
Migration from the Muslim World to the West: Its Most Recent Trends and Effects

Arno Tausch

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes patterns of global migration during the last five years, often associated with the “European refugee crisis” since summer 2015, documented by the World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix data (BMM). Based on cross-national data, gathered and documented for this analysis, the article also provides first quantitative analyses of the predictable effects of the rising migration from the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) countries on the societies of the host countries. With around a third of the total immigrant population originating from OIC countries, the growing future Muslim presence in European politics and economics is not a fantasy but a reality. The European Union has become the world’s leading magnet of global migration, with around a fifth of global migration now flowing into the EU countries. Europe seems to have found—as yet—no coherent answer to this. It takes little imagination to realize that the expected monumental shifts in the underlying demographics of Western countries, caused by Muslim mass migration, may have very serious and even dramatic effects on the future support for the state of Israel and on its backing among the populations of the leading Western military and economic powers. The article shows that in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, rich Arab immigration-hosting countries, hitherto the main recipients of OIC migration, became more restrictive in their immigration policies, while a considerable proportion of OIC migration now turned to Europe, accelerated by the instabilities wrought by the civil war in Syria. Contrary to the assumptions of the dominant “welcome culture” in the media and the academia of most West European countries, the negative social and political consequences of this mass migration, especially for gender relations and the overall inequality dimensions, cannot be overlooked and are spelled out in this article, relying on multivariate analysis of the relevant international cross-national data.

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This article analyzes patterns of global migration during the last five years, often associated with the rise of migration to Europe and the “European refugee crisis”¹ since summer 2015, documented by the World Bank *Bilateral Migration Matrix* data (*BMM*),² which allows researchers to analyze migration from every country of the world to every other country of the world.

The article aims to shed new light on these issues based on a thorough, global, and quantitative analysis of the international flows of the now more than 265 million global migrants. Based on cross-national data, gathered and documented for this analysis, it also provides first quantitative analyses of the predictable effects of these processes on the societies of the host countries of this rising global and OIC (countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) migration.³

The potential consequences of growing Muslim mass migration for the state of Israel, for the entire West, and for the worldwide Jewish communities are manifold. Recent Gallup data suggest that millions of people from countries often fundamentally and violently opposing Israel, and in which hating Jews is endemic,⁴ now want to migrate to the leading Western military powers, hitherto providing vital support to the Jewish state. At the end of the day and on a global scale, there are now 166 million people willing to emigrate to the United States, 46 million people to the United Kingdom, and 39 million people to France. The large majority of them are from poorer developing countries, above all in the Muslim world.

It takes little imagination to realize that, within just one to two decades, these expected monumental shifts in the underlying demographics of Western countries, caused by Muslim mass migration, may have very serious and even dramatic effects on the future support for the state of Israel and on its backing among the populations of the leading Western powers, and also on the Jewish populations living in Western democracies. With around a third of the total immigrant population in the entire EU-28 now originating from Turkey and the other OIC countries,⁵ the growing future Muslim presence in European politics and economics is not a fantasy but a reality.⁶ As this article will show, the European Union has recently become the world’s leading magnet of global migration, with around a fifth of global migration now flowing into the EU countries. There is no indication whatsoever that this is a temporary phenomenon that will abate in the near future. Europe seems to have found—as yet—no coherent answer to the refugee crisis and to the challenges of mass migration across the Mediterranean.⁷

Thus one of the undoubted effects of the recent global migratory movements to Europe is what they portend in the long term for the rise of anti-Semitism

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and for Israeli security. This crisis is also combined with other intensifying economic and institutional shortcomings of the European Union and the European Monetary Union, which were already evident even before the economic crisis of 2008, and which will come to the fore in a downward spiral of European politics and economics in the near future.⁸ If anything, the problems will worsen after Brexit⁹ and the elections to the European Parliament in 2019.¹⁰

This article's central message is that in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, rich Arab immigration-hosting countries, hitherto the main recipients of OIC migration, became more restrictive in their immigration policies, while a considerable proportion of OIC migration has now turned to Europe, accelerated by the instabilities wrought by the civil war in Syria.

Contrary to the assumptions of the dominant "welcome culture" in the media and the academia of most West European countries,¹¹ the negative social and political consequences of this mass migration, especially for gender relations and the overall inequality dimensions, cannot be overlooked. We test these relationships with multivariate analyses of these effects of migration processes on development indicators of the countries of the world, duly considering key economic, geographical, and political variables influencing these processes such as geographical latitude, geographical distance from Europe, income levels, and years of membership in the European Union.¹² The chosen methodologies for these cross-national tests of the effects of migration are partial correlation analyses and promax factor analyses, which are among the standard contemporary tools of multivariate analysis in the social sciences.¹³ The focus will be particularly on the effects of migration from the OIC countries.

This article is part of a larger research project that analyzes the consequences of the welcome culture after the refugee crisis of summer 2015 and thereafter for the long-term social and political processes of Western democracies. The current article now deals with the quantitative analysis of these migration processes. The aim of the research effort is to challenge the hitherto-existing "air superiority" of a naïve welcome culture among Western political elites, the leading Western universities and research centers, and also among the main liberal and moderate left-wing media in Western countries.

BACKGROUND

THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION SYSTEM ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

In a recent study by one of the important American geostrategic think tanks, Carnegie Europe describes the current dilemmas of European migration policy:

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Europe continues to face its greatest migration wave since the end of World War II. The majority of migrants are arriving from outside the continent, especially the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) but also the Sahel and, increasingly, Asia. In March 2017, Frontex, the EU's frontier agency, warned that the number of people undertaking the Central Mediterranean crossing was on the rise. With the arrival of summer, the next wave of MENA migration into Europe is about to be unleashed. A May 2017 German government report warned that up to 6.6 million people were clustered around the Mediterranean preparing to cross to Europe from Africa, awaiting favorable summer weather to launch to sea. Now that the Western Balkan migration route has been closed, Libya is fast becoming the main transition point, reportedly with 2.5 million migrants in North Africa waiting to cross by boat. Meanwhile, over 3 million remain stalled in Turkey, prevented from entering Europe by the EU's March 2016 refugee deal with the Turkish government. The figures could be higher still: some estimates put the number of migrants preparing to enter Europe as high as 8–10 million. The uninterrupted flow of migration into the EU has redefined Europe's geostrategic position. Today, Europe's Southern border runs deep into Africa along the Sahel and across the Middle East. Southern Europe in particular remains exposed and vulnerable to pressure from MENA migration flows, which have had two ripple effects.¹⁴

The Carnegie Foundation points out the following consequences of this growing mass migration:

1. The progressive erosion of the EU's Schengen system of passport-free travel across Europe.
2. The growing polarization among states across the continent, with fundamental and increasingly sharp divisions on the question of resettlement of the newly arriving immigrants especially between Germany and Central and Eastern Europe.
3. Europeans' initial calm, goodwill, and even enthusiasm for the new arrivals and welcome culture have given way to growing public anger.
4. Public confidence in European governments' ability to deal with the crisis has rapidly declined.

The study notes that the current EU debate on how to tackle the crisis seems to have bifurcated into two strands:¹⁵

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- The European Commission and some countries, especially Germany, have made demands for European solidarity on resettlement quotas for the migrants who have already arrived in Europe.
- Other EU member states have demanded the slowdown of immigration flows by closing off access routes or increasing financial aid to migration transition countries outside Europe to keep the migrants in place.¹⁶
- One of the most likely consequences, according to the Carnegie study, is the strengthening of right-wing and populist political parties that oppose mass migration in upcoming elections.

THE POLITICAL AND ACADEMIC LEFT DOES NOT GRASP THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS

In contrast, most published analyses in the social sciences—especially in Europe—have hitherto highlighted what they perceive as the dangers of rampant “Islamophobia” and offer so-called critical “discourse” analyses of the arguments of right-wing political parties that oppose mass migration from Muslim countries.¹⁷ Certainly the recent mass migration from the Muslim world to Europe seems to have worked as an accelerant, fanning the flames of anti-Semitism, racism, right-wing populism, and fatigue with democracy, already mounting in the region since the 2008 economic crisis.¹⁸ To this should be added the widespread poverty and inequality caused by the long-term effects of austerity policies along with the 2008 crisis.¹⁹

Empirical analyses from the field of political psychology quite correctly warn about the dehumanization involved in recent political right-wing discourse about refugees.²⁰ Not atypically for the state of the debate in Europe, the left-wing German Jewish intellectual Max Czollek, in his much-acclaimed²¹ recent essay “Disintegrate Yourself,”²² even called for “radical diversity” as an answer to the strengthening of right-wing and populist political forces in Europe and maintained:

Jews should not make the mistake to think that because Muslims currently are the main focus of attacks from the right that we will be spared. They may burn the mosques now, but they will burn the synagogues later.... I argue that the central concept we must get rid of is the concept of integration. Only then will we be able to honestly appeal to the quarter of the German population who are (post)migrants to help us defeat this resurgence of Nazi-thought.... We need to reach out to other marginalized groups because, ultimately, the challenge the right-wing poses is the challenge to our very existence. It also means to appeal to

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the part of the German population that refuses to align with the normalization of racist, chauvinistic and arrogant modes of thinking. We will have none of it. And we will not give up easily. This is what de-integration means.²³

Left-wing supporters of the welcome culture were quick to accuse what they call “football thugs, politically active gays, Jewish academics, French celebrities, uneasy alliances of feminists and conservatives, politicians hungry for power” of being behind the belief that “Islam will overrun the West.”²⁴

Attempting to listen to what “the other side,” that is, the “migration pessimists” have to say, we find arguments critical of the policies of the European welcome culture, which include statements from the hard core of the Western defense establishment. Israeli former Chief of Staff and former Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon even told *The Times of Israel* that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was “intentionally Islamicizing Europe. People are ignoring it. It’s deliberate Islamization.”²⁵ Some security experts as well as some politicians usually associated with the left now argue that refugee flows—often consisting these days of mainly young male Muslims—are deliberately used as a kind of “Trojan horse,”²⁶ being part of an “organized invasion” of Muslims into the West.²⁷ NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, the American General Philip Breedlove, recently suggested that refugees are “weaponized” by Russia against Europe.²⁸

What, then, is our own assessment? However much, as a European author aware of the horrors of intolerance practiced by European right-wing regimes in the 1930s and 1940s, we might originally sympathize with such an approach,²⁹ the outlook epitomized by Czollek’s analysis overlooks the undeniable dark sides of the evolving situation in Western countries, especially in Europe, in the wake of sharply increased migration from the conflict zones of the Muslim world.³⁰ Indeed Czollek’s call for “radical diversity” was anticipated in the famous novel *Submission* by the French writer Michel Houellebecq, in which, in the upcoming French presidential elections of 2022, the left teams up with the Muslim Brotherhood to defeat the National Front of Marine Le Pen—after which a sharia society is introduced in France.³¹

GROWING EUROPEAN ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT MIGRATION WAVES

Much of the European academia and media still seem to be in a state of shock-induced paralysis, unable to come to terms with the challenges posed by Islamism and Muslim anti-Semitism almost two decades after 9/11 and almost half a decade after the Paris 2015 terror attacks. But these aspects are well-known to any serious analyst of developments in the region, and are often

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glossed over in the call for “radical diversity.”³² Official reports published on behalf of the European Commission now also openly highlight the dangers emanating from Islamist political violence in Europe and from Muslim anti-Semitism. Such documents also include the annual *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports*³³ as well as the reports of the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency,³⁴ including their reports on anti-Semitism³⁵ and the FRA flagship *Annual Report*.³⁶

Of the 205 terror attacks recorded in Europe in 2017, 137 (66.83%) were separatist in character, 33 (16.10%) were jihadist, 24 (11.71%) were left-wing, and 5 (2.44%) were right-wing.³⁷ Certainly, unease about “imported” anti-Semitism and even terrorism is spreading, especially among Europe’s Jewish communities.³⁸ The events in Paris on November 13, 2015, which killed at least 130 people and wounded hundreds,³⁹ along with the rising Islamist attacks on Jewish people and institutions all over Europe, are typical of this situation.⁴⁰

The Fundamental Rights Agency, in its most recent report on anti-Semitism in Europe,⁴¹ interviewed over 16,000 Jewish respondents from the entire European Union. A majority of the Jewish respondents in 9 out of 12 countries said that the Arab-Israeli conflict affects their feelings of safety “a great deal” or “a fair amount.”⁴² That majority comprised over 85% of the Jewish respondents in Belgium and France and at least 70% of them in Spain, Germany, and Denmark.⁴³ The survey also asked Jewish respondents if they felt that they were deemed responsible for the Israeli government’s actions. Half of the Jewish respondents in Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain (50%–55% depending on the country) said that people in their country “frequently” or “all the time” blame them for anything done by the Israeli government. According to the FRA report, the results suggest that in some EU member states Jewish respondents feel a close link between their safety and events taking place in Israel as well as relations between Israel and its neighbors.⁴⁴

What the FRA calls the “normalization of anti-Semitism” is also evidenced, according to the report,

by the wide range of perpetrators, which spans the entire social and political spectrum. The most frequently mentioned categories of perpetrators of the most serious incident of antisemitic harassment experienced by the respondents include someone they did not know (31%); someone with an extremist Muslim view (30%); someone with a left-wing political view (21%); a colleague from work or school/college (16%); an acquaintance or friend (15%); and someone with a right-wing political view (13%).⁴⁵

We are inclined to agree with a realistic and pessimistic long-term scenario of migration to Europe, which would estimate that the problems Muslim mass migration now poses are almost unsolvable. Consolidated population-weighted

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figures compiled from international surveys suggest that 17.38% of the entire Muslim population in the world on average now support terrorist organizations and acts of terrorism (average rates of favoring Hamas, Hizbullah, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, suicide bombing) and that in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 74% of the population are anti-Semitic.⁴⁶

This scenario also would emphasize especially the long-term strategic implications of mass migration from the Muslim world to the leading Western countries, and for Israel and the Jewish communities in the West. Given the growing dependence of European political decision-making on “Turkish goodwill” to stumble along in the “refugee crisis,”⁴⁷ such a scenario would also cautiously take into account the role that Turkey’s current government now plays in global Islamism (see also below).

POPULATION PROJECTIONS TO 2050: MORE THAN 20% MUSLIMS IN EUROPE?

As background for the present empirical study, it is also worth noting what is at stake in pure demographic terms. Already some time ago, a high-ranking U.S. diplomat and security analyst, Timothy Savage, caused an uproar in the scholarly debate by stating that in light of the sheer demographics to be observed in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, Europe’s Muslim population could rise to 20% by 2050.⁴⁸ Writing more than a decade before the refugee crisis of 2015, Savage then almost prophetically stated:

Most European countries closed their doors to labor immigration in the 1970s, following the first Arab oil embargo and the subsequent economic downturn, yet some 500,000 immigrants—primarily family reunification cases—and 400,000 asylum seekers arrive in western Europe each year. According to the International Organization for Migration, Muslims make up a large and increasing proportion of both groups, coming primarily from Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia. Muslims probably also make up a significant proportion of western Europe’s illegal immigrants (between 120,000 and 500,000 enter the EU annually). Indeed, in a number of European countries, the words “Muslim” and “immigrant” are virtually synonymous.⁴⁹

Only to add:

Currently, the waves of immigrants and asylum seekers from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)—the region with the world’s second-highest fertility rate—have had more to do with the worsening conditions in the MENA countries than with labor shortages in Europe, the region with the world’s lowest fertility rate. As the MENA population doubles in the next three decades

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and Europe's shrinks, increased migratory flows from south to north appear unavoidable—a trend augmented by Europe's graying population, as opposed to the youthful MENA average. In 2000 the UN projected that, to counterbalance their increasingly graying populations, EU states annually would need 949,000 migrants to maintain their 1995 populations; 1,588,000 migrants to maintain their 1995 working-age populations; or 13,480,000 migrants to maintain their population support ratios (the ratio of people aged 15-64 to those aged 65 and older).⁵⁰

In light of recent more sophisticated population projections (see below), it should be emphasized that Savage also observed already in his 2004 article that the Muslim birthrate in Europe is “higher than that of non-Muslims,” contributing to what he called the “burgeoning numbers of Muslims in Europe” even if no further migration were to occur. As a result, he predicted that Muslim communities in Europe would be “significantly younger than the non-Muslim population” and that Europe's “Generation X” and “Millennium Generation” would include considerably more Muslims than would the continent's population as a whole.

Savage also highlighted that one-third of France's five million Muslims are under the age of 20 (compared to 21% of the French population as a whole); one-third of Germany's Muslims are under 18 (compared to 18% of the German population as a whole); one-third of the United Kingdom's Muslims are under 15 (compared to 20% of the British population as a whole); and one-third of Belgium's Muslims are under 15 (compared to 18% of the country's population as a whole). Savage concluded by noting that conservative projections estimated that, compared to 5% at the time of his analysis, Muslims would constitute 20% of Europe's population by 2050.⁵¹

Compared to the key findings of more recent and sophisticated population projections (see below), Savage was also not far off the mark at least for key EU countries. He also drew the attention of global scholarship to the fact that the growing Muslim presence in Europe has tended to cluster geographically within individual states, particularly in industrialized, urban areas within clearly defined, poorer neighborhoods such as Berlin's Kreuzberg district, London's Tower Hamlets, and the banlieues (suburbs) of major French cities:

Two fifths of Muslims in the United Kingdom reside in the greater London area; one-third of Muslims in France live in or around Paris; and one-third of Muslims in Germany are concentrated in the Ruhr industrial area. Muslims now constitute more than 25 percent of the population of Marseille; 20 percent of Malmo, Sweden; 15 percent of Brussels and Birmingham, as well as Paris; and 10 percent or more of London, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Oslo, and Copenhagen.⁵²

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A recent study by the Washington-based Pew Research Center revealed the relevance of this approach.⁵³ The study relies on state-of-the-art demographic modeling developed at the IIASA research center in Laxenburg near Vienna.⁵⁴ The baseline for all three Pew European Muslim population scenarios is that the Muslim population in Europe (defined here as the 28 countries of the European Union before Brexit, plus the countries of the European Economic Area—EEA—closely associated with the European Union, i.e., in the Pew study Norway and Switzerland)⁵⁵ as of mid-2016 is estimated at 25.8 million (4.9% of the overall population)—up from 19.5 million (3.8%) in 2010. Even if all migration into Europe were to immediately and permanently stop—a “zero migration” scenario—the Muslim population of Europe still would be expected to rise from the current level of 4.9% to 7.4% by the year 2050.⁵⁶ This is because Muslims are younger (by 13 years on average) and have higher fertility (a difference of one child more per woman, on average, than the rest of the European population) than other Europeans, mirroring a global pattern. A second, “medium” migration scenario assumes that all refugee flows will stop as of mid-2016 but that recent levels of “regular” migration to Europe will continue (i.e., migration of those who come for reasons other than seeking asylum). Under these conditions, Muslims already could reach 11.2% of Europe’s population in 2050.⁵⁷

Finally, the most realistic “high” Pew migration scenario projects the record flow of refugees into Europe from 2014 to 2016 to continue indefinitely into the future with the same religious composition (i.e., mostly made up of Muslims) in addition to the typical annual flow of regular migrants.⁵⁸ In this scenario Muslims could make up 14% of Europe’s population by 2050—nearly triple the current share.⁵⁹

Also worth considering are some of the country implications of these demographic trends. Germany’s population (6% Muslim in 2016) would be projected to be about 20% Muslim by 2050 in the high scenario—a reflection of the fact that Germany has accepted many Muslim refugees in recent years—compared to 11% in the medium scenario and 9% in the zero-migration scenario. Sweden, which also has accepted a relatively high number of refugees, would experience even greater effects if the migration levels from 2014 to mid-2016 were to continue indefinitely: Sweden’s Muslim population (8% in 2016) could grow to 31% in the high scenario by 2050, compared to 21% in the medium scenario and 11% with no further Muslim migration.

An estimated 3.7 million Muslims migrated to Europe from mid-2010 to mid-2016. They include approximately 2.5 million regular migrants entering legally as workers, students, and so on, as well as 1.3 million Muslims who have been or are expected to be granted refugee status including an estimated 980,000 Muslim refugees who arrived from 2014 to mid-2016.⁶⁰

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Non-Muslim migration to Europe was much smaller. From mid-2010 to mid-2016 only an estimated 1.9 million Christians emigrated to Europe, followed numerically by people with no religious affiliation (410,000), Buddhists (390,000), and Hindus (350,000). Christians made up only 30% of regular migrants (1.6 million regular Christian migrants) and only 16% of all refugees (250,000 Christian refugees).⁶¹ This dovetails with the conspicuous silence in the West about Christianity as the most persecuted religion worldwide. One does not necessarily have to share the values and convictions of the religious right in America to arrive at the conclusion that Western migration policy has done little to support Christians in countries where they indeed suffer from massive restrictions and even persecutions.⁶² According to Open Doors, the organization monitoring Christian persecution, 215 million Christians experience high levels of persecution in the countries on the group's World Watch List. This amounts to 1 in 12 Christians worldwide.⁶³ North Korea is ranked number one for the 17th consecutive year as the most dangerous country for Christians. During the World Watch List 2018 reporting period, 3,066 Christians were killed, 1,252 were abducted, 1,020 were raped or sexually harassed, and 793 churches were attacked. Islamist oppression fuels Christian persecution in 8 of the top 10 countries.⁶⁴

The Pew population projections offer a realistic image of what European politics will look like three decades from now (Map 1 and Table 1).

THE END OF THE "TURKISH TANGO"

Migration optimists would respond to all this by saying that by promoting democracy and free trade in Europe's neighborhood, migration problems can be solved and peaceful relations between the participating countries will ensue, thus promoting a zone of peace in the Mediterranean.⁶⁵


In the rhetoric of official EU policies, this—now rather waning—scenario still plays an important role, as a look at the official websites of the European Commission and the European Parliament will show.⁶⁶ The anchors of this policy were:

- Accepting Islam in the European Union⁶⁷
- Combating anti-Muslim hatred⁶⁸
- Enhancing the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)⁶⁹
- Offering a perspective for Turkey—making it an EU member⁷⁰
- Orderly migration⁷¹
- Solving the refugee crisis in Europe⁷²

Table 1: Projected Muslim population shares in Europe by 2050 according to the Pew Center

Country	Muslim population share in 2050 in %	Country	Muslim population share in 2050 in %
Sweden	30.6	Luxembourg	9.9
Cyprus	28.3	Greece	9.7
Austria	19.9	Spain	7.2
Germany	19.7	Slovenia	5.2
Belgium	18.2	Hungary	4.5
France	18	Ireland	4.4
United Kingdom	17.2	Portugal	2.5
Norway	17	Croatia	2.1
Malta	16.2	Czech Republic	1.2
Denmark	16	Estonia	1
Netherlands	15.2	Romania	0.9
Finland	15	Slovakia	0.7
Italy	14.1	Latvia	0.4
Switzerland	12.9	Lithuania	0.2
Bulgaria	11.6	Poland	0.2

Map 1: Projected Muslim population shares in Europe by 2050 according to the Pew Center



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Turkey, the country of origin of millions of migrants to Europe and partner of the West since the end of the Second World War, was given an especially important role in this scenario, both in the context of migration and also in that of possible future EU membership. It was hoped that society and politics in Turkey would eventually develop along a “Muslim Calvinist” or “Islamic Calvinist” trajectory,⁷³ thus providing an alternative to radicalization and Islamism, especially after the 9/11 attacks. To be both a majority-Muslim country and a stable and reliable Western ally like Turkey would prove to be possible, and at the end of the day democracy and free trade would diminish the migration processes across the Mediterranean.

