," `August 22, 2010.
- 7 Yehoshafat Harkabi, "Arab Positions on Zionism," in Shmuel Almog, ed., *Zionism and the Arabs* (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1983), 191.
- 8 Jeffrey Herf, "The 'Jewish War': Goebbels and the Antisemitic Campaigns of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 19, 1 (Spring 2005): 54. See also: Herf, *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) and *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
- 9 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 343.
- 10 Ibid., 378.
- 11 "Jewish War," 54.
- 12 *The Jewish Enemy*, 273, 274. For general and historical background, see: "Incitement to Genocide in International Law," *Holocaust Encyclopedia*, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007839>.
- 13 "Bystanders to Genocide," *Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/4571/>.
- 14 "Incitement," Robert Cryer, *The Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity* ed. Dinah Shelton (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005) 2: 493-500; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the U.N. General Assembly on 9 December 1948, Article III, item c, "Direct and public incitement to commit genocide." <http://www.un-documents.net/cppcg.htm>.
- 15 <http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/8stagesofgenocide.html>.
- 16 Gregory H. Stanton, "The 8 Stages of Genocide," <http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html>. The author thanks Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink Ten Cate, chairman of the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, in Amsterdam for this reference.
- 17 Ehud Sprinzak, "Anti-Zionism: From Delegitimization to Dehumanization," *Forum on the Jewish People, Zionism and Israel* 53 (May 1984): 2.
- 18 Ibid., 2-3.
- 19 See Joel Fishman, "The Relegitimization of Israel and the Battle for the Mainstream Consensus," *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 6, 2 (2012): 9-20, <http://israelcfr.com/documents/6-2/6-2-2-JoelFishman.pdf>.
- 20 Anthony Julius, *Trials of the Diaspora: A History of Anti-Semitism in England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 483-531.
- 21 Michael Ghannassia and Pascal Markowicz, *Le Boycott d'Israel: Que dit le droit?* (Paris: CRIF, 2011), 23.
- 22 Vladimir I. Lenin, "War and Revolution," in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, eds., *The Soviet Art of War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), 25.
- 23 *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. and intro. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961), 21-22. See also: Robert Strausz-Hupé, *Protracted Conflict* (New York: Harper, 1963). "In the eyes of Arafat and his cronies the Oslo peace process was really never about genuinely resolving the conflict or improving the lives of ordinary Palestinians but far more about ways to ultimately substitute Palestine for Israel." Wistrich, *Lethal Obsession*, 729-730.

- 24 Robert Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1970), 12.
- 25 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918* (New York: Norton, 1971).
- 26 Fernand Braudel, "History and the Social Sciences: The *Longue Durée*," in Sarah Matthews, ed., *On History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 27.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 28.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 26.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 29.
- 30 *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967) 2: 81.
- 31 Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf] with Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land*, trans. Linda Butler Koseoglu (New York: Times Books, 1978), 69.
- 32 *El Mundo* (Caracas), February 11, 1980 as cited by Wistrich, *Lethal Obsession*, 703 (and 1080, n. 58).
- 33 Thomas L. Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 120.
- 34 *Ibid.*, *Playboy* interview, as quoted by Friedman, 179.
- 35 <http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP23601>, 'Al-Arabi' (Egypt), June 24, 2001.
- 36 Interview of Feisal Hussein by Maya Rosenfeld, "The Real Leadership Is That Which Stands behind the Political Posters: Feisal Hussein in the Relations with the Left and with Peace Now" (in Hebrew), *Etgar* (1990): 9-11.
- 37 Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, 107-108.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 447.
- 39 Thomas L. Friedman, "Foreign Affairs; Arafat's War," October 13, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/13/opinion/foreign-affairs-arafat-s-war.html>.
- 40 See Tom Lantos, "The Durban Debacle: An Insider's View of the World Racism Conference at Durban," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* (2002) 26: 1.
- 41 http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/durban_ngo_declaration_2001.pdf.
