The correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin covered three decades down to the mid-1960s and touched on many of the most urgent problems in modern political philosophy. At bottom the key question they debated is whether the true paradigm of philosophy is a purely naturalistic rationalism of the kind fashioned by the thirteenth century Arab and Jewish thinkers in their revival of Aristotelianism and exemplified, later on, by Spinoza; or whether the true paradigm is grounded in the Reason (nous) of Plato and Aristotle as it symbolizes a range of experiential meaning from intelllection to faith, thus comprehending analysis, intuition, and revelation. Strauss contends for the former, Voegelin for the latter view; one in the name of demonstrative knowledge, the other in the name of mystic philosophy. Despite their substantial disagreements, both writers stand severely at odds with contemporary ideologies and, generally, join in preferring the ancients to the moderns.

The fascinating correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin raises more questions than it answers, if merely taken by itself. There are, to be sure, a number of extremely valuable debates that arise between the two writers, especially in the letters of 1949 through 1951. Often, however, the exchange gives only straws in the wind and a sense of agreements and disagreements, but much that unites and much that separates them ultimately remains obscure. To account adequately for everything would require a review of the correspondence in the context of the entire corpus of the technical writing and teaching of both men. That large task cannot be undertaken on this occasion, although some tentative suggestions will be ventured by way of conclusion. Since this correspondence is an exchange between the two giants of political philosophy of our time, there should be no doubt of its importance and great intrinsic interest.

Forthcoming as a commentary in Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, edited and translated by Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993). Copyright held by the Pennsylvania State University Press: published herein by permission.

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The tone of the exchange, stretching over the three decades from 1934 to 1964, is respectful and even warm to the extent of polite friendliness. It is a bit stiff, formal and civil, thawing eventually to “Mr. Strauss” and “Mr. Voegelin,” never to Leo and Eric, but this does not inhibit a lively and frank discussion. Most of the efforts to define the intellectual relationship between the two men are made by Strauss, and these almost always point up differences. It is of some moment that only 5 of the 51 surviving letters were written after Voegelin published the first three volumes of Order and History (1956 and 1957), perhaps a significant fact. Moreover, Strauss makes little or no comment to Voegelin about what he has written on the basis of a profound study of the Bible — specifically of the Hebrew Old Testament — Israel and Revelation,2 his meticulous interpretation of the pre-Socratics that displays a philological and theoretical mastery of the some 55 Greek authors considered in The World of the Polis, nor the close textual analysis and interpretation given of the principal political writings of Plato and Aristotle as powerfully presented in the third of these volumes. Of course, there are gaps from missing letters, but this is mainly a problem for the correspondence during the years down to 1953 or so; and it is extremely unlikely that a discussion of Order and History has disappeared.3 There is the relocation (which could have played a part in disrupting the correspondence) as the Voegelins moved from Baton Rouge to Munich in 1958. There he began a new phase of his career in Germany by establishing the Political Science Institute through his appointment to the chair in that discipline left vacant at the University of Munich since the death of Max Weber in 1920.

But the silence is significant, no matter what allowances are made. And apart from rare occasions such as the present one when the matter is directly raised (or at the annual meetings of the Eric Voegelin Society when panels were devoted to the relationship in 1989 and 1990), the silence continues virtually into the present by latter-day Straussian scholars. Thus, a 1989 recall of critical exchanges with Strauss mentions Alexandre Kojève, C.B. Macpherson, Raymond Aron, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl Lowith and Arnaldo Momigliano, but passes over Voegelin — surely classified with Strauss as another “maverick” taking on the “authorities” and on much the same ground, i.e., an insistence on the indispensability of classical philosophy for a rational understanding of the human condition per se, not least of all of the contemporary world and its crisis.4

This silence may be the most important aspect for consideration. How is the silence to be interpreted? Perhaps these letters point toward an answer. A preliminary answer must be that Voegelin’s publication of the initial volumes of Order and History finally put a period to the relationship that had been declining since his 1951 Walgreen Lectures at the University of Chicago, published as The New Science of
Medieval Rationalism or Mystic Philosophy?

