THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL AND STATIST TRADITIONS IN ZIONIST FOREIGN POLICY

Shmuel Sandler

The dilemma of choosing between goals that emanate from the ethno-national setting of Israel as opposed to those serving the state is rooted in Zionist thought and international behavior. The origins go back to the founding fathers of Zionism in the nineteenth century who responded to different challenges of their environment. Two case studies in which the Zionist movement had to choose between its loyalty to the Land of Israel and the idea of an immediate materialization of a Jewish state are examined. One case is the Uganda controversy and the second is the partition debate of 1937.

Introduction

Israel’s society and polity are currently divided between two major ideals which may be defined as the State of Israel vs. the Land of Israel. While the traditional cleavages of Ashkenazim-Sephardim and religious-secular continue to exist to a certain degree, the split between those recommending the immediate or ultimate annexation of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip because of historical or religious reasons and those objecting to this option because of demographic or political reasons has intensified. It has been on the public agenda since Israel acquired those territories in 1967, but became more salient with the coming to power of the national camp in 1977. Also, the actual peace treaty with Egypt that sharpened the dilemma of exchanging territory for peace contributed to the actualization of a dilemma that previously seemed theoretical.

The current debate in Israel is composed of many elements including security considerations and economic factors, as well as domestic political and personal influences. Without downgrading the role of these variables, it seems that ultimately the debate touches the essence of Zionism. Is the main goal of the Jewish national movement the establishment of a Jewish state in which the Jewish people as a majority and enjoying sovereignty will control its destiny, public life and institutions? Or is the return of the Jewish people to the land of its ancestors and regaining control over all the Land of Israel the main
purpose of Zionism. Obviously the above dilemma is put as two clear ideal-type options, neither of which could be totally identified with one or another segment in Zionism or the State of Israel. It was presented in this way because of the distinction between the state and the nation that is at the base of the modern polity and influences its international behavior.

This study is an attempt to trace the roots of the current dilemma facing Israeli society, starting in the nineteenth century setting when Zionism was conceived both as an ideological and a political movement. Our understanding of the dilemma could be improved by borrowing some concepts from comparative politics.

**Ethnonationalism vs. Statism — A Theoretical Analysis**

Contemporary theorists in politics and sociology see the national and the territorial state as two different concepts that link up in the modern nation state, but do not always exactly overlap each other. While the nation has its roots in the ethnic community which preceded the appearance of the state, the latter is a political-territorial construct. “The modern state,” according to A.D. Smith, “refers to a set of autonomous and abstract institutions within a given territory; the modern nation refers to a sense of historic community associated with a unique ‘homeland.’”

We may, in fact, define the modern state as a territorially bounded and differentiated set of public institutions, autonomous from all others and highly centralized, having exclusive control and authority within that territory.

The nation, on the other hand, is not primarily a political construct, although it does possess a vital territorial element. It is this element which links a cultural grouping, defined by its unique heritage and its psychological sense of solidarity and destiny, to the world of politics and interstate relations. The nation may, after all, be defined, essentially, as an ethnic community possessing a territory exclusively its own, with a territorial economy and common rights of membership, or citizenship, within that territory. An ethnic community, in turn, can be defined as a social group which possesses a sense of common origins, a unique history and one or more elements of culture, and a sense of communal belonging or solidarity. The nation, as the etymology suggests, is a modern development of that ancient social formation, the ethnic community, which was found in antiquity and which has persisted into the modern era. Both are founded on the sense of common origin and descent from a founding ancestor, even if he is mythical, and both also refer back
to a common place of origin, the group’s original habitat, as well as a common time of origination. Even where the ethnic community has lost touch with “its” original habitat, the reborn and revived nation requires “its own” territory — as the Turks did Anatolia and the Jews Israel — in which it may flourish.2

It is the ethnic element that binds the nation to a certain territory, and it is the territory which links the nation to the state and through it to world politics. While a state could be established on any territory, an ethnic nation-state needs a particularistic territory.

Walker Connor, the first theorist to draw attention to this gap and the originator of the concept of ethnonationalism, also links the nation to the ethnic community and argues that the link with the state occurred only following the growing acceptance of the doctrine of self-determination. Distinguishing between an ethnic group which is “other-defined” and a nation which is “self-defined,” he argues that national awareness existed in Europe centuries before it received political legitimacy. It was the doctrine of popular sovereignty which replaced the previous legitimacy of the divine right of kings to rule that gave birth to the concept of self-determination. While the American and French Revolutions gave expression to the first doctrine, the nineteenth century experienced the spread of the idea of ethnonationalism. It was, however, only during World War I that Woodrow Wilson’s principle of “the right of self-determination” received political legitimacy in a peace treaty and the link between nation and state was formalized. It was from Europe that the linkage between ethnic nation and state emerged and spread throughout the world, achieving global proportions.

The legitimation of ethnonationalism in the modern era and its contemporary strength pose a question regarding the relationship between modernization and nationalism. Indeed, Connor has argued against common wisdom which assumed that modernization would lead to assimilation and thus reduce ethnicity and demands for self-determination.3

How could we explain the linkage between modernization and nationalism? The school of modernization traditionally did not distinguish between state and nation, yet they provide important insights that are useful for our analysis. Samuel Huntington in his studies on changing societies concluded that “the breakup of traditional societies may lead to psychological disintegration and anomie, lest these very conditions also create the need for new identifications and loyalties.” “Modernization means that all groups, old as well as new, traditional as well as modern, become increasingly aware of themselves as groups and of their interests and claims in relation to other groups.”4 Defining nationalism as transpersonal identification in an impersonal world,
Ernst Haas has explained nationalism as a rational choice to “hold a society together while people are being buffeted by the strains of modernization.” The relationship between strain or stress and the search for links of interest and value with others who are similarly situated rationalizes the creation of symbols which otherwise would be regarded as an imagined community. Haas’ contribution to our understanding is by steering nationalism away from a romantic notion to a rational response of a community that finds itself under rapid social change.

Three insights could therefore be extrapolated regarding the nature of modern nationalism. First, its roots are ethnic and therefore distinguishable from the state; while the state by definition needs territory, it is the ethnonational dimension that links the group to a certain territory. It is the state, however, that links it to interstate politics. Second, nationalism’s legitimacy is based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the right of self-determination, ideas which were spreading in nineteenth century Europe and ultimately were linked to the modern state. Third, nationalism is a rational choice of a society under stress going through the process of modernization.

The Ethnonational Dimension of Zionism

The Ethnic Roots of Zionism

Modern Jewish nationalism, while sharing many of the characteristics of other national movements and undoubtedly influenced by them, was nevertheless distinguishable from several perspectives. Unlike other national movements which flourished in nineteenth century Europe, the Jews did not dwell on the territory which they claimed to be their historical land. Moreover, the Jews constituted a distinguishable minority in every country where they lived.

Being the classic diaspora — a minority everywhere — the Jews by definition constituted an ethnic group. Carrying with them the memory of their ancient homeland, common origin, founding ancestor and other ethnic properties, they were, according to their own definition, a nation in exile. Gola (exile) and tefutza (diaspora) were both divinely ordained to be ended also through divine will. Geula (redemption) and kibbutz galuyot (ingathering of the exiles) were the two processes that were anticipated to take place when the Almighty decided to redeem His people. Both processes were interrelated and both were directly linked to the ancestral homeland — Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel). It was in the Land of Israel that the Jewish condition of being persecuted and dependent on the whim of the gentiles was to be transformed, and
it was only in their ancient homeland that the Jews were to terminate their diaspora situation.

The association of exile and diaspora with Divine will, as well as the return of the Jews to their homeland, was accompanied by a religious content linking the Jews to their land. This contact was kept alive, as David Vital in his comprehensive work on the origins of Zionism has pointed out:

The very high degree of ritualization and formalization of religious observance which had been instituted bit by bit in Exilic times served, through the forms and contents adopted, to preserve, almost to absurdity, the sense of a vital tie to an actual living land: the prayers for rain delivered regularly even in the wettest parts of Europe; the annual harvest festival (Shavu’ot); the close study of the body of laws governing the practice of agriculture which are integral parts of the Talmud; and more generally, the repetition, in a great variety of verbal forms in every service of prayer, of the fundamental belief that the people of Israel had been granted a land and the present (Exilic) condition was temporary and would come to its appointed land.7

As a result of the religious content, the land also received Divine attributes, especially when reunited with its people. The Land of Israel was the only place in the world where prophecy could be maintained, and where the Schechina (the Almighty’s presence on earth) could dwell. Exile was shared by both the Jewish people and the Almighty who would return to the land only with the return of His people. Only in the Land of Israel would the Jews “finally attain security and dignity, possibly glory...a country where, alone, it is possible of a Jew to be fully and unambiguously what he is.”8

Undoubtedly, the Jews qualify as an ethnic group by the criteria provided by both Connor and Smith. Being “other defined” in each polity where they dwelled, and possessing a sense of common origins, a unique history, and all the other properties of ethnic communities, no one could dispute this fact. But the Jews could to a certain extent also qualify as a nation even prior to the appearance of Zionism. Their self-perception as being different and unique and their commitment to a specific and historical territory meets both the requirements of Connor that “a nation is a self-aware ethnic group” and Smith’s “homeland” requirement.9 Could we then define Jewish nationalism as preceding the modern era?

