

SURVEY OF ARAB AFFAIRS

A periodic supplement to Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints

SAA: 5 8 Av 5746/ 13 August 1986

In this issue:

JORDAN'S INTERNAL TURMOIL

JORDAN WOOS ISRAELI ARABS

***** Survey of Recent Literature**

***** Data Base**

JORDAN'S INTERNAL TURMOIL

Before World War II, small countries, like small fish, lived in constant fear of being swallowed up. Since the United Nations sanctified borders after the war and an international state system was created, the threat to small states is more likely to come from within. For example, Gabriel Ben-Dor pointed out recently that Lebanon's is no longer a viable state due to the continuing civil war; only the international community supports the illusion of sovereignty. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is in a similar position. King Hussein knows that the major threat to his reign is internal subversion. Domestic considerations thus affect many of the

King's crucial decisions, including his longstanding refusal to negotiate with Israel over the territories.

Though the Jordanians are in no position to admit it, they are quite content with the present state of affairs. Israeli control of the territories, particularly under the Labor government, suits Jordan's domestic needs. The other options — war, formal peace or Israeli annexation of the territories — would seriously unsettle their fragile domestic situation. There is a direct link between Israeli control and the alleviation of Jordan's internal problems.

The Jordanian regime faces three critical problems in its perpetual struggle to

retain power. First, the Hashemite Kingdom is split between Palestinians, who comprise approximately 70 percent of the population, and the indigenous Bedouin. The second threat to the regime's stability stems from the difficulty of absorbing a growing number of educated young people into the Jordanian economy, particularly since the 1982 economic slowdown. The young intelligentsia will only resign themselves to the idea of non-democratic monarchy if the economic rewards are large enough. The third problem entails closing the economic gap between Jordan's metropolitan center and the Transjordanian hinterland and stemming the flow of the rural Bedouin, King Hussein's staunch supporters, to the more radical, Palestinized capital of Amman. For over ten years, Jordan has been encouraging regional development in an attempt to thwart the continued growth of the Amman-Zarqa area.

Metropolitan growth and the Palestinization of Jordan are two interrelated problems. In the 1950s and the 1960s, these processes were actually encouraged by the Jordanian government. As an avid student of history, King Hussein realized that a metropolitan center is the basis of not only modern civilization but of strong government. In 1949, he had to create a center from scratch, one far removed from the Palestinian area he incorporated into his kingdom. At that time, only the Palestinians, especially the refugees of the 1948 war, were available for relocation. They alone had the skills to man the emerging state bureaucracy that was purposely centralized in Amman. The Amman district doubled its population, from 218,465 to 433,617 between 1952 and 1961. Immigration from the West Bank accounted for most of this increase, as the demographic patterns of the East Bank, West Bank, and the Amman district clearly demonstrate. While the Amman district population increased by nearly 100 percent during that period and the overall East Bank population by 51 percent, the West Bank population increased by a mere 9 percent.

But the King got more metropolitan growth and more Palestinians than he had bargained for. The 1967 war resulted in the mass immigration of 200,000 Palestinians from the West Bank. Most of these were settled in refugee camps in the Amman area. Then industry naturally emerged to capitalize on the large and variegated Amman

workforce and the superior infrastructure of the capital, unparalleled in other parts of the country. Once again, the population of the Amman district doubled in the span of ten years.

Jordan has also absorbed thousands of Palestinian refugees from Lebanon over the past ten years, including former members of PLO factions who have little loyalty to the regime. Thus the Palestinization of Jordan and the growth of the metropolitan center are two sides of the same coin.

What concerns the regime most is the possibility that the formerly sedentary Bedouin from Balqa, Ma'an, and al-Karak will join the Palestinians. The Hashemite regime has long maintained a policy of co-opting the Bedouin to protect the regime and using Palestinians to develop the state. The specialization of labor is highly developed in the army, where the native Transjordanians man the fighting units and the Palestinians control the technical and logistical arms. In government, especially in the higher echelons, the real positions of power were carefully allotted to native Transjordanians only, while the Palestinians fulfilled representative roles. This division of labor was made possible by the physical geographic separation between Palestinians and Jordanians.