Politics. So, the further question to be wondered about is, exactly why? To which the preliminary plausible answer must be that — from the perspectives of both men — persuasion had reached its limits, and there was little more to be said between them because of fundamental disagreement.

I

The air of mutual respect that pervades the correspondence is founded partly in common civility and Old World manners and partly in a recognition of the seriousness of each other’s scholarship, with a sense that their exchanges constitute a conversation between spoudaioi. There is strong general agreement about the defectiveness of modern philosophy and the science of man from Machiavelli and Hobbes onward. Both see this as requiring a return to the Greeks, and Strauss remarks that radical doubt of all of the dogmas of the past three or four centuries is the beginning of wisdom. Voegelin more often than not is conciliatory, obliging, even deferential, seemingly intent on coaxing as much candor and insight as he can from his guarded correspondent. Clearly enough, sparring is going on, as each writer tests the other in various ways. There is eagerness for rapport, especially from Voegelin’s side, but caution, wariness and dubiousness, especially from Strauss’s side. Now and then an issue becomes transparent for disagreement, the debate is joined and sparks fly.

Thus, with enthusiasm Voegelin embraces Strauss’s principle of understanding a thinker as he understood himself. And how is that? Voegelin, in characteristic fashion, elaborated the principle to mean that the conscientious interpreter has “to restore the experiences which have led to the creation of certain concepts and symbols; or: [since] symbols have become opaque...they must be made luminous again by penetrating to the experiences which they express.” “We are in greater agreement than I first supposed,” Voegelin concludes. Still, Strauss remains silent on the key question of how and in what sense philosophy can be said to be experientially anchored.

That silence is broken in alarm and indignation, however, by an outburst provoked by Voegelin’s use of the term existential in the Gorgias essay. Strauss writes:

In his critique of Plato, Heidegger tries to find the way by rejecting philosophy and metaphysics as such....[But] insofar as I am serious and there are questions, I look for the “objective” truth. The sophist is a man to whom truth does not matter....The passion of revelation that moves the Platonic dialogue, this highest mania, cannot be understood within Kierkegaard’s concept of “existence,” and [the
attempt to do so] must for the present be rejected as a radical illusion....The question Plato or existentialism is today the ontological question — about "intellectuals" we (i.e., Plato and I) do not need to waste words, unless it were about how they finally have to be interpreted, namely within Platonic or existentialist philosophy.7

Clearly, Voegelin struck a nerve. Strauss seems mollified by Voegelin's conciliatory explanation that existentialism (which he has no wish to defend) is not intended and that ontology is, indeed, centrally important. "I swear, I am not straying on existentialist paths; we are in agreement also on the question of ontology." However, Voegelin presses the point:

The truth of ontology (including in particular philosophical anthropology) is not a datum, that can be recognized by anyone at any time. Ontological knowledge emerges in the process of history and biographically in the process of the individual person's life under certain conditions of education, the social context, personal inclination, a spiritual conditioning. Episteme is not just a function of understanding, it is also in the Aristotelian sense, a dianoetic arete. For this non-cognitive aspect of episteme I use the term "existential."....A history of political ideas in particular should investigate the process in which "truth" becomes socially effective or is hindered in such effectiveness. You see, it does not have to do with a negation or relativization of ontology, but rather with the correlation between perception in the cognitive and existential sense; this correlation is for me the theme of "history."8

To this Strauss responds with worries of why Voegelin puts "'truth' in quotation marks? Is truth only so-called truth, the illusion of a respective period?" The closest classical equivalent to existential he believes is practical, understood as the contradiction of theoretical. "If I am not totally mistaken," Strauss goes on, "the root of all modern darkness from the 17th century on is the obscuring of the difference between theory and praxis." An intervening letter from Voegelin is lost, but it apparently allayed Strauss's worst fears. He writes:

The question is whether there is a pure grasp of truth as essential human possibility, quite regardless of what the conditions and actualization of this possibility are, or whether there is not such a grasp as essential possibility. When you say "only at such and such a time did that order of the soul emerge," you leave open if this order of the soul is the natural telos of Man or a "coincidence," that it could also not have emerged, does it not deprive it of the status of a telos? However that may be, it seems to me nonetheless, that we are in more fundamental agreement than I believed.9
Strauss’s questions go unanswered in this context. At an earlier place, Strauss writes of “the science established by Plato and Aristotle: the postulate of an exact ethics and politics in Plato; Aristotle’s adhering to the ideal of exactness despite the abandonment of its application to the human things; the necessarily higher ranking of physics over ethics and politics for at least Aristotle and his successors.”10 Whether the exactness of the theoretical sciences, in contrast to the practical ones, equates with the pure grasp of truth as possibility for Strauss remains unclear, and he seems to leave it “open.” At a later place he speaks of his Walgreen Lectures, published as Natural Right and History, as presenting the “problem of natural right as an unsolved problem,” thus holding out the conception of philosophy itself as “an uncompletable ascent.” Philosophy on the classical model is disclosed as an unsuspected third way to the conventional alternatives of choosing between “positivism-relativism-pragmatism and neo-Thomism,” whereby it is shown that the consequence of one’s ignorance is “that one must strive after knowledge.”11

A not dissimilar third way is disclosed by Voegelin from his study of the same sources. The paradigm of true philosophy is provided by Plato and Aristotle. But underlying classical philosophy itself, by Voegelin’s reading, is faith in the divine cosmos as the primal experience articulated in myth and differentiated through noesis in philosophy. It may be true that classical philosophy is “ahistorical” in that it is a loving search of the heights and depths of reality to discern the process and structure of being by the spiritually sensitive man who seeks abiding truth. But the modern derailment of philosophy from Descartes to Hegel (which Voegelin considers as a unit) deforms this questing dimension of philosophizing by transforming the uncompletable ascent described as the love of wisdom in Plato into the possession of exact truth as the system of science.12 “I would permit myself a correction to your formulation,” therefore, Voegelin writes,

that “all earlier philosophy” was unhistorical. The “system”—philosophy from Descartes to Hegel — seems to me to form a unity insofar as the idea of a philosophical, closed, “system” dominates. The idea of “system” though, the possible exhaustive penetration of the mystery of the cosmos and its existence by the intellect, is itself a gnostic phenomenon, a drawing in of eternity into the time of the individual thinker. I would therefore restrict your comment on philosophy [to] the Platonic-Aristotelian sense....With regard to the “second thesis” of your letter, that philosophy is radically independent of faith,...I do not see how you get around the historical fact of the beginning of philosophy in the attitude of faith of Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Parmenides.13
II

We come now to the crux of the disagreement between our two writers. Strauss, in the earlier letter, had written that this second thesis was "the root of our disagreement," and in this he was not wrong. In response to Voegelin's asserted "historical fact" Strauss flatly denies it and adds: "whatever nocin might mean, it is certainly not pīstis in some sense. On this point Heidegger...is simply right." This becomes the "one point where our paths separate" Strauss states, although Voegelin reads Philosophy and Law (1935; English translation, 1987) and finds that Strauss had in that earlier book held a view much like his own. But this, too, Strauss denies. "Your classics are the Greeks and not the Bible," he argues. "The classics demonstrated that truly human life is a life dedicated to science, knowledge, and the search for it." "I believe still today," writes Strauss, "that the theioi nomoi is the common ground of the Bible and philosophy — humanly speaking. But I would specify that short of that, it is the problem of the multitude of theioi nomoi, that leads to the diametrically opposed solutions of the Bible on the one hand, of philosophy on the other."

The sharp contrast between a Middle Ages based on revelation and a classical antiquity not so grounded, according to Strauss, leads him to this further statement:

There is a double interest not to disguise this essential difference in any way. First, the interest in revelation, which is by no means merely natural knowledge. Secondly, human knowledge, episteme. You yourself have said of yourself that science matters very much to you. For me, it matters a great deal to understand it as such....The classics demonstrated that truly human life is a life dedicated to science, knowledge, and the search for it....Every synthesis is actually an option either for Jerusalem or for Athens.