Part of this scenario would be not only the EU-membership possibility for Turkey but eventually also a similar possibility for Israel, and the enhanced development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership with most of the other countries of the region.⁷⁴ In the early years of the new millennium, the European Union and the then European Commission President Romano Prodi strongly promoted this approach and called it the “ring of friends” involving a joint economic area extending between Morocco and Russia.⁷⁵ This “ring of friends” was supposed to be a countermodel to Islamist terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, creating a zone of peace in the Mediterranean. As Prodi put it at that time:

I want to see a “ring of friends” surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbors, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea. This encircling band of friendly countries will be diverse. The quality of our relations with them will largely depend on their performance and the political will on either side.... The goal of [European Union] accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect? A substantive and workable concept of proximity would have a positive effect. The existing and well-functioning instruments of the EU’s policy for its neighbors are the foundations for any new approach. We should be able to combine this proposal with the variety of existing partnership, cooperation, association and stabilization agreements. But we must also better exploit their potential and build on this basis. Let me concentrate on the question of what political perspective would best extend the area of stability without immediate enlargement of the Union. We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter.⁷⁶

An important element of this approach is the idea that democracy and free trade are key requirements for peaceful relations between nations, anywhere in the world.⁷⁷ Moderate and organized migration across the Mediterranean would be part of this model, and it would be manageable and also affordable in terms of its political costs.

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The “Muslim Calvinist” model was also pinned on the assumption that there is good reason to hope that the overwhelming majority of Muslim migrants to Europe are deeply committed to democracy, the market economy, and especially the capitalist work ethos, a scenario that would facilitate the societal integration of these millions of migrants and would leave ample room for optimism for an otherwise aging continent.⁷⁸ The scenario was also connected to the view, shared by most analysts in the Western world in the early years of the 2000s, that the Turkish Republic under Erdogan was a valid countermodel to radical Islamism and that Turkey’s path was based on a conservative-liberal society. Turkey—in all aspects, involving both migration and EU expansion—would have been the anchor for this model; and Turkey’s eventual EU membership would also prove to the rest of the world that Europe was not exclusively a “Christian club.”⁷⁹

Turkey, an active member of NATO since 1952,⁸⁰ to this day plays a pivotal role in the refugee deal between the European Union and Turkey since the refugee crisis of 2015, making Europe still more dependent on its partnership with Ankara.⁸¹

The initial empirical studies on “Islamic Calvinism” all focused on the deeply religious and hard-working Turkish regions of Central Anatolia, where Erdogan’s political party, the AKP, had and still has its strongest power base. The positive assessment of Turkey’s role as a Western ally with a majority-Muslim population also underlay the decision by European leaders, reached in Helsinki in 1999, to grant Turkey after all the status of an official candidate for EU membership after the first promises in this respect were already made in the so-called Ankara Agreement of 1963 between the then European Economic Community of six countries and Turkey.⁸²

A large number of key Western decision-makers in both the United States and the European Union shared this hope, overlooking the “small print” of the deeply Islamist origins of the AKP and the role played by such radical Islamist organizations as Milli Görüş,⁸³ the Muslim Brotherhood, and others in Turkey, which became evident in the country especially after 2008.⁸⁴

The illusions held and even cultivated by Western politicians, military and intelligence officials, academics, foreign policy strategists, and other members of the Western “foreign policy machinery”—the present author, surely part of this machinery, included—may be understandable, but looking the other way when a political strategy encounters difficulty is never a good strategy.⁸⁵ To debate President Erdogan’s role in Turkey without mentioning his mentor and idol, Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011), the prime minister of Turkey from 1996 to 1997, is to neglect Turkish realities and the virulent anti-Semitism that characterized Erbakan’s entire political life.⁸⁶

Illusions often have a long life, including in politics. After 9/11, for Western decision-makers it sounded like “music from another planet” to read about

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the results of the NATO summit of 2004, held in Istanbul, or about the then forward-looking liberal declarations of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which is the official state institution established in 1924 to administer religion in the secular Republic of Turkey.⁸⁷ But by around 2008, the true Islamist face of the AKP Party came to the surface, and “dancing the Turkish tango” for all practical purposes came slowly to an end.⁸⁸ In 2010 the close strategic cooperation between Israel and Turkey, which began to evolve in the 1990s, most definitively ended with the *Mavi Marmara* affair when the Turkish ship, which was part of the so-called Gaza Freedom Flotilla in support of Hamas, did not heed the Israeli navy’s warnings and IDF commandos had to raid it, leading to the death of 10 Turkish activists. This event was in many ways also the turning point in Turkish foreign and domestic policies in the direction of forming alliances with Islamist forces.⁸⁹

Many observers have begun to ask themselves how Turkey still functions as a NATO member and nominally still aspires to EU membership while, for all practical purposes, it is situating itself in radical opposition to the West. The current Turkish leadership’s rhetoric is increasingly similar to that of America’s adversaries and is only rarely that of a partner and ally.⁹⁰ A recent study by the Hudson Institute, a U.S. think tank, offers this perspective:

In December 2017, U.S. national security advisor General H. R. McMaster singled out Turkey and Qatar as prime sources of funding for extremist Islamist ideology globally. Roughly at the time of McMaster’s pronouncement, his point was unwittingly reinforced by a key mouthpiece of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the editor of the Islamist daily *Yeni Şafak*, Ibrahim Karagül: “Turkey is emerging as a new power center opposing the United States, the world’s strongest power...the matter is no longer about Jerusalem or about Turkey and Israel. It is a showdown between the United States and Turkey.” Karagül went on to claim that America’s aim was to occupy Islam’s holy sites, Mecca and Medina.⁹¹

Thus, to this day, European politics does not seem to have found a coherent strategy for integrating Muslim minorities.⁹² Instead the discernible patterns are a growing political radicalization of the European majority population along with a significant trend of radicalization among segments of the Muslim immigrant population.⁹³ And a weak and internally divided European Union, affected by several other internal and external crises such as Brexit,⁹⁴ the malfunctioning of the European Monetary Union,⁹⁵ and the lack of a coherent European foreign policy,⁹⁶ seems to be stumbling its way through this predicament.

DATA AND METHODS

This article relies on the original data on bilateral migration in the countries of the world as presented in the exhaustive *Bilateral Migration Matrix (BMM)*,⁹⁷ collected by the World Bank for the periods of 2013 and 2017.⁹⁸

The *Bilateral Migration Matrix* contains information on how many people from 217 countries, regions, and regional entities are present in each of the 217 countries, regions, and regional entities. That makes 47,089 data for 2013 and 47,089 data for 2017, or 94,178 data in all. From these 94,178 data almost unlimited further statistical information can be extracted. What was the exact number of people from, say, Afghanistan or Albania migrating to Zambia or Zimbabwe in 2013 and in 2017, and what was the increase of this number over time? The challenges to providing an exact, compact summary of the most important findings from this mass of data are considerable.

The migration data obtained by analyzing the World Bank *BMM* data were then tested for their quantitative, statistical relationships with standard global development data.⁹⁹ Appendix Table 4 documents all our variables and the sources for these analyses.

As indicated earlier, this article is part of a growing research tradition of studying issues of migration and asylum with quantitative and cross-national data.¹⁰⁰ In accordance with a vast tradition in economics and other quantitative social science, this research tradition attempts to explain the drivers and the macroeconomic and social consequences of migration at the level of the nation-state (or regional subunits).¹⁰¹ The statistical methodology for drawing conclusions from the cross-national data relied here on the well-known techniques of partial correlations and promax factor analysis, which are standard procedures in quantitative social science.¹⁰²

Our independent variables were approximately time-matched with the dependent variables of our partial correlation analyses:

- The EU as recipient of global migration from this country in %
- Migration balance per inward migration in %
- Share of total immigrant population per total population in %
- Share of total immigration from OIC countries in % of total inward immigration

In our partial correlation analyses of the effects of the welcome culture and increased migration from Muslim countries, we held the following variables constant:

- *Absolute geographical latitude*: Easterly, William, New York University—Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, May 2000, “The

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Middle-Class Consensus and Economic Development,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2346, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=630718.

- *Distance to Belgium*: http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6
- *Income per capita, 2010 (EU = 100)*: calculated from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator>
- *Income 2013 (EU = 100) ^2*: calculated from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator>
- *Years of membership in the EU, 2010*: website of European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm and EU Scadplus http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index.htm, as well as <http://www.state.gov>

So that we could present meaningful conclusions from the *BMM*, we worked with the following country groupings, taking the divisions into the old and new member states of the European Union, the BRICS countries, and Turkey particularly into consideration:

- Australia, Canada, New Zealand
- Brazil
- China
- EU-15 (“old members” of the European Union)
- High-income Arab countries
- India
- Mexico
- New EU member states
- OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation)
- Russia
- South Africa
- Rest of the World (RoW)
- Turkey
- USA

The Appendix lists the country groupings of the analysis.

In order to test the empirically observable consequences of the welcome culture, we also performed a factor analysis of the main available internationally comparable variables of democracy and migration policy. Table 2 lists the variables used for our model. For 110 countries there were fully available data.

Table 2: Variables of our factor analytical model of international democracy and migration policy

	Percentage of total variance explained (0 = 0%; 1 = 100%)
Combined Failed States Index	0.911
Civil and Political Liberties violations	0.901
Closing economic gender gap	0.681
Closing educational gender gap	0.748
Closing health and survival gender gap	0.525
Closing of global gender gap, overall score 2009	0.897
Closing political gender gap	0.672
Corruption avoidance measure	0.896
Democracy measure	0.858
Rule of law	0.911
Immigration – share of population 2005 (%)	0.816
Net international migration rate, 2005-2010	0.645
Overall Development Index based on 35 variables	0.925
Share of international immigrant stock (%)	0.806
Asylum seekers as permille of total population	0.846
Asylum recognition rate	0.527
Global Terrorism Index	0.735
Effective Democracy Index	0.949
HDI 2012 (UNDP Human Development Index, 2012)	0.828
Share of total immigration. OIC countries 2013, in %	0.533
Migration balance per inward migration 2013	0.69
EU as recipient of global migration from this country in %, 2013	0.527

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We should recall that a reduction in the number of foreign residents in a given country basically can have the following main reasons:

- a) The target country of migration has become less attractive to this specific immigrant community, and migrants have returned to their home country because of the movement of wages, employment, inequality ratios, and so on in the target country or improved economic conditions in the home country or both.
- b) The acquisition of citizenship of the target country by members of the migrant community. Migrants thus disappear from the screens of the *BMM* because they are now citizens of the target country and are no longer counted as migrants.
- c) Deteriorating political, social, or ecological conditions in the target country and/or improved conditions in the home country, or rising xenophobia against members of the immigrant community among citizens of the target country.
- d) Toughening migration policy rules for citizens of the foreign country, applied by the host country (“Send them back”).
- e) Migrants have become illegal aliens in the target country and disappeared from the screens of the statistical system underlying the *BMM*.

RESULTS

The information contained in the *Bilateral Migration Matrix* was first of all processed in three Appendix tables. Appendix Table 1 analyzes the shifts in the global patterns of migration, 2013-2017. Appendix Table 2 analyzes the shifts in the patterns of migration to the EU-28, now the global number-one destination of global migration, 2013-2017. Appendix Table 3 shows the shifts in the patterns of migration to the United States, now the global number-two destination of global migration, 2013-2017.

In the following we briefly summarize our initial results. The statistical tables in this article contain the distilled most important statistical information from the *BMM*. Our survey of results also contains a subchapter, which may be more interesting for specialists than for the general readership of this article.

- In a nutshell, global migration patterns changed considerably from 2013 to 2017, with Turkey, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States,

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South Africa, Uganda, Oman, Malaysia, Kuwait, Canada, the Russian Federation, Angola, and France (in descending order) taking in more than half a million or more additional migrants in 2017 than in 2013, while Saudi Arabia and Pakistan reduced the number of migrants residing in these respective two countries by half a million or more migrants each. That is, Turkey and Germany dramatically increased their inward migration while Saudi Arabia and Pakistan dramatically reduced it.

- In 2017 just four states in world society were the target of more than 10 million migrants each (United States, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Russian Federation) and another 10 countries (United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Canada, France, Australia, Spain, Italy, Ukraine, India, and Turkey) hosted 5 to 10 million migrants each. Together these 14 countries were the target of more than 57% of overall global migration.
- Just three countries increased their outward migration by one million migrants or more than in 2013: Syria, India, and South Sudan, while only one country—Mexico—decreased its outward migration by one million people or more than in 2013.
- In 2017 just 10 states were the source of five million or more outward migrants to other countries: in descending order, India, Mexico, Russian Federation, China, Bangladesh, Syria, Pakistan, Ukraine, Philippines, and Afghanistan. These 10 countries already accounted for some 35% of global outward migration, documented in our tables.
- From 2013 to 2017 there were also some more dramatic shifts, this time in the pattern of migration-sending countries to the European Union. Sixteen countries increased their migration stock residing in the European Union by 100,000 or more people each: Syria, Poland, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, China, Spain, Hungary, Moldova, Iraq, India, Greece, Portugal, Pakistan, and Croatia. Apart from increased migration from the poorer European east and south, the inflow of new migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan was considerable. At the same time (i.e., 2017), the number of nationals from Serbia, Albania, and Russia residing in the European Union was reduced by 100,000 or more people than in 2013.
- Among the EU countries, the following 14 migration-sending countries had a million or more nationals residing in a (another) country of the EU-28 (in descending order): Romania, Poland, Morocco, Turkey, Russian

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Federation, Germany, Italy, Algeria, India, Portugal, Ukraine, United Kingdom, France, and China.

- For a number of decades now, migration to the United States has been dominated by inflows from the Asia-Pacific region and from Latin America. But the United States was also not immune to the general trends analyzed in this article. In the United States, the largest immigrant communities with more than a million people are nowadays from (in descending order) Mexico, India, China, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, El Salvador, Vietnam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the Republic of Korea and thus have a relatively small share of people of Islamic faith. But Appendix Table 3 also shows the trends of increased Muslim migration to the United States over the period 2013–2017. This is all the more significant because in those five years, under the Obama administration, the number of foreign residents from stable and long-term political allies of the United States, like Germany or South Korea, declined considerably. In addition, migration to the United States from other close friends and allies such as Canada, Poland, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines corresponds to this pattern. Reducing the migrant stock from friends and allies as a de facto policy of the Obama administration is also evident from the cases of Romania, Hungary, Ireland, Colombia, Chile, Thailand, Greece, and Lithuania, of which there were now 10,000 to 500,000 fewer migrants residing in the United States than in 2013. At the same time, under the Obama administration the number of migrants from some Muslim countries to the United States increased considerably. The number of Tunisians residing in the United States, for example, now increased by 110,000 from 2013 to 2017. During the same period, the number of migrants to the United States from Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Gambia, Turkey, Malaysia, Yemen, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait increased by 10,000 to 100,000.

Aggregating our data according to major country groupings, we can draw the following conclusions. Table 3 shows that the 15 old center countries of the European Union (i.e., the 15 countries forming the community before the big EU enlargement since 2004) are already the main target of global migration, now taking in some 20% of global migrants, while the United States now even trails Europe and takes in less than 18% of global immigration. One could state pointedly that U.S. policy is to attract engineers from India, while Europe takes in asylum-driven migration from the Muslim world. Compared to the almost magnetic effects in the direction of Europe, the role of the rich Arab immigration countries (global recipient share of 10.8%) and of Australia,

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Canada, and New Zealand (global recipient share of 6%) as other, alternative targets of global migration from the Muslim countries is now far smaller, and has diminished in importance over time. The table also provides insight into other discernible shifts of global migration patterns, 2013-2017.

Graph 1 and Graph 2 further highlight the shifts that have taken place over time—with “Old Europe” now in the dominant role of global migration recipient number one, while the United States, the Dominion countries, and the rich Arab countries have all reduced their role as global migration target countries.

Clearly, Turkey and neighboring Muslim OIC states as well as South Africa have also become significant destination countries in recent years.

Table 4 and Graphs 3 and 4 show that poorer Muslim countries and the rest of the world now account for over 60% of global migration senders. Apart from India, the poorer Muslim countries are also the countries with a very high increase of migration over time, while Mexico’s high outward profile in 2013 was significantly diminished in the last five years by restrictive U.S. immigration policies.

The following section highlights some further trends for the specialists and may be skipped over by the general readership. These readers may directly continue at the next section, “The Growing Muslim Migration to Europe.”

HIGHLIGHTING SOME FURTHER TRENDS FOR SPECIALISTS

Graphs 3 and 4 further highlight these inexorable shifts in global migration patterns to be observed from 2013 to 2017.

A growing large part of global migration now originates from the Muslim world, from India, and from poor countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, listed here among the “other countries.”

Compared to these global shifts, increasing global migration from Europe’s south, devastated by the economic crisis of 2008 and its aftermaths, as well as from Europe’s east, is rather a trickle.

In the following statistical materials, we analyze the absolute numbers of people who moved across borders around the globe from 2013 to 2017 (Graphs 5-9). They highlight the huge numbers of people involved in the almost tectonic shifts in the structures of global migration in those years. It again emerges that the European center countries of the “old” EU-15 became the target region of growing migration from the poor countries of the Muslim world and from Sub-Saharan Africa. In absolute numbers, the increases in the number of people residing in another country both from the poor countries of the Muslim world and from Sub-Saharan Africa, in a time span of just five years, amount to more than five million people.

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There was an increase of more than four million migrants in the center of the European Union. Apart from Turkey, Europe has become the real center of global migration flows.

Graph 7 shows that these shifts in global migration affected the EU-15 far more dramatically than the United States, South Africa, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and also the rich Arab countries. Whereas in the rich Arab countries there were around 150,000 fewer migrants than in 2013, and the United States, South Africa, and the traditional “Dominion emigration countries” of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand took in only around an additional 1.1 to 1.3 million migrants, the number of migrants in Europe has recently increased by 4.2 million people. The above-described increases in global migration also led to an influx of almost 2.6 million additional migrants to Turkey, almost 3.0 million additional migrants to neighboring Muslim countries, and 4.6 million additional migrants to the rest of the world.

Graph 8 looks at the shifts among the major migration-sending countries. Around the world there were three big winners and one big loser in the process of transnational migration. The winners were the Muslim countries, the poorer nations of Africa, and India, and the big loser was Mexico. There were more than five million migrants more from the OIC countries than in 2013, and migration from the countries of the “rest of the world”—in their great majority poorer nations in Africa—also increased by more than five million people, while global migration from India increased by more than 2.5 million people. In the same period Mexico’s global migration decreased by more than a million people, and compared to the other big global migration flows, the increase in global migration by one million people from the new member states of the European Union is a relatively smaller, not to say negligible quantity.


Finally, Table 5 and Graph 9 highlight the share of migration from OIC countries in the countries of the EU-15 by international comparison. OIC inward migration in the EU-15 plays a far larger role than in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and in the United States. The table shows, for example, that in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand the share of migrants from China is 8.41%, from the EU-15 it is 25.56%, from India it is 7.20%, and so on, while in Brazil 42.14% of migrants were from the EU-15. The share of the poorer Muslim countries in total inward migration in, say, Brazil was 4.82%, in China 8.21%, in Mexico 0.33%, and so on.

Table 3: Global migration recipients

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	% Global migration recipients 2017	% Global migration recipients 2013	DYN (dynamics) (%) of receiving migration recipients
EU-15	53,236,081	49,022,956	20.035	19.873	0.162
Rest of the world (RoW)	48,805,058	44,217,075	18.367	17.925	0.443
USA	47,493,736	46,136,362	17.874	18,703	-0.829
Other OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation)	37,377,361	34,381,116	14.067	13,938	0.129
High-income Arab countries	28,791,346	28,944,870	10.835	11.734	-0.898
Australia, Canada, New Zealand	16,279,434	15,134,034	6.127	6.135	-0.008
Russia	11,652,102	11,048,064	4.385	4,479	-0.094
India	5,188,550	5,338,486	1.953	2.164	-0.211
Turkey	5,092,286	2,504,519	1.916	1.015	0.901
New EU member states	4,532,297	4,429,816	1.706	1.796	-0.09
South Africa	4,035,585	2,685,233	1.519	1.089	0.43
China	1,483,938	1,133,324	0.558	0.459	0.099
Mexico	1,009,532	1,103,460	0.38	0.447	-0.067
Brazil	736,913	599,678	0.277	0.243	0.034
Total	265,714,219	246,678,993	100	100	xx

Migration from the Muslim World to the West

Graph 1: Global migration recipients



Graph 2: The dynamics of receiving global migration





Table 4: Global migration senders


	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	% Global migration senders 2017	% Global migration senders 2013	DYN % Migration Senders
Rest of the world (RoW)	78,011,143	72,952,765	30.833	30.45	0.383
Other OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation)	76,499,155	71,244,337	30.235	29.737	0.499
EU-15	22,947,367	22,514,781	9.07	9.397	-0.328
India	16,444,830	13,885,099	6.5	5.795	0.704
New EU member states	14,002,830	12,857,580	5.534	5.367	0.168
Mexico	11,881,712	13,220,345	4.696	5.518	-0.822
Russia	10,961,164	10,910,492	4.332	4.554	-0.222
China	10,060,253	9,651,150	3.976	4.028	-0.052
Turkey	3,037,921	3,110,051	1.201	1.298	-0.097
USA	3,034,407	3,167,905	1.199	1.322	-0.123
Australia, Canada, New Zealand	2,666,851	2,586,197	1.054	1.079	-0.025
Brazil	1,708,083	1,804,341	0.675	0.753	-0.078
South Africa	934,364	806,294	0.369	0.337	0.033
High-income Arab countries	821,841	873,736	0.325	0.365	-0,040
Total	253,011,921	239,585,073	100,000	100,000	xx

Migration from the Muslim World to the West


Graph 3: Global migration senders




Graph 4: The dynamics of sending global migration



Graph 5: Global migration recipients – the numbers




Graph 6: Global migration senders – the numbers



Migration from the Muslim World to the West

Graph 7: The shifts in global migration – the increases and decreases of received immigrants, 2013-2017 (in millions)



Graph 8: The shifts in global migration – the increases and decreases in the importance of migration senders, 2013-2017 (in millions)




Table 5: Results from the Bilateral Migration Matrix: Migrants from (a location or category) received in (a location or category) (in %)

		Immigrants from:					
		AUS CND NZ	China	EU-15	High- income Arab countries	India	Mexico
Received in:	AUS CND NZ	4.86	8.41	25.56	0.55	7.2	0.55
	Brazil	0.42	3.3	42.14	0.07	0.15	0.46
	China	2.81	0	4.94	0.07	1.14	0.1
	EU-15	1.02	1.98	19.05	0.25	2.43	0.22
	High-income Arab countries	0	0	0.34	0.63	32.03	0
	India	0.04	0.14	0.16	0.44	0	0
	Mexico	1.05	0.88	5.18	0.01	0.21	0
	New EU MS	0.78	0.83	16.56	0.09	0.22	0.05
	Other OIC	0.11	1.01	1.78	0.62	4.66	0
	Rest of the World (RoW)	0.65	11.25	7.37	0.04	2.23	0.22
	Russian Federation	0.01	0.48	1.36	0.01	0.05	0
	South Africa	0.92	1.34	14.3	0.06	1.39	0.02
	Turkey	0.14	0.04	9.08	0.14	0.02	0
	United States	2.02	4.72	5.72	0.34	5.39	25.65

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	New EU MS	Other	Other OIC	Russia	South Africa	Turkey	USA	Brazil	Total
	5.18	29.69	11.88	0.73	1.8	0.44	2.8	0.36	100
	1.59	43.18	4.82	0.24	0.27	0.06	3.31	0	100
	0.21	67.29	8.21	0.74	0.15	0.13	5.44	8.77	100
	17.03	21.26	26.4	2.75	0.63	4.75	1.12	1.11	100
	0	13.22	53.47	0	0	0.23	0.09	0	100
	0	15.38	83.75	0.03	0	0	0.05	0	100
	0.25	17.76	0.33	0.16	0.02	0.02	73.54	0.58	100
	22.72	42.44	4.27	10.07	0.18	0.59	1.13	0.07	100
	0.43	17.07	62.1	11.4	0.04	0.36	0.34	0.08	100
	2.66	47.75	13.74	10.16	0.44	0.32	2.08	1.09	100
	2.49	46.15	49.32	0	0	0.09	0.04	0	100
	1.44	53.11	26.42	0.19	0	0.06	0.58	0.17	100
	12.52	5.39	71.56	0.69	0.01	0	0.4	0.01	100
	2.15	44.12	7.63	0.88	0.21	0.27	0	0.91	100

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THE GROWING MUSLIM MIGRATION TO EUROPE

Our data suggest that the OIC countries (poorer OIC countries plus high-income Arab countries plus Turkey) in the West have now reached the following share of total inward immigration:

EU-15	31.40%
South Africa	26.54%
Rest of the World (RoW)	14.10%
AUS CND NZ	12.87%
China	8.41%
United States	8.24%
Brazil	4.95%
New EU MS	4.95%
Mexico	0.36%

By all standards, European openness to Muslim-country inward migration is without parallel in the West. By comparison, European immigration policy did little to actively attract immigration from other regions of the world outside Europe, as shown in Graph 9.