It was the religious character of Jewish collective identity that disqualified it from being considered as nationalism. Traditional Jewish identity, as we have seen, was a passive identity; the Almighty exiled the Jews from their land and subordinated them to the gentiles and He will redeem them. The Jews, according to this formula, besides
repenting their sins, were supposed to await redemption, and were forbidden to hasten it through active pursuit. In the absence of an active ideology, Jewish self-consciousness, though different from other nations because of the Jews' exilic and diasporic conditions, was a product of nineteenth century nationalism. The Jewish national awakening took place in a century in which the general society was experiencing complex processes of transformation accompanied by comprehensive ideologies. The Jewish people, dispersed among societies experiencing these changes, could not but be affected by them, especially when society around them adopted specific policies and requirements from the Jews as citizens of the emerging new political order.

Emancipation and Nineteenth Century Europe

Undoubtedly, the most profound process that affected nineteenth century European Jewry was that of "emancipation." Howard Sacher, in his comprehensive work on the history of Israel, opens his first chapter entitled "The Rise of Jewish Nationalism" with the gathering of a Sanhedrin by Napoleon Bonaparte on February 9, 1807. "The determining factor" behind Napoleon's demand that the Jews to whom the General Assembly had granted equality should accept the responsibilities of citizenship "was the unsparing rationalism that already had overthrown the ancien regime, and that seemed capable of final validation only if applied without distinction to all the inhabitants of the land." "He demanded specific assurances that rabbinical jurisdiction in Jewish civil and judicial affairs was a thing of the past, that the Jews had turned their backs forever on their separate nationhood, on their cooperative status and not least of all on their traditional hope for redemption in Palestine."10

Emancipation, which spread to other Western European countries and the United States, theoretically presented Western Jewry with an easy choice: full equal rights in exchange for their denouncing any separate national existence or aspirations. The new nation-state could not tolerate additional national and political loyalties transcending its framework. In contrast, the separation between church and state in several Western countries tolerated religious pluralism. In an age of Enlightenment in which commitment to their religion among Jews was declining in any event, the ethnonalional elements so closely interwoven into Jewish religion could therefore be amended. Indeed, the spread of Reform Judaism, especially in Germany, induced the dropping of the ideas of exile and return from Jewish ritual as well as the Hebrew language and traditional education. The Jew could therefore continue being Jewish, just like his Christian neighbor could keep his religion as long as he dropped his particularistic ethnonalional attributes.
In reality, the choice was not as simple. First, for those Jews who preferred to continue the traditional practice of Judaism, the dropping of Zion and the belief in redemption through return constituted a religious problem. Second, while gentile society was obliged in accordance with the Enlightenment to accept the Jews into their ranks as equal citizens, religious anti-Jewishness was now replaced by modern anti-Semitism. Third, emancipation was in effect limited to Western Europe; in Eastern Europe and especially in the Russian Empire during the mid-nineteenth century where 75 percent of world Jewry lived, repression and deprivation of Jews continued unhalted. To a certain extent, the conditions of the Jews worsened in the nineteenth century. In an attempt to “resolve” the Jewish problem, especially following the partition of Poland through which Russia received large numbers of Jews, the Russian czars adopted a three-tier policy. They tried to forcefully integrate some of the Jews through assimilation; they confined the Jews in the western provinces to the “Pale of Settlement”; and encouraged large-scale emigration. Emancipation, therefore, despite the high hopes attached to it, did not resolve the problems for most of the Jews. The proponents of emancipation’s main request, that the Jews abandon their ethnonational attributes in exchange for integration into civic society, while consistent in the abstract, was not proceeding in reality as expected.

Emancipation also contained an additional element. The idea that the Jews in an enlightened world could not be subjected to repression or regarded as second class citizens could also be interpreted on the collective level. If the Jew as an individual deserved equality as a citizen, the Jews as a group deserved equality as a nation. Just as the doctrine of self-determination and popular sovereignty grew out of the duality doctrine, it was only natural that a similar deduction would take place among the Jews. The only problem in this logical deduction was that the individual and the collective solution contradicted each other. As we have seen, Jewish ethnonationalism was the main obstacle in granting the Jews full equality; the emerging “nation state” which was ready to accept the Jews as full Jewish citizens could not tolerate the existence of other ethnonational collectivities within its boundaries.

Even if this world was not beset by anti-Jewish attitudes, which it was, the Jews could not ask for full individual and ethnonational rights in the emerging nation-state at the same time.

It was this contradiction that split the world Jewish community into two main sentiments. Those who desired and also could resolve the Jewish problem through an individual emancipation supported the abandonment of the ethnonational characteristics and perceived the Jews merely as another “church.” These attitudes were primarily popular in the West. In the East, where individual Jewish
emancipation was never instituted, the Jews were more traditional. When the czarist regime adopted anti-Jewish measures that even exceeded in their gravity the pre-emancipation era, the Jews opted for a collective solution. It was Eastern European Jewry that started to develop such ethnonational motives as the return to the ancestral homeland — Zion — and the national language — Hebrew.

Nineteenth century Eastern European Jews differed from Western European Jews in an additional aspect. Whereas in the West, the birth of the nation-state ensured the existence of the territorial state and was part of a socio-political revolution which replaced the social order, in the East the situation was different. Eastern European Jews witnessed the revival of ethnic themes and the formation of national movements and uprisings of Balkan or Central and Eastern European peoples directed against the three empires — Hapsburg, Russian and Ottoman — which controlled their destiny. Unlike these peoples, the Jews did not have any territorial claim on any land in Europe, and the only territory which was associated with their past was far away and tied in with a messianic redemption. It was therefore only natural that the two forerunners of the ethnonational revival were the Sephardic rabbi Judah Alkeleli from Semlin near Belgrade and Zvi Hirsch Kalischer from Poland, who already in the 1830s and 1840s started writing about the need of the Jews to return to their ancient homeland. Seeing the emancipation of the Jews in the West as an augury of the messianic era, they both argued that it was the duty of the Jews to speed up redemption by the ingathering of the Jews into the Holy Land. Kalischer went even as far as demanding that Jews train themselves in self-defense and agriculture. He was also explicit in preaching to his people to "take to heart the examples of the Italians, Poles, and Hungarians, who laid down their lives and possessions in the struggle for national independence, while we, the children of Israel, who have the most glorious and holiest of lands as our inheritance, are spiritless and silent." In a talmudic way of deduction, he confirmed and argued: "All the other peoples have striven only for the sake of their own national honor; how much more should we exert ourselves, for our duty is to labor not only for the glory of our ancestors but for the glory of God who chose Zion!"13

The impact of emancipation and its ensuing delusions on Jewish nationalism was expressed in the most articulate way by Moses Hess. Following an intensive collaboration with the two founders of socialism — Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels — Hess produced one of the earliest Jewish national statements. While not abandoning socialism, he accepted Mazzini’s liberal nationalism and saw in it a humanistic universal force that would bring harmony to the world. In his vision and especially in Rome and Jerusalem, however, it was the task of Jewish nationalism to bring together social justice within a national-religious
entity and thus be an example which the whole universe should emulate. For him, prior to the French Revolution, "the Jewish people was the only people in the world whose religion was at once national and universalist."14 Influenced by Hegel, he emphasized the importance of the historic process, but it was the Jewish religion that combined national, universal and historical elements and that is why they were the people chosen by God. The messianic age will come only after all the peoples will mature into nations who, without surrendering their particular and typical identities, will create a unified, peaceful, harmonious world.

It was clear from his writings that only on its land — in Jerusalem, not Rome — would the Jewish nation be able to fulfill its historic missions. But Hess also sanctifies other ethnonational elements such as Jewish history, the Hebrew language, Jewish rituals — especially those connected with the mourning over the destruction of the Temple, fruits and rituals linked to the Land of Israel, and even particularistic Jewish racial features.15 Coming from a non-Orthodox Jew, Hess’s statements may represent the cleverest ethnonational articulation in early Zionism, or proto-Zionism as later Zionists liked to refer to the pre-PinskiHerzl thinkers. At the same time we have to keep in mind that Hess was the exception and the center of Jewish ethnonationalism was in the East, not in Western Europe.

Modernization

Finally, the synthesis between ethnic Jewish identity and nineteenth century European nationalism and emancipation in explaining the appearance of Zionism as a national movement must be complemented by the impact of modernization. For it is the latter which transformed Jewish self-consciousness from a passive to an active idea and force. Ethnic identity by itself, as it had existed prior to the nineteenth century, did not produce a national movement. Emancipation and the emergence of the nation-state permitted the expression of Jewish religious identity, at least in Western Europe, thus relieving some Jews at least in theory of the need for a state. It was the injection of modernization and rationalism that produced Zionism as a national movement.