Well, you speak of the religious foundation of classical philosophy. I would not do so. Of course, "religious foundation" was not part of Voegelin's speech, either, but words put in his mouth by Strauss. He passes over the matter, however, and his responsive analysis qualifies the sharp distinction between "human knowledge and revealed knowledge," by noticing that the latter is human insofar as it is the knowledge of concrete persons who experience it as stemming from a divine source and (while pointedly rejecting psychologizing explanations, i.e., Feuerbach's and Marx's), Voegelin arrives at the following important formulations.

Revelation, then, is humanly debatable because it, like all knowledge, is human knowledge....It distinguishes itself from "mere"
human knowledge in that its contents are experienced as "being addressed" by God. And through this experience of "being addressed" the essential contents of revealed knowledge are given; a man who understands himself in his "mere" humanness over against a transcendent being; a world-transcendent Being, who is experienced as the highest reality against all worldly being; a being who "addresses," therefore is a person, God; a man [is one] who can be addressed by this being, who thereby stands in a relation of openness to him. In this sense I would venture the formulation: the fact of revelation is its content.18

This sense of revelation as the experience of divine presence19 is shown to require the development of self-reflective consciousness whereby the man separates himself clearly from the divine, the movement from compactness toward differentiation, a "process in which man de-divinized himself and realized the humanity of his spiritual life."20 This achievement of Greek philosophy is absorbed by Christianity in the early centuries. The erotic orientation toward divine Being of man in Plato meets with no response, however, in contrast with the amicitia of Thomas — a contrast familiar from the New Science of Politics but qualified by Voegelin in later work so as to take account of his subsequent understanding of both reason and revelation in Hellenic philosophy, as suggested below.21

Strauss's response is to appeal to Christian dogma, rather than enter into a discussion that appeals to experiential analysis, which Voegelin is steadily stressing. The former suggests that there may yet be a common ground between himself and Voegelin, if only the latter accepts dogma in the Catholic sense, "because [he writes] my distinction between revelation and human knowledge to which you object is in harmony with the Catholic teaching. But I do not believe that you accept the Catholic teaching."22 By this is meant the clear doctrinal distinctions reflected by the dichotomies of natural human knowledge and supernatural revelation, reason and faith, science and religion, in particular — and again Strauss is right. Because, just as Voegelin has here discerned the human element in revelation and the presence of revelatory experience (faith) as undergirding Greek philosophy from its pre-Socratic beginnings through its climax in Plato and Aristotle, so also is he moving in the direction that takes him, in the decades ahead, to an analysis of reason (Nous and noesis) in classical philosophy that greatly widens our understanding of it and attributes the notion of merely "natural reason" to a misunderstanding fostered by the medieval Christian philosophers.23 The human reality of philosophy no less than of Judaic and Christian revelation is the metaxy or participatory reality of the In-Between of divine-human encounter, to hint at the later formulations.
How closely faith and reason converge can instructively be seen from a passage from Voegelin’s Candler Lectures of 1967, entitled “The Drama of Humanity,” where he was able to enumerate ten meanings of Reason in Plato and Aristotle, as follows.