The following sections address policy-relevant issues with the help of choropleth maps, based on Excel country data. The computer programs for creating such choropleth maps are freely available.¹⁰³ Map 2 highlights the share of the EU-28 countries as a percentage of total outward migration destination from any country of the world. It is a map of the global migration market share of Europe in the international competition for labor, and the map also reflects the migration choices that global migrants made compared to other destination countries.

The highest attractiveness of the EU-28 as a migration destination was observed in:


1. Monaco
2. Isle of Man
3. Andorra
4. Greenland
5. Faroe Islands
6. Luxembourg

Migration from the Muslim World to the West

Graph 9: Origins of migrants into the EU-15, by 2017, in %



Map 2: The share of the EU-28 countries as a percentage of total outward migration destination from each country, 2017



Map 2 (Fragment)




Map 3: The EU-28 becoming a more attractive migration destination over time from particular countries (based on inverted ranks)



Migration from the Muslim World to the West

Map 3 (Fragment)



7. Algeria
8. Morocco
9. Romania
10. Curaçao
11. Slovakia
12. Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
13. Turkey
14. Albania
15. Madagascar

The lowest attractiveness of the EU-28 as a migration destination was observed in:

1. Saint Martin (French part)
2. Puerto Rico
3. Marshall Islands
4. Guam
5. Northern Mariana Islands
6. Lesotho
7. South Sudan

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8. Palestinian Territories
9. Micronesia, Federated States of
10. Samoa
11. Burma
12. Tonga
13. Mexico
14. Macao
15. Tuvalu

Map 3 shows the changes of these relationships over time based on the changes of percentage rates in 2017 and 2013, converted to rankings to increase visibility in the map. The most dramatic decreases of the European Union's attraction as a migration destination were observed in Sao Tome and Principe, the Republic of the Congo, and Cape Verde. Among the highest percentage increases were observed in Qatar, Greece, and Bulgaria. The highest numerical value in the map—213 (black)—corresponds to the highest increase of the EU's attraction as a migration destination; the lowest value—1 (white)—corresponds to the lowest attractiveness.

The greatest increases of the attractiveness of the EU-28 as a migration destination, 2013-2017, were observed in:

1. Isle of Man
2. Seychelles
3. Bermuda
4. Cayman Islands
5. Qatar
6. Greece
7. Saint Kitts and Nevis
8. Bulgaria
9. Iraq
10. North Korea
11. Hungary
12. Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
13. Madagascar
14. Moldova
15. Syria

The greatest decreases of the attractiveness of the EU-28 as a migration destination, 2013-2017, were observed in:

1. Sao Tome and Principe

Migration from the Muslim World to the West

2. Congo, Republic of the
3. Cape Verde
4. Gabon
5. Tunisia
6. Libya
7. Gambia, The
8. Uganda
9. Montenegro
10. Zambia
11. Albania
12. Sweden
13. Czech Republic
14. Angola
15. Kenya

THE GROWING GLOBAL IMPORTANCE OF MUSLIM MIGRATION

The next politically relevant question we would like to answer with our data analysis is the share of poorer Muslim country immigration compared to total immigration. Table 6 lists the countries of the world precisely ordered by the ascending share of total immigration from the OIC countries in percentage of total immigration.

There was no migration from Muslim countries to American Samoa; Burundi; Comoros; Greenland; Guam; Haiti; Isle of Man; Jamaica; Kiribati; Kosovo; Laos; Macao; Marshall Islands; Micronesia, Federated States of; Palau; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Samoa; Tonga; Turks and Caicos Islands; Tuvalu; or Virgin Islands (British).

Their (upward weighted) rank for the variable: DYN share of OIC countries, 2013-2017 was 93; their upward weighted rank for the variable rising share of Muslim migration was 53.

Map 4 and Map 5 show the percentage rates of Table 6 above. Map 5 also offers a zoom on the European macroregion and the European neighborhood.

Map 6 uses the same methodology as Map 3 and applies this methodology to the data of Table 6, in order to show which countries became more dependent on OIC immigration over time from 2013 to 2018.

The ranks in Table 6 used in this map are marked in black, and highlight that a country became more open and oriented toward immigration from the OIC countries.

The following countries experienced the fastest expansion of the percentage of migrants from OIC countries per total migration over the period 2013-2017:

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Paraguay	0.38	0.37	-0.01	90	1.5	-1.13	58
Cambodia	0.43	0.43	0	93	1.54	-1.11	63
Guatemala	0.47	0.44	-0.02	81	1.58	-1.13	56
Vanuatu	0.49	0.47	-0.02	86	1.6	-1.13	60
Dominican Republic	0.43	0.53	0.1	107	1.54	-1.01	81
Mozambique	0.58	0.58	0	93	1.68	-1.11	66
Ecuador	0.73	0.58	-0.15	69	1.82	-1.24	41
Honduras	0.63	0.59	-0.04	76	1.73	-1.14	50
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	0.11	0.61	0.5	121	1.24	-0.64	104
Luxembourg	0.74	0.64	-0.1	72	1.83	-1.19	46
Chile	0.77	0.64	-0.13	70	1.86	-1.22	42
Thailand	0.64	0.65	0.01	95	1.74	-1.09	71
Uruguay	0.78	0.66	-0.13	71	1.87	-1.22	43

Table 6: Basic facts about global migration from the OIC countries are based on the World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix. Countries listed in order of the share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in % (from low to high)

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Puerto Rico	0.11	0.11	0	93	1.25	-1.13	57
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.21	0.13	-0.08	74	1.33	-1.21	44
Bhutan	0.18	0.17	-0.01	88	1.31	-1.14	51
Belize	0.21	0.17	-0.04	77	1.34	-1.17	49
Costa Rica	0.21	0.2	-0.01	89	1.34	-1.14	54
Croatia	0	0.22	0.22	113	1.14	-0.92	87
Djibouti	0.24	0.24	0	93	1.36	-1.12	61
El Salvador	0.26	0.25	0	93	1.38	-1.13	59
Argentina	0.25	0.26	0	93	1.38	-1.12	62
Bolivia	0.28	0.29	0.01	96	1.4	-1.11	64
Serbia	0.23	0.31	0.08	105	1.36	-1.05	75
Mexico	0.34	0.36	0.02	97	1.46	-1.1	68

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Cayman Islands	1.99	1.99	0	93	3.01	-1.02	80
Poland	2.01	2	0	93	3.02	-1.02	78
Mongolia	2.3	2.28	-0.02	83	3.3	-1.02	79
Bahamas, The	2.25	2.29	0.04	100	3.26	-0.96	83
Namibia	0	2.32	2.32	143	1.14	1.18	144
French Polynesia	2.39	2.39	0	93	3.38	-0.99	82
Venezuela	2.56	2.62	0.06	103	3.54	-0.92	88
Nepal	1.51	2.67	1.16	133	2.56	0.11	129
Monaco	4.15	2.91	-1.24	46	5.03	-2.13	32
Iceland	2.95	2.98	0.03	99	3.91	-0.93	86
Tanzania	3.19	2.99	-0.19	66	4.13	-1.14	55
Cuba	3.08	3.08	0	93	4.04	-0.95	85
New Zealand	3.15	3.2	0.05	102	4.1	-0.9	91
Liechtenstein	6.63	3.24	-3.39	24	7.37	-4.13	19

Table 6 (continued)

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Angola	0.7	0.7	0	93	1.8	-1.1	67
Equatorial Guinea	13.05	0.7	-12.35	9	13.39	-12.69	8
Peru	0.76	0.75	-0.02	85	1.86	-1.11	65
Andorra	1.06	1.06	-0.01	91	2.14	-1.08	72
Panama	1.1	1.07	-0.02	82	2.17	-1.1	70
Nicaragua	0.87	1.35	0.48	120	1.96	-0.61	106
Faroe Islands	3.24	1.47	-1.77	41	4.18	-2.71	27
San Marino	1.65	1.5	-0.15	68	2.69	-1.19	47
Botswana	1.64	1.64	0	93	2.68	-1.04	76
Zambia	0.65	1.65	1	130	1.75	-0.1	124
Albania	1.06	1.69	0.63	123	2.13	-0.44	113
Slovakia	1.25	1.71	0.46	119	2.31	-0.6	107
Northern Mariana Islands	1.71	1.71	0	93	2.75	-1.03	77
Colombia	1.94	1.91	-0.04	78	2.96	-1.06	74

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Philippines	5.46	5.46	0	93	6.27	-0.81	97
Hong Kong	5.56	5.56	0	93	6.36	-0.8	100
Uganda	4.84	5.73	0.89	129	5.69	0.04	128
New Caledonia	5.74	5.78	0.04	101	6.53	-0.75	101
Lithuania	5.86	5.84	-0.02	84	6.64	-0.8	99
Romania	8.86	6.56	-2.29	33	9.45	-2.89	23
Ireland	6.98	7.18	0.21	112	7.69	-0.51	110
Korea, South	7.08	7.19	0.1	108	7.79	-0.6	108
Curacao	7.35	7.37	0.02	98	8.04	-0.67	103
China	9.76	7.46	-2.31	32	10.31	-2.85	25
United States	6.99	7.83	0.84	127	7.7	0.13	131
Saint Lucia	9.12	8.51	-0.61	57	9.7	-1.19	45
Indonesia	8.65	8.65	0	93	9.26	-0.61	105
Saint Barthélemy	15.51	9.16	-6.35	16	15.7	-6.54	14

Table 6 (continued)

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Japan	2.99	3.27	0.27	115	3.95	-0.68	102
Bermuda	2.29	3.32	1.03	131	3.29	0.03	127
Lesotho	2.29	3.67	1.37	135	3.29	0.37	134
Dominica	4.61	3.96	-0.65	56	5.47	-1.51	37
Korea, North	3.99	3.98	0	93	4.88	-0.9	90
Hungary	3.33	4.02	0.68	124	4.27	-0.25	118
Czech Republic	4.44	4.41	-0.02	80	5.31	-0.89	92
Aruba	4.93	4.46	-0.47	61	5.77	-1.31	40
Grenada	4.51	4.51	0	93	5.38	-0.86	93
Kenya	6.8	4.64	-2.16	34	7.53	-2.89	24
Estonia	3.93	4.8	0.87	128	4.83	-0.03	126
Seychelles	5.06	4.83	-0.23	65	5.89	-1.06	73
Brazil	4.91	4.83	-0.08	75	5.75	-0.92	89
Latvia	4.52	4.89	0.38	118	5.38	-0.49	111
Burma	5.17	5.16	-0.01	87	5.99	-0.84	95

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Yemen	16.03	14.57	-1.46	44	16.19	-1.62	36
Switzerland	14.57	15.19	0.63	122	14.81	0.38	135
Kyrgyzstan	15.2	15.2	0	93	15.41	-0.21	120
Mauritius	0.32	15.61	15.3	160	1.44	14.18	186
Barbados	10.64	15.65	5.01	155	11.13	4.52	172
Fiji	19.14	15.89	-3.26	26	19.11	-3.23	21
Georgia	16.49	16.3	-0.18	67	16.62	-0.32	117
Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha	16.3	16.56	0.26	114	16.44	0.12	130
Bulgaria	18.42	17.57	-0.85	53	18.43	-0.86	94
Somalia	0.17	18.22	18.05	163	1.3	16.92	187
Finland	13.46	18.37	4.92	154	13.77	4.6	173
Spain	16.98	18.76	1.78	142	17.09	1.67	149
Solomon Islands	20.84	18.93	-1.91	38	20.7	-1.78	33

Table 6 (continued)

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Eritrea	9.45	9.44	-0.01	92	10.01	-0.57	109
Azerbaijan	13.76	9.53	-4.23	23	14.06	-4.53	17
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	9.93	10.02	0.09	106	10.46	-0.44	114
Slovenia	10.32	10.02	-0.3	63	10.83	-0.81	98
Cyprus	10.24	10.36	0.12	110	10.75	-0.39	115
Moldova	10.98	10.62	-0.36	62	11.45	-0.83	96
Belarus	10.65	10.65	0	93	11.13	-0.48	112
Tajikistan	10.25	11.08	0.83	126	10.76	0.32	132
Uzbekistan	13.45	11.44	-2.01	37	13.76	-2.33	31
Malta	10.79	11.85	1.06	132	11.27	0.58	137
Australia	10.47	12.08	1.61	140	10.97	1.11	142
Ukraine	11.93	12.26	0.33	116	12.34	-0.08	125
Kazakhstan	13.97	13.09	-0.89	52	14.26	-1.17	48
Portugal	13.39	13.39	0	93	13.71	-0.32	116
Canada	13	14.48	1.48	139	13.35	1.14	143

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Malawi	25.18	23.27	-1.91	39	24.78	-1.51	38
Antigua and Barbuda	23.36	23.47	0.11	109	23.07	0.4	136
Bangladesh	29.63	26.42	-3.21	27	28.96	-2.54	28
Denmark	23.74	28.32	4.58	153	23.43	4.89	174
Vietnam	31.86	29.31	-2.55	31	31.05	-1.74	35
Sao Tome and Principe	32.17	29.6	-2.57	30	31.34	-1.74	34
Italy	28.22	29.62	1.4	136	27.63	1.99	151
Guyana	31.56	29.82	-1.74	42	30.78	-0.95	84
Belgium	25.55	30.02	4.47	152	25.13	4.89	175
Sweden	31.14	31.47	0.34	117	30.37	1.1	141
Swaziland	33.58	32.49	-1.08	48	32.66	-0.17	121
Oman	33.94	34.02	0.08	104	33.01	1.01	140
Germany	31.94	34.82	2.88	147	31.13	3.69	163
Qatar	33.3	35.63	2.33	144	32.41	3.22	161

Table 6 (continued)

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
South Africa	17.28	18.94	1.66	141	17.36	1.58	148
Congo, Republic of the	16.19	19.41	3.22	148	16.34	3.07	160
United Kingdom	20.66	19.44	-1.22	47	20.54	-1.1	69
Norway	19.06	19.77	0.7	125	19.04	0.73	138
Trinidad and Tobago	16.32	20.71	4.39	150	16.46	4.25	169
Ethiopia	7.93	21.32	13.39	159	8.59	12.73	184
Brunei Darussalam	1.75	21.65	19.9	164	2.78	18.87	189
Suriname	27.67	22.12	-5.55	19	27.12	-5	16
Zimbabwe	44.32	22.13	-22.19	3	42.76	-20.63	2
Montenegro	39.29	22.17	-17.12	6	38.03	-15.86	6
Austria	19.99	22.65	2.67	146	19.91	2.75	158
Sri Lanka	0.14	22.76	22.62	166	1.27	21.49	191
Israel	26.13	23.23	-2.9	28	25.67	-2.44	29

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Cape Verde	51.19	50.91	-0.28	64	49.2	1.71	150
Kuwait	57.12	51.44	-5.68	18	54.77	-3.33	20
Armenia	76.05	52.57	-23.48	2	72.55	-19.98	3
Pakistan	61.57	53.56	-8.02	14	58.95	-5.39	15
Mali	84.17	53.73	-30.45	1	80.17	-26.44	1
Timor-Leste	54.84	54.82	-0.02	79	52.63	2.19	152
Chad	38.33	56.08	17.75	162	37.13	18.95	190
Maldives	57.28	57.19	-0.09	73	54.92	2.27	153
Central African Republic	65.31	58.13	-7.18	15	62.46	-4.33	18
Tunisia	59.57	58.54	-1.02	49	57.07	1.48	146
Singapore	59.85	58.85	-1	51	57.34	1.51	147
Saudi Arabia	67.75	62.35	-5.4	20	64.75	-2.4	30
Gabon	62.45	62.45	0	93	59.78	2.68	156
Palestinian Territories	63.4	63.4	0	93	60.66	2.73	157

Table 6 (continued)


Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Morocco	53.76	35.71	-18.05	5	51.61	-15.9	5
Algeria	47.11	37.23	-9.88	12	45.37	-8.14	10
Madagascar	31.55	37.39	5.84	156	30.76	6.63	181
Turkmenistan	15.56	37.85	22.29	165	15.75	22.1	192
Papua New Guinea	51.06	41.44	-9.62	13	49.08	-7.64	12
Sudan	56.27	42.11	-14.16	8	53.97	-11.86	9
Netherlands	45.66	43.87	-1.79	40	44.01	-0.14	122
Malaysia	51.69	46.53	-5.17	21	49.68	-3.15	22
United Arab Emirates	52.4	47.63	-4.77	22	50.34	-2.71	26
Cameroon	64.13	47.78	-16.35	7	61.35	-13.57	7
Bahrain	50.12	47.97	-2.15	35	48.2	-0.23	119
Greece	67.79	48.53	-19.26	4	64.78	-16.25	4
France	51.35	49.21	-2.14	36	49.35	-0.14	123
Russia	50.43	49.41	-1.02	50	48.49	0.92	139

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Niger	90.28	84.43	-5.85	17	85.9	-1.48	39
Guinea-Bissau	82	84.58	2.57	145	78.13	6.44	179
Burkina Faso	92.27	88.99	-3.27	25	87.77	1.22	145
Cote d'Ivoire	90.56	89.95	-0.61	58	86.17	3.78	165
Iran	91.68	91.02	-0.66	55	87.22	3.8	166
Liberia	93.16	91.46	-1.7	43	88.61	2.85	159
Iraq	91.11	92.52	1.41	137	86.68	5.83	178
Mauritania	92.3	93.56	1.26	134	87.8	5.76	177
Gambia, The	97.08	96.59	-0.49	60	92.29	4.3	170
Jordan	98.94	98.22	-0.72	54	94.03	4.19	168
Lebanon	99.07	99.26	0.19	111	94.16	5.1	176

Table 6 (continued)

Country	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %	Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %	DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017 in %	Rank of DYN share of migration from OIC countries, 2013-2017	Trend of Muslim share of total immigration	Residual Muslim share of total immigration	Indicator: rising share of Muslim migration (based on residuals)
Togo	47	63.74	16.74	161	45.27	18.47	188
Nigeria	59.63	64.07	4.44	151	57.13	6.94	182
Senegal	77.42	65.9	-11.52	11	73.83	-7.93	11
Guinea	67.4	66.8	-0.6	59	64.42	2.38	154
Macedonia	71.46	68.6	-2.86	29	68.23	0.36	133
South Sudan	67.19	68.66	1.47	138	64.22	4.44	171
Turkey	29.33	70.37	41.04	167	28.68	41.69	193
Ghana	86.58	74.84	-11.74	10	82.43	-7.59	13
Libya	75.27	75.27	0.01	94	71.81	3.47	162
Sierra Leone	71.96	75.3	3.34	149	68.7	6.6	180
Afghanistan	71.57	77.92	6.35	157	68.33	9.59	183
Benin	79.13	79.13	0	93	75.43	3.69	164
Egypt	80.72	79.37	-1.34	45	76.93	2.45	155
India	82.55	82.55	0	93	78.65	3.9	167
Syria	72.01	82.84	10.83	158	68.75	14.09	185

Map 4: Share of total inward immigration from OIC countries, 2013 in %



1. Turkey
2. Sri Lanka
3. Turkmenistan
4. Brunei Darussalam
5. Somalia
6. Chad
7. Togo
8. Mauritius
9. Ethiopia
10. Syria
11. Afghanistan
12. Madagascar
13. Barbados
14. Finland
15. Denmark
16. Belgium
17. Nigeria
18. Trinidad and Tobago
19. Sierra Leone
20. Congo, Republic of the
21. Germany

Migration from the Muslim World to the West

22. Austria
23. Guinea-Bissau
24. Qatar
25. Namibia
26. Spain
27. South Africa
28. Australia
29. Canada
30. South Sudan

These tendencies are also highlighted in our zoom on the European macroregion.


MIGRATION BALANCES: HOW ARAB COUNTRIES NOW BY FAR OUTPERFORM WESTERN NATIONS ON THE GLOBAL MIGRATION LADDER

Table 7 and Map 7 address the next politically relevant question arising from the debate on migration issues: the migration balance per total inward migration. This table shows how rich Arab countries and the United States and Australia had a very high ratio of the migration balance per inward migration, showing in a way how attractive these countries are on the ladders of international migration. To explain this concept of the migration balance per inward migration, let us look at the data in Table 7 for Oman, the world leader, in 2017. Oman had an inward migrant population of more than two million people within its borders (2.07 million), while Oman's role as a migration-sending country was negligible and there were only some 26,000 citizens of Oman living abroad. The migration balance for Oman was thus 2.05 million people, that is, the migration balance was almost 99% per inward migration. The citizens of Oman just did not care about living and working abroad, while more than two million people chose to live in Oman.

For all intents and purposes, the reverse is the case for Cuba. Only 16,177 foreign citizens lived in Cuba in 2017 while no less than 1.6 million Cubans lived abroad, and the migration balance was 1.58 million people. Our ratio of Cuba's attractiveness as a migration destination was very negative, namely, 97.84 or 25%. The 15 most highly classified countries of the world were:

1. Oman
2. Qatar
3. United Arab Emirates
4. Saudi Arabia
5. Guam
6. Maldives

Map 5: Share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2017 in %



Map 5 (Fragment)




Migration from the Muslim World to the West

*Map 6: Rising share of migration from Muslim countries
(based on ranks in Table 6)*



Map 6 (Fragment)



Jewish Political Studies Review

7. Kuwait
8. United States
9. Virgin Islands (U.S.)
10. Bahrain
11. Australia
12. American Samoa
13. New Caledonia
14. French Polynesia
15. Turks and Caicos Islands

The following countries were at the bottom of the international migration ladder: high outward migration and a very negative migration balance per inward migration.

1. Cuba
2. Lesotho
3. Somalia
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina
5. Eritrea
6. El Salvador
7. Sri Lanka
8. Afghanistan
9. Haiti
10. Jamaica
11. Guyana
12. Burma
13. Lao PDR
14. Morocco
15. Philippines

Map 7 now highlights the results from Table 7. In this choropleth map, the countries with high attractiveness and placed at the top of the international migration ladder are painted in white, while the least attractive countries for international migration are painted in black. Hardly anybody around the world would like to go to these, while a large number of their own citizens have left, voting with their feet on how they evaluated the conditions at home. Map 7 portrays the world in 2017. For reasons of map visibility, we based our maps on inverted ranks of migration balance per inward migration in percentages. Oman is the world leader, painted in pink, and Cuba is the world laggard, painted in black. We also offer a zoom for the Euro-Mediterranean macroregion (Map 6).