This physical separation is now threatened by the possibility of internal migration from the countryside to the city, as rural Transjordanians are demanding the same public services and job opportunities offered to Amman area residents. To avert immigration, the regime was forced to develop these employment opportunities. Thus, for the past decade, the government has adopted a policy of subsidizing regional decentralization. But it has been hardpressed to satisfy employment demands as indicated by data on the centralization of modern industry.

Nevertheless, some gains have been made. Industrial parks have been set up in the Irbid district and the cities of Balqa and Amman. Aqaba has been transformed into a regional port, and a phosphate industry and infrastructure have developed in the Dead Sea area. Two universities have been founded: Yarmuk University (the scene of recent violent clashes among the student body) in the Jordan Valley area, and the recently established Muta University. Muta has long been staunchly pro-King, so it is no surprise that the

university houses the College of Police Sciences -- the basic training center for Secret Service recruits. Most of these recruits are of Bedouin origin.

Jordan has more than adequately dealt with job-creation and educational placement for a rapidly expanding educated population. The regime was careful to develop a system of higher education geared to its economic and political needs. Unlike most third-world countries (Egypt, for example), only 17,000 of nearly 60,000 post-secondary students received a professional or liberal-arts education in the two universities; the rest were channeled into trade and vocational junior colleges. Meanwhile, the government was able to export its high-level manpower to the Gulf states while achieving domestic economic growth at the same time. Both trends have significantly tapered off since 1983.

Through territories mutually controlled by Jordan and Israel, the Jordanians are able to monitor and direct the movement of Palestinians between the East and West Banks in a manner that does not aggravate the Jordanian domestic situation.

Were war with Israel to break out, a further influx of Palestinian immigrants from the West

Bank would adversely influence all three fronts. If Israel exploited such a war to expel the Palestinians from the West Bank, most Palestinians would emigrate to Amman, or even worse, to the larger towns in rural Jordan which are now being industrialized to thwart emigration of the locals to the Amman district. This would tax the absorptive capacities of the state and upset the demographic balance between Transjordanians and Palestinians.

Peace -- and the return of most of the West Bank to Jordan -- would produce similar if not such dramatic risks by enabling free movement over the bridges. There is no assurance that the Palestinian flow would be from East to West. Palestinians in the 1950s preferred metropolitan Amman; they might do the same after reincorporation. Pressures to repatriate Palestinians from Lebanon are also likely to increase. Many are likely to prefer a lively metropolis like Amman to the more staid Nablus. No wonder Jordan has recently announced a \$150 million regional grant to the West Bank. The grant, which is primarily meant to subsidize unemployed white-collar workers, has fine print that reads "Jordan wants the West Bankers in the West Bank."

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JORDAN WOOS ISRAELI ARABS

The PLO is displaying an increasing interest in the Israeli Arab community. This reflects the growing strength of a demographically thriving, educated community whose lobbying role on behalf of Palestinian issues is viewed with renewed appreciation, even in the face of continuing disunity among Palestinians and a loss of effectiveness abroad.

Now it appears that Jordan is also beginning to curry favor with the Israeli Arabs. Sheikh Sa'ad a-Din al-'Alami, the President of the Higher Muslim Council (also the official representative of the Qadi al-Quda and the mufti of Jordan) recently announced the Council's

intention to contribute nearly \$1 million to complete the *Jami'* -- a large mosque where Muslims fulfill their duty to pray publicly on Fridays -- in the Israeli town of Shafar'am. He added that the Council intends to aid other Israeli Arab towns to meet their religious needs.

Shafar'am was chosen for sound reasons. First, it is located in the Western Galilee and not in the areas contiguous to the West Bank. It is a mixed town, the only one where the three minorities that comprise the Arab population -- Christians, Druze and Muslims -- reside side by side in substantial numbers. With a population approaching 20,000 it is also one of the largest

and fastest growing Arab towns. For years Shafar'am has been demanding elevation from local council status to municipal council from the Ministry of Interior.