Reason is:
1. the consciousness of existing from a Ground, an awareness filled with content and not empty. Reason is thereby the instrument for handling world-imminent reality. Rebellion against reason since the eighteenth century creates a void in this dimension that must then be filled by substitutes.
2. the transcendence of human existence, thereby establishing the poles of consciousness: immanent-transcendent.
3. the creative Ground of existence which attracts man to itself.
4. the sensorium whereby man understands himself to exist from a Ground.
5. the articulation of this understanding through universal ideas.
6. the perseverance through lifetime of concern about one’s relation to the ground, generative of existential virtue: phronesis (wisdom, prudence), philia (friendship), and athanatizein (to immortalize human existence).
7. the effort to order existence by the insight gained through understanding the self to be existentially linked to the Ground and attuned to it: the major intellectual operation of so translating consequences of this insight as to form daily habits in accordance with it.
8. the persuasive effort to induce conscious participation of the self, and other men’s conscious participation, in transcendent reason (Plato’s peitho). The problem of communicating and propagating the truth of being.
9. the constituent of man through his participation in (the reason of) the Ground; or, the constituent force in man qua human through participation in the divine Nous which is his specific essence.
10. the constituent of society as the homonoia or “like-mindedness” of Everyman in a community formed through recognition of the reason common to all men. In Aristotle, if love within the community is not based upon regard for the divinity of reason in the other man, then the political friendship (philia politike) on which a well-ordered community depends cannot exist. The source of the Christian notion of “human dignity” is the common divinity in all men. Nietzsche perceived that if that is surrendered then there is no reason to love anybody, one consequence of which is the loss of the sense and force of obligation in society and, hence, of its cohesiveness.

If any of the enumerated components of reason is lost, imbalanced constructions result which eventuate in psychological and social
breakdowns and disintegrations. As is suggested by this listing of the meanings of reason in Plato and Aristotle, noetic reason is philosophic or scientific reason, an activity of the consciousness articulated out of experience in a variety of interrelated symbolisms and symbolic forms.24

In his Aquinas Lecture of 1975, entitled "The Beginning and the Beyond," Voegelin characterizes the relationships between philosophy and revelation in this way:

The dichotomies of Faith and Reason, Religion and Philosophy, Theology and Metaphysics can no longer be used as ultimate terms of reference when we have to deal with experiences of divine reality, with their rich diversification in the ethnic cultures of antiquity, with their interpretation in the cultures of the ecumenic empires, with the transition of consciousness from the truth of the intra-cosmic gods to the truth of the divine Beyond, with the contemporary expansion of the horizon to the global ecumene. We can no longer ignore that the symbols of "Faith" express the responsive quest of man just as much as the revelatory appeal, and that the symbols of "Philosophy" express the revelatory appeal just as much as the responsive quest. We must further acknowledge that the medieval tension between faith and reason derives from the origins of these symbols in the two different ethnic cultures of Israel and Hellas, that in the consciousness of Israelite prophets and Hellenic philosophers the differentiating experience of the divine Beyond was respectively focused on the revelatory appeal and the human quest, and that the two types of consciousness had to face new problems when the political events of the Ecumenic Age cut them loose from their moorings in the ethnic cultures and forced their confrontation under the multicivilizational conditions of an ecumenic empire.25

Had Leo Strauss lived to read these words, it seems likely that his reaction might have been much as it was in his Letter of June 4, 1951: "Said in one sentence — I believe that philosophy in the Platonic sense is possible and necessary — and you believe that philosophy understood in this sense was made obsolete by revelation. God knows who is right."26 It hardly needs to be said that this formulation is simplistic and distorts Voegelin's argument.

III

One has the familiar sense of ships passing in the night after this review of some of the salient passages in the correspondence. Is there
more to it than that? What conclusions can be drawn, however tenta-
tively?

The restraining sentiment to be remembered as a kind of motto of ci-
vility for whatever we conclude about the debate under consideration
may be taken from a remark Strauss made to Voegelin: "...agreement in
our intentions..., so long as we have to combat the presently reigning
idiocy, is of greater significance than the differences [between us],
which I also would not wish to deny."27

That said, some of the differences can be noted, on the assumption
that the agreements have become clear enough by now. What lies be-
hind the basic disagreement is expressed already in 1942 by Strauss and
persists during the entire subsequent relationship with Voegelin: "the
impossibility of grounding science on religious faith....Now you will
say that the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of science was put to rest
through Christianity and the discovery of history. I am not quite per-
suaded of that."28