The following countries most spectacularly improved their position on the international migration ladder, 2013-2017:

Migration from the Muslim World to the West

1. Lesotho
2. Somalia
3. Morocco
4. Lao PDR
5. Bosnia and Herzegovina
6. Afghanistan
7. Vietnam
8. Equatorial Guinea
9. Romania
10. Bulgaria
11. Tunisia
12. Angola
13. Iraq
14. Haiti
15. Trinidad and Tobago

The following countries most dramatically worsened their position on the international migration ladder:

1. Sri Lanka
2. Eritrea
3. Cuba
4. Sao Tome and Principe
5. Syrian Arab Republic
6. Cape Verde
7. Seychelles
8. Armenia
9. Samoa
10. Nepal
11. Albania
12. Central African Republic
13. South Sudan
14. Tonga
15. Grenada

Based on the results of Table 7, we now portray the inverted ranks of the last column of Table 7 (DYN Migration ladder, based on percentages) in a choropleth map. The map tells us which countries moved higher and which countries moved lower on the scales of transnational migration. Deteriorations are marked in black, improvements in white. Again, we also offer a zoom on the Euro-Mediterranean macroregion. The map clearly shows that the days of European high ratios of the migration balance per inward migration are gone,

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
French Polynesia	34,830	34,830	4,029	3,801	30,801	31,029	88.43	89.09	-0.65
Turks and Caicos Islands	24,540	11,356	3,116	1,580	21,424	9,776	87.3	86.09	1.22
Singapore	2,623,404	2,323,252	337,924	282,213	2,285,480	2,041,039	87.12	87.85	-0.73
Djibouti	123,537	123,537	18,082	14,888	105,455	108,649	85.36	87.95	-2.59
Liechtenstein	25,648	12,208	3,899	4,023	21,749	8,185	84.8	67.05	17.75
Cayman Islands	33,689	33,671	5,320	4,376	28,369	29,295	84.21	87	-2.8
Canada	8,078,763	7,404,179	1,276,770	1,335,191	6,801,993	6,068,988	84.2	81.97	2.23
Brunei Darussalam	280,421	206,173	47,462	43,118	232,959	163,055	83.07	79.09	3.99
Sweden	1,746,117	1,453,645	312,761	352,002	1,433,356	1,101,643	82.09	75.78	6.3
Israel	1,962,511	2,049,056	356,070	367,324	1,606,441	1,681,732	81.86	82.07	-0.22
Andorra	45,409	45,086	8,381	7,398	37,028	37,688	81.54	83.59	-2.05
Isle of Man	45,872	44,688	9,196	861	36,676	43,827	79.95	98.07	-18.12
Gabon	394,953	394,953	83,129	48,886	311,824	346,067	78.95	87.62	-8.67
Thailand	4,438,567	4,490,941	993,253	1,007,294	3,445,314	3,483,647	77.62	77.57	0.05

Table 7: Migration balances in the global migration processes. Countries listed by migration balance per inward migration, 2017, in % (in descending order)

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Oman	2,074,334	1,112,032	26,241	24,028	2,048,093	1,088,004	98.73	97.84	0.9
Qatar	2,085,606	1,908,531	27,270	19,889	2,058,336	1,888,642	98.69	98.96	-0.27
United Arab Emirates	8,312,524	8,001,674	180,090	153,737	8,132,434	7,847,937	97.83	98.08	-0.25
Saudi Arabia	12,185,284	14,600,521	313,824	291,682	11,871,460	14,308,839	97.42	98	-0.58
Guam	87,978	80,770	2,774	2,764	85,204	78,006	96.85	96.58	0.27
Maldives	84,678	84,230	3,191	1,254	81,487	82,976	96.23	98.51	-2.28
Kuwait	3,323,025	2,592,755	210,727	322,816	3,112,298	2,269,939	93.66	87.55	6.11
United States	47,493,736	46,136,362	3,034,407	3,167,905	44,459,329	42,968,457	93.61	93.13	0.48
Virgin Islands (U.S.)	63,271	63,271	4,660	4,194	58,611	59,077	92.63	93.37	-0.74
Bahrain	810,573	729,357	63,689	61,584	746,884	667,773	92.14	91.56	0.59
Australia	6,875,657	6,468,640	579,912	487,275	6,295,745	5,981,365	91.57	92.47	-0.9
American Samoa	41,845	41,845	3,583	3,319	38,262	38,526	91.44	92.07	-0.63
New Caledonia	65,446	63,037	6,946	6,381	58,500	56,656	89.39	89.88	-0.49

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Macao SAR, China	353,654	333,269	144,684	136,821	208,970	196,448	59.09	58.95	0.14
Lebanon	1,995,221	1,586,721	816,841	810,854	1,178,380	775,867	59.06	48.9	10.16
Argentina	2,391,065	2,396,448	996,100	986,818	1,394,965	1,409,630	58.34	58.82	-0.48
Northern Mariana Islands	24,155	24,155	10,202	10,038	13,953	14,117	57.76	58.44	-0.68
Japan	2,357,707	2,437,268	1,056,419	1,012,924	1,301,288	1,424,344	55.19	58.44	-3.25
Slovenia	380,263	365,560	171,202	171,331	209,061	194,229	54.98	53.13	1.85
Tanzania	707,066	652,918	322,830	250,086	384,236	402,832	54.34	61.7	-7.35
Iran, Islamic Rep.	2,699,465	2,649,516	1,237,344	1,604,750	1,462,121	1,044,766	54.16	39.43	14.73
Uganda	1,692,251	531,401	775,892	406,193	916,359	125,208	54.15	23.56	30.59
Solomon Islands	9,220	7,870	4,248	3,044	4,972	4,826	53.93	61.32	-7.4
Cote d'Ivoire	2,298,009	2,446,171	1,065,361	1,020,416	1,232,648	1,425,755	53.64	58.29	-4.65
Denmark	557,573	556,825	259,282	265,529	298,291	291,296	53.5	52.31	1.18
Aruba	40,144	34,506	19,785	17,097	20,359	17,409	50.71	50.45	0.26
Botswana	166,430	146,456	82,914	57,525	83,516	88,931	50.18	60.72	-10.54

Table 7 (continued)

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Libya	788,419	755,974	181,279	146,839	607,140	609,135	77.01	80.58	-3.57
South Africa	4,035,585	2,685,233	934,364	806,294	3,101,221	1,878,939	76.85	69.97	6.87
Spain	6,256,804	6,618,000	1,453,098	1,230,969	4,803,706	5,387,031	76.78	81.4	-4.62
Jordan	3,289,902	3,592,780	769,025	782,015	2,520,877	,2810,765	76.62	78.23	-1.61
Norway	782,450	692,040	190,350	204,275	592,100	487,765	75.67	70.48	5.19
Switzerland	2,544,611	2,480,941	644,174	649,963	1,900,437	1,830,978	74.68	73.8	0.88
Luxembourg	264,515	229,409	71,545	65,980	192,970	163,429	72.95	71.24	1.71
France	7,969,646	7,456,145	2,207,397	2,184,539	5,762,249	5,271,606	72.3	70.7	1.6
Belgium	1,873,511	1,702,542	561,750	530,401	1,311,761	1,172,141	70.02	68.85	1.17
Costa Rica	454,416	413,705	143,285	131,235	311,131	282,470	68.47	68.28	0.19
Austria	1,593,399	1,397,766	510,455	529,623	1,082,944	868,143	67.96	62.11	5.86
Germany	12,550,982	11,110,943	4,142,199	4,141,435	8,408,783	6,969,508	67	62.73	4.27
Hong Kong SAR, China	2,883,051	2,804,753	1,059,439	784,079	1,823,612	2,020,674	63.25	72.04	-8.79
Kenya	1,308,860	892,691	523,364	475,499	785,496	417,192	60.01	46.73	13.28

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Ethiopia	1,234,818	774,848	847,712	749,139	387,106	25,709	31.35	3.32	28.03
Panama	191,135	158,417	133,525	143,705	57,610	14,712	30.14	9.29	20.85
Bermuda	23,452	20,179	16,735	12,504	6,717	7,675	28.64	38.03	-9.39
Greece	1,274,288	988,245	1,000,070	1,000,137	274,218	-11,892	21.52	-1.2	22.72
Turkmenistan	314,482	226,327	258,256	249,523	56,226	-23,196	17.88	-10.25	28.13
Nigeria	1,540,221	1,233,592	1,309,063	1,117,901	231,158	115,691	15.01	9.38	5.63
Bhutan	54,746	50,862	47,077	90,797	7,669	-39,935	14.01	-78.52	92.52
Cyprus	207,591	207,313	179,283	148,769	28,308	58,544	13.64	28.24	-14.6
Mauritania	183,485	102,570	158,537	136,270	24,948	-33,700	13.6	-32.86	46.45
Ireland	836,625	752,500	770,861	782,838	65,764	-30,338	7.86	-4.03	11.89
Belize	62,818	50,860	58,687	61,806	4,131	-10,946	6.58	-21.52	28.1
Russian Federation	11,652,102	11,048,064	10,961,164	10,910,492	690,938	137,572	5.93	1.25	4.68
Iceland	41,050	35,395	39,876	36,940	1,174	-1,545	2.86	-4.37	7.22
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	27,978	27,021	27,332	21,830	646	5,191	2.31	19.21	-16.9

Table 7 (continued)

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Netherlands	2,041,933	1,964,922	1,019,145	1,008,742	1,022,788	956,180	50.09	48.66	1.43
Gambia, The	205,063	162,919	106,525	70,966	98,538	91,953	48.05	56.44	-8.39
United Kingdom	9,202,494	7,838,837	4,820,072	5,151,142	4,382,422	2,687,695	47.62	34.29	13.34
Venezuela, RB	1,426,251	1,171,331	774,208	655,400	652,043	515,931	45.72	44.05	1.67
Italy	5,906,960	5,766,163	3,236,664	2,928,772	2,670,296	2,837,391	45.21	49.21	-4
Cameroon	710,362	596,861	400,165	360,642	310,197	236,219	43.67	39.58	4.09
Chad	707,930	490,616	411,961	403,850	295,969	86,766	41.81	17.69	24.12
Malaysia	3,249,192	2,408,329	1,892,736	1,683,132	1,356,456	725,197	41.75	30.11	11.64
Congo, Rep.	492,286	431,470	292,508	177,294	199,778	254,176	40.58	58.91	-18.33
Turkey	5,092,286	2,504,519	3,037,921	3,110,051	2,054,365	-605,532	40.34	-24.18	64.52
Bahamas, The	73,684	61,343	44,350	46,042	29,334	15,301	39.81	24.94	14.87
San Marino	5,481	4,857	3,303	3,449	2,178	1,408	39.74	28.99	10.75
Equatorial Guinea	221,865	10,141	133,910	126,069	87,955	-115,928	39.64	-1143.16	1182.8
New Zealand	1,325,014	1,261,215	810,169	763,731	514,845	497,484	38.86	39.44	-0.59
Czech Republic	752,773	745,200	484,685	524,399	268,088	220,801	35.61	29.63	5.98

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Belarus	1,088,815	1,085,396	1,646,080	1,620,196	-557,265	-534,800	-51.18	-49.27	-1.91
Namibia	126,920	65,379	192,392	138,615	-65,472	-73,236	-51.59	-112.02	60.43
Latvia	259,290	323,642	397,745	342,317	-138,455	-18,675	-53.4	-5.77	-47.63
Monaco	34,651	24,299	53,763	52,987	-19,112	-28,688	-55.16	-118.06	62.91
Burundi	299,569	254,477	466,962	378,797	-167,393	-124,320	-55.88	-48.85	-7.02
Kiribati	4,283	4,246	6,684	5,367	-2,401	-1,121	-56.06	-26.4	-29.66
Togo	330,186	202,476	524,460	461,101	-194,274	-258,625	-58.84	-127.73	68.89
Ghana	527,034	439,252	865,204	737,217	-338,170	-297,965	-64.16	-67.83	3.67
Croatia	636,073	756,980	1,057,021	888,219	-420,948	-131,239	-66.18	-17.34	-48.84
Zambia	163,104	98,907	278,355	231,208	-115,251	-132,301	-70.66	-133.76	63.1
Liberia	236,518	225,484	405,732	370,453	-169,214	-144,969	-71.54	-64.29	-7.25
Zimbabwe	426,496	360,992	738,198	973,247	-311,702	-612,255	-73.08	-169.6	96.52
Congo, Dem. Rep.	985,983	502,975	1,849,863	1,306,026	-863,880	-803,051	-87.62	-159.66	72.04
Pakistan	3,182,958	4,080,766	6,098,502	6,170,411	-2,915,544	-2,089,645	-91.6	-51.21	-40.39
Korea, Rep.	1,233,607	1,232,220	2,418,235	2,604,888	-1,184,628	-1,372,668	-96.03	-111.4	15.37

Table 7 (continued)

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Guinea	464,672	378,464	467,933	398,475	-3,261	-20,011	-0.7	-5.29	4.59
Angola	638,499	87,436	661,595	518,711	-23,096	-431,275	-3.62	-493.25	489.63
Palau	5,723	5,590	5,959	5,575	-236	15	-4.12	0.27	-4.39
Kazakhstan	3,716,976	3,476,233	3,945,105	3,826,984	-228,129	-350,751	-6.14	-10.09	3.95
Finland	267,289	293,167	292,426	314,075	-25,137	-20,908	-9.4	-7.13	-2.27
Ukraine	5,362,652	5,417,737	5,995,314	5,583,906	-632,662	-166,169	-11.8	-3.07	-8.73
Papua New Guinea	35,191	25,441	40,862	38,951	-5,671	-13,510	-16.11	-53.1	36.99
Rwanda	509,788	452,406	606,728	345,824	-96,940	106,582	-19.02	23.56	-42.57
Serbia	834,126	770,529	1,014,577	1,292,910	-180,451	-522,381	-21.63	-67.8	46.16
Chile	502,165	415,493	628,656	610,232	-126,491	-194,739	-25.19	-46.87	21.68
Niger	296,089	132,294	383,917	290,330	-87,828	-158,036	-29.66	-119.46	89.8
Uzbekistan	1,488,892	1,266,278	2,071,103	1,912,897	-582,211	-646,619	-39.1	-51.06	11.96
Hungary	496,368	472,798	705,169	570,188	-208,801	-97,390	-42.07	-20.6	-21.47
Estonia	134,775	197,611	201,868	191,205	-67,093	6,406	-49.78	3.24	-53.02
Malawi	237,104	206,578	355,596	287,469	-118,492	-80,891	-49.97	-39.16	-10.82

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Portugal	893,945	893,847	2,289,642	2,028,597	-1,395,697	-1,134,750	-156.13	-126.95	-29.18
Benin	253,284	234,241	657,594	486,756	-404,310	-252,515	-159.63	-107.8	-51.83
Sudan	741,446	446,707	2,019,643	1,508,273	-1,278,197	-1,061,566	-172.39	-237.64	65.25
Marshall Islands	3,513	2,130	9,764	9,768	-6,251	-7,638	-177.94	-358.59	180.65
Swaziland	33,295	25,524	94,196	97,807	-60,901	-72,283	-182.91	-283.2	100.28
Seychelles	13,261	12,079	37,935	9,554	-24,674	2,525	-186.06	20.9	-206.97
Montenegro	90,209	50,708	261,641	281,812	-171,432	-231,104	-190.04	-455.75	265.72
Lithuania	223,227	221,462	652,985	588,897	-429,758	-367,435	-192.52	-165.91	-26.61
Mauritius	55,684	44,997	164,008	172,204	-108,324	-127,207	-194.53	-282.7	88.17
Dominican Republic	502,701	607,253	1,497,952	1,375,512	-995,251	-768,259	-197.98	-126.51	-71.47
Yemen, Rep.	389,450	314,683	1,221,130	1,268,940	-831,680	-954,257	-213.55	-303.24	89.69
India	5,188,550	5,338,486	16,444,830	13,885,099	-11,256,280	-8,546,613	-216.94	-160.09	-56.85
Timor-Leste	12,063	11,569	38,235	33,395	-26,172	-21,826	-216.96	-188.66	-28.3
Greenland	6,607	5,694	20,948	17,679	-14,341	-11,985	-217.06	-210.48	-6.57
Korea, Dem. Rep.	48,939	46,813	160,919	223,679	-111,980	-176,866	-228.82	-377.81	149

Table 7 (continued)

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Curacao	38,254	36,865	75,139	80,143	-36,885	-43,278	-96.42	-117.4	20.97
Faeroe Islands	8,001	3,641	16,207	13,364	-8,206	-9,723	-102.56	-267.04	164.48
Senegal	312,017	209,398	643,640	540,363	-331,623	-330,965	-106.28	-158.06	51.77
Burkina Faso	725,649	696,983	1,518,063	1,642,594	-792,414	-945,611	-109.2	-135.67	26.47
Tajikistan	279,455	275,735	638,249	607,802	-358,794	-332,067	-128.39	-120.43	-7.96
Brazil	736,913	599,678	1,708,083	1,804,341	-971,170	-1,204,663	-131.79	-200.88	69.1
Malta	46,219	34,455	108,313	109,892	-62,094	-75,437	-134.35	-218.94	84.6
Barbados	42,652	32,280	100,113	100,528	-57,461	-68,248	-134.72	-211.43	76.7
Azerbaijan	515,416	323,843	1,215,260	1,287,404	-699,844	-963,561	-135.78	-297.54	161.76
South Sudan	845,775	629,577	2,018,258	759,057	-1,172,483	-129,480	-138.63	-20.57	-118.06
Vanuatu	3,814	3,688	9,269	8,408	-5,455	-4,720	-143.03	-127.98	-15.04
Ecuador	452,126	359,315	1,100,472	1,160,820	-648,346	-801,505	-143.4	-223.06	79.67
Antigua and Barbuda	29,838	28,733	73,491	56,842	-43,653	-28,109	-146.3	-97.83	-48.47
Moldova	404,810	391,508	1,024,551	859,400	-619,741	-467,892	-153.09	-119.51	-33.58
Mali	451,367	195,553	1,143,309	895,684	-691,942	-700,131	-153.3	-358.03	204.73

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Guinea-Bissau	23,405	18,024	106,901	91,216	-83,496	-73,192	-356.74	-406.08	49.34
Saint Lucia	12,700	12,180	58,521	56,481	-45,821	-44,301	-360.8	-363.72	2.92
Paraguay	192,135	185,776	895,988	958,878	-703,853	-773,102	-366.33	-416.15	49.81
Bangladesh	1,576,709	1,396,514	7,796,958	7,572,135	-6,220,249	-6,175,621	-394.51	-442.22	47.71
Iraq	370,223	245,003	1,932,429	2,370,153	-1,562,206	-2,125,150	-421.96	-867.4	445.43
Algeria	342,196	270,407	1,833,302	1,784,499	-1,491,106	-1,514,092	-435.75	-559.93	124.18
Bolivia	150,738	119,033	880,525	878,981	-729,787	-759,948	-484.14	-638.43	154.29
Puerto Rico	321,970	319,393	1,935,897	1,712,333	-1,613,927	-1,392,940	-501.27	-436.12	-65.15
Grenada	11,367	11,367	69,096	57,877	-57,729	-46,510	-507.86	-409.17	-98.7
Egypt, Arab Rep.	555,860	416,271	3,444,832	3,386,059	-2,888,972	-2,969,788	-519.73	-713.43	193.7
Poland	667,739	663,755	4,294,300	3,882,994	-3,626,561	-3,219,239	-543.11	-485	-58.11
China	1,483,938	1,133,324	10,060,253	9,651,150	-8,576,315	-8,517,826	-577.94	-751.58	173.64
Micronesia, Fed. States	4,457	2,600	32,869	29,335	-28,412	-26,735	-637.47	-1028.27	390.8
Trinidad and Tobago	50,214	32,488	371,785	374,492	-321,571	-342,004	-640.4	-1052.71	412.31

Table 7 (continued)

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Sierra Leone	112,140	96,368	374,691	336,003	-262,551	-239,635	-234.13	-248.67	14.54
Slovak Republic	182,863	158,100	612,186	592,292	-429,323	-434,192	-234.78	-274.63	39.85
Kyrgyz Republic	226,960	226,960	781,950	738,283	-554,990	-511,323	-244.53	-225.29	-19.24
Madagascar	45,128	34,313	158,873	166,886	-113,745	-132,573	-252.05	-386.36	134.31
Nepal	549,784	971,247	2,005,848	1,986,203	-1,456,064	-1,014,956	-264.84	-104.5	-160.34
Uruguay	91,425	76,747	351,045	340,446	-259,620	-263,699	-283.97	-343.6	59.62
Mozambique	246,954	218,811	954,042	727,389	-707,088	-508,578	-286.32	-232.43	-53.9
Central African Republic	186,822	134,237	728,216	342,019	-541,394	-207,782	-289.79	-154.79	-135
Saint Kitts and Nevis	9,605	5,673	40,612	29,054	-31,007	-23,381	-322.82	-412.15	89.32
Georgia	203,708	190,268	875,753	746,017	-672,045	-555,749	-329.91	-292.09	-37.82
Macedonia, FYR	130,979	139,751	564,949	626,312	-433,970	-486,561	-331.33	-348.16	16.83
Suriname	61,156	41,670	263,788	263,263	-202,632	-221,593	-331.34	-531.78	200.44
Armenia	220,584	327,955	968,686	785,740	-748,102	-45,785	-339.15	-139.59	-199.56
Mongolia	18,209	17,225	81,311	74,847	-63,102	-57,622	-346.54	-334.53	-12.02

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Peru	107,496	104,919	1,487,776	1,454,362	-1,380,280	-1,349,443	-1284.03	-1286.18	2.15
Cambodia	76,333	75,566	1,114,226	1,118,878	-1,037,893	-1,043,312	-1359.69	-1380.66	20.97
Nicaragua	42,096	41,482	629,892	633,057	-587,796	-591,575	-1396.32	-1426.1	29.78
Palestinian Territories	256,517	256,517	3,857,805	4,018,219	-3,601,288	-3,761,702	-1403.92	-1466.45	62.54
Cape Verde	15,379	14,874	237,921	173,048	-222,542	-158,174	-1447.05	-1063.43	-383.63
Colombia	142,969	129,632	2,750,889	2,530,528	-2,607,920	-2,400,896	-1824.12	-1852.09	27.97
Honduras	38,834	27,503	790,990	658,817	-752,156	-631,314	-1936.85	-2295.44	358.59
Vietnam	103,464	68,290	2,694,270	2,592,233	-2,590,806	-2,523,943	-2504.07	-3695.92	1191.85
Tuvalu	171	148	4,468	3,880	-4,297	-3,732	-2512.87	-2521.62	8.76
Philippines	218,783	213,150	5,970,193	6,001,696	-5,751,410	-5,788,546	-2628.82	-2715.71	86.9
Morocco	109,006	50,771	3,047,116	3,040,327	-2,938,110	-2,989,556	-2695.37	-5888.31	3192.95
Lao PDR	45,489	21,801	1,292,295	1,294,218	-1,246,806	-1,272,417	-2740.9	-5836.51	3095.61
Burma	103,380	103,117	2,947,287	3,139,596	-2,843,907	-3,036,479	-2750.93	-2944.69	193.77
Guyana	15,632	1,770	461,812	462,636	-446,180	-447,866	-2854.27	-3032.27	177.99
Jamaica	34,907	34,907	1,057,988	1,097,627	-1,023,081	-1,062,720	-2930.88	-3044.43	113.56

Table 7 (continued)