Ben Halperin explained the appearance of Zionism as a synthesis between the original "thesis of traditionalism" and its "antithesis of modernism." The Zionists, according to Halperin, accepted the contribution of the Western modernists that there was a Jewish problem that had to be solved rationally, but rejected their solution that emancipation would resolve the problem. From the traditionalists they accepted that the Jews would keep their ethnic heritage, culture and the
The historic myth of Jewish independence and the eventual return of the Jews to their homeland. They rejected, however, their attitude that since “exile” was a divine punishment, the solution to the Jewish problem was not in the hands of man, and the only route was to pray to be relieved and restored to Zion. “For with modernism, Zionism shared the general principle that the Jewish problem required an immediate, rational solution; but it differed sharply — and emotionally — on the nature of the problem and the solution. With traditionalism, Zionism shared, as an emotional bond, the common vision of a solution by which the Exile would be transcended.”

Halpern’s Hegelian analysis must be complemented by the insights regarding modern nationalism introduced at the outset. Ernst Haas explained nationalism as a rational response to a society under stress. “Rationalization by way of nationalism, of course, can take two forms: people under stress can seek to resolve it by identifying with the existing state, but they can also look for help by seceding from it. Each course is predicated by principles of rational choice.” In a similar vein, Huntington claimed that modernization can destroy some sources of identity while reinvigorating others. Indeed, some of the Jews, particularly in the West, who were offered “emancipation,” opted for the first solution, while the Jews of the East to whom emancipation was never offered preferred the second. After realizing that emancipation did not resolve anti-Semitism, segments of Western Jewry joined their less modernized brethren in the East in calling for a national solution to the woes of the Jews.

In traditional society, man accepts his natural and social environment as given. “Above all,” Huntington argued, “modernization involves belief in the capacity of man by reasoned action to change his physical and social environment.” Undoubtedly, it was the active element that characterized Zionism and reinvigorated those ethnonational elements that were there but dormant.

The Statist Dimension of Zionism

Although political Zionism is identified with the appearance of Theodor Herzl and the convention of the first World Zionist Congress in 1897, its forerunner was Leo Pinsker, who in 1882 published a pamphlet entitled Auto-Emancipation: An Appeal to His People by a Russian Jew. Pinsker shared several characteristics with the founder of political Zionism fifteen years later. Like Herzl, he came from a secular background, a fact which explains why both did not originally argue that the solution to the Jewish problem could only be found in Palestine. None of them reached their conclusions because of love of Zion or any other longing for the ancient homeland. Each thinker came
to a similar conclusion only because of their despair of enlightenment and emancipation to resolve the plight of the Jews and were prompted by the outbreak of an anti-Semitic wave — Pinsker by the pogroms of 1881 and Herzl by the Dreyfus Trial. Equally important was the fact that both articulated in a very clear fashion their goal in political terms — namely that the only solution to the Jewish problem was an independent Jewish state. It was this element that differentiated them from their predecessors.

Political Zionism was indeed distinguishable from proto-Zionism and even the local Hibbat Zion (Love of Zion) societies that followed Pinsker’s statements by suggesting a political solution to a social problem. While their predecessors may have been induced by similar realities, they nevertheless stressed national renaissance, the “homeland,” and other sacred ethnonational symbols, and saw themselves as continuing the history of the Jewish people who for almost two thousand years carried the belief that they would be liberated and returned to their ancient homeland. In contrast, Pinsker and Herzl articulated their theory in terms of a problem and a solution, or a disease and a cure. The Jewish problem could have been theoretically resolved through enlightenment and emancipation or even assimilation, but in practice it was not. Consequently, the only remedy was “autoemancipation” and Der Judenstaat. The realities of the nineteenth century dictated that the Jews take their fate in their own hands and create a Jewish territorial state.

Pinsker’s analysis of the situation of the Jews and especially the hatred of them and the pogroms was a rational one. He did not attach the hatred of Jews to metaphysical explanations but rather to their socio-political configuration. In the same vein was his programmatic solution totally detached from mythical-traditional elements. He stated clearly:

We must, above all, not dream of restoring ancient Judaea. We must not attach ourselves to the place where our political life was once violently interrupted and destroyed. The goal of our present endeavors must be not the ‘Holy Land’ but a land of our own….Thither we shall take with us the most sacred possessions, which we have saved from the shipwreck of our former fatherland, the God-idea and the Bible. It is only these which have made our old fatherland the Holy Land and not Jerusalem of the Jordan.

While regarding the Holy Land as a preferable solution, he put the emphasis on the material condition of the territory such as its accessibility to Jews and capability to offer Jews security, refuge, and productivity. It was indeed a statement detached from any ethnonational emotions. Finally, he put the emphasis on the historic conjunction, arguing that the Jews were living in an era that was conducive to a
political-territorial solution and national regeneration. "Let 'now or never' be our watchword," he concluded his arguments.21

Ultimately it was Herzl that was considered the founder of political Zionism, and rightly so. Although Pinsker, under the pressures of Moshe Leib Lilienblum who also was shaken by the 1881 pogroms, became the leader of the Hibbat Zion movement, his visions and mobilization efforts were limited, both in extent and appeal. Pinsker's appearance was a miniature pre-run of the great show that Herzl performed a decade and a half later.

In retrospect Herzl's contribution to Zionism came in three installments which in total extended only over eight years — 1896-1904. The three included: (1) his pamphlet entitled The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question, which appeared in 1896; (2) the convention of the first World Zionist Congress in 1897, followed by five annual conventions chaired by Herzl; and (3) his extensive global diplomatic activity during that period. All three projects must be evaluated according to the environment in which they were implemented and the long-term impact they had on the evolution of Zionism.

The central theme of Der Judenstaat is very similar to that of Pinsker; a Jewish state is the only answer to the problem of modern anti-Semitism. Already in the preface after introducing his idea, namely the restoration of a Jewish state, he states "Everything depends on our compelling force. And what is that force? The misery of the Jews."22 The two subsequent chapters are essentially dedicated to the analysis of the causes of modern anti-Semitism and the applicability of the solution, i.e., the establishment of the Jewish state. The rest of the book is a detailed analysis of the ways and means by which the Jews are to fulfill their plan.

What is most outstanding about the book from our perspective is the lack of appeal to ethnonational elements. Thus we could find statements like "We are one people — our enemies have made us one without our consent....Distress binds us together, and thus united, we suddenly discover our strength."23 Assimilation, according to Herzl, might have been a solution, but anti-Semitism would not let the Jews follow this course of action. The establishment of the Jewish state would be an advantage to the assimilating Jews, as it would eliminate anti-Semitism and thus allow them to assimilate in peace.

The official language of the Jewish state will not necessarily be Hebrew but could be any popular language and the state may be multilingual like Switzerland.24 Although the ancient faith kept the Jews together, the clergy would be kept in the synagogues just like the army in its barracks.25 Finally, it is the state idea (to distinguish from the land) that would transplant the Jews. Although he used expressions like "next year in Jerusalem"26 to assist his argument, it is clear that for
him it was the political, not the ethnonational, element that prevailed. Indeed, he posed the question “Palestine or Argentina?” and answered, “We shall take what is given us and what is selected by Jewish public opinion. The society will determine both these points.”

Although Palestine seemed preferable to Argentina, it was because of its attractiveness to the masses. Immediately he then turned and outlined what the Jews would be able to offer the Great Powers in exchange for Palestine. Instead of claiming historical rights to the territory as a true ethnonationalist would do, he turned to calculate the quid pro quo and the symbolism in resolving the “Jewish Question after eighteen centuries of Jewish suffering.”

Another major persistent theme in Der Judenstaat is that the Zionist enterprise will depend on organization and collective action. Starting with the statement, “An individual who attempted to undertake this huge task alone would be either an imposter or a madman,” he then goes on at great length to describe organizational and legal procedures. He describes in great detail the economic institutions that would organize and finance Jewish migration and settlement. The political organ called by him “the society of Jews,” although described in a briefer manner, is the first to be established. Essentially it would be a self-appointed organ that would mobilize the Jews, organize the technicalities, and negotiate the political details of their departure.

A third major theme of the book relevant to our argument is that the state of the Jews would be established in accordance with the interests and support of the world community. Stating at the outset that “The Jewish State is essential to the world; it will therefore be created,” he repeatedly emphasizes the harmony between Jewish interests and those of the nations among whom they reside. This harmony is needed because of power realities which guide world politics. “In the world as it now is and for an indefinite period, might precedes right.”

In the continuation, he concludes: “The movement will not only be inaugurated with absolute conformity to the law, but it cannot even be carried out without the friendly cooperation of interested governments, who would derive considerable benefits from it.”

Repeating the underlying mutual interest throughout the book, he concludes with: “The world will be freed by our liberty, enriched by our wealth, magnified by our greatness.”