- 42 Vladimir I. Lenin, "War and Revolution," *Soviet Art of War*, 25: "...This writer [Clausewitz] whose basic views are now undoubtedly familiar to every thinking person, nearly eighty years ago challenged the ignorant man-in-the-street conception of war as being a thing apart from the policies of the government and classes concerned, as being a simple attack that disturbs the peace, and is then followed by the restoration of the peace thus disturbed...."
- 43 Bernard Lewis, "Communism and Islam," *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 30, 1 (January 1954): 9-10. (The author thanks Mr. Ralph Amelan, research librarian of the American Cultural Center, Jerusalem, for this text.) The understanding here is that the Abode of Islam will be permanently at war with the Abode of War until it is absorbed. Recently, an innovation has been added, the *dar al-da'wa*, the regions of the world where Islam is preached. *Dawa* is the invitation to the nations to accept Islam. Shammai Fishman, "Fiqh al-Aqalliyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities," Hudson Institute, *Research Monographs on the Muslim World*, Series no. 1, Paper no. 2 (October 2006).
- 44 Sharansky and Dermer, *Case for Democracy*, 82-83.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 87.
- 46 Aristotle, *Politics*, ed. R. F. Stalley, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), xi and *ibid.*, III, 6, 1278b6, 97.
- 47 Stalley, "Introduction," *ibid.*, xi, "Everything which exists by nature exists for an end and one cannot grasp its nature without understanding that end."
- 48 *Ibid.*, xxxv.
- 49 *Ibid.*, 255-256 and Aristotle 1333b39.

- 50 Ibid., 255.
- 51 Ibid., 73.
- 52 Ibid., 1310a12, 208.
- 53 Robert C. Tucker described the type of governance of a regime based on the ideology of liberation movement as “a revolutionary mass-movement regime under single party auspices.” *The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change* (New York: Norton 1972), 7.
- 54 During the question-and-answer session at the conclusion of a lecture in Tel Aviv (January 31, 2001), Prof. Bernard Lewis commented on Natan Sharansky’s interpretation, that there cannot be peace until the Palestinian Authority becomes a democracy. He replied, “They [the Palestinians] will not have a democracy like Sweden. As long as they have a corrupt tyranny, there will be no peace.”
- 55 See, for example, Articles 15, 19, 20, 22 in Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Palestinian Covenant and Its Meaning* (London: Valentine Mitchell, 1979), *passim*.
- 56 Sharansky and Dermer, *Case for Democracy*, 176 and <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/140224>.
- 57 See Wistrich, *Lethal Obsession*, 724-726.
- 58 Ofira Seliktar, *Doomed to Failure? The Politics and Intelligence of the Oslo Peace Process* (Santa Barbara/Oxford: Praeger, 2009), 156.
- 59 “Peace is a bit like marriage. You have to close your eyes and accept what is possible to accept.” Address to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Jewish Communities of North America, Jerusalem, December 2008.
- 60 Braudel, “History and the Social Sciences: The *Longue Durée*,” 36.
- 61 Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001.
- 62 Ibid., 70.
- 63 It is clear in retrospect that the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin seriously misjudged the situation when he declared “Once a local Palestinian council is established, (that body) will be responsible for the Palestinians’ internal problems, and it will deal with them as they need to be dealt with, without the hassle of the High Court of Justice, interference by B’tselem, and all kinds of left-wing bleeding hearts and organizations of mothers and fathers. As for security problems, we’ll take care of that.” *Jerusalem Post*, September 3, 1993. The author thanks Ralph Amelan for this source. See also: Natan Sharansky “From Helsinki to Oslo,” *Journal of International Security Affairs (JINSA)*, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 29.
- 64 See Joel Fishman, “The Broken Promise of the Democratic Peace: Israel and the Palestinian Authority,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, no. 477, May 1, 2002, <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp477.htm>.
- 65 *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 34.
- 66 Ibid., 21.
- 67 Larry Diamond cited in USAID, “Global Trends in Democracy,” <http://www.usaid.gov/fani/ch01/globaltrends.htm>.
- 68 Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel’s Response* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 101.