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Fiji	27,505	22,828	209,685	201,462	-182,180	-178,634	-662.35	-782.52	120.17
Syrian Arab Republic	1,013,818	1,394,227	7,776,231	3,971,493	-6,762,413	-2,577,266	-667.02	-184.85	-482.17
Albania	142,577	180,695	1,194,524	1,264,185	-1,051,947	-1,083,490	-737.81	-599.62	-138.19
Dominica	8,033	6,419	73,955	76,787	-65,922	-70,368	-820.64	-1096.25	275.61
Romania	391,142	198,839	3,662,849	3,430,476	-3,271,707	-3,231,637	-836.45	-1625.25	788.8
Comoros	12,555	12,511	117,846	111,182	-105,291	-98,671	-838.64	-788.67	-49.96
Bulgaria	153,974	84,101	1,475,224	1,416,601	-1,321,250	-1,332,500	-858.1	-1584.4	726.31
Sao Tome and Principe	8038	6,345	84,766	36,115	-76,728	-29,770	-954.57	-469.19	-485.38
Tonga	5,436	5,436	62,226	56,303	-56,790	-50,867	-1044.7	-935.74	-108.96
Mexico	1,009,532	1,103,460	11,881,712	13,220,345	-10,872,180	-12,116,885	-1076.95	-1098.08	21.13
Indonesia	345,930	295,433	4,247,814	4,116,587	-3,901,884	-3,821,154	-1127.94	-1293.41	165.47
Tunisia	61,708	36,526	785,623	670,902	-723,915	-634,376	-1173.13	-1736.78	563.65
Samoa	10,534	10,534	134,757	114,568	-124,223	-104,034	-1179.26	-987.6	-191.66
Guatemala	81,589	72,764	1,071,030	1,051,813	-989,441	-979,049	-1212.71	-1345.51	132.8

Table 8: Partial correlation of the EU as recipient of global migration from a given country in %, 2013, with standard socioeconomic and sociopolitical indicators. Constant: absolute latitude; distance from Belgium; income per capita 2010 (EU=100), income per capita 2010 (EU=100) ^{^2}; years of membership in the EU, 2010

	Partial correlation with EU as recipient of global migration from this country in %, 2013	Error p (two- tailed)	Degrees of freedom
Unemployment rate	0.177	0.039	133
Total unemployment rate of immigrants (both sexes)	0.16	0.048	152
Gallup poll about satisfaction: safety	-0.197	0.023	130

Table 9: Partial correlation of the migration balance per inward migration, 2013, with standard socioeconomic and sociopolitical indicators. Constant: absolute latitude; distance from Belgium; income per capita 2010 (EU=100), income per capita 2010 (EU=100) ^{^2}; years of membership in the EU, 2010

	Partial correlation with migration balance per inward migration 2013	Error p (two-tailed)	Degrees of freedom
World Values Survey: dissent from the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws	0.317	0.043	39
Quintile share income difference between richest and poorest 20%	-0.222	0.019	109

Table 7 (continued)

	Global migration recipients 2017	Global migration recipients 2013	Global migration senders 2017	Global migration senders 2013	Migration balance 2017	Migration balance 2013	Migration balance per inward migration 2017 in %	Migration balance per inward migration 2013 in %	DYN Migration ladder (based on percentages)
Haiti	40,533	38,061	1,292,950	1,377,674	-1,252,417	-1,339,613	-3089.87	-3519.65	429.78
Afghanistan	155,198	105,090	5,055,219	5,632,196	-4,900,021	-5,527,106	-3157.27	-5259.4	2102.13
Sri Lanka	51,037	324,977	1,728,372	1,780,110	-1,677,335	-1,455,133	-3286.51	-447.76	-2838.74
El Salvador	42,442	41,615	1,559,934	1,525,397	-1,517,492	-1,483,782	-3575.45	-3565.5	-9.95
Eritrea	16,041	15,798	645,445	387,410	-629,404	-371,612	-3923.72	-2352.27	-1571.45
Bosnia and Herzegovina	37,634	23,197	1,638,113	1,699,893	-1,600,479	-1,676,696	-4252.75	-7228.07	2975.33
Somalia	44,868	24,593	2,032,921	1,920,875	-1,988,053	-1,896,282	-4430.89	-7710.66	3279.76
Lesotho	7,093	3,095	327,926	323,988	-320,833	-320,893	-4523.23	-10368.11	5844.88
Cuba	16,177	16,177	1,598,975	1,485,105	-1,582,798	-1,468,928	-9784.25	-9080.35	-703.9

Map 7: Global migration balance, 2017




Map 7 (Fragment)




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Map 8: Improvements or deteriorations on the ladder of international migration



Map 8 (Fragment)



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indicating that Europeans, confronted by Monetary Union austerity and the aftermaths of the 2008 economic crisis, in turn are beginning to migrate to other countries. These trends are exacerbated by high inward migration in the wake of the European refugee crisis of 2015.

TENDENCIES EMERGING FROM THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: PARTIAL CORRELATIONS

The methodology section explained that in order to determine the long-term effects of our variables, we first of all looked at the partial correlation coefficients of key variables, discussed in the work, with an array of dependent variables, especially collected for this study and presented in the Appendix. In each case we test the effects of our key variables independent of absolute geographical latitude; geographical distance from Belgium as the geographical center of the European Union; income per capita 2010 (EU =100), income per capita 2010 (EU=100) squared; and finally, years of membership in the EU, 2010.

In presenting the partial effects, we concentrate on those that falsify basic assumptions of the welcome culture. Table 8 answers the politically relevant question whether a tendency of a given country's population to have a preference to emigrate to the European Union over other migration destinations has socially and politically beneficial effects on the migration-sending countries independent of geographical latitude; geographical distance from the EU; the nonlinear effects of income on key social and political variables; and finally, years of membership in the EU. Table 8 neatly falsifies some of the key assumptions of the welcome culture and the illusions of "win-win" only effects of a propensity to emigrate to the EU. Independent of the effects of the variables, kept constant in the partial correlations, the EU as a recipient of global migration from a given country of the world in percentage has a positive and significant effect on the unemployment rate in the home country of the migrants to the EU, and on the unemployment rate of immigrants in the home country of the migrants to the EU. There are also significant negative effects on the satisfaction with the safety situation in the home country of the migrants to the EU. In other words, a propensity to emigrate to the European Union over other migration destinations does nothing to alleviate the unemployment situation at home, and it contributes to a deteriorating safety situation in the home countries of the migrants.

Table 9 offers an answer to the question about the long-term effects of the migration balance per inward migration, again independent of our economic, political, and geographical control variables. *Ceteris paribus*, there is an interesting effect on the dissent from the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws, and inequality between the richest and poorest strata

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is reduced by a country's high position on the global migration ladder. The movements of hundreds and hundreds of thousands of citizens abroad with a negative effect on the migration balance in fact petrifies structures of religious fundamentalism and limits religious secularism, well captured by the variable: dissent from the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws. A country's dominant position on the international migration ladders alleviates inequality, while a country's low position on the international migration ladders with the concomitant heavy outward migration contributes to the wrath of different strata in society, leading toward "fundamentalist" currents in society that are so familiar from countries and territories like the Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

Table 10 and Table 11 offer the final tests of the effects of increased immigration from the Muslim world, overlooked by the welcome culture of recent years, again independent of the economic, political, and geographical control variables. The array of social and political negative effects of the share of total immigration from OIC countries on a great number of variables is impressive and further falsifies basic assumptions of the welcome culture of recent years. Equality, civil rights, absence of high military burden rates, absence of terrorism, environmental data, satisfaction with life and the main economic and social conditions in the country, economic growth, gender equality, effective democracy, social protection, secularism, employment, education, and global tolerance are, *ceteris paribus*, the losers of the share of total immigration coming from the OIC countries.

The same can be said about the long-term negative effects of the share of total immigrant population per total population, independent of our economic, political, and geographical control variables.

TENDENCIES EMERGING FROM THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: PROMAX FACTOR ANALYSIS

In the following, we tested the multivariate effects of key variables of the welcome culture on a host of variables, measuring economic and social well-being for the 110 countries with complete available data. Variable definitions and sources are listed in Appendix Table 4.

If basic assumptions of the welcome culture were true, then its key variables—such as asylum recognition rates, share of migration from OIC countries, and so on—would have to have very significant and positive effects on the most important social and political development variables. To this end we applied the sophisticated statistical methodology of promax factor analysis, which allows the analysis of the correlations between the dimensions (factors) and best reproduces the correlation matrix between the variables.

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Table 10: Partial correlation of the share of total immigration from OIC countries in %, 2013, with standard socioeconomic and sociopolitical indicators. Constant: absolute latitude; distance from Belgium; income per capita 2010 (EU =100), income per capita 2010 (EU = 100) ^2; years of membership in the EU, 2010

	Partial correlation with share of total immigration from OIC countries in %, 2013	Error p (two-tailed)	Degrees of freedom
Coefficient of human inequality 2013	0.393	0	121
Civil and political liberties violations	0.273	0.001	152
Military expenditures per GDP	0.21	0.023	116
Military personnel rate ln (MPR+1)	0.192	0.022	140
Global Terrorism Index	0.186	0.03	134
Carbon emissions per capita	0.168	0.038	150
Combined Failed States Index	0.164	0.043	150
Gallup poll about satisfaction: jobs	-0.188	0.033	128
Gallup poll about satisfaction: freedom of choice	-0.189	0.028	132
Pearson time series correlation 2007- 2014 with GDP per capita growth	-0.2	0.025	123
% women in government, all levels	-0.211	0.009	150
Female share of seats in parliament	-0.214	0.008	151
Closing political gender gap	-0.229	0.012	119
Effective Democracy Index	-0.234	0.004	149
Gallup poll about satisfaction: healthcare quality	-0.238	0.006	129
Democracy measure	-0.24	0.005	133
Gallup poll about satisfaction: education quality	-0.257	0.005	115
Closing educational gender gap	-0.266	0.003	119

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	Partial correlation with share of total immigration from OIC countries in %, 2013	Error p (two-tailed)	Degrees of freedom
ESI (Environmental Sustainability Index) (Yale, Columbia) Social and Institutional Capacity Component	-0.271	0.002	125
Gallup poll about satisfaction: Overall Life Satisfaction Index	-0.283	0.001	132
HDI 2012 (UNDP Human Development Index, 2012)	-0.284	0	152
Global Tolerance Index	-0.284	0.029	57
Overall Development Index, based on 35 variables and combined to seven dimensions	-0.3	0.001	116
Closing health and survival gender gap	-0.305	0.001	119
Social protection (ILO)	-0.308	0	148
LFPR (Labor Force Participation Rate) age group 55-59	-0.319	0	149
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)	-0.335	0	131
Female population with at least some secondary education	-0.351	0	136
WVS: dissent from the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws	-0.367	0.018	39
Mean years of schooling 2013	-0.381	0	152
Closing economic gender gap	-0.397	0	119
UNDP Education Index	-0.418	0	152
Closing of global gender gap overall score 2009	-0.439	0	119

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Table 11: Partial correlation of the share of total immigrant population per total population in % with standard socioeconomic and sociopolitical standard indicators. Constant: absolute latitude; distance from Belgium; income per capita 2010 (EU =100), income per capita 2010 (EU=100)^{^2}; years of membership in the EU, 2010

	Partial correlation with immigration – share of population 2005 (%)	Error p (two-tailed)	Degrees of freedom
Military expenditures per GDP	0.588	0	116
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%)	0.56	0	150
Carbon emissions per capita	0.544	0	150
Military personnel rate ln (MPR+1)	0.379	0	140
Membership in the OIC	0.375	0	152
Civil and political liberties violations	0.365	0	152
Ecological footprint (gha/cap)	0.34	0	124
Combined Failed States Index	0.276	0.001	150
Carbon emissions per million U.S. dollars GDP	0.225	0.005	151
FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of total population	0.163	0.043	152
Country share in top world 500 universities	-0.16	0.047	152
Gallup poll about satisfaction: Overall Life Satisfaction Index	-0.173	0.045	132
Labor force participation rate of migrants (both sexes)	-0.211	0.009	152
Per capita world-class universities	-0.246	0.002	152
Gallup poll about satisfaction: trust in other people	-0.246	0.01	106
Tertiary enrollment	-0.248	0.004	131

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	Partial correlation with immigration – share of population 2005 (%)	Error p (two-tailed)	Degrees of freedom
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)	-0.266	0.002	131
Female share of seats in parliament	-0.277	0.001	151
Closing economic gender gap	-0.284	0.002	119
Health expenditure as % of GDP	-0.29	0	152
Closing health and survival gender gap	-0.294	0.001	119
% women in government, all levels	-0.295	0	150
LFPR (Labor Force Participation Rate) age group 55-59	-0.328	0	149
ESI (Environmental Sustainability Index) (Yale, Columbia)	-0.345	0	125
Closing of global gender gap overall score	-0.359	0	119
Social protection (ILO)	-0.375	0	148
Closing political gender gap	-0.377	0	119
Gender Empowerment Index value	-0.416	0.001	63
Effective Democracy Index	-0.43	0	149
Overall Development Index, based on 35 variables and combined to seven dimensions	-0.432	0	116
Democracy measure	-0.467	0	133
World Values Survey: dissent from the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws	-0.516	0.001	39
ESI Social and Institutional Capacity Component	-0.528	0	125

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The following variables measured the welcome culture of a given country:

- Asylum recognition rate
- Asylum seekers as permille of total population
- EU as recipient of global migration from this country 2013 (%)
- Immigration—share of population 2005 (%)
- Migration balance per inward migration 2013
- Net international migration rate 2005-2010
- Share of international immigrant stock (%)
- Share of total immigration for OIC countries 2013 (%)

The following variables measured the effects of the welcome culture on socioeconomic development:

- Civil and political liberties violations
- Closing economic gender gap
- Closing educational gender gap
- Closing health and survival gender gap
- Closing of global gender gap, overall score 2009
- Closing political gender gap
- Combined Failed States Index
- Corruption avoidance measure
- Democracy measure
- Effective Democracy Index
- Global Terrorism Index
- Immigration—share of population 2005 (%)
- Overall Development Index based on 35 variables
- Rule of law

Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14 now highlight the main results of our factor analysis, based on the IBM SPSS 24 version of promax factor analysis. There are six resulting factors, explaining more than 76% of the total variance of the entire model. According to the practices of social science statistics, they were interpreted according to their “loadings” with the original variables of the model. For each factor, “loadings” equal or above the usual threshold of ± 0.500 were taken into due consideration. The resulting factors can be named in the following way:

- Corruption avoidance
- Closing the gender gap
- Development and freedom
- International asylum-driven immigration

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- Protection of civil rights
- Victims of global terrorism

The following tables now list the most important results of our statistical investigation. We leave the details of our statistical results to the specialists, interested in multivariate analysis. But the main result, summarized in Table 14, speaks for itself: international asylum-driven migration negatively affects corruption avoidance, gender equality, and the dimension of development and freedom. For our other results, see Table 12 and Table 13.¹⁰⁴ The country results of our factor analytical procedure are listed in Appendix Table 5.

Clear contradictions of the reasoning of the welcome culture are the negative loadings of closing the gender gap with the share of total immigration from OIC countries, 2013, in percentages, and the negative loading of the factor “development and freedom” with the asylum recognition rate.

Asylum-driven immigration, defined by a high share of international immigrant stock (%) and by the variable “asylum seekers as permille of total population,” affects the variables of our factor analytical investigation in the following way: it strongly and negatively affects closing educational gender gap and the UNDP Human Development Index, 2012. Lesser but still noteworthy negative effects between -0.499 and -0.100 are evident for the Overall Development Index, based on 35 variables, the democracy measure, the ratio

Table 12: The factor analytical model: explained variances

	Eigenvalue	% of total variance explained	Cumulative percentage explained
Corruption avoidance	8.794	39.973	39.973
Closing the gender gap	2.589	11.768	51.741
Development and freedom	1.854	8.426	60.167
International asylum-driven immigration	1.346	6.117	66.284
Protection of civil rights	1.195	5.434	71.718
Victims of global terrorism	1.049	4.768	76.485

	Corruption avoidance	Closing the gender gap	Development and freedom	<i>International asylum-driven immigration</i>	Protection of civil rights	Victims of global terrorism
Closing educational gender gap	0.51	0.611	0.383	-0.692	-0.042	-0.001
Closing health and survival gender gap	0.122	0.345	0.521	0.015	0.059	-0.194
Closing of global gender gap overall score 2009	0.473	0.915	0.506	-0.403	0.269	0.075
Closing political gender gap	0.394	0.702	0.419	-0.065	0.237	0.4
Corruption avoidance measure	0.913	0.589	0.62	-0.218	0.443	0.252
Democracy measure	0.317	0.775	0.717	-0.404	0.718	0.373
Rule of law	0.904	0.621	0.65	-0.239	0.519	0.257
Overall Development Index, based on 35 variables	0.758	0.852	0.786	-0.427	0.383	0.293
Global Terrorism Index	-0.187	-0.228	-0.155	0.218	-0.047	0.729
Effective Democracy Index	0.781	0.791	0.773	-0.284	0.679	0.309
HDI 2012 (UNDP Human Development Index, 2012)	0.806	0.622	0.634	-0.52	0.178	0.16

Table 13: The factor loadings: the quality of democracy and the welcome culture (migration-policy-relevant variables are italicized)

	Corruption avoidance	Closing the gender gap	Development and freedom	<i>International asylum-driven immigration</i>	Protection of civil rights	Victims of global terrorism
<i>Immigration – share of population 2005 (9%)</i>	0.659	-0.072	-0.17	-0.139	-0.019	-0.255
<i>Net international migration rate, 2005-2010</i>	0.739	0.151	0.242	0.003	0.29	0.131
<i>Share of international immigrant stock (9%)</i>	-0.291	-0.357	-0.296	0.887	-0.135	0.077
<i>Asylum seekers as permille of total population</i>	0.013	-0.143	-0.111	0.866	0.092	0.018
<i>Asylum recognition rate</i>	-0.262	-0.308	-0.652	0.341	-0.169	-0.229
<i>Share of total immigration OIC countries, 2013 in %</i>	0.012	-0.569	-0.235	0.247	-0.001	0.142
<i>Migration balance per inward migration 2013</i>	0.237	0.023	0.02	0.109	0.703	0.051
<i>EU as recipient of global migration from this country in %, 2013</i>	0.378	0.267	0.638	-0.13	0.174	0.098
<i>Combined Failed States Index</i>	-0.848	-0.708	-0.757	0.382	-0.493	-0.131
<i>Civil and political Liberties violations</i>	-0.536	-0.798	-0.78	0.386	-0.766	-0.275
<i>Closing economic gender gap</i>	0.144	0.657	0.262	-0.194	0.357	-0.235

Table 14: The correlations between the factors: democracy and welcome culture

Component	Corruption avoidance	Closing the gender gap	Development and freedom	International asylum-driven immigration	Protection of civil rights	Victims of global terrorism
Corruption avoidance	1	0.485	0.485	-0.293	0.318	0.149
Closing the gender gap	0.485	1	0.709	-0.406	0.442	0.201
Development and freedom	0.485	0.709	1	-0.326	0.486	0.324
International asylum-driven immigration	-0.293	-0.406	-0.326	1	-0.065	-0.007
Protection of civil rights	0.318	0.442	0.486	-0.065	1	0.275
Victims of global terrorism	0.149	0.201	0.324	-0.007	0.275	1

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of the closing of the global gender gap overall score, the Effective Democracy Index, the Rule of Law Index, the corruption avoidance measure, and closing the economic gender gap. The following negative tendencies in society are likewise enhanced by asylum-driven immigration: civil and political liberties violations, the Combined Failed States Index, and the Global Terrorism Index.

PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS

ON THE BREAKDOWN OF THE WELCOME CULTURE

Our analysis spelled out some of the dire consequences of the welcome culture in Europe from 2015 onward. A senior Israeli analyst of international relations and international security, Manfred Gerstenfeld, recently remarked correctly that the policies of the welcome culture in Europe have reached their limits.¹⁰⁵ Liberal and left-wing European political elites, the media, and academia appear to be simply unwilling to hear such arguments. Gerstenfeld pointed out:

Yet [Angela Merkel's] legacy may well be heavily influenced by a single fateful decision: to open Germany's borders to migrants in September 2015. Since then, about a million and a half migrants have entered the country. Many came from Muslim countries, in particular Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Merkel misjudged both the extent of the problems that so many non-Europeans would bring with them and the absorption capacity of the German population.... Germany's newly appointed Anti-Semitism Commissioner, Felix Klein, has said he is not surprised that many German Jews are debating whether to leave. This leads to a troubling question: Whereas Chancellor Kohl enabled the building up of a greatly increased Jewish community through immigration, will Chancellor Merkel's legacy be a substantially diminishing Jewish community through emigration?¹⁰⁶

In a similar vein, in 2017 Mordechai Kedar aptly described realities already evolving all over Europe :

Some of the refugees will not find work in the countries to which they have migrated and will live on the economic and social fringes. They will become part of poor Islamic neighborhoods, many of which have existed in West European cities for years with local police afraid to enter them. Poverty and life on the margins turn some young Muslims into easy prey for terror recruiters, who stir up the urge for jihad in them by portraying the absorbing society as rotten to the core and overrun with promiscuity, prostitution, alcohol, drugs, materialism, and corruption. Those societies, the recruiters argue, use the immigrants as slaves

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for factories, garages, shops, and humiliating and degrading service professions while the natives are exploitative lawyers, accountants, businesspeople, and owners of houses and apartments. The recruitment of Muslim young people, particularly those who have learned in public schools that “everyone is equal,” is only a matter of time. The refugee-absorbing countries will suffer a concomitant upsurge in crime: violence in the public domain, sexual harassment and attacks, burglaries, car thefts, consumption of drugs and alcohol, and unofficial, untaxed work. This will be in addition to illegal building, along with a growth in public spending on social services for immigrants related to children, unemployment, aging, and health. Already today, the rate of first- and second-generation immigrants in West European prisons is substantially higher than their rate in the general population.¹⁰⁷

Timothy Hatton contended in a recent article that the existing asylum system, which encourages migrants to make hazardous maritime or overland crossings to gain access to an uncertain prospect of obtaining refugee status, is inefficient, poorly targeted, and lacks public support.¹⁰⁸ In the long run, Hatton argues, it should be replaced by a substantial joint program of refugee resettlement that would help those most in need of protection, eliminate the risks to refugees, and command more widespread public support. Hatton foresees the feasibility of three elements for reform: first, implementing tougher border controls to reduce unauthorized entry; second, promoting direct resettlement of refugees from countries of first asylum; and third, expanding refugee-hosting capacity through enhanced burden-sharing among destination countries.

In Hatton’s view, the existing asylum policy is simply dysfunctional.¹⁰⁹ In order to lodge a claim for asylum, potential applicants must “risk their lives in hazardous sea voyages, circumnavigating fences and dodging border guards, and often falling prey to unscrupulous people smugglers.”¹¹⁰ The current policy, Hatton maintains, selects a range of migrants more than half of whom are rejected as genuine refugees, and some of whom remain in the limbo of the informal economy. Worse still, it leaves behind many of those who are in greatest need of protection, doing little to assist them in the camps and shanty towns where they languish.¹¹¹

In Hatton’s analysis one of the dire consequences, running counter to the central assumptions of the welcome culture, is that the incentives for “spontaneous” asylum migration must be reduced.¹¹² Border controls that have broken down need to be strengthened. Low asylum recognition rates show that many of those who do manage to gain unauthorized entry to European countries are not genuine refugees.¹¹³ Tighter borders deter applications.¹¹⁴


Hatton also underlines that most refugees (86%) are located in relatively poor countries, often just across the border from the country from which they have fled. Hence resettlement of genuine refugees must be on the international

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agenda.¹¹⁵ International asylum policies, then, need to shift away from spontaneous asylum migration toward a substantial resettlement program that would target those who most need help.¹¹⁶

One of our main empirical results accords entirely with Hatton's argument that asylum-driven migration negatively affects development. Our factor analysis has shown that key Western countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Scandinavia, and the German-speaking democracies in Europe, have now joined the bandwagon of international asylum-driven immigration. The factor scores from Appendix Table 5, projected onto a choropleth map of the world and onto the zoomed-in map of the Euro-Mediterranean macroregion, clearly support our contention about the spread of Chancellor Merkel's welcome culture and its connection to events in the Muslim world.