In the years ensuing the publication of Der Judenstaat, Herzl pursued the last two themes — political organization and world diplomacy. The convention of the World Zionist Congress in 1897, in which 200-250 representatives from 24 countries participated, was an unprecedented act in terms of Jewish history. Its significance from our perspective was the creation of a world-wide mobilizing institution that henceforth was assembled frequently to publicly demand a political solution for the Jewish people. The World Zionist Congress
incorporated the various ideological and geographic segments of the Jewish people within one political-institutional framework sharing a broad common denominator. In addition it created the political means for accomplishing the goals of the Zionist movement.

Loyal to his political approach, the Congress was for Herzl the nucleus from which the Jewish state would emerge, and not the colonization process that was going on in Palestine, emphasizing the limitations of that process already during his first Congress address.\(^{35}\) Herzl himself was so impressed by the Congress that he wrote in his diary his famous entry: "At Basel I founded the Jewish State." The entry continues: "At Basel, then, I created this abstraction which, as such, is invisible to the vast majority of people. And with infinitesimal means, I gradually worked the people into the mood for a state and made them feel that they were its National Assembly."\(^{36}\) Thus speaks a state-builder rather than an ethnonational leader. Indeed, in the ensuing Congresses a set of institutions and organizations was formed, serving as an institutional foundation for the State of Israel. Herzl was actively involved in the erection of all the major institutions, even the Jewish Colonial Bank, renamed the Jewish Colonial Trust, in which he invested his own resources.\(^{37}\)

Herzl’s third contribution to political Zionism was in promoting global diplomacy as the main arena of Zionist activity. His personal high politics diplomacy preceded the convening of the Zionist Congress and followed the publication of Der Judenstaat. His first target was the Ottoman Sultan and his court in Constantinople, and in the years between 1896 and 1904 he met with leading European aristocrats and diplomats, and even the German Kaiser himself during his 1898 visit to Jerusalem.\(^{38}\)

His persistent diplomatic efforts directed at the Sultan’s court, the Austrian and German aristocracies and the British imperial bureaucracy throughout his eight years at the forefront of the movement indicated his belief that this was the only way Zionism could accomplish its goal. He had explicitly stated this belief at the outset of his activity. Looking at the Zionist activities in Palestine, he stated: “My programme, on the other hand, is to halt infiltration and to concentrate all energies on the acquisition of Palestine under international law. This requires diplomatic negotiations, which I have already begun, and a publicity campaign on the very largest scale.”\(^{39}\)

Herzl, as we have seen above, stressed the need for Zionism to rely on the self-interest of the gentiles and, in his diplomatic pursuit of the Great Powers, especially those with interests in the Middle East, demonstrated how his conceptual framework should be implemented. In his encounters with the leaders of the imperial powers he tried to draw their support for Zionism in accordance with their particular interests. Thus to the Ottomans he offered Jewish financial aid, and to
the European rulers (Germany and Russia), the evacuation of the Jews whom they despised and the solution of the problem of anti-Semitism. To the liberal British imperial bureaucracy he suggested the diversion of the direction of Jewish migration from the West to the Middle East and the establishment of a British-oriented Jewish colony there. It seems that for the founder of political Zionism, arguments based on self-interest were more convincing and promising than to forward a historical right argument.

At the same time, this analysis should not mislead us to see Herzl as a classic power politics statesman. The founding father of Zionism was a nineteenth century liberal who believed in the harmony of nations and the settlement of disputes through reason rather than force. He conceived his ideas along cooperative lines in which all sides gain rather than one’s gain is someone’s loss. His liberal thinking was not only evident in his economic formulas for the Jewish state concerning the desirable regime that would be erected in it, but was also transferred to the international arena. He believed that a Jewish state would be established because all the sides concerned would gain from its establishment. Although not a utopian, and he was aware that such an accusation may arise and therefore repeatedly tried to show the practicability of his idea, one could define him as a nineteenth century liberal who believed in rationality as the moving force behind the reason of state.40

In retrospect, one of Herzl’s major contributions to the evolution of Zionism was in stressing interstate action as a vehicle to promote the Jewish state. While being a classic liberal, he introduced the Zionists to global politics, statecraft, and the need to mobilize international support in order to advance their political goals. He taught them to formulate their Jewish state scheme according to the principles of the international community and search for political allies, especially among the Great Powers. In addition, he left behind a world-wide Jewish organization, thus educating his people to the importance of institutions, mass mobilization, and collective action. In short, Herzl left an embryo for the Jewish state and a legacy to be picked up and developed by his heirs.

Spiritual vs. Religious Zionism

Political Zionism and its forerunners, the ethnonational stream in Zionism, complemented each other during the early years of the movement. Conflict was to break out, as we shall see, only when the movement was faced with operational questions like the Uganda debate and three decades later during the partition debate. It was delayed as long as both approaches agreed about the centrality of
territoriality. As long as the location or the extent of that territory was not a realistic option, both approaches were intertwined. Early indicators of the built-in tensions, however, came from the only real critic of the central tenets of Zionism, Asher Zvi Ginsberg, known by his pen name Ahad Ha-Am, the leader of spiritual Zionism.

Ahad Ha-Am’s main contribution to the evolution of Zionist doctrine was in his ability to detect at an early stage the inherent contradictions of the Jewish national movement. Already during the years of Hibbat Zion, he criticized the movement for adopting the wrong course of action. By appealing to the private concerns of the individual Jew, Hibbat Zion continued the tradition of the exile, which reflected the decline of the collective spirit of the Jewish nation. Revival of the national spirit of the Jewish nation was therefore the main task of Zionism. Another line of criticism, articulated after his visit to Palestine in 1891, was that in their desire to attract the masses, the leaders of the movement ignored the obstacles to the fulfillment of their goals. Interestingly enough, the founder of spiritual Zionism pointed out such material problems as scarcity of cultivatable land, the objection of the Arab population to Jewish settlement, and the opposition of the Great Power controlling Palestine — the Ottomans — to Jewish settlement.

At the same time, while basing his criticism on a realistic evaluation of the Zionist enterprise, he advanced a spiritual approach to be adopted by the movement. Distinguishing between the affliction of the Jews (tzarat ha-yehudim) and afflictions of Judaism (tzarat ha-ya-hadut), he recommended that Hibbat Zion concentrate on the latter. In his framework, the settlement in Palestine should aspire to secure a spiritual center which would radiate inspiration to the Jewish people and thus enable them to live a national life even in the diaspora.

Ahad Ha-Am’s criticism of political Zionism was naturally even more severe than that of its predecessor, Hibbat Zion, and it came immediately following the First Zionist Congress. Consistent with his realistic approach, he warned against the illusion that the ingathering of the exiles was possible to be achieved within the near future. Similarly, the promise to resolve the material problems of the Jews seemed to him unrealistic. But most important, he regarded the Jewish people as deserving more than just a small state in accordance with the trend in Europe which would be “a plaything in the hands of great neighbors.” A nation that suffered as much as the Jews and “was a light unto the gentiles cannot be satisfied with no more than this [a small state] as a reward for its hardships — when many other nations, of unknown origins and without culture, have achieved it in short order without first suffering a fraction of what it had undergone.” 41 His solution was therefore to concentrate on a spiritual center which would become “not merely a state of the Jews but truly a Jewish state.” 42

Ahad Ha-Am’s approach is important from our perspective because
it demonstrated at an early stage more than all the other approaches the inherent tensions between ethnonationalism and statism. Ahad Ha-Am was an ethnonationalist in the sense that he stressed ethnic elements like Jewish culture and language. Aware of the national spirit that engulfed Europe, he understood that the Jewish people could not continue and maintain their organic culture in the new nationalist climate. Under the new circumstances, the Jews could develop their culture only on their historic land where they could integrate their cultural heritage with the general culture without being overtaken by the latter. His approach to the historic land was, however, only instrumental and not idealistic as was that of other Jewish ethnonationalist thinkers. From this perspective he was closer to political Zionism. As such, he was the first ethnonational Zionist to sense the real implications of political Zionism. Ahad Ha-Am, who never saw in the state the ultimate goal of Zionism, was not surprised when Herzl suggested shifting the emphasis from Palestine to East Africa.

Another element in Ahad Ha-Am's approach was his unique conception of state-diaspora relations. As indicated above, Ahad Ha-Am, unlike many of the Zionists, did not believe that the diaspora could or even should disappear at once following the establishment of the Jewish state. His idea of a spiritual center in Palestine was both state- and diaspora-oriented. In an article written in 1909, he distinguished between two ethnic schools in contemporary Jewry: the cultural autonomists or Yiddishists and the Zionists. While the first concentrated on the survival of Yiddish culture in the diaspora where it was born, the latter had a historical perspective and dated the beginning of Jewish national history from the Exodus from Egypt. For Ahad Ha-Am both schools were wrong as he believed neither that the Jews in the modern era could achieve national autonomy in the diaspora, nor that the Jewish people in the diaspora would cease to exist once a Jewish state was established. Spiritual Zionism, according to Ahad Ha-Am, was a synthesis of these two opposing schools and as such greater than each one of them. While agreeing with the Zionists that national survival would be impossible without "the new rampart [which] must be built outside the diaspora in our historic land," spiritual Zionism refused "to believe in the possibility of transferring all the Jews in the world to Palestine, and consequently in refusing to accept the proposition that we cannot survive in the diaspora." And he continues:

On the contrary, it [spiritual Zionism] holds that dispersion must remain a permanent feature of our life, which it is beyond our power to eliminate, and therefore it insists that our national life in the diaspora must be strengthened. But that object, it holds, can be attained only by the creation of a fixed center for our national life in the land of its birth. Isolated groups of Jews wandering about the
world here, there, and everywhere can be nothing more than a sort of formless raw material until they are provided with a single permanent center, which can exert a “pull” on them, and so transform the scattered atoms into a single entity with a definite and self-subsistent character of its own.45

Indeed, Ahad Ha-Am, probably the most incisive and brilliant Zionist thinker, was a man of originality. The founder of spiritual Zionism provided the most realistic and down-to-earth analysis of the Zionist enterprise. He was the first to discern the direction in which political Zionism was pulling. He was also the man who, starting with a pure ethnonational perspective, perceived a framework for the Jews who would not accept the ethnonationalist solution and preferred to stay in the diaspora.