But the key to Shafar'am's selection as the first recipient of Jordanian largesse lies in the position of its mayor, Ibrahim Nimr Husayn. Husayn is the President of State Council of Arab Local Council Heads, an organization comprising 32 local councils and cities in the Arab sector, nearly 70 percent of the Arab population. Originally set up in 1972, the committee intended to serve as a special interest lobby to press for

better treatment from the Israeli government in solving the grave infrastructural problems facing hilly villages and towns undergoing urbanization. In time, it broadened its base of interest to include wider Palestinian issues, including civil rights in the territories. Members of the Israeli government have often met with the Council, although it is not officially recognized. Whatever the Jordanian motivations may be, the residents of Shafar'am are nonetheless pleased. So is Mayor Husayn. A renovated and enlarged mosque should serve as a further reason to accord the town full municipal status.

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SURVEY OF RECENT LITERATURE

The Indigenous Problems of Institutions of Higher Education in the Occupied West Bank. Abdul Jawad Saleh. Nicosia: Al-Kuds Center for Research, 1982. (Recently Released) (in Arabic). 192 p.

The Palestinian Universities — Between What Is and What Is to Be Expected. Dr. Ali M. Jarbawi. Jerusalem: Arab Studies Center, 1986. (in Arabic).

The appearance of these two books on the local Palestinian universities could not have been better timed. Birzeit University is going through its worst crisis ever — a three week long strike by the faculty and administration over the mass termination of all faculty contracts, presumably for financial reasons. Meanwhile the faculties of all the universities in the West Bank and Gaza still refuse to accept the 15 percent wage cut demanded by the Ramallah-based Council for Higher Education. Both of these books attempt to explain the present financial and political crisis, and both partially succeed.

Al-Jarbawi's is the drier and more academic work. In fact it reads like a model academic study, written by a Birzeit political scientist who mastered his craft at a good American university. The book opens with a theoretical discussion of the role of universities in developing countries. Such universities face two often contradictory objectives. On one hand, all universities must strive to contribute to universal knowledge;

therefore they are members of an international community committed above all to research. On the other hand, universities in developing countries are morally committed to enhancing the welfare and political objectives of their respective societies. In this sense they are pragmatic institutions. The task of the Palestinian universities, like that of all third world universities, is reaching the happy medium between these objectives.

The author then proceeds to show how the local universities sought to achieve both objectives but attained neither. Meeting the practical needs of society was their first priority. Al-Jarbawi has no difficulty defining the basic objective behind the expansion of these institutions — absorbing as many Palestinian high-school graduates as possible to prevent emigration. Quality and appropriateness of courses and syllabi were sacrificed for quantity. The universities were soon churning out graduates unsuited for the job market, with skills of little use to Palestinian development.

These institutions then awakened to the need to conduct research. But al-Jarbawi argues they did so for motives of prestige. Money was squandered as each university set up its own research institute, often duplicating one another's efforts. Al-Jarbawi concludes by calling for greater centralization in the decision-making process through the Committee for Higher Education. The problems and the policy proposals are familiar to academic specialists the world over. What I missed seeing was a discussion of the universality of the research community, which would require that al-Jarbawi and his colleagues establish ties with the Israeli universities. These are, according to most assessments, research universities and likewise members of the international community.

Saleh's book covers much the same academic ground, but he utilizes more statecraft, even intrigue. The author is an insider both in the PLO and in territorial politics. He was a "PLO" mayor of al-Bireh, Ramallah's twin city, in 1972. He was expelled by the Israelis two years later for helping set up the National Front, a coalition of Communists and Fatah supporters in the territories. Once expelled, he and three other Palestinians exiled for the same reason were automatically made members of the 12 man Executive Committee of the PLO. He was removed from the committee four years later.

Through reading the book, one clearly understands why he fell from grace in the PLO. In fact, one wonders how he remained alive after publishing this searing attack on PLO tactics. At best he accuses them of ineptitude in dealing with

the local universities. At worst he accuses the PLO of openly selling out its supporters in these institutions. He comes down hard on the PLO for failure to support the Committee for Higher Education in the early years of its existence and for a similar failure to support the faculty unions in the local universities against their Boards of Governors. In the long-term, the former omission was by far the more important. Established in 1977, soon after the election of the pro-PLO mayors, the Committee could easily have become a major vehicle for Palestinian institution-building. Instead, the PLO delayed funds needed to effectively monitor and control the universities while avoiding duplication of efforts and the emergence of academic programs which profitted neither the students nor Palestinian society at large.