Map 9: Factor scores for international asylum-driven immigration (scale ranges from 1 to 110, based on factor scores)



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GROWING DISTANCE FROM THE WELCOME CULTURE IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

World Values Survey data¹¹⁷ show that on a global scale, and in light of the shadow economy for migration via asylum,¹¹⁸ support for a strict immigration policy is anyway on the global increase, paradoxically even in the countries whose citizens were initially the main beneficiaries of the welcome culture initiated by Chancellor Merkel in September 2015. Table 15 and Map 10, again also with a zoom on the Euro-Mediterranean macroregion, show these results.

Table 15: Average support for a strict immigration policy according to World Values Survey data

Country/region	Support on a scale from 1 to 4	Country/region	Support on a scale from 1 to 4
Burkina Faso	1.7	Belarus	2.21
Rwanda	1.72	Spain	2.23
Vietnam	1.84	Algeria	2.25
Bosnia	1.87	Saudi Arabia	2.27
Mali	1.9	Romania	2.29
Ethiopia	1.96	Sweden	2.31
Azerbaijan	2.08	Switzerland	2.31
Morocco	2.09	Peru	2.31
Albania	2.12	Ghana	2.31
Ukraine	2.13	Zimbabwe	2.33
Uruguay	2.14	Moldova	2.33
Andorra	2.18	Uganda	2.34
Armenia	2.18	Croatia	2.35
Bosnia	2.18	Serbia	2.35
Guatemala	2.19	China	2.36
Nigeria	2.19	Canada	2.37

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Country/region	Support on a scale from 1 to 4	Country/region	Support on a scale from 1 to 4
Pakistan	2.37	Russia	2.57
Mexico	2.38	Cyprus	2.59
Kyrgyzstan	2.38	Serbia and Montenegro	2.6
Bulgaria	2.39	Poland	2.62
Argentina	2.4	Zambia	2.62
Chile	2.41	Puerto Rico	2.64
Italy	2.41	Tanzania	2.69
Slovenia	2.41	Singapore	2.7
Dominican Rep.	2.41	Trinidad and Tobago	2.71
Australia	2.42	Philippines	2.71
Hong Kong	2.43	Taiwan	2.72
Germany	2.44	Lithuania	2.72
South Korea	2.44	Turkey	2.73
Norway	2.45	Macedonia	2.76
Brazil	2.46	Egypt	2.76
New Zealand	2.46	Czech Rep.	2.77
Georgia	2.47	Indonesia	2.77
Japan	2.49	India	2.77
Venezuela	2.51	Hungary	2.79
Montenegro	2.51	Slovakia	2.82
Bangladesh	2.51	Jordan	2.88
Finland	2.52	Thailand	2.88
United States	2.54	South Africa	2.89
Estonia	2.55	Iran	2.91
Latvia	2.57	Malaysia	3.07

Map 10: Global support for a strict immigration policy according to World Values Survey data



Map 10 (Fragment)



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NO ROOM FOR COMPLACENCY: THE FREE WORLD MUST TAKE STOCK OF WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT

Our concluding maps (Map 11, Map 12, and Map 13), based on the cross-national data, documented in our cross-national dataset of Table 4 and Appendix Table 5, are meant to provide a final empirical reflection of the issues under debate in this article. The free world—characterized by development, freedom, and respect for civil rights in the spirit of the Enlightenment—is under threat from transnational terrorism. In the days since September 2015, when for the sake of the welcome culture border controls were abolished and hundreds of thousands of individuals entered countries like Austria, Germany, or Sweden without proper controls of identities, documents, and other vital indicators, the fact that the Western world is under an existential threat from radical Islamism seems to have been forgotten completely.


Our empirical analysis falsified some of the key assumptions of the welcome culture and the illusions of “win-win” only effects of a propensity to emigrate to the European Union. We showed some of the negative, long-term societal effects of increased immigration from the Muslim world that have been overlooked by the welcome culture of recent years, independent of the economic, political, and geographical control variables. Equality, civil rights, absence of high military burden rates, absence of terrorism, environmental data, satisfaction with life and the main economic and social conditions in a given country, economic growth, gender equality, effective democracy, social protection, secularism, employment, education, and global tolerance are simply not, *ceteris paribus*, the winners of the share of total immigration coming from the OIC countries. The same can be said about the long-term negative effects of the share of total immigrant population per total population, independent of our economic, political, and geographical control variables. International asylum-driven migration strongly and negatively affects corruption avoidance, gender equality, and the dimension of development and freedom.

If anything, this article should be a contribution to a growing debate initiated by Israeli scholars and policymakers on the contradictions of the welcome culture. The critique of this ideology cannot be left only to the right-wing populists in the West, now gaining in election after election.

Map 11: Factor scores for development and freedom



Map 11 (Fragment)




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*Map 12: Factor scores for the protection of civil rights
(scale ranges from 1 to 110, based on factor scores)*




Map 12 (Fragment)



Map 13: Factor scores for victims of global terrorism



Map 13 (Fragment)



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APPENDIX

OIC (ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION)¹¹⁹

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Arab Rep., Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, The, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen Rep.

EU 15 (OLD EU MEMBER STATES)

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom

NEW EU MEMBER STATES (COUNTRIES THAT JOINED THE EU IN 2004 OR LATER)

Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia

HIGH-INCOME ARAB COUNTRIES

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

OTHER OIC (ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION; SEE ABOVE)

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Arab Rep., Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, The, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic,

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Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen, Rep.

OTHER COUNTRIES (REST OF THE WORLD)

American Samoa, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Bahamas, The, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Channel Islands, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Faeroe Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Georgia, Ghana, Greenland, Grenada, Guam, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong SAR, China, Iceland, Isle of Man, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Dem. Rep., Korea, Rep., Lao PDR, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Macao SAR, China, Macedonia, FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Fed. States, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Martin (French part), St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, RB, Vietnam, Virgin Islands (U.S.), Zambia, Zimbabwe

DATA IN EXCEL FORMAT IS AVAILABLE FROM:

https://www.academia.edu/37568941/Migration_from_the_Muslim_World_to_the_West_Its_Most_Recent_Trends_and_Effects

Migration from the Muslim World to the West

Appendix Table 1: Shifts in the global patterns of migration, 2013-2017

Destination country	Increase/decrease of being a migration destination 2013-2017	Migration destination 2017	Migration destination 2013
Turkey	2,587,767	5,092,286	2,504,519
Germany	1,440,039	12,550,982	11,110,943
United Kingdom	1,363,657	9,202,494	7,838,837
United States	1,357,374	47,493,736	46,136,362
South Africa	1,350,352	4,035,585	2,685,233
Uganda	1,160,850	1,692,251	531,401
Oman	962,302	2,074,334	1,112,032
Malaysia	840,863	3,249,192	2,408,329
Kuwait	730,270	3,323,025	2,592,755
Canada	674,584	8,078,763	7,404,179
Russian Federation	604,038	11,652,102	11,048,064
Angola	551,063	638,499	87,436
France	513,501	7,969,646	7,456,145
Congo, Dem. Rep.	483,008	985,983	502,975
Ethiopia	459,970	1,234,818	774,848
Kenya	416,169	1,308,860	892,691
Lebanon	408,500	1,995,221	1,586,721
Australia	407,017	6,875,657	6,468,640
China	350,614	1,483,938	1,133,324
United Arab Emirates	310,850	8,312,524	8,001,674
Nigeria	306,629	1,540,221	1,233,592
Singapore	300,152	2,623,404	2,323,252
Sudan	294,739	741,446	446,707
Sweden	292,472	1,746,117	1,453,645

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Destination country	Increase/decrease of being a migration destination 2013-2017	Migration destination 2017	Migration destination 2013
Greece	286,043	1,274,288	988,245
Mali	255,814	451,367	195,553
Venezuela, RB	254,920	1,426,251	1,171,331
Kazakhstan	240,743	3,716,976	3,476,233
Uzbekistan	222,614	1,488,892	1,266,278
Chad	217,314	707,930	490,616
South Sudan	216,198	845,775	629,577
Equatorial Guinea	211,724	221,865	10,141
Austria	195,633	1,593,399	1,397,766
Romania	192,303	391,142	198,839
Azerbaijan	191,573	515,416	323,843
Bangladesh	180,195	1,576,709	1,396,514
Qatar	177,075	2,085,606	1,908,531
Belgium	170,969	1,873,511	1,702,542
Niger	163,795	296,089	132,294
Italy	140,797	5,906,960	5,766,163
Egypt, Arab Rep.	139,589	555,860	416,271
Brazil	137,235	736,913	599,678
Togo	127,710	330,186	202,476
Iraq	125,220	370,223	245,003
Cameroon	113,501	710,362	596,861
Senegal	102,619	312,017	209,398
Ecuador	92,811	452,126	359,315
Norway	90,410	782,450	692,040
Turkmenistan	88,155	314,482	226,327

Migration from the Muslim World to the West

Destination country	Increase/decrease of being a migration destination 2013-2017	Migration destination 2017	Migration destination 2013
Ghana	87,782	527,034	439,252
Chile	86,672	502,165	415,493
Guinea	86,208	464,672	378,464
Ireland	84,125	836,625	752,500
Bahrain	81,216	810,573	729,357
Mauritania	80,915	183,485	102,570
Hong Kong SAR, China	78,298	2,883,051	2,804,753
Netherlands	77,011	2,041,933	1,964,922
Yemen, Rep.	74,767	389,450	314,683
Brunei Darussalam	74,248	280,421	206,173
Algeria	71,789	342,196	270,407
Bulgaria	69,873	153,974	84,101
Zimbabwe	65,504	426,496	360,992
Zambia	64,197	163,104	98,907
New Zealand	63,799	1,325,014	1,261,215
Switzerland	63,670	2,544,611	2,480,941
Serbia	63,597	834,126	770,529
Namibia	61,541	126,920	65,379
Congo, Rep.	60,816	492,286	431,470
Morocco	58,235	109,006	50,771
Rwanda	57,382	509,788	452,406
Tanzania	54,148	707,066	652,918
Central African Republic	52,585	186,822	134,237
Indonesia	50,497	345,930	295,433

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Destination country	Increase/decrease of being a migration destination 2013-2017	Migration destination 2017	Migration destination 2013
Afghanistan	50,108	155,198	105,090
Iran, Islamic Rep.	49,949	2,699,465	2,649,516
Burundi	45,092	299,569	254,477
Gambia, The	42,144	205,063	162,919
Costa Rica	40,711	454,416	413,705
Montenegro	39,501	90,209	50,708
Vietnam	35,174	103,464	68,290
Luxembourg	35,106	264,515	229,409
Panama	32,718	191,135	158,417
Libya	32,445	788,419	755,974
Bolivia	31,705	150,738	119,033
Malawi	30,526	237,104	206,578
Burkina Faso	28,666	725,649	696,983
Mozambique	28,143	246,954	218,811
Tunisia	25,182	61,708	36,526
Slovak Republic	24,763	182,863	158,100
Lao PDR	23,688	45,489	21,801
Hungary	23,570	496,368	472,798
Macao SAR, China	20,385	353,654	333,269
Somalia	20,275	44,868	24,593
Botswana	19,974	166,430	146,456
Suriname	19,486	61,156	41,670
Benin	19,043	253,284	234,241
Trinidad and Tobago	17,726	50,214	32,488
Sierra Leone	15,772	112,140	96,368

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Destination country	Increase/decrease of being a migration destination 2013-2017	Migration destination 2017	Migration destination 2013
Slovenia	14,703	380,263	365,560
Uruguay	14,678	91,425	76,747
Bosnia and Herzegovina	14,437	37,634	23,197
Channel Islands	13,581	96,173	82,592
Georgia	13,440	203,708	190,268
Liechtenstein	13,440	25,648	12,208
Colombia	13,337	142,969	129,632
Moldova	13,302	404,810	391,508
Turks and Caicos Islands	13,184	24,540	11,356
Bahamas, The	12,341	73,684	61,343
Belize	11,958	62,818	50,860
Malta	11,764	46,219	34,455
Honduras	11,331	38,834	27,503
Liberia	11,034	236,518	225,484
Madagascar	10,815	45,128	34,313
Mauritius	10,687	55,684	44,997
Barbados	10,372	42,652	32,280
Monaco	10,352	34,651	24,299
Papua New Guinea	9,750	35,191	25,441
Guatemala	8,825	81,589	72,764
Swaziland	7,771	33,295	25,524
Czech Republic	7,573	752,773	745,200
Guam	7,208	87,978	80,770
Paraguay	6,359	192,135	185,776

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Destination country	Increase/decrease of being a migration destination 2013-2017	Migration destination 2017	Migration destination 2013
Iceland	5,655	41,050	35,395
Aruba	5,638	40,144	34,506
Philippines	5,633	218,783	213,150
Guinea-Bissau	5,381	23,405	18,024
Fiji	4,677	27,505	22,828
Faeroe Islands	4,360	8,001	3,641
Lesotho	3,998	7,093	3,095
Poland	3,984	667,739	663,755
St. Kitts and Nevis	3,932	9,605	5,673
Bhutan	3,884	54,746	50,862
Tajikistan	3,720	279,455	275,735
Belarus	3,419	1,088,815	1,085,396
Bermuda	3,273	23,452	20,179
Peru	2,577	107,496	104,919
Puerto Rico	2,577	321,970	319,393
Haiti	2,472	40,533	38,061
New Caledonia	2,409	65,446	63,037
Korea, Dem. Rep.	2,126	48,939	46,813
Micronesia, Fed. States	1,857	4,457	2,600
Lithuania	1,765	223,227	221,462
Sao Tome and Principe	1,693	8,038	6,345
Dominica	1,614	8,033	6,419
Curacao	1,389	38,254	36,865
Korea, Rep.	1,387	1,233,607	1,232,220
Marshall Islands	1,383	3,513	2,130

Migration from the Muslim World to the West

Destination country	Increase/decrease of being a migration destination 2013-2017	Migration destination 2017	Migration destination 2013
Solomon Islands	1,350	9,220	7,870
Isle of Man	1,184	45,872	44,688
Seychelles	1,182	13,261	12,079
Antigua and Barbuda	1,105	29,838	28,733
Mongolia	984	18,209	17,225
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	957	27,978	27,021
Greenland	913	6,607	5,694
Guyana	862	15,632	14,770
El Salvador	827	4,442	41,615
Cambodia	767	76,333	75,566
Denmark	748	557,573	556,825
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	735	10,995	10,260
San Marino	624	5,481	4,857
Nicaragua	614	42,096	41,482
St. Lucia	520	12,700	12,180
Cabo Verde	505	15,379	14,874
Timor-Leste	494	12,063	11,569
Maldives	448	84,678	84,230
Andorra	323	45,409	45,086
Cyprus	278	207,591	207,313
Myanmar	263	103,380	103,117
Eritrea	243	16,041	15,798
Palau	133	5,723	5,590
Vanuatu	126	3,814	3,688

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Destination country	Increase/decrease of being a migration destination 2013-2017	Migration destination 2017	Migration destination 2013
Portugal	98	893,945	893,847
Comoros	44	12,555	12,511
Kiribati	37	4,283	4,246
Tuvalu	23	171	148
Cayman Islands	18	33,689	33,671
American Samoa	0	41,845	41,845
Cuba	0	16,177	16,177
Djibouti	0	123,537	123,537
French Polynesia	0	34,830	34,830
Gabon	0	394,953	394,953
Grenada	0	11,367	11,367
Jamaica	0	34,907	34,907
Kosovo	0	0	0
Kyrgyz Republic	0	226,960	226,960
Northern Mariana Islands	0	24,155	24,155
Samoa	0	10,534	10,534
St. Martin (French part)	0	0	0
Tonga	0	5,436	5,436
Virgin Islands (U.S.)	0	63,271	63,271
West Bank and Gaza	0	256,517	256,517
Argentina	-5,383	2,391,065	2,396,448
Macedonia, FYR	-8,772	130,979	139,751
Finland	-25,878	267,289	293,167
Albania	-38,118	142,577	180,695

Migration from the Muslim World to the West

Destination country	Increase/decrease of being a migration destination 2013-2017	Migration destination 2017	Migration destination 2013
Thailand	-52,374	4,438,567	4,490,941
Ukraine	-55,085	5,362,652	5,417,737
Estonia	-62,836	134,775	197,611
Latvia	-64,352	259,290	323,642
Japan	-79,561	2,357,707	2,437,268
Israel	-86,545	1,962,511	2,049,056
Mexico	-93,928	1,009,532	1,103,460
Dominican Republic	-104,552	502,701	607,253
Armenia	-107,371	220,584	327,955
Croatia	-120,907	636,073	756,980
Cote d'Ivoire	-148,162	2,298,009	2,446,171
India	-149,936	5,188,550	5,338,486
Sri Lanka	-273,940	51,037	324,977
Jordan	-302,878	3,289,902	3,592,780
Spain	-361,196	6,256,804	6,618,000
Syrian Arab Republic	-380,409	1,013,818	1,394,227
Nepal	-421,463	549,784	971,247
Pakistan	-897,808	3,182,958	4,080,766
Saudi Arabia	-2,415,237	12,185,284	14,600,521

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Croatia	102,401	506,476	404,075	1,057,021	888,219
Other South	81,100	503,278	422,178	8,848,510	4,946,635
Turkey	72,308	2,501,804	2,429,496	3,037,921	3,110,051
Lithuania	65,288	405,428	340,140	652,985	588,897
Germany	54,177	1,815,680	1,761,503	4,142,199	4,141,435
Georgia	52,961	168,791	115,830	875,753	746,017
Latvia	50,773	203,635	152,862	397,745	342,317
Ukraine	47,104	1,211,180	1,164,076	5,995,314	5,583,906
South Africa	47,091	337,641	290,550	934,364	806,294
Australia	45,134	249,536	204,402	579,912	487,275
Bangladesh	44,650	426,826	382,176	7,796,958	7,572,135
Egypt, Arab Rep.	40,287	287,062	246,775	3,444,832	3,386,059
Sudan	37,992	52,559	14,567	2,019,643	1,508,273
Eritrea	35,573	99,379	63,806	645,445	387,410
Philippines	33,367	483,394	450,027	5,970,193	6,001,696
Nepal	32,760	96,343	63,583	2,005,848	1,986,203
Senegal	31,396	293,789	262,393	643,640	540,363

Appendix Table 2: Shifts in the patterns of migration to the EU-28, 2013-2018

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Syrian Arab Republic	742,103	922,472	180,369	7,776,231	3,971,493
Poland	449,322	3,118,899	2,669,577	4,294,300	3,882,994
Italy	349,035	1,656,559	1,307,524	3,236,664	2,928,772
Romania	275,367	3,211,429	2,936,062	3,662,849	3,430,476
Bulgaria	196,567	756,354	559,787	1,475,224	1,416,601
Afghanisan	193,920	482,369	288,449	5,055,219	5,632,196
Other North	172,989	642,873	469,884	4,283,361	2,713,351
China	172,099	1,068,610	896,511	10,060,253	9,651,150
Spain	167,601	854,883	687,282	1,453,098	1,230,969
Hungary	153,830	487,420	333,590	705,169	570,188
Moldova	142,111	442,237	300,126	1,024,551	859,400
Iraq	142,004	575,087	433,083	1,932,429	2,370,153
India	128,254	1,277,402	1,149,148	16,444,830	13,885,099
Greece	121,669	547,068	425,399	1,000,070	1,000,137
Portugal	114,846	1,276,305	1,161,459	2,289,642	2,028,597
Pakistan	113,548	892,992	779,444	6,098,502	6,170,411

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Cote d'Ivoire	16,977	141,901	124,924	1,065,361	1,020,416
Guinea	16,692	76,584	59,892	467,933	398,475
Ethiopia	16,542	124,667	108,125	847,712	749,139
Korea, Dem. Rep.	16,398	23,098	6,700	160,919	223,679
Ghana	16,131	225,309	209,178	865,204	737,217
Rwanda	15,526	29,854	14,328	606,728	345,824
Sierra Leone	15,351	46,545	31,194	374,691	336,003
Sri Lanka	15,211	365,618	350,407	1,728,372	1,780,110
Morocco	15,157	2,687,208	2,672,051	3,047,116	3,040,327
Cameroon	14,785	156,783	141,998	400,165	360,642
Algeria	14,448	1,632,223	1,617,775	1,833,302	1,784,499
Tajikistan	13,771	33,323	19,552	638,249	607,802
New Zealand	13,167	83,840	70,673	810,169	763,731
Slovak Republic	12,141	532,485	520,344	612,186	592,292
Gambia, The	11,910	54,581	42,671	106,525	70,966
Kosovo	9,964	379,964	370,000	561,424	550,000
Nicaragua	9,370	31,547	22,177	629,892	633,057

Appendix Table 2 (continued)

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Cuba	29,424	202,887	173,463	1,598,975	1,485,105
Somalia	29,134	248,966	219,832	2,032,921	1,920,875
Seychelles	27,676	29,699	2,023	37,935	9,554
United Kingdom	27,166	1,209,486	1,182,320	4,820,072	5,151,142
Nigeria	25,761	383,785	358,024	1,309,063	1,117,901
Venezuela, RB	24,838	289,182	264,344	774,208	655,400
Congo, Dem. Rep.	24,340	221,367	197,027	1,849,863	1,306,026
Honduras	22,329	62,077	39,748	790,990	658,817
Angola	22,132	227,027	204,895	661,595	518,711
Uzbekistan	21,126	74,495	53,369	2,071,103	1,912,897
Hong Kong SAR, China	21,034	112,007	90,973	1,059,439	784,079
Cyprus	20,790	106,510	85,720	179,283	148,769
Kazakhstan	20,722	816,618	795,896	3,945,105	3,826,984
Kyrgyz Republic	19,831	94,331	74,500	781,950	738,283
Mali	18,932	112,763	93,831	1,143,309	895,684
Mexico	18,136	118,519	100,383	11,881,712	13,220,345
Dominican Republic	17,005	241,348	224,343	1,497,952	1,375,512

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Malaysia	5,399	81,185	75,786	1,892,736	1,683,132
Luxembourg	5,166	63,956	58,790	71,545	65,980
Malawi	5,056	22,802	17,746	355,596	287,469
Congo, Rep.	5,050	112,973	107,923	292,508	177,294
St. Kitts and Nevis	4,972	5,080	108	40,612	29,054
Guatemala	4,704	20,250	15,546	1,071,030	1,051,813
Cambodia	4,439	73,960	69,521	1,114,226	1,118,878
Lao PDR	4,360	50,466	46,106	1,292,295	1,294,218
Peru	4,005	358,313	354,308	1,487,776	1,454,362
Bermuda	3,840	4,126	286	16,735	12,504
Tunisia	3,839	588,333	584,494	785,623	670,902
Azerbaijan	3,752	44,587	40,835	1,215,260	1,287,404
Qatar	3,707	4,468	761	27,270	19,889
Mongolia	3,683	17,978	14,295	81,311	74,847
Burkina Faso	3,472	26,472	23,000	1,518,063	1,642,594
Haiti	3,436	84,527	81,091	1,292,950	1,377,674
Myanmar	3,385	20,607	17,222	2,947,287	3,139,596

Appendix Table 2 (continued)