It is in this context of spiritual Zionism that another approach, religious Zionism, should be analyzed. Although Ahad Ha-Am saw himself and was also perceived as the great opponent of political Zionism, his cultural approach was most problematic to the Orthodox members of the Zionist movement who became an official faction (Mizrahi) within the movement in 1902. The position of the religious Zionists would be pertinent and sometimes even decisive on every occasion when the statist-political approach would confront that of the ethnonational.

At base was the question of whether the Jews constituted one people because of a divine mission or an ethnic heritage. What was the core of the nation — religion or primordial loyalties? This basic dilemma was best analyzed by David Vital:

The central question at issue was that of the nature and special, cosmological role (if any) of the Jewish people. Were they to be seen primarily in theological or in historical terms? Granted that Judaism the religion and Jewry the people were in original conception and circumstance so intertwined as to be inseparable in the past age of faith, must they so continue in the modern age of doubt? Was it religion that was to be seen primarily in functional terms, as the great mechanism whereby the Jewish people had accomplished the unique feat of preserving their social and cultural identity during twenty centuries of Exile? Or was the relationship to be seen in reverse order if it was to be properly understood: namely, that it was the function of the people to serve and preserve the ends and content of their religion? To the Orthodox mind the truth of the latter proposition was beyond question. The world’s order and purposes were fundamentally divine. To deprive the Jews of their primordial role in that order was to render their collective existence, to say nothing of the pain they had suffered, meaningless. Zionism, by substituting history and sociology for theology and metaphysics,
and by concerning itself with man rather than with Providence, was far worse then heretical; it was profoundly materialistic and wholly and unalterably profane.46

In light of this contradiction one could perfectly understand why a large share, and especially the more Orthodox and anti-modernization elements in world Jewry, objected actively to the Zionist movement. Although two forerunners of Zionism were Orthodox rabbis Alkalai and Kalischer, the majority of the religious leadership did not join the Zionist movement. The assumption of leadership in both the intellectual and political spheres by secular and modernized Jews even further alienated Orthodox Jewry from the movement. Rabbi Samuel Mohiliver, who died in 1898, was the only recognized authority of Orthodox Jewry who supported Hibbat Zion and, later on, political Zionism. Most of the heads of the yeshivot (rabbinical seminaries) and the Rebbes of the various Hasidic courts objected to Zionism.

The schism between ethnonationalism and religion may explain why the heir to Rabbi Mohiliver among the religious Zionists, Rabbi Jacob Reines, could cooperate rather easier with political Zionism than with cultural Zionism. Indeed, his cooperation with Herzl, that reached its peak, as we shall see, during the Uganda controversy, further crystallized the dividing line between the political and the ethnonational approaches to Zionism.

Rabbi Reines' point of departure was similar to that of political Zionism, namely the deteriorating conditions of the Jews in Europe which required a political solution.47 In contrast to Alkalai and Kalischer who foresaw the beginning of the messianic age in light of emancipation and the national era that engulfed other nations, Reines witnessed the collapse of emancipation and the ascendancy of anti-Semitism, especially in Eastern Europe. But while sharing these experiences with Pinsker and Herzl, he differed from them by being an Orthodox rabbi who never doubted divine messianic redemption. How could he then justify cooperation with a movement that provided a secular national substitute to the ancient religious belief that redemption would come as part of a divine scheme. Or worse, how could redemption come through the hands of non-observant Jews, when exile was a divine punishment for sin?

Reines distinguished between the ultimate messianic redemption and the need to save the Jews from the current physical threat to their existence. The Zionist search for a territory to which the Jews could migrate and which would constitute an autonomous political entity was interpreted by him as an attempt to find a "security shelter." The Zionist movement was, according to him, dedicated to resolve the materialistic problems of the Jews, not their spiritual ones, which Judaism could continue to take care of as it did for millennia. As a purely
political movement, Zionism therefore did not constitute a substitute for divine redemption. More than that, by cooperating with secular Zionists he hoped that the religious sector could influence its secular counterpart to repent, interpreting their aspiration to return to Zion as an indication that they were despairing of enlightenment and its false promises.

Cooperation between religious Jews and the Zionist movement was limited for Reines to political Zionists and not spiritual Zionists. The latter approach, which saw the main problem to be in Judaism and therefore called for a spiritual renaissance, was a threat to traditional Judaism. Spiritual Zionism in its emphasis on educational and cultural renovation offered an alternative to religion. Loyal to his approach, Reines supported the political Zionists in their struggle against the spiritual Zionists headed by Ahad Ha-Am and the "democratic faction," demanding to concentrate on political rather than cultural action. Herzl and the other political Zionists who despised spiritual Zionism, and motivated in their desire to promote unity among the Jews, accepted the view of the religious Zionists and refused to include cultural matters within the agenda of the Zionist movement. Ultimately, despite the common front of the religious and the political Zionists, cultural activity was included within the framework of Zionism, but only after a separation between the religious and a progressive independent stream was accepted, a division which in essence exists until today in educational and cultural activity in Israel. Reines gave in only because the unity of the Zionist movement and the Jewish people in their search for a secure home was a supreme value in his political religious philosophy.

This attitude of "struggle from within" which was later carried on by the Mizrahi movement, however, was not accepted by many other Orthodox leaders who left the Zionist movement and in 1912 formed the anti-Zionist Agudat Israel.

The struggle of religious Zionism from within and its preference for political over spiritual Zionism, and the fact that most of the Orthodox rabbis either objected to Zionism from its inception or left it the minute it adopted a cultural program, could serve as an indication of the problematics in the fusion between the ethnonational and the political dimensions of the Zionist movement.

Ethnonationalism was a nineteenth century product influenced by doctrines such as "popular sovereignty" and "right of peoples for self-determination," and as such rested territorial demands on historical rights. It was a secular rational approach to resolve problems of identity created by the modernizing industrial society which also enabled a level of communication that had not existed before. As such it offered a substitute to religion which had provided the preceding legitimacy of social order. The Jews of Europe could not but be influenced by the new
ideas in their social and intellectual environment and adopted these secular notions as part of their collective rights of self-determination or as a solution to their problems generated by emancipation or modern anti-Semitism. As a secular response to the conditions of the Jews since the beginning of their exile, Zionism thus presented a threat to the Orthodox notion that “it is through our Law alone that our people are a people.” For Orthodox rabbis elements like historic land, ancient language, and Jewish culture presented a threat that nationalism would become a substitute for the core of traditional Judaism. The fact that this renaissance would be led by secular people like Ahad Ha-Am was even more threatening. In contrast, political Zionism, which perceived a Jewish state as a solution to an impending catastrophe or the material misery of the Jews, could be accepted at least by a portion of Orthodox rabbis such as Reines, Shmuel Rabinowitz and Zeev Yavetz. Perceiving the state as a functional tool to save the Jews from the misery and physical threats that emanated from a nationalistic Europe justified participation in the Zionist movement. In short, although the conceptions of Mizrahi did not remain as consistent in the future, this early alliance between political Zionism and religious Zionism provided further proof of the distinction between the ethnonational and political origins of Zionism.

The Uganda Controversy

If one needs proof of the tension between the ethnonational and the political approaches in Zionism, the “Uganda controversy,” as it came to be known, was an event in which the two approaches came into open clash. The fact that this affair almost caused a split in the newly born Zionist movement serves as an indication of the gap between two traditions whose point of departure was different. Six years after its establishment, the Sixth Zionist Congress, when faced with its first major policy decision, was engulfed in a debate which was carried on after the Congress was dissolved and disappeared from the Zionist agenda only following Herzl’s death in July 1904. All the factions and major figures in the Zionist movement participated in the debate and when it was all over, the Zionist movement emerged reunited around Eretz Israel as its focus of attention and aspiration. At the same time, the basic dilemma between national aspiration and political realities was not resolved and would accompany the movement.

