Israel and the UN Gaza Report
The Ethos of Israel’s Citizen Army

IDF Paratroopers, June 5, 1965
Missile attack, Sderot, September 3, 2007
The Strategic Background to the Gaza War

Philadelphi Route

Palestinian Rocket Attacks:

- Be'er Sheva: 213,100
- Ashkelon: 111,000
- Ashdod: 210,500
- Gadera: 17,700
- Kiryat Malachi: 19,800
- Kiryat Gat: 47,900
- Netivot: 25,500
- Ofakim: 24,900
- Sderot: 19,400
- Yavne: 32,200
- Gadera: 17,700
- Jerusalem: 769,400

Explosives, Katyusha rockets, anti-aircraft missiles, foreign Jihadists, Revolutionary Guards near Tehran.

Israeli Disenagement from Gaza

500 1000 1500 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

4 36 159 281 179 946 783 1730

Israel

Gaza Strip

Mediterranean Sea

Egypt
UN Gaza Report: The Main Accusation Against Israel: “Deliberate Attacks Against the Civilian Population”

“...a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population.” (1893)

“a deliberate policy of disproportionate force aimed not at the enemy but at... the civilian population.” (1886)

“The repeated failure to distinguish between combatants and civilians...the result of deliberate guidance issued to soldiers...” (1889)
The Evidence of **Deliberate Israeli Attacks on Civilian Targets** in the UN Gaza Report:

1. Deliberate Attacks on Non-Combatants

2. The Scale of the Destruction

3. Attacks on Mosques
Deliberate Attacks on Non-Combatants:

“The mission found numerous instances of deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects (individuals, whole families, houses, mosques) in violation of the fundamental international humanitarian law principle of distinction, resulting in deaths and serious injuries.” (1921)
Hamas Activity in Northern Gaza

Training Camps
Izadin Alkasam Brigade HQ
Mosque Mastroah Amar
Mosque
Military Base
Training Camp
School
School
School
School
Mosque Kooka
Mosque
Mosque

KEY
Rocket Launching Area
Civilian Facilities
Hamas Facilities
Findings in the field
Type of location
Bunker
Hide Out
Military Camp
General check post
Mines
Barriers
Tunnel
Embattlements
Posts
Cement blocks
“The IDF will hit and destroy any site or building containing ammunition or weapons. As of the publication of this announcement, the life of anyone in whose home ammunition and weapons are to be found is in danger, and he must leave the place for the sake of his own safety and that of his family.”

IDF Command
The Hamas Police as a Case Study

Among the 89 killed in the IDF attack on police headquarters on December 27, 81 (91%) were members of armed terrorist groups. Among them:

**Omar Bakr Shimali** (b. 1988) was a member of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Shimali began as an activist in the Hamas student organization (al-Kutla al-Islamiya). He was assigned to a “Special Unit” and was stationed at front-line positions. At the same time, Shimali was active in the military police and worked at police headquarters.

**Mohammed Khaled Shahiber** (b. 1987) joined the al-Qassam Brigades in 2007 and was stationed at front-line positions.

**Bilal Mahmoud Omar** (b. 1989) joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 2006 and at the same time was active in the Hamas security apparatus. In 2007 he joined the al-Qassam Brigades and was assigned to forward positions. He served as a security guard at the home of Police Commander Tawfik Jabber.

**Sidqi Ismail Hamad** (b. 1983) was active in Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, and in mid-2008 joined the al-Qassam Brigades. He served as a bodyguard for Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh. He was an officer with the rank of lieutenant in the Security and Protection apparatus.

**Mohammed Tawfik al-Nimra** (b. 1986) joined Hamas in 2003 and also swore loyalty to the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006 he joined the al-Qassam Brigades and was stationed in front-line positions.


**Nasser Abdallah al-Ghara** (b. 1962) joined Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1989, and in 2004 he joined the al-Qassam Brigades. He was active in the engineering unit that was engaged in preparing explosive charges.

**Nahez Salim abu-Namous** (b. 1989) joined the al-Qassam Brigades in 2007 and underwent infantry and mortar training.

**Hussam Muhammed al-Majaida** (b. 1982) joined Hamas in 2004 and a year later the al-Qassam Brigades. He was active in the Executive Force of the Palestinian Police established by Hamas in 2006.

**Hassan Maher Hassan Aruk** (b. 1985) was active in the al-Qassam Brigades and was stationed in front-line positions.

**Hamza Oudeh Muhammad al-Khalidi** (b. 1983) was active in Jaysh al-Ummah, an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Gaza Strip.

**Muhammad al-Dasuki** (b. 1982), active in the Popular Resistance Forces, suspected of involvement in the terrorist attack against a U.S. convoy in the Gaza Strip in October 2003.

Note: The UN Gaza Report itself establishes that: “...if the members of the law enforcement agency are at the same time members of an armed group, they would be combatants.” (431)
"During its visits to the Gaza Strip, the Mission witnessed the extent of the destruction of residential housing caused by air strikes, mortar and artillery shelling, missile strikes, the operation of bulldozers and demolition charges. The destruction of housing was carried out in the absence of any link to combat operations." (53)
"The Mission is unable to make any determination on the general allegation that Palestinian armed groups used mosques for military purposes." (486)
You can see a mosque where weaponry was stored.

Mosque stockpiled with Grads and Qassam rockets

Hamas attacking Ibn Taymmiyah mosque, Rafah, August 14, 2009
Sources Used by the Gaza Report Which Raise Doubts About the Veracity or Reliability of Its Conclusions:

1. Jessica Montell, Executive Director of B’Tselem

2. “Soldiers Breaking the Silence”

3. UN Gaza Report
Jessica Montell, Executive Director of B’Tselem - Israeli Human Rights NGO Extensively Cited in the Gaza Report:

“I was disturbed by the framing of Israel’s military operation as part of “an overall policy aimed at punishing the Gaza population for its resilience.” The facts presented in the report itself would not seem to support such a far-reaching conclusion. In light of the sweeping conclusions regarding Israel, the very careful phrasing regarding Hamas abuses is particularly conspicuous. The mission did not find conclusive evidence regarding Hamas’ use of mosques and civilian buildings for military purposes, nor does it criticize Hamas’ firing from and shielding themselves within civilian areas. The evidence accumulated over the past eight months regarding both these phenomenon cannot be ignored.”

Read more at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jessica-montell/the-goldstone-report-on-g_b_306500.html
“Soldiers Breaking the Silence”: Testimonies that Were Left Out of the UN Gaza Report:

“There were briefings by commanders on the importance of not harming civilians and property in the houses that the forces entered and also an order was given that forbids sleeping on Palestinians’ beds.”

“There was an explicit order not to shoot towards people carrying white flags.”

“The assumption was that if civilians are encountered they are to be sent to an area far from the theater of combat. The soldiers reported on their communications devices the movement of civilians in order to prevent their being harmed by other forces.”
“The Mission notes that those interviewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about the presence of or conduct of hostilities by the Palestinian armed groups. Whatever the reasons for their reluctance, the Mission does not discount that the interviewees’ reluctance may have stemmed from a fear of reprisals.” (440)