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Hassan Nasrallah’s Critical Mistakes since October 7, 2023

 
Filed under: Hizbullah, Israeli Security, Operation Swords of Iron

Hassan Nasrallah’s Critical Mistakes since October 7, 2023
Lebanese hung Hassan Nasrallah in effigy after the massive and devastating bomb blast in the Beirut Port in August 2020 that was attributed by many to Hizbullah explosives.(Twitter, August 8, 2020)

Since Hassan Nasrallah opened his war against Israel on October 8, he made a series of strategic miscalculations that significantly weakened Hizbullah and harmed the people of Lebanon.

His reputation as a wise and effective leader was severely tarnished in Lebanon and across the Arab world, and eroded his credibility, leaving him viewed as a failure.

Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hizbullah, had long boasted of his deep understanding of Israeli society, its political landscape, and media.

However, since his war began on October 8, 2023, he committed several strategic blunders, especially in his assessment of Israel’s capabilities and responses.

Here are some of his most critical mistakes:

Failure to Act on October 7

Nasrallah’s first major error occurred on the war’s first day, October 7, 2023. He failed to order the “Radwan” forces, stationed on the Israeli border, to invade northern Israel and seize the Galilee region. This could have occurred simultaneously with Hamas’s attack on settlements near the Gaza border. These forces had been training for years for such an operation and were combat-ready, but the order never came.

This missed opportunity could have allowed Hizbullah to score a significant victory over Israel. At the time, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) presence on the Lebanon border was thin, and Hizbullah could have relatively easily occupied parts of the Galilee and captured Israeli settlements and military bases.

Sources suggest that Nasrallah was not informed by Yahya Sinwar of the exact timing of Hamas’s “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation. While he was aware of Hamas’ broader intentions, the lack of precise information left him unprepared.

By the time he recovered from the surprise, the IDF had reinforced its positions on the northern border, and Hizbullah lost the element of surprise.

Ignoring Lessons from the 2006 War

Nasrallah’s second major miscalculation was failing to learn from Hizbullah’s experience during the 2006 Lebanon War. Once again, he dragged Lebanon into a dangerous conflict to serve Iran’s regional ambitions. By tying Lebanon’s fate to that of the Gaza Strip, Nasrallah faced harsh criticism both within Lebanon and from the Shiite community from which Hizbullah draws its support.

His actions led to devastation in southern Lebanon, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths and displacing half a million people, many of whom have flooded into Beirut and other parts of the country.

Misjudging Israel’s Resilience

Nasrallah’s third error was in underestimating Israel’s national resilience. He believed that Israel could only endure short conflicts and was ill-prepared for a prolonged war of attrition, like the ongoing campaign in Gaza. He also expected that the international community would impose harsh sanctions on Israel and force it to end the conflict, which did not happen. Nasrallah miscalculated Israel’s response to the issue of hostages, assuming that it would cave to Hamas’ demands, but that, too, has proven false.

Underestimating Israeli Military Strength

His fourth mistake lay in underestimating the capabilities of the Israeli Air Force and intelligence services. The IDF had thoroughly prepared for the northern front, assembling a comprehensive and precise target list. The Israeli Air Force’s subsequent strikes were highly effective, and Hizbullah was left on the defensive, particularly after the Israeli intelligence services (SIGINT) infiltrated and disrupted its communications network.

Conclusion

Hassan Nasrallah failed to grasp that Israel is fighting for its survival in the region, and its citizens have no intention of leaving. His miscalculations led Hizbullah and the people of Lebanon to pay a steep price.

The image of Nasrallah as a shrewd and successful leader has been shattered – except for sycophantic Western media publishing fawning obituaries.

Today, Nasrallah is seen in Lebanon and the Arab world as a defeated and discredited figure, serving Iran’s agenda rather than protecting Lebanon. His errors left him on the defensive to his very end, struggling for survival in the face of Israeli attacks.