The origins of the Uganda or, to be more accurate, East Africa affair were rooted in Herzl’s diplomatic efforts to court the rulers of Europe in order to win recognition for an international charter for a Jewish state. Following his encounters with the Ottoman Sultan, the German Kaiser, and the very powerful Russian Minister of Interior, Plehve, what
seemed like a breakthrough came from his meetings with the British Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. In the wake of discussions on a British-sponsored charter for Jewish settlement close to Palestine — El-Arish or Cyprus — Chamberlain came up with the British East Africa Protectorate idea as a land to be settled by the Jews. The British motives included a growing Jewish problem in England as a result of Jewish emigration from anti-Semitic Eastern Europe accompanied by an imperial rationale to modernize and strengthen British influence in Africa. The Boer War experience molded Britain’s understanding that not every European migration would automatically translate into a loyal pro-British colony. It was assumed that the Jews would constitute a loyal element. Although Herzl turned the idea down when it was offered to him during an April 1903 meeting with the Colonial Secretary, he later on picked it up when convinced by his English chief aide, Leopold Greenberg, that Zionism could not afford to reject this opportunity. Thus when the Sixth Zionist Congress opened in Basel (23-28 August 1903), it very fast became the main stage on which the question of East Africa was debated.48

A careful analysis of the minutes of the Sixth Congress proceedings could not verify whether the founder of political Zionism saw in East Africa a substitute for Palestine. On the one hand, he presented it as a practical move on the way to Palestine and as a necessity in light of the worsening Jewish situation in Eastern Europe (Kishinev) and the immense migration that was taking place to a point where even the receiving countries were closing their gates. Moreover, he did not ask the Congress to abandon its goal of building a national home in Palestine. His only request at the outset was to establish a small committee to look into the matter. On the other hand, following the Sixth Congress and realizing the uproar that his policy had aroused, Herzl confided in his closest friends that he planned to resign because of the incompatibility between his idea and the maxims of the Zionist movement. He reminded his friends that he was first a Judenstättler and only later did he become a lover of Zion. If the next Zionist Congress would not accomplish Palestine he would not be able to continue because he had achieved something and he personally could not lead a movement that was not ready to accept it.49

Even if we may have doubts about Herzl’s intentions, the behavior of the opposition (the Tzionei-Zion [Zionists of Zion] or Nein-Sayers [No-Sayers], as they were called) was a clear indication of how they perceived the intentions or the results of the Zionist leaders’ policy. The full meaning of the East Africa project to the opposition could be understood from their behavior on two occasions: the Sixth Congress, and later on during the Kharkov Conference (11-14 November 1903) in which the Russian members of the Grosses Aktions-Comite (Greater Actions Committee — GAC) participated. On the first occasion, the
opposition to the East Africa proposal was still relatively moderate because of the surprise factor, the attempt by many delegates and leaders not to embarrass Herzl who put all his prestige behind the proposal, the understanding that the Zionists could not afford to offend Great Britain, which was the first Great Power to take notice of the plight of the Jews and offer them a territory within the Empire, and finally the absence of the foremost leader of the opposition, Menahem Ussishkin. Yet despite all these moderating circumstances, a formidable opposition led by the Russian delegation was formed against even appointing a committee to look into the project. Among the several lines of criticism that were advanced by the opposition, the most salient one was that the Zionist Congress had to choose between a Jewish state and Eretz Israel. Victor Jacobson “insisted that the problem facing the Congress was essentially a simple one requiring a clear, unambiguous answer: yes or no, Zion or Africa. It did not admit of any compromise solution on tactical grounds. Zionism denoted not only physical redemption but also the (spiritual) regeneration which was inspired by love for the ‘land of our fathers.’” The return to Palestine was dictated by history, while East Africa was in the last resort nothing but the capricious idea of Joseph Chamberlain. Shmarya Levin, the second main speaker against East Africa, asked in an emotional address: “If...a people could not have two languages, how could one talk of having two states? Might not the Jewish people fall asleep in the ‘African night’? What they needed was not a nachtasye, but a place to enjoy the broad daylight.”

50 Thus by referring to the concept used by the supporters of the Uganda proposal, nachtasye (night shelter), indicating that East Africa would be a temporary solution, he expressed the main fear of most of the opposers that it would become the lasting and only solution, thus deviating the Jews from Zion.

The vote on the proposal also indicated the split in the movement between the two alternatives. Formally, the results implied a clear victory for Herzl and the ja-Sayers in favor of sending an expedition to East Africa. Out of 468 delegates who voted, 292 (62.4 percent) voted yes; 176 (37.6 percent) voted no, and 143 abstained or missed the vote. A closer look at the personalities of those who abstained, their motives, the pressures put on by Herzl and other calculations reveals that the abstentions and missing votes should be seen as “no” votes, leading to the conclusion that the vote was split down the middle.51 What may have been even more indicative, as Vital has pointed out, was that the mainstream Russian Zionists voted overwhelmingly against the resolution. “It followed that the alliance between Herzl and the heirs of Hibbat Zion had now snapped.”

52 If Herzl and the other political Zionists expected that following the Sixth Congress, in which they had grasped the strength of the ethnonational feelings, the debate would have abated and the two
camps would somehow find a new modus vivendi, they were proven wrong. The campaign against Uganda intensified following the return of Menahem Ussishkin from Palestine where he had organized an assembly to represent the “Jewish people in Eretz Israel.” This act in itself was a challenge to Herzl and the Basel Congress’ authority, and it was accompanied by a direct assault on the two institutions when Ussishkin learned following his return about what had happened in Basel. In the ensuing months an exchange of “open letters” in the press took place between Ussishkin and Herzl in sharp personal and ideological tones, revealing the dividing line between them. Starting with a letter to the Smaller Actions Committee (namely Herzl and his court) on a side issue, he ended the letter with an accusation that the “Viennese demonstrated that they could only destroy Eretz Israel but not build it.”53 He continued with an open letter to the delegates of the Sixth Congress published in HaTzofeh, the Hebrew organ of the Eastern European Zionists, on October 20, 1903. In this letter he declared that he would not comply with the decision of the Sixth Congress, explaining:

A majority of the Congress may decide questions of ways and means, but not of principles and ideals. And just as no majority in the world can cause me to apostatize from the faith of Israel or the Law of Israel, so no numerical majority totalling two hundred ninety-five will detach me from the Land of Israel.

Only those who were overtaken by the exacerbated diplomacy and policy did not understand, in their innocence, that a decision by a Zionist Congress to send an expedition to some other country implies a divorce to the Land of Israel.54

In the exchange of open letters that followed, the assaults between the two leaders became personal, calling on each other to resign. What was interesting in the exchange, from our perspective, was the reiteration of the two concepts — Hibbat Zion vs. political Zionism — indicating that the two leaders were aware of the origins of the tension between the two approaches. Ussishkin finished his second open letter by saying: “There is higher than higher and that is the primary ideal. It is not I who has betrayed it and therefore it is not I who should leave the battle.”55 In a short letter to Moses Gaster, Ussishkin repeated three times the concept realpolitik which he differentiated from the ideological element in his battle against Uganda.56 In a draft letter to the Jewish people in which he wanted to resign but never submitted (dated November 11, 1903), Herzl spoke about the existing split in the Zionist movement which also passed through him. He who started as a Jewish-statist and became a Hovev Zion, was now faced with a split between his heart which stayed with the Zionists and his reason which went with the Africans.57
The rejection of the East Africa project by the Russian Zionists was formally expressed at the Kharkov conference of the Russian members of the GAC. The resolutions adopted there amounted to an ultimatum to Herzl to shift course, accompanied by threats of actions to be taken in the event that he would not comply. It seemed as if the Zionist movement was on the verge of a formal split between the two schools of thought.58

A split, however, did not take place. At the April 1904 GAC meeting in Vienna, both sides, despite eventual confrontations, made efforts to reconcile their differences. Probably what motivated Herzl to appease his opposition was the gradual withdrawal of British government support for the East Africa project accompanied by the realization of the Zionist leader that he might have misjudged the depth of emotions attached to Eretz Israel. It is very difficult to judge how Herzl's illness influenced his behavior and to which direction. The Seventh Congress that convened in the wake of Herzl's death dealt with the East Africa question but rejected it. The absence of the founder of political Zionism and the withdrawal of the British proposal obviously allowed for a smooth death of the East Africa project.