Behind these formulations stand two philosophers both victimized
and appalled by the deculturation and banality of modernity who de-
voted their lives to the recovery of true philosophy, Strauss on the ba-
sis of the medieval Arabic and Jewish philosophy of Averroes, Al-
farabi, and Maimonides, Voegelin by a far-reaching critical revision
of the medieval Christian philosophy of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas and
Eckhart. This is not to question that, from their divergent perspectives,
both men took classical philosophy and the science of man and being it
achieved with utmost seriousness, nor that each deeply, even fervently,
believed his interpretation to be both true to the texts and in
accord with the real self-understanding of Socrates, Plato and Aristo-
tele of the philosopher’s calling. It is entirely understandable that a
"non-believer" (as Strauss termed himself) and a "mystic philosopher"
in the Christian tradition (as Voegelin regarded himself) would not see
eye to eye about ultimate things.

How, indeed, could it be otherwise? And both Strauss and Voegelin
believed that they avoided religious dogma out of devotion to the
quest for the truth of being, one in the name of ancient rationalism, the
other in the name of the fundamental experiences and their noetic and
pneumatic articulation through several modes of symbolization. Thus,
to Voegelin the core problem of all philosophy was the problem of
transcendence — meaning not the immanent transcendence of Husserl
and of the nature-based philosophy of Strauss, but the transcendence of
divine Being. His definition is given at the Beginning of Order
and History in the following words and are taken as true to philosophy
as Plato perfected it:

Philosophy is the love of being through love of divine Being as the
source of its order. The Logos of being is the object proper of phi-
sophical inquiry; and the search for truth concerning the order of being cannot be conducted without diagnosing the modes of existence in untruth. The truth of order has to be gained and regained in the perpetual struggle against the fall from it; and the movement toward truth starts from a man's awareness of his existence in untruth. The diagnostic and therapeutic functions are inseparable in philosophy as a form of existence. And ever since Plato, in the disorder of his time, discovered the connection, philosophical inquiry has been one of the means of establishing islands of order in the disorder of the age. Order and History is a philosophical inquiry concerning the order of human existence in society and history. Perhaps it will have its remedial effect — in the modest measure that, in the passionate course of events, is allowed to Philosophy.29

As one recent commentator remarked after surveying the Voegelinian corpus, "Voegelin adumbrates a philosophy of spiritual ascent, of which there are famous examples, such as Plotinus, Plato, St. Bonaventura, and Meister Eckhart.30 If the understanding of Reason is so expanded as to reassert the participatory and intuitive dimensions of classical philosophy's Nous, the understanding of faith and revelation also is reevaluated — and it emphatically is not creedal, doctrinal, or dogmatic faith that is at issue in Voegelin's work. In reflectively groping toward his later (1975) formulation of the matter quoted at the end of the preceding section, he finds in Strauss's Philosophy and Law (1935) substantial agreement with his own understanding of the fundamental experience of the divine Cosmos as the background of all experiences of order. 'I have the impression that you have retreated from an understanding of the prophetic (religious) foundation of philosophizing (with which I would heartily agree) to a theory of episteme and you refuse to see the problem of episteme in connection with experience, out of which it emerges.' Almost sorrowfully, Voegelin continues, "Why you do this, I do not know. And how this position can work...I cannot predict."31

As noticed earlier, Strauss acknowledges that "the Law has primacy" and that "I basically stand on the same ground" as he did fifteen years before, but with deeper understanding. "I believe still today that the theoi nomoi is the common ground of the Bible and philosophy — humanly speaking." But the multitude of divine laws so confuse things as to lead to solutions diametrically opposed to one another in the Bible and in philosophy. He rejects any blending of the two, contending that every "synthesis is actually an option either for Jerusalem or for Athens."32 For Voegelin, the theorization of this problem by Augustine is essentially valid for an understanding of the relationship of science (especially metaphysics) and revelation.
Revealed knowledge is, in the building of human knowledge, that knowledge of the pre-givens of perception (sapiencia, closely related to the Aristotelian nous as distinguished from episteme). To these pre-givens belongs the experience of man of himself as esse, velle; the inseparable primal experience: I am a knowing and willing being; I know myself as being and willing; I will myself as being and knowing human. (For Augustine in the