Yet, despite the many shortcomings of the local Palestinian universities described in these books, these institutions have made much progress since they were first established in the mid- and late 1970s. Al-Jarbawi's book itself attests to this. Such an academic work would have never been published in Arab Judea and Samaria ten years ago. First of all, there were no political scientists to speak of then. In addition, not only were there no research institutes to publish it, but there were no universities to even write about. Saleh's book perhaps attests to something even more interesting — the beginnings of intellectual tolerance within the PLO, which financed the book through one of their own research organizations.

—Hillel Frisch

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DATABASE — JORDAN

The following six charts use numbers to depict some of the problems facing Jordan that are raised in this issue of *Survey of Arab Affairs*. Table No. 1 presents strong demographic growth, particularly in the Amman metropolitan area. Table No. 2 shows the youthfulness of Jordan in comparison to Western nations, which means that a small workforce must support many dependents. Table No. 3 illustrates the growth of metropolitanism from the economic vantage point. Note that we are dealing with non-family based modern economic concerns of five or more workers, located overwhelmingly in the Amman

area.

Secondary and higher education was practically an invention of the 1970s. As Tables Nos. 4 and 5 indicate, Jordan in the 1970s easily coped with the rise in the number of graduates. The country enjoyed one of the highest growth rates in the world (the Gross Domestic Product grew by 10-12 percent annually), and many graduates found employment in the Gulf States.

One-third of the Jordanian workforce is employed outside Jordan. Yet from 1982, as Table No. 6 indicates, the economy has slowed considerably.

Table No. 1

Number of Residents of the Kingdom of Jordan				
District	1952	1961	1971	1983
Amman	218,465	433,617	927,000	1,372,400
Balqa	24,292	69,057	110,000	172,900
Irbid	213,877	273,976	491,000	715,200
Karak	60,556	67,211	70,000	147,500
Ma'an	29,061	46,914	60,000	87,300
The West Bank	742,279	805,450		
Total	1,288,530	1,696,255	1,658,000	2,495,300

Table No. 2
The Work Force in Jordan
(Compared with Western Countries)

	Ages 15-64 (in thousands)	
	1960	1979
Jordan	52	51
United Kingdom	65	64
Japan	64	69
France	64	62

Age under 15 in Jordan (in thousands)		
	1961	1979
	45.6	53.2

Table No. 3

Economic Institutions With 5 Or More Workers
According To District - 1983

District	Number of Institutions	Percent of Total	Number of Workers	Percent of All Workers
Amman	972	93.2	29,809	95.2
Irbid	51	4.9	876	2.8
Balqa	6	0.6	283	0.9
Kirik	7	0.7	270	0.2
Ma'an	1043		31,292	0.9

LABOR FORCE AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Table No. 4 (part 1)
The Expansion of High School Education
For the Last Ten Years

Scholastic Year	Total No. of Students	Scholastic Year	Total No. of Students
1974/75	37,154	1979/80	80,173
1975/76	42,137	1980/81	87,673
1976/77	53,171	1981/82	90,583
1977/78	62,115	1982/83	94,008
1978/79	73,493	1983/84	95,540

Table No. 5

Students in Universities, Community Colleges and
Teacher Training Institutes in Jordan

	Community Colleges	Universities	Total
1967/8	560	1,698	2,258
1974/5	4,432	4,805	9,237
1983/4	32,391	23,204	55,595

Table No. 4 (part 2)
Population and Labor Force
(figures in thousands)

	1975	1979	1980	1981	1982
Population	1,810	2,147	2,233	2,322	2,415
Employment by Sectors					
Agriculture	49	42	63		53
Industry	39	51	58		63
Construction	30	67	59		74
Transport/Communications	28	32	270		48
Public Administration and Defence	122	151	270		223
Other Services	87	78	270		70
Total	355	421	450		531
Employment Seeking Work					
Seeking Work	7	39			
Total Labor Force	362	460			

Table No. 6
Economic Structure

Macro-Economic Indicators	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
GDP at market prices JD *	1,166	1,323	1,434	1,523	—
Real GDP growth %	10.5	5.7	3.2	2.3	2.0
Population*	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7
Exports fob \$*	735	751	580	757	675
Imports cif \$* (balance)	3,173	3,243	3,040	2,789	2,250
Debt service ratio %	9.6	9.3	11.3	—	—

*in millions