In retrospect, however, the Uganda controversy exposed the two streams that ran in the Zionist movement, each one representing a different facet of the Zionist idea. Starting from separate points of departure, the ethnonational and the state approaches were amalgamated at the First Zionist Congress, as both perceived the main operational goal of the Zionist enterprise in terms of a nation-state. Although Ahad Ha-Am recognized from its outset the separating line between the two approaches, as long as the Zionist movement was not faced with an operational alternative, the tension between the two approaches was dormant. Once a major Great Power forwarded a semi-official offer for a Jewish-designed territory, the built-in tension broke out into the open. On one side stood all those whose point of departure was that a Jewish state was the solution to the physical threat hanging over the Jewish people, and on the other were all those whose main concern was the national revival of the Jews. It was Ahad Ha-Am who in the wake of the Sixth Congress again identified the variance between the two approaches. Following a description of the difference between Hibbat Zion and his own spiritual Zionism, he then noted:

But both parties stood on a common, rock-solid base: belief in the power of the historic bond between the people and the land to reawaken our people to self-recognition and to stir them to fight for strength until such time as the conditions necessary for their free development had been established.59

Ahad Ha-Am took the essence of Zionism further and argued:
Yes, there in America there is everything — everything except one thing: the historic base that alone is capable of accomplishing the great feat of sending tens of thousands of peddlers and middlemen to the land and renewing a proper national spirit in the heart of a scattered and divided people.60

On the other end stood Israel Zangwill who also understood the dividing line between the two approaches. Emphasizing the state and the territorial dimension, he seceded from the Zionist movement following the Seventh Congress and established the Jewish Territorial Organization (ITO). Despite its failure, this movement, dedicated to achieving a Jewish state on any possible territory, was a dramatic expression of the rationale that guided political Zionism.

Further proof as to the gap between the two approaches was seen in the behavior of Mizrachi — the religious Zionists led by Rabbi Reines — who supported Herzl during the Uganda controversy. Motivated by a similar rationale to that of the political Zionists, namely the urgent need to save the Jewish people, Reines and his followers differentiated between the two goals — the nation and the national territory. While emphasizing that by no means were the religious Jews abandoning their ancestral land, priority was given to the Jewish people. “Nevertheless, we agreed to the African proposal,” he wrote in a letter to Herzl following the Sixth Congress, “because we pay attention to the needs of the people that is dearer to us than the land — and the needs of the people which is declining both materially and spiritually require a secure shelter anywhere — and because we trust our people, Zionism and our respected leader, that they will never forget Zion....And by agreeing to Africa we have not forgotten Zion our holy city even for a moment....And what is good for Israel is also good for our country. If there is no Israel in the world there is no Zion in the world.”61 Further more, aligning themselves with political Zionism which did not posit itself as an ideological alternative to traditional Judaism against the ethnonationalists who did, it was only natural that when the gap between the two secular streams in Zionism surfaced, they supported the faction that presented a smaller ideological threat.62

David Vital, at a conference on “100 Years of Zionism” in December 1981, summarized the Uganda debate nicely: “Two linked questions had always been at issue and were to the fore throughout the debate on East Africa; what was the true and desirable relationship between the Jewish people and other nations; and what was the true and desirable relationship between the Jews and their own historic past?”63 For political Zionism, and especially Herzl and Zangwill, the first question was of the essence, and if “continuity was judged incompatible with the primary goals of Zionism as these were understood,”64 the latter received priority.
"For the opposing school of thought these ancient burdens — the past itself — were, on the contrary, of the essence, central and indispensable to their national feeling."65 And he concludes:

The Herzlians compared Jews and non-Jews. The anti-Herzlians compared modern Jews with Jews in some former or some ideal condition. They were nothing if not romantics. The original Odessa Lovers of Zion, the Ahad Ha-Amist moralists, the Ussishkinite settlement-first men and the other sub-categories of the genus, each group in its way, were all creatures of the haskalah. All looked forward to a reform of the Jewish condition, but at the same time backward for the elements out of which to reconstruct it. And since the return to the cultivation of land was an essential part of their prescription for the restoration of social health in the future, and the Land of Israel specifically was of course central to past Jewish history and belief, they ended by seeing Eretz Israel as the pivot on which all would turn. To do without it was to lose an indispensable source of strength, a force for renewal as powerful as it was indefinable.66

David Vital argues that in the post-Uganda era, as a result of the debate and its consequences, the Zionist movement crystallized itself around the Yishuv and Eretz Israel. Correct as it may be, from our perspective the inherent tension between the "state" and the ethnonational orientation did not disappear. It was to reappear again, strong as ever, at the next turning point when the Zionist movement and the Yishuv encountered its major foreign policy decision: to accept or reject the partition of Palestine.

The Partition Debate

Forty years after the First Zionist Congress in Basel, the Zionist movement was engulfed in an ideological and political debate. This debate, which like the Uganda controversy did not bear any immediate political consequences, nevertheless reflected the opposing orientations in the Yishuv, the basic tenets and dilemmas of Zionism, and determined political realities which matured only a decade later. It would be accurate to state that the partition idea, developed and debated in 1937, legitimized internationally in 1947, and abolished in 1967, has accompanied Israeli foreign and domestic politics henceforth. Another similarity with the previous great debate was that the 1937 debate was a reaction to a British proposal containing territorial elements, but short of the national aspirations of the Zionist movement. Despite the fact that the British government in both cases ultimately backed off proposals initiated by high-ranking officials, the proposals
nevertheless sparked a major controversy within the Zionist movement. In retrospect both proposals could be regarded as helping to crystallize attitudes and policies which determined the political behavior of the Zionist movement in the ensuing years. The fact that the Zionists reacted so profoundly to a relatively underdeveloped idea indicated how basic the dilemma was to the Yishuv. It was sufficient for a semi-official proposal, prior to being considered by the British government, to ignite a controversy in which the main factions of the movement participated.

But the partition debate took place more than thirty years after the Uganda controversy. During these three decades the Zionist movement had changed drastically in many respects. Looking back at the years that elapsed, the Zionist movement could claim major diplomatic and territorial achievements. The diplomatic strategy conceived by Herzl could claim to its credit the big breakthrough that took place in the midst of World War I and its wake. The Balfour Declaration that supported the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine was, following the war, adopted in principle by the League of Nations and became an integral part of the Mandate over Palestine that was awarded to Britain. These statements came close to the international charter that political Zionism had been seeking since its inception. At the same time practical Zionism could claim to its credit the expansion of the Yishuv during those years. From around 50,000 Jews in Eretz Israel at the turn of the century (a ratio of 1:10 in the population), the Yishuv grew to around 384,000 at the end of 1936 (a ratio of 1:3). The ownership of land also increased significantly from around 220,000 dunams owned by Jews at the turn of the century to 1.6 million dunams at the end of 1935.

By the mid-1930s, the Yishuv had developed a whole network of territory-wide organizations which were non-existent in 1904, and essentially controlled the "national institutions" of the world-wide Zionist movement. Indeed, practical Zionism could display its achievements against the record of the diplomatic school and show at least as impressive a record, and that despite the fact that many of its achievements were made possible because of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.

Also the political map of the Zionist movement was transformed and represented the changes in the Jewish world that took place in the intervening years. The East-West division was replaced by a developed political-ideological spectrum ranging from right to left on social issues, religious affairs and national policies. From a geographic perspective, the new Jewish concentrations in Palestine and American and British Jewry replaced Vienna and Odessa. In addition, what had developed in the meantime was a profound intercommunal conflict in Palestine which was at least officially the main cause of the partition
recommendations of the 1936 royal commission. Partition in itself was a significant deviation from what was originally perceived as the national home for the Jewish people. Having lost a large share of Palestine in 1922 to the Emirate of Transjordan, Western Palestine was now to be divided even further. At the same time, what was offered to the Jews in comparison to the past was within the boundaries of historical Eretz Israel and it was formal sovereignty, not a protectorate.

What were the operational elements contained in the partition proposal advanced by the royal commission headed by Lord Peel? It contained three main recommendations: abolition of the Mandate, sovereignty to each of the two national communities dwelling in Palestine, and a detailed map of how to divide the territory.70 By advancing these proposals, the commission was acknowledging the failure of Britain to promote a stable setting in which the national aspirations of both the Arab and Jewish communities could be satisfied. Having heard testimony from all the concerned parties, the commission reached the conclusion that the ethnonational differences between Arabs and Jews were irreconcilable. By suggesting to convert the “national home” into a Jewish state, they offered the Zionists a means which would allow them to control immigration, thus accepting one of the main maxims of the movement. The price that the Jews would have to pay would be concessions on their ethnonational aspirations. The Jewish state would essentially consist of the Galilee and the coastal plain, thus providing them with only 20 percent of Western Palestine, not to speak of Transjordan which was demanded by the Revisionists and never formally abandoned by the Yishuv leadership. Moreover, the territory which the Jews were asked to concede included the most sacred historical monuments. It included the areas which had been settled in ancient times by the tribes of Judah and Ephraim from which the two dynasties of David and Israel emerged and in which their respective capitals were located. The heart of the territory in which the Second Commonwealth was erected, Judea (536 BCE-70 CE), was also excluded. Thus, while receiving a territory in Eretz Israel, what was offered to them was definitely not the core of the ancient Jewish historical homeland.