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Zimbabwe	8,981	133,635	124,654	738,198	973,247
Burundi	8,835	21,090	12,255	466,962	378,797
Uganda	8,718	83,884	75,166	775,892	406,193
Isle of Man	8,686	8,751	65	9,196	861
Netherlands	8,573	514,684	506,111	1,019,145	1,008,742
Armenia	8,300	84,902	76,602	968,686	785,740
El Salvador	7,883	32,980	25,097	1,559,934	1,525,397
Togo	7,706	53,918	46,212	524,460	461,101
Chile	7,459	145,301	137,842	628,656	610,232
Madagascar	7,326	130,606	123,280	158,873	166,886
Singapore	7,307	59,255	51,948	337,924	282,213
Tanzania	7,224	47,448	40,224	322,830	250,086
Estonia	7,159	89,557	82,398	201,868	191,205
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	6,634	23,455	16,821	27,332	21,830
Saudi Arabia	6,416	55,470	49,054	313,824	291,682
Malta	6,241	40,763	34,522	108,313	109,892
West Bank and Gaza	5,606	15,362	9,756	3,857,805	4,018,219

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Kuwait	1,794	23,378	21,584	210,727	322,816
Niger	1,721	10,902	9,181	383,917	290,330
Gabon	1,677	23,120	21,443	83,129	48,886
Panama	1,569	8,859	7,290	133,525	143,705
Chad	1,438	9,743	8,305	411,961	403,850
Comoros	1,388	37,564	36,176	117,846	111,182
Swaziland	1,368	3,811	2,443	94,196	97,807
Iceland	1,353	21,125	19,772	39,876	36,940
Aruba	1,346	4,961	3,615	19,785	17,097
Central African Republic	1,251	18,652	17,401	728,216	342,019
Belize	1,205	1,363	158	58,687	61,806
Sao Tome and Principe	1,125	20,127	19,002	84,766	36,115
Turkmenistan	1,100	10,671	9,571	258,256	249,523
Yemen, Rep.	1,086	24,430	23,344	1,221,130	1,268,940
Belgium	1,017	407,672	406,655	561,750	530,401
Papua New Guinea	1,006	1,453	447	40,862	38,951
Andorra	916	7,761	6,845	8,381	7,398

Appendix Table 2 (continued)

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
United Arab Emirates	3,291	39,678	36,387	180,090	153,737
Antigua and Barbuda	3,281	3,520	239	73,491	56,842
Guinea-Bissau	3,182	42,518	39,336	106,901	91,216
Liberia	3,151	13,911	10,760	405,732	370,453
Greenland	3,020	19,054	16,034	20,948	17,679
Jordan	2,886	40,788	37,902	769,025	782,015
Botswana	2,875	3,906	1031	82,914	57,525
Canada	2,618	233,469	230,851	1,276,770	1,335,191
Costa Rica	2,604	10,806	8,202	143,285	131,235
Mauritania	2,595	31,499	28,904	158,537	136,270
Faeroe Islands	2,505	14,509	12,004	16,207	13,364
Namibia	2,486	3,594	1,108	192,392	138,615
Timor-Leste	2,232	4,051	1,819	38,235	33,395
Cabo Verde	2,065	110,504	108,439	237,921	173,048
Benin	2,039	28,771	26,732	657,594	486,756
Djibouti	2,025	9,051	7,026	18,082	14,888
Mozambique	1,834	85,019	83,185	954,042	727,389

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Kiribati	155	195	40	6,684	5,367
Puerto Rico	154	262	108	1,935,897	1,712,333
Bahrain	148	7,114	6,966	63,689	61,584
Bahamas, The	132	6,743	6,611	44,350	46,042
Micronesia, Fed. States	132	144	12	32,869	29,335
St. Lucia	110	13,336	13,226	58521	56,481
Virgin Islands (U.S.)	109	139	30	4,660	4,194
New Caledonia	98	122	24	6,946	6,381
Fiji	96	6,550	6,454	209,685	201,462
Turks and Caicos Islands	92	103	11	3,116	1,580
Brunei Darussalam	81	6,024	5,943	47,462	43,118
Macao SAR, China	81	2,180	2,099	144,684	136,821
French Polynesia	70	128	58	4,029	3,801
Barbados	65	20,600	20,535	100,113	100,528
Guyana	61	28,889	28,828	461,812	462,636
Tuvalu	29	73	44	4,468	3,880
Guam	2	6	4	2,774	2,764

Appendix Table 2 (continued)

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Bhutan	867	2,058	1,191	47,077	90,797
Dominica	775	15,570	14,795	73,955	76,787
Cayman Islands	749	872	123	5,320	4,376
Paraguay	739	90,973	90,234	895,988	958,878
Oman	736	6,990	6,254	26,241	24,028
Lesotho	728	1,150	422	327,926	323,988
Samoa	645	844	199	134,757	114,568
Trinidad and Tobago	642	25,099	24,457	371,785	374,492
Monaco	635	51,825	51,190	53,763	52,987
Grenada	615	9,167	8,552	69,096	57,877
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	374	6,778	6,404	57,344	60,569
Maldives	345	500	155	3,191	1,254
Solomon Islands	294	352	58	4,248	3,044
Tonga	253	449	196	62,226	56,303
Vanuatu	231	1,047	816	9,269	8,408
Palau	172	195	23	5,959	5,575

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Norway	-7,639	119,624	127,263	190,350	204,275
Zambia	-7,853	31,288	39,141	278,355	231,208
Kenya	-9,632	163,517	173,149	523,364	475,499
Korea, Rep.	-10,295	107,774	118,069	2,418,235	2,604,888
Macedonia, FYR	-10,422	267,390	277,812	564,949	626,312
Denmark	-10,867	124,931	135,798	259,282	265,529
Austria	-11,314	295,462	306,776	510,455	529,623
Mauritius	-11,432	96,093	107,525	164,008	172,204
Lebanon	-12,406	208,350	220,756	816,841	810,854
Vietnam	-13,518	402,809	416,327	2,694,270	2,592,233
Indonesia	-15,300	170,273	185,573	4,247,814	4,116,587
Brazil	-15,572	582,132	597,704	1,708,083	1,804,341
Israel	-15,802	71,501	87,303	356,070	367,324
France	-16,624	1,071,721	1,088,345	2,207,397	2,184,539
Iran, Islamic Rep.	-19,005	404,639	423,644	1,237,344	1,604,750
Jamaica	-19,106	131,455	150,561	1,057,988	1,097,627
Switzerland	-20,706	483,560	504,266	644,174	649,963

Appendix Table 2 (continued)

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
American Samoa	0	1,086	1,086	3,583	3,319
Channel Islands	0	24,025	24,025	26,639	26,490
Curacao	0	65,487	65,487	75,139	80,143
Northern Mariana Islands	0	29	29	10,202	10,038
South Sudan	0	7,913	7,913	2,018,258	759,057
St. Martin (French part)	0	0	0	6	6
Marshall Islands	-3	21	24	9,764	9,768
Liechtenstein	-41	1,235	1,276	3,899	4,023
San Marino	-165	2,233	2,398	3,303	3,449
Uruguay	-285	93,166	93,451	351,045	340,446
Libya	-901	71,247	72,148	181,279	146,839
Equatorial Guinea	-3,163	23,211	26,374	133,910	126,069
Japan	-3,490	130,375	133,865	1,056,419	1,012,924
Slovenia	-4,421	116,695	121,116	171,202	171,331
Colombia	-5,288	508,481	513,769	2,750,889	2,530,528
Suriname	-6,462	208,473	214,935	263,788	263,263
Bolivia	-6,819	204,203	211,022	880,525	878,981

Appendix Table 2 (continued)

	Increase of migration stock in the EU-28	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2017	Migrants from this country in the EU-28 2013	Migrants from this country in the world 2017	Migrants from this country in the world 2013
Belarus	-21,670	292,303	313,973	1,646,080	1,620,196
Ireland	-21,713	474,474	496,187	770,861	782,838
Finland	-22,338	215,985	238,323	292,426	314,075
Argentina	-23,238	388,250	411,488	996,100	986,818
Thailand	-24,576	227,846	252,422	993,253	1,007,294
Montenegro	-26,098	83,779	109,877	261,641	281,812
Sweden	-37,486	148,135	185,621	312,761	352,002
Ecuador	-42,036	527,253	569,289	1,100,472	1,160,820
Czech Republic	-54,249	321,704	375,953	484,685	524,399
United States	-67,915	632,505	700,420	3,034,407	3,167,905
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-92,991	980,006	1,072,997	1,638,113	1,699,893
Russian Federation	-125,228	1,881,793	2,007,021	10,961,164	10,910,492
Albania	-125,851	982,972	1,108,823	1,194,524	1,264,185
Serbia	-162,801	630,756	793,557	1,014,577	1,292,910
World	4,315,606	57,768,378	53,452,772	266,143,792	247,245,059

Appendix Table 3: Shifts in the patterns of migration to the United States, 2013-2017

	Migration inflow/ outflow 2013- 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2013
Mexico	-1,377,148	11,573,680	12,950,828
China	-253,479	2,130,352	2,383,831
Germany	-116,940	563,985	680,925
Korea, Rep.	-103,469	1,041,727	1,145,196
Canada	-84,205	783,206	867,411
Serbia	-76,157	37,654	113,811
Poland	-73,159	424,928	498,087
Italy	-70,427	335,763	406,190
Macedonia, FYR	-63,666	26,171	89,837
United Kingdom	-62,023	696,896	758,919
Philippines	-57,267	1,941,665	1,998,932
Russian Federation	-41,222	397,236	438,458
Ecuador	-33,732	439,123	472,855
Nicaragua	-31,269	243,024	274,293
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-30,617	101,638	132,255
Hong Kong SAR, China	-29,917	212,253	242,170
Ukraine	-29,093	347,759	376,852
Jamaica	-28,740	736,303	765,043
Vietnam	-28,316	1,352,760	1,381,076
Romania	-27,009	161,629	188,638
Cambodia	-21,047	152,415	173,462
Hungary	-20,294	62,296	82,590
Peru	-19,738	427,445	447,183
Ireland	-17,731	125,840	143,571
Panama	-17,264	94,958	112,222

Appendix Table 3 (continued)

	Migration inflow/ outflow 2013- 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2013
Colombia	-16,946	704,587	721,533
Chile	-15,866	93,647	109,513
Guyana	-15,003	266,368	281,371
Thailand	-14,334	253,585	267,919
Indonesia	-14,147	94,453	108,600
Lao PDR	-13,065	183,894	196,959
Greece	-12,014	135,484	147,498
Lithuania	-11,253	33,640	44,893
Bolivia	-9,911	79,461	89,372
Austria	-9,648	44,943	54,591
Singapore	-8,166	28,940	37,106
Norway	-8,003	22,669	30,672
South Africa	-7,818	94,141	101,959
Iran, Islamic Rep.	-7,341	386,073	393,414
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	-6,613	19,897	26,510
Trinidad and Tobago	-6,340	242,661	249,001
Israel	-6,260	142,078	148,338
Uruguay	-6,073	42,181	48,254
Somalia	-5,528	93,020	98,548
Netherlands	-5,481	79,902	85,383
Sweden	-5,349	48,294	53,643
Croatia	-4,642	39,747	44,389
France	-4,281	175,250	179,531
Dominica	-4,205	31,220	35,425
Belize	-4,181	48,918	53,099
Belarus	-3,044	62,514	65,558
Bahamas, The	-2,406	33,163	35,569

Appendix Table 3 (continued)

	Migration inflow/ outflow 2013- 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2013
Armenia	-1,725	90,946	92,671
Bulgaria	-1,562	70,800	72,362
Barbados	-1,010	54,374	55,384
Switzerland	-742	38,144	38,886
Fiji	-510	43,406	43,916
Denmark	-411	33,715	34,126
Moldova	-68	42,403	42,471
American Samoa	0	0	0
Andorra	0	111	111
Azerbaijan	0	22,320	22,320
Bahrain	0	2,848	2,848
Benin	0	694	694
Bermuda	0	9,026	9,026
Bhutan	0	144	144
Botswana	0	708	708
Brunei Darussalam	0	1,080	1,080
Burkina Faso	0	514	514
Burundi	0	456	456
Cayman Islands	0	3,833	3,833
Central African Republic	0	688	688
Chad	0	381	381
Channel Islands	0	0	0
Comoros	0	73	73
Congo, Rep.	0	953	953
Curacao	0	3,586	3,586
Djibouti	0	24	24
Equatorial Guinea	0	513	513

Appendix Table 3 (continued)

	Migration inflow/ outflow 2013- 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2013
Estonia	0	11,874	11,874
Faeroe Islands	0	53	53
French Polynesia	0	2,321	2,321
Gabon	0	417	417
Greenland	0	702	702
Guam	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	0	97	97
Isle of Man	0	0	0
Kiribati	0	1,878	1,878
Korea, Dem. Rep.	0	0	0
Kosovo	0	25,294	25,294
Lesotho	0	599	599
Liechtenstein	0	35	35
Luxembourg	0	3,076	3,076
Madagascar	0	1,711	1,711
Malawi	0	1,731	1,731
Maldives	0	0	0
Mali	0	740	740
Malta	0	12,245	12,245
Marshall Islands	0	9,038	9,038
Mauritania	0	163	163
Mauritius	0	2,983	2,983
Micronesia, Fed. States	0	19,765	19,765
Monaco	0	651	651
Mongolia	0	195	195
Montenegro	0	24,112	24,112
Mozambique	0	2,540	2,540

Appendix Table 3 (continued)

	Migration inflow/ outflow 2013- 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2013
Namibia	0	924	924
New Caledonia	0	362	362
Niger	0	547	547
Northern Mariana Islands	0	7,298	7,298
Oman	0	1,288	1,288
Palau	0	2,966	2,966
Papua New Guinea	0	2,732	2,732
Qatar	0	2,249	2,249
Rwanda	0	825	825
San Marino	0	773	773
Sao Tome and Principe	0	133	133
Seychelles	0	1365	1,365
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	0	920	920
Slovak Republic	0	24,145	24,145
Solomon Islands	0	108	108
South Sudan	0	25,466	25,466
St. Martin (French part)	0	0	0
Swaziland	0	0	0
Timor-Leste	0	0	0
Togo	0	1,411	1,411
Tonga	0	20,515	20,515
Turks and Caicos Islands	0	1,191	1,191
Tuvalu	0	144	144
United States	0	0	0
Vanuatu	0	147	147
Virgin Islands (U.S.)	0	0	0
West Bank and Gaza	0	43,407	43,407

Appendix Table 3 (continued)

	Migration inflow/ outflow 2013- 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2013
Finland	178	21,526	21,348
Cameroon	478	49,430	48,952
Uzbekistan	479	62,713	62,234
Iceland	589	5,581	4,992
Latvia	649	24,691	24,042
Tajikistan	912	4,725	3,813
Slovenia	965	9,510	8,545
Turkmenistan	986	2,268	1,282
Aruba	1,030	6,485	5,455
Costa Rica	1,213	85,133	83,920
St. Lucia	1,288	23,000	21,712
Algeria	1,544	19,316	17,772
Portugal	1,611	176,638	175,027
Sri Lanka	1,728	55,049	53,321
Lebanon	2,253	128,608	126,355
United Arab Emirates	2,572	12,219	9,647
Kyrgyz Republic	2,621	6,020	3,399
Macao SAR, China	2,755	12,366	9,611
Spain	2,907	105,975	103,068
Sierra Leone	3,887	38,101	34,214
Cyprus	4,230	20,091	15,861
Haiti	4,363	668,223	663,860
New Zealand	4,755	33,605	28,850
Kazakhstan	5,462	32,017	26,555
Jordan	5,621	81,930	76,309
Guatemala	5,746	935,707	929,961
Cabo Verde	5,879	44,519	38,640

Appendix Table 3 (continued)

	Migration inflow/ outflow 2013- 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2013
Samoa	6,051	18,405	12,354
St. Kitts and Nevis	6,260	18,798	12,538
Belgium	6,310	35,406	29,096
Grenada	6,368	36,056	29,688
Eritrea	6,445	43,010	36,565
Suriname	6,574	14,555	7,981
Argentina	7,360	189,126	181,766
Guinea	7,413	20,005	12,592
Angola	7,596	13,841	6,245
Antigua and Barbuda	8,359	31,165	22,806
Albania	8,368	93,033	84,665
Libya	8,647	9,520	873
Liberia	8,850	88,090	79,240
Japan	9,258	355,156	345,898
Egypt, Arab Rep.	9,692	181,677	171,985
Kuwait	10,262	36,659	26,397
Czech Republic	10,285	74,639	64,354
Saudi Arabia	10,955	99,849	88,894
Morocco	11,258	80,384	69,126
Yemen, Rep.	11,554	61,680	50,126
Georgia	11,781	26,688	14,907
Paraguay	12,321	31,257	18,936
Malaysia	13,840	78,459	64,619
Turkey	13,940	120,745	106,805
Gambia, The	14,536	22,783	8,247
El Salvador	15,255	1,387,022	1,371,767
Zambia	15,890	24,455	8,565

Appendix Table 3 (continued)

	Migration inflow/ outflow 2013- 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2017	Migrant stock in the United States 2013
Kenya	17,066	129,670	112,604
Congo, Dem. Rep.	18,009	25,147	7,138
Cote d'Ivoire	18,086	28,348	10,262
Sudan	18,356	39,346	209,90
Syrian Arab Republic	20,255	96,694	76,439
Iraq	20,693	221,587	200,894
Ghana	21,832	171,428	149,596
Australia	21,835	93,179	71,344
Afghanistan	25,017	94,726	69,709
Uganda	25,512	44,965	19,453
Myanmar	25,719	142,494	116,775
Senegal	28,458	41,631	13,173
Tanzania	30,510	49,434	18,924
Bangladesh	30,575	234,640	204,065
Zimbabwe	35,481	54,567	19,086
Nepal	41,341	129,450	88,109
Brazil	41,589	409,595	368,006
Pakistan	43,776	382,852	339,076
Ethiopia	49,119	244,924	195,805
Nigeria	54,702	306,874	252,172
Cuba	70,454	1,271,618	1,201,164
Venezuela, RB	71,628	290,224	218,596
Dominican Republic	94,275	1,085,321	991,046
Honduras	100,365	651,059	550,694
Tunisia	109,876	118,931	9,055
Puerto Rico	218,715	1,903,730	1,685,015
India	373,753	2,434,524	2,060,771

Appendix Table 4: The variables of the multivariate analysis

1	Combined Failed States Index	http://www.funforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=452&Itemid=900
2	Civil and political liberties violations	ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/
3	Closing economic gender gap (World Economic Forum)	World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/index.htm
4	Closing educational gender gap (World Economic Forum)	World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/index.htm
5	Closing health and survival gender gap (World Economic Forum)	World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/index.htm
6	Closing global gender gap (World Economic Forum) overall score 2009	World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/index.htm
7	Closing political gender gap (World Economic Forum)	World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/index.htm
8	Corruption avoidance measure	ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/
9	Country share in top world 500 universities	University of Shanghai http://www.arwu.org/
10	Crisis Performance Factor 2008-2011	calculated from https://www.imf.org/en/Data
11	Democracy measure	ESI Yale Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/

27	Life satisfaction (0-10)	Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html
28	Net exports of ecological footprint gha per person	Global footprint network at http://www.footprintnetwork.org/images/uploads/Ecological_Footprint_Atlas_2009.pdf
29	Per capita world-class universities	https://www.academia.edu/35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_development_in_the_21st_Century_Cross-national_perspectives_and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file
30	Quintile share income difference between richest and poorest 20%	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
31	Rule of law	Yale-Columbia ESI Index website http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/csi/
32	Tertiary enrollment rate	Nationmaster Sydney http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php
33	Total unemployment rate of immigrants (male and female)	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
34	Unemployment rate	United Nations Statistics http://unstats.un.org/unsd/Demographic/Products/socind/unemployment.htm
35	Cyclones – average number of tropical cyclones per year	http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm
36	Natural logarithm (number of people permille inhabitants 1980-2000 killed by natural dsasters per year + 1)	http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm
37	Tertiary emigration rate	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
38	Droughts – average number of droughts per year	http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm
39	Earthquakes – average number of earthquakes per year	http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/rdr.htm
40	Carbon emissions per million U.S. dollars GDP	ESI Yale-Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/csi/
41	Carbon emissions per capita	ESI Yale-Columbia Index http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/csi/

Appendix Table 4 (continued)

12	Ecological footprint (gha/cap)	Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html
13	Economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2009	IMF http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php
14	Economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2010	IMF http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php
15	Economic growth in real terms pc. per annum, 1990-2005	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
16	Environmental Performance Index (EPI)	EPI Yale Columbia Index http://epi.yale.edu/Home
17	ESI (Environment Sustainability Index) (Yale, Columbia)	Yale-Columbia ESI Index website http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/
18	Female probability of surviving to age 65	calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
19	Gender Empowerment Index value (UNDP)	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
20	Global Tolerance Index (based on World Values Survey)	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, "Are Practicing Catholics More Tolerant of Other Religions than the Rest of the World? Comparative Analyses Based on World Values Survey Data (November 21, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075315 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3075315
21	Happy life years	Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html
22	Happy Planet Index (HPI)	Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html
23	Human Development Index (HDI) value 2004	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
24	Infant mortality 2005	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
25	Labor-force participation rate of migrants (male and female)	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
26	Life expectancy (years) (by 2010)	Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html

55	MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP	UNCTAD http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls . In addition, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls . Furthermore, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls . In addition, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls and http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf and http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1
56	MNC PEN – stock of Inward FDI per GDP	UNCTAD http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls . In addition, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls . Furthermore, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls . In addition, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1 and http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf and http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1
57	MNC PEN: DYN MNC PEN 1995-2005	UNCTAD http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls . In addition, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls . Furthermore, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls . In addition, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1 and http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf and http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1
58	Openness – Index, 1990 (export-share per GDP + import-share per GDP)	calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
59	Population density	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
60	Public education expenditure per GNP	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
61	UNDP education index	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
62	Worker remittance inflows as % of GDP	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
63	Immigration – share of population 2005 (%)	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/

Appendix Table 4 (continued)

42	% women in government, all levels	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
43	% world population	calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
44	2000 Economic Freedom Score	Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org/Index/
45	Absolute latitude	Easterly, William, New York University – Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, May 2000, "The Middle-Class Consensus and Economic Development," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2346, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=630718 . Data in Excel format still best retrievable best from a Google search, entering the words "easterly POLRIGHTS98" at the site: http://www.cgdev.org . The address of the site is given as www.cgdev.org/doc/.../easterly/easterly_consensusdata.xls . Alternatively, a Google search using the search profile words "easterly_consensusdata.xls" also yields the dataset.
46	Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%)	calculated from UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
47	Comparative price levels (U.S. = 1.00)	calculated from UNDP (GDP curr/GDP PPP) UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
48	Foreign savings rate	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
49	FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of total population	calculated from ILO http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/themes/epz/epz-db.pdf
50	Natural logarithm of GDP per capita	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
51	Natural logarithm of GDP per capita ^{v2}	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
52	Membership in the OIC	OIC http://www.oic-oci.org/
53	Military expenditures per GDP	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
54	Military personnel rate ln (MPR+1)	US CIA https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html

75	LEPPR 55-59 (Labor Force Participation Rate of people aged 55-59)	calculated from https://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/ilostat-home/home?_afdr:ctrl-state=483whtx6d_48x_afdl:oop=2218127479071575#
76	International stock of refugees	http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr/2009/
77	Share of international immigrant stock (%)	http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr/2009/
78	Annual rate of growth of international migration, 1960-2005	http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr/2009/
79	Total population in millions	http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr/2009/
80	Thousand asylum seekers per total population (in millions)	http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr/2009/
81	Asylum seekers as permille of total population	http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr/2009/
82	Dummy variable: employment permit for asylum seekers required (only in countries of the European Union)	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0745:DE:NOT
83	Asylum recognition rate	https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2677645
84	Permissiveness, pessimism (from World Values Survey; Tausch, Heshmati, Karoui, 2014)	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
85	Traditional religion	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
86	Racism	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
87	Higher education of the younger generation	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)

Appendix Table 4 (continued)