In drawing the map of partition, the Peel Commission was influenced by the political rationale of the Zionist movement. In addition to offering free Jewish immigration in the future through sovereignty, it also provided the fertile portions of Palestine to the Jewish state, thus providing an economic base for the absorption of future Jewish immigrants. The drawing of the map was also influenced by the reality that these regions were populated primarily by Jewish settlements and linked to each other geographically, while the mountains were held by the Arabs and the Jewish population there was relatively sparse. The area offered to the Arabs bordered with the Transjordan Emirate.
with which it was designed to be united. One could also deduce from this proposal that the commission perceived the Yishuv as capable of constructing an independent political entity, while the Arab community in Palestine was not yet developed for such a task. Transjordan, which had been semi-independent for a while, was designed to assist in their political development. Recommended population transfers between the two states were designed to bring about ethnic homogeneity, thus reducing communal tension and conflict, which was the essence of the partition idea. Seeing ethnic hostility as the main cause of the conflict also led to disregard of the geo-strategic weakness of the plan by providing the Arab state with control of the high places. It was assumed that separation between the two communities would suffice to promote stability.71

A verbal analysis of the statements made by supporters and opponents of the partition idea would not reveal a clearcut dichotomy between statist and ethnonationalists, just as we could not categorize the two camps as Right and Left, since opposition and support crossed ideological boundaries. Each camp advanced statist arguments coupled with realistic considerations. Thus the Revisionists, headed by Vladimir Jabotinsky, saw themselves as the heirs of political Zionism, demanding large-scale political action to establish a state which would also contain Transjordan. In their opposition to partition they were joined by the leftist Hashomer Hatzair and elements from the political center that supported a binational state rather than two separate ethnically homogeneous states. In Mapai, led by David Ben-Gurion, the dominant social democratic party which also dominated the World Zionist Organization since 1935, at the beginning of the debate the majority of voices were against partition, basing their arguments on both historical and political reasons. The two General Zionist parties in the center of the political map split on this issue, one favoring and the other opposing partition. In the religious camp, the majority of the Mizrahi — which supported Herzl during the Uganda controversy — now objected to partition. Non-Zionist Agudat Israel, established in 1912 and objecting to a Jewish state lest it not be religious, was divided on this issue.72

A more in-depth analysis would reveal that the position of the supporters was primarily pragmatic while that of the opponents was more loaded with ideological and national elements. The point of departure of many supporters of partition was their evaluation that the British Mandate was coming to an end and that the Zionists could henceforth only expect a turn for the worse from their perspective. A sovereign Jewish state would continue the process of state-building that had started under the Mandate, absorb millions of Jews under pressure, and assist others who would stay in the diaspora. Establishment of a Jewish state would also demonstrate that in contradiction of the anti-
Moreover, many might argue that Zionism's pragmatic approach was not limited to the Zionist movement. An orderly transfer would indicate that Zionism did not involve expulsion of Arabs. Most important was the evaluation by many supporters that by rejecting partition the Zionist movement might be missing an historic opportunity that might not repeat itself. Moreover, many argued that by accepting partition, the future Jewish state was not excluding opportunities to recapture its historic domain. Finally, the partition plan essentially reflected the settlement pattern of the Yishuv and as a matter of fact provided it with territories beyond its control at the time.

As stated above, the arguments of the opponents contained many pragmatic elements such as the ability of a tiny state to absorb all the Jews aspiring to settle in it, its strategic vulnerability, and on whose side time was working. They rejected the pessimistic evaluation of the supporters as well as their yielding attitude. At the same time, they rejected connotations that the Yishuv had the right to concede parts of the ancient homeland, holy places, and historical statutes. Others argued that Eretz Israel was an historical, integral unit stretching on both sides of the Jordan. The arguments of the opposition from the binational camp were based on notions as to what better suited the ideals of Judaism. Shmuel Dothan, who extensively analyzed the partition debate and compared the opposing views, summarized the opposition attitude in the following words:

...the 'hard core' [of the opposers' view] was the assumption that Eretz Israel is the land of the Jews alone, and that the Arabs who had not created anything in it, and to whom it meant nothing...have only the right to reside in it, but not the right to rule it. This view was expressed by many opposers...who were convinced that their right in Eretz Israel was based on attachment, recognition of the nations of the world and on the huge labor that so many Jews invested in it. They were supported by religious and other Jews with attachment to tradition and history who perceived Eretz Israel as the land of their ancestors, and according to them their right can never be nullified.73

Despite the fact that the opposition to partition was comprehensive and encompassed elements from almost every party in the Yishuv and the diaspora, in addition to the total opposition of such parties as the Revisionists, Hashomer Hatzair, Mizrahi and others, the opponents did not succeed in forming a united front. Even the cool reception of the plan by the British Parliament on July 20-21, 1937, and the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations between
July 30 and August 18, 1937,74 did not produce an effective opposition. An action committee headed by the veteran leader from the Uganda controversy years, Menachem Ussishkin, with Berl Katzenelson, the ideologue of Mapai, Dr. Haim Bograshov (General Zionists) and Rabbi Meir Berlin (Mizrahi), was formed in Zurich on the eve of the Twentieth Zionist Congress. Subsequently, they expanded the opposition to also include Hashomer Hatzair and the State Party (the Revisionist wing which did not secede from the WZO), and American Zionists such as Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Henrietta Szold. But this impressive coalition could not counterbalance the weight of the central leadership of the WZO and the Jewish Agency.

By 1935, and following a long struggle, the leadership of the WZO and the Jewish Agency was consolidated in the hands of the statist segment of the Zionist movement. While Dr. Chaim Weizmann retained the presidency and directed the diplomatic activity of the movement, David Ben-Gurion, as chairman of the Zionist Executive, and his colleagues from Mapai controlled the main functions and the process of policy-making. Despite the rivalry between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, the two leaders united in their acceptance of the partition principle. Thus while Weizmann mobilized the support of the diaspora representatives, the leader of the Yishuv consolidated the position of Mapai despite the fact that many were originally opposed to partition. Indeed, this alliance was sufficient to bring about a clear majority — 299 in favor, 160 opposed, 6 abstained and 19 were absent.

On the surface the vote of the Twentieth Congress was similar to that of the Sixth Congress on East Africa. The formal leadership achieved a majority, despite a strong opposition, in favor of a decision which only allowed the Zionist Executive to negotiate with Britain on “ascertaining the precise terms for the proposed establishment of a Jewish state.” The Executive was forbidden to commit the movement to any definite scheme of partition without a resolution of a newly-elected Congress. In effect, the resolution was a clear victory for the partition camp. The new Executive elected by the Twentieth Congress was composed of a majority of partition supporters. Moreover, the attempt of the Revisionists to form coalitions with forces that were not members of the WZO, such as Agudat Israel, or with forces from within, did not materialize. Ussishkin’s attempt to organize a united opposition in the wake of the Congress was a far cry from his 1903-1904 campaign. The failure of the opposition to organize an effective campaign in the immediate post-Congress period was another indication of the strength of the formal Zionist leadership.

In summary, while recognizing the limits in comparing the two debates — Uganda and partition — because of the different settings and questions, a broad analogy may be made. In both cases a pragmatic political approach confronted a more ideological ethnonationally-
oriented approach. Although both approaches in both cases based their arguments on a mixture of ethnonational and realistic arguments, the emphasis of each approach was clear. What may be even more important was the severity of the debate; it reflected the tension between the two streams in the Zionist ideology and movement, which accompanies the movement and the State of Israel until today. The victory of the partition idea, despite the disappearance of the pure statist approach from the Zionist agenda in the post-Uganda years, reflected the emergence of the Yishuv and a semi-state organization in the 1920s and 1930s.

The results of the two debates should be looked at as representing a partial victory for each approach. Despite the defeat of Herzl in the Uganda debate, the essence of his political Zionism was not abandoned; it was carried on and translated into victory in 1917 and remained a central component in Zionist foreign policy until and after the establishment of the Jewish state. Looking at it from the ethnonational perspective, despite the victory of the partition principle in 1937, it should be emphasized that now the question was not the choice of Palestine but rather what should be the territorial boundaries of Eretz Israel, a question reemerging in full strength in the post-1967 era.

Notes

2. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a..." Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1978): 380; A.D. Smith, "States and Homelands," p. 188.


20. The Zionist Idea, p. 194.

21. Ibid., p. 198.


23. Ibid., p. 92.

24. Ibid., pp. 145-146.

25. Ibid., p. 146.

26. Ibid., p. 82.

27. Ibid., p. 95.

28. Ibid., p. 96.

29. Ibid., p. 83.

30. Ibid., chs. 3, 5.

31. Ibid., p. 32.

32. Ibid., p. 76.

33. Ibid., p. 83.

34. Ibid., p. 157.


38. On Herzl’s diplomacy, see, for instance, Vital, Ibid., chs. 2-4.


40. See Herzl’s own testimony to his political theory in The Jewish State.
60. *Ibid*.
62. For further analysis on the attitudes of religious Zionism, see Don-Yehiya, "Ideology and Policy," pp. 121-126.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
66. Ibid., p. 87.
69. Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory (Berkeley: University of California, 1983), p. 43, Table 2.1.
72. The two most comprehensive books on the attitudes and debate in the Yishuv regarding the binational idea and partition are Susan Lee Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times (Tel Aviv: Shikmona Press, 1979), and Shmuel Dothan, Partition of Eretz Israel in the Mandatory Period. See also Shmuel Sandler, "Partition versus Sharing in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Governing Peoples and Territories (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1982).
73. Dothan, Partition of Eretz Israel in the Mandatory Period, p. 315.