64	Muslim population share per total population (Nationmaster)	Nationmaster Sydney http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php
65	Net international migration rate, 2005-2010	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
66	Years of membership in the EU, 2010	Website of European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm and EU Scadplus http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index.htm , as well as http://www.state.gov/
67	Years of membership in the EMU, 2010	Website of European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm and EU Scadplus http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index.htm , as well as http://www.state.gov/
68	Social security expenditure per GDP average 1990s (ILO)	ILO http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/protection/soctfas/research/stat/table14.htm
69	Overall 30 variable development index (Tausch and Heshmati, 2012)	https://www.academia.edu/35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_development_in_the_21st_Century_Cross-national_perspectives_and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file
70	Overall Development Index, based on 35 variables (Tausch and Heshmati, 2012)	https://www.academia.edu/35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_development_in_the_21st_Century_Cross-national_perspectives_and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file
71	Overall Development Index, based on 35 variables (Tausch and Heshmati, 2012) and combined to seven dimensions	https://www.academia.edu/35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_development_in_the_21st_Century_Cross-national_perspectives_and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file
72	Avoiding net trade of ecological footprint gha per person	https://www.academia.edu/35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_development_in_the_21st_Century_Cross-national_perspectives_and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file
73	Mean economic growth rate crisis years	calculated from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/weosejgr.aspx
74	Principal component growth 2008-2011, final version	calculated from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/weosejgr.aspx

97	Time series Pearson correlation 2007-2014 with GDP per capita income growth	calculated from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
98	Pearson correlation 1992-2014 with GDP per capita income growth	calculated from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
99	Slope 2007-2014 of GDP per capita growth (calculated from World Bank) on time axis	calculated from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
100	Deregulation Index 2013, World Bank (World Bank Regulatory Quality Index)	calculated from https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf and http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home
101	Social protection (ILO)	based on ILO Social Protection data, see https://www.academia.edu/35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_development_in_the_21st_Century_Cross-national_perspectives_and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file
102	Presumed crime rate of the nationals from this country in Austria	https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2677645
103	Comparative price level 2013	calculated from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
104	Distance from Belgium	http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6
105	EEA + EFTA members	https://www.academia.edu/35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_development_in_the_21st_Century_Cross-national_perspectives_and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file
106	Migration to the EU permille of total population, 2010	calculated from http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporasissues/brief/migration-remittances-data and https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
107	Income 2010 (natural logarithm of EU = 100)	calculated from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
108	Income 2010 (natural logarithm of EU = 100) $\wedge 2$	calculated from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator

Appendix Table 4 (continued)

88	Distrust of the army and the press (from World Values Survey, Tausch, Heshmati, Karoui, 2014)	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, <i>The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World</i> (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
89	Authoritarian character	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, <i>The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World</i> (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
90	Tolerance and respect + postmaterialism (from World Values Survey, Tausch, Heshmati, Karoui, 2014)	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, <i>The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World</i> (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
91	The “ego” company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness) (from World Values Survey, Tausch, Heshmati, Karoui, 2014)	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, <i>The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World</i> (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
92	Female rejection of the market economy and democracy	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, <i>The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World</i> (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
93	Muslim Development Index, based on WVS	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, <i>The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World</i> (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
94	Overall Population Development Index, based on WVS	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, <i>The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World</i> (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
95	Muslim Empowerment Index, based on WVS	calculated from World Values Survey, see Tausch, Arno, Almas Heshmati and Hichem Karoui, 2014, <i>The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World</i> (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science)
96	MIPEX 2013 (Migrant Integration Policy Index)	from MIPEX, http://www.mipex.eu/

128	Foreign direct investment, net inflows per GDP	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
129	Gallup poll about satisfaction: education quality	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
130	Gallup poll about satisfaction: efforts to deal with the poor	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
131	Gallup poll about satisfaction: freedom of choice	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
132	Gallup poll about satisfaction: healthcare quality	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
133	Gallup poll about satisfaction: jobs	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
134	Gallup poll about satisfaction: local labor market	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
135	Gallup poll about satisfaction: overall Life Satisfaction Index	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
136	Gallup poll about satisfaction: safety	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
137	Gallup poll about satisfaction: standard of living	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
138	Gallup poll about satisfaction: trust in national government	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
139	Gallup poll about satisfaction: trust in other people	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
140	GDP per capita in purchasing power PPP \$	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
141	General government final consumption expenditure	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
142	GINI Index Income Inequality (UNDP)	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
143	HDI 2012 (UNDP Human Development Index 2012)	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
144	Health expenditure as % of GDP	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
145	Homicide rate	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
146	Justification of wife beating among females	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/

Appendix Table 4 (continued)

109	Global Terrorism Index	http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/
110	Effective Democracy Index	https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228163550_Measuring_Effective_Democracy
111	Share of Roman Catholics per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
112	Share of Protestants per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
113	Share of other Christians per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
114	Share of Orthodox Christians per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
115	Share of Jews per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
116	Share of Muslims per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
117	Share of Hindus per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
118	Share of Buddhists per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
119	Share of adherents of Eastern religions per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
120	Share of adherents of other religions per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
121	Share of people without religion per total population	https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/religion-adherence-data
122	Average annual HDI growth 2000-2013	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
123	Coefficient of human inequality 2013	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
124	ESI Index Component Social and Institutional Capacity	Yale/Columbia ESI Index website http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/
125	Expenditure on education (per GDP)	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
126	Female population with at least some secondary education	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
127	Female share of seats in parliament	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/

161	Migration balance 2017	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
162	Migration balance 2013	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
163	Migration balance per inward migration 2017	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
164	Migration balance per inward migration 2013	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
165	DYN migration ladder	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
166	Ecological footprint per capita	Happy Planet Index website http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html
167	EU as recipient of global migration from this country in %, 2017	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
168	EU as recipient of global migration from this country in %, 2013	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
169	DYN (growth) share of EU in receiving global migration from this country	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
170	Trend – EU share in receiving global migration from this country	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
171	Residual – EU share in receiving global migration from this country	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data

Appendix Table 4 (continued)

147	Justification of wife-beating among males	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
148	LEX 2013 Life expectancy 2013	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
149	Mean years of schooling 2013	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
150	Net migration rate	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
151	Prison population per 100,000	UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/
152	World Values Survey: dissent from the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws	from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp
153	Share of total immigration from OIC countries 2013 in %	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
154	Share of total immigration from OIC countries 2017 in %	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
155	DYN (growth) share of OIC countries 2013-2017	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
156	Residual Muslim share of migration	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
157	Global migration recipients 2017	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
158	Global migration recipients 2013	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
159	Global migration senders 2017	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data
160	Global migration senders 2013	calculated from World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaisues/brief/migration-remittances-data

	Corruption avoidance	Closing the gender gap	Development and freedom	International asylum-driven immigration	Protection of civil rights	Victims of global terrorism
Bulgaria	-0.213	0.609	0.867	-0.467	-0.012	0.105
Burkina Faso	-0.839	-1.44	-1.27	0.508	0.584	-1.131
Cambodia	-1.066	-0.624	-0.343	-0.114	-0.864	-1.455
Cameroon	-1.002	-1.57	-0.946	1.336	-0.575	0.532
Canada	1.703	1.038	0.667	-0.006	1.132	-0.115
Chad	-1.638	-1.72	-1.239	6.515	0.461	-1.193
Chile	0.681	0.827	1.268	-0.587	0.638	1.375
China	-0.307	-0.393	-1.401	0.882	-1.629	1.014
Colombia	-0.703	0.257	0.147	-0.559	-0.905	0.707
Costa Rica	0.571	0.968	0.58	-0.246	0.577	-0.164
Croatia	0.385	0.219	0.527	-0.589	-0.199	-1.059
Cuba	-0.363	0.263	-0.46	-0.324	-5.57	-0.693
Cyprus	0.891	0.227	0.941	-0.691	0.866	0.664
Czech Republic	0.564	0.428	1.262	-0.617	0.748	0.01
Denmark	1.517	1.566	1.26	0.081	1.118	0.34
Ecuador	-0.763	0.586	0.194	0.044	-0.323	-0.553

Appendix Table 5: The factor scores: democracy and welcome culture

	Corruption avoidance	Closing the gender gap	Development and freedom	International asylum-driven immigration	Protection of civil rights	Victims of global terrorism
Albania	-0.663	-0.152	-0.185	-0.73	-0.144	-0.487
Algeria	-0.441	-1.308	0.498	1.014	-1.203	0.584
Angola	-1.2	-0.914	-0.937	1.226	-0.834	-1.602
Argentina	-0.116	0.659	0.786	-0.602	-0.086	0.07
Armenia	-0.152	-0.855	-1.438	-1.02	0.112	-0.403
Australia	1.749	1.088	0.818	-0.583	1.025	0.331
Austria	1.631	0.909	1.555	-0.082	0.905	0.778
Azerbaijan	-0.443	-0.769	-2.187	-0.61	-0.975	-0.812
Bangladesh	-0.832	-0.521	-1.021	-0.313	-0.14	1.948
Belarus	-0.282	-0.249	-0.604	-0.421	-1.355	-1.24
Belgium	1.281	0.9	1.687	-0.331	0.958	0.557
Benin	-0.966	-1.377	0.152	0.565	1.443	-0.393
Bolivia	-0.728	0.099	-0.507	-0.502	0.067	-0.671
Botswana	0.16	0.523	-0.915	-0.431	0.989	-0.554
Brazil	-0.32	0.16	0.529	-0.602	0.235	-0.332

	Corruption avoidance	Closing the gender gap	Development and freedom	International asylum-driven immigration	Protection of civil rights	Victims of global terrorism
Iran	-0.251	-1.682	-0.605	2.534	-0.936	0.327
Ireland	1.843	1.355	1.438	-0.327	0.842	1.258
Israel	1.326	0.33	-0.729	-0.704	0.377	0.542
Italy	0.893	0.384	1.012	-0.61	0.89	0.958
Japan	0.589	0.725	1.059	-0.781	1.02	-0.484
Kazakhstan	-0.205	-0.452	-0.84	-0.465	-1.178	-1.836
Kenya	-1.084	-0.644	-1.015	1.641	-0.242	0.09
Korea, South	0.211	-0.071	0.61	-0.628	0.712	-0.243
Kuwait	2.353	-1.647	-1.987	-0.741	-1.107	-2.088
Kyrgyzstan	-0.696	-0.184	-1.21	-0.127	-1.092	-1.371
Lithuania	-0.11	0.877	1.275	-0.785	0.66	-0.731
Macedonia	-0.258	-0.274	0.271	-0.702	0.248	0.327
Malawi	-0.967	-0.318	-1.294	-0.008	0.54	-0.957
Malaysia	0.358	-0.643	-0.912	-0.252	-0.334	0.034
Mali	-1.147	-1.152	-0.411	0.626	1.353	1.023
Mauritania	-0.444	-1.635	-0.287	0.306	-0.327	-0.765

Appendix Table 5 (continued)

	Corruption avoidance	Closing the gender gap	Development and freedom	International asylum-driven immigration	Protection of civil rights	Victims of global terrorism
Egypt	-0.36	-1.618	-0.682	1.091	-1.152	1.187
El Salvador	-1.005	0.585	0.186	-0.622	-1.378	-0.474
Estonia	0.601	0.592	0.584	-0.64	0.463	-0.975
Ethiopia	-1.263	-1.062	-0.987	1.032	0.276	-0.251
Finland	1.585	2.279	1.608	-0.011	0.847	0.646
France	1.246	0.923	1.426	-0.277	0.875	1.393
Gambia. The	-0.205	-1.078	-0.856	1.636	0.024	-2.065
Georgia	-1.203	-0.245	-0.933	-1.182	-0.096	0.177
Germany	1.408	1.262	1.248	0.313	0.942	0.999
Ghana	-0.238	-0.541	-0.672	0.081	0.849	-0.802
Greece	0.72	-0.042	1.24	-0.742	0.902	1.129
Guatemala	-0.954	-0.369	-0.51	-0.297	-0.582	-0.542
Honduras	-0.871	0.33	-0.452	-0.395	-0.912	-0.429
Hungary	0.352	0.593	1.223	-0.501	0.808	-0.268
India	-0.226	-0.818	-0.887	-0.426	1.091	3.543
Indonesia	-0.713	-0.285	-0.861	-0.329	-0.905	0.168

	Corruption avoidance	Closing the gender gap	Development and freedom	International asylum-driven immigration	Protection of civil rights	Victims of global terrorism
Peru	-0.515	0.475	-0.052	-0.451	-0.574	0.335
Philippines	-0.674	1.093	-0.392	-0.312	-0.913	1.101
Poland	0.216	0.718	1.451	-0.648	0.417	-0.335
Portugal	1.023	0.772	0.648	-0.476	1.007	-0.399
Romania	-0.388	0.249	1.315	-0.669	-0.134	-1.041
Russia	-0.403	-0.278	-0.095	-0.654	-0.291	0.324
Saudi Arabia	0.997	-2.142	-1.499	0.977	-1.852	-0.633
Senegal	-0.686	-0.737	0.595	0.417	0.799	0.422
Slovakia	0.238	0.467	1.461	-0.627	0.494	-0.671
Slovenia	0.832	0.714	0.957	-0.671	0.976	-0.691
South Africa	0.109	1.059	0.633	-0.201	0.65	1.365
Spain	1.435	0.997	1.133	-0.512	0.762	1.171
Sri Lanka	-0.32	0.794	0.149	-0.348	-0.589	1.042
Sweden	1.849	2.029	1.254	0.63	0.965	1.291
Switzerland	1.958	1.312	1.178	0.31	0.88	0.118
Tajikistan	-1.275	-0.505	-1.121	-0.012	-0.646	-1.61

Appendix Table 5 (continued)

	Corruption avoidance	Closing the gender gap	Development and freedom	International asylum-driven immigration	Protection of civil rights	Victims of global terrorism
Mexico	-0.6	0.142	0.237	-0.618	-0.31	0.561
Moldova	-0.901	0.301	-0.208	-0.592	-0.048	-1.48
Mongolia	-0.453	0.749	0.707	-0.734	0.748	-1.124
Morocco	-0.431	-1.232	0.823	-0.062	-2.891	-0.045
Mozambique	-1.246	0.36	-0.77	0.475	0.608	-0.218
Namibia	-0.169	0.461	-0.597	0.028	0.416	-0.899
Nepal	-0.767	-0.595	-1.097	0.862	0.06	1.032
Netherlands	1.578	1.279	1.225	0.132	1.022	0.491
New Zealand	1.73	1.845	0.738	-0.635	0.903	0.355
Nicaragua	-0.917	0.529	-0.487	-0.418	-0.586	0.253
Nigeria	-1.199	-1.236	-0.61	0.069	0.072	1.387
Norway	1.883	2.156	1.475	0.73	0.861	1.191
Oman	1.063	-1.482	-1.173	-0.315	-1.245	-1.585
Pakistan	-0.911	-1.838	-0.979	1.25	-0.106	2.686
Panama	-0.096	0.691	0.339	-0.541	0.614	-0.716
Paraguay	-0.779	0.13	-0.653	-0.406	-0.306	-0.441

Appendix Table 5 (continued)

	Corruption avoidance	Closing the gender gap	Development and freedom	International asylum-driven immigration	Protection of civil rights	Victims of global terrorism
Tanzania	-0.897	-0.122	-1.077	2.812	-0.052	-0.174
Thailand	-0.316	0.402	0.28	0.038	0.461	0.879
Trinidad and Tobago	-0.235	0.817	0.1	-0.526	-0.089	-0.124
Tunisia	0.164	-1.117	0.632	-0.312	-1.532	0.597
Turkey	-0.293	-1.035	0.393	-0.236	0.145	1.076
Uganda	-0.972	-0.131	-1.23	2.079	-0.683	-0.343
Ukraine	-0.456	-0.051	-0.082	-0.672	-0.048	0.385
United Arab Emirates	2.983	-1.986	-2.407	-0.42	-1.62	-1.696
United Kingdom	1.4	1.3	1.035	0.022	1.033	1.664
United States	1.277	1.112	0.826	-0.566	1.055	0.648
Uruguay	0.118	0.821	1.172	-0.779	0.726	-0.393
Venezuela	-0.58	-0.027	0.341	-0.615	-0.259	-0.465
Yemen	-1.355	-2.355	-0.656	1.944	-0.372	1.119
Zambia	-0.874	-0.642	-1.171	1.997	-0.11	-1.123
Zimbabwe	-1.523	-1.169	-2.073	-0.198	-0.939	-0.961

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NOTES

1. All statistical data, quotations, and internet downloads for this article were double-checked as of January 16, 2019. On the controversial term “European refugee crisis” see, among others, Guild, Elspeth et al., *The 2015 Refugee Crisis in the European Union*, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2015; Tausch, Arno, “Europe’s Refugee Crisis. Zur aktuellen politischen Ökonomie von Migration, Asyl und Integration in Europa” (Europe’s Refugee Crisis: On the Current Political Economy of Migration, Asylum and Integration in Europe), October 22, 2015, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2677645> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2677645>.
2. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data>.
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11. There are many ways of translating the German-language term “*Willkommenskultur*” into English. We opted for the version “welcome culture” used by the *New York Times*; see <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/magazine/the-new-europeans.html>
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15. Ibid.
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21. Czollek's book was widely and positively received in the German-language media in Europe, among others in *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), <https://www.zeit.de/kultur/literatur/2018-08/desintegriert-euch-max-czollek-migranten-juden-deutschland>; *Der Falter* (Vienna), <https://www.falter.at/falter/rezensionen/buch/752/9783446260276/desintegriert-euch>; and *Deutschlandfunk* (German Radio), https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/max-czollek-desintegriert-euch-die-utopie-der-radikalen.950.de.html?dram:article_id=429415, while *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich) reviewed the book critically, <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/desintegriert-euch-max-czollek-kritik-1.4131109-2>.
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 25. <http://www.timesofisrael.com/an-ex-defense-chief-sees-europe-deliberately-islamicized-at-turkeys--hand>.
 26. For quotations, see Schmid, *Links*.
 27. For quotations, again see *ibid.* As Schmid suggests, the “Trojan horse” suggestion and the notion of an “organized invasion” are from Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman, “Zeman nennt Flüchtlingenstrom ‘organisierte Invasion,’” *Die Welt*, 27 December 2015, <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article150346836/Zeman-nennt-Fluechtlingstszustrom-organisierte-Invasion.html>.
 28. As Schmid, *ibid.*, notes, in a hearing of the U.S. Senate’s Armed Services Committee on March 1, 2016, NATO’s Supreme Commander Philip Breedlove talked about the “weaponization” of migrants. The *Deutsche Welle* quoted him as saying: “Together, Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve.... These indiscriminate weapons used by... Bashar al-Assad, and the non-precision use of weapons by the Russian forces—I can’t find any other reason for them other than to cause refugees to be on the move and make them someone else’s problem.” “NATO Commander: Russia Uses Syrian Refugees as ‘Weapon’ against the West,” *Deutsche Welle*, March 2, 2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/nato-commander-russia-uses-syrian-refugees-as-weapon-against-west/a-19086285>. See also: <http://www.stripes.com/news/breedlove-russia-s-syria-campaign-sending-foreign-fighters-to-europe-1.397031>.
 29. Much of the European debate seems to be characterized by an almost automatic reflex: “My enemy’s enemy is my friend.” Since European right-wing parties target Muslim mass immigration, for many Europeans who deem themselves “progressives” or “liberals” and oppose right-wing populism, anything connected with Islamism and Muslim anti-Semitism is beyond discussion; see also Krantz,

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30. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/world/europe/france-new-anti-semitism.html>; Jikeli, Günther, *European Muslim Antisemitism: Why Young Urban Males Say They Don't Like Jews* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015). One could remark here wryly that all has been predicted by Houellebecq, Michel, *Submission*, trans. L. Stein (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2015).
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 32. Tibi, Bassam, "The totalitarianism of jihadist Islamism and its challenge to Europe and to Islam," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, 1 (2007): 35-54; Tibi, Bassam, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: From Jihadist to Institutional Islamism* (London: Routledge, 2014).
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 35. <http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/antisemitism-overview-2006-2016>.
 36. <http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/fundamental-rights-report-2018>.
 37. Schoenberg, Arnold, *Die Zukunft Europas und das Judentum: Impulse Zu einem gesellschaftlichen Diskurs*, ed. Oskar Deutsch (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2017); see also the novel by Menasse, Robert, *Die Hauptstadt* (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Suhrkamp, 2017), which won a 2017 German Book Award and portrays the European bureaucracy as the vanguard of Enlightenment in Europe. See also "Brussels, E.U. Capital, Gets a Novel, Tart, Empathic," <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/books/new-novel-about-european-union.html>.
 38. On developments in France: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/frances-jewish-leaders-raise-the-alarm-over-brutal-murder-of-holocaust-survivor/2018/03/26/28cf8686-30f4-11e8-8abc-22a366b72f2d_story.html?utm_term=.4003672658d3; on developments in Sweden: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/facing-death-chants-and-hate-crimes-swedens-jews-live-in-a-climate-of-fear/>; on developments in Germany: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/world/europe/anti-semitism-germany-jews-kipa-solidarity.html>. This list could be continued endlessly.
 39. <https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/attacks-in-paris>; <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/08/europe/2015-paris-terror-attacks-fast-facts/index.html>.
 40. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/10/28/how-pittsburgh-shooting-compares-attacks-jews-europe-where-anti-semitism-has-been-growing/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8809a26340fd.

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42. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Experiences and perceptions*.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. See Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch, *Islamism*.
47. See Günter Seufert, *Turkey as Partner of the EU in the Refugee Crisis: Ankara's Problems and Interests*, SWP Comment 2016/C 01, January 2016, available at: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkey-as-partner-of-the-eu-in-the-refugee-crisis/>. Seufert aptly described this dependency: "Meanwhile, in Germany and other EU member states, a public critical of Turkey sneered at what was deemed 'kowtowing' by European politics to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. All this illustrates that eyes remain firmly closed to the unpleasant realisation that the familiar power balance between the EU and accession candidate Turkey has now turned on its head, for, in the refugee crisis, the EU is more reliant on Turkey than vice versa." For the official EU policies, see https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22664/eu-and-crisis-syria_en; see also Annegret Bendiek, *A Paradigm Shift in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: From Transformation to Resilience*, SWP Research Paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, October 2017, available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2017RP11_bdk.pdf.
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 56. Pew, *Europe’s Growing Muslim Population*.
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 61. Ibid.
 62. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-01/moore-why-dont-we-hear-about-persecuted-christians/5641390>.
 63. <https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution>.
 64. Ibid.
 65. The present author, having been a European migration policy bureaucrat and EU-policy analyst from 1992 to 2016, actively contributed to this thinking.
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 67. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/369031/IPOL-CULT_ET\(2007\)369031_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/369031/IPOL-CULT_ET(2007)369031_EN.pdf).
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ARNO TAUSCH is currently Honorary Associate Professor of Economics, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary (since Fall Semester 2010) and adjunct professor (Universitaetsdozent) of political science at Innsbruck University, Department of Political Science, Innsbruck University, Austria (since 1988). He entered the Austrian Civil Service on January 1, 1992, and retired from active service on February 29, 2016. He served as an Austrian diplomat abroad and was attaché, and later counselor for labor and migration at the Austrian Embassy in Warsaw, 1992-1999. Since 1978, he taught numerous regular courses in political science, economics, and sociology at universities in Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, and the United States. He authored or coauthored books and articles for major international publishers and journals, among them 19 books in English, 2 books in French, 8 books in German, and around 100 articles in peer-reviewed journals and also numerous articles in the media of several countries. His publications also include a number of essays for leading economic and foreign policy global think tanks such as the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv; the IZA Institute of Labour Economics, Bonn; the Polish Institute for International Affairs PISM, Warsaw; and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Comparisons (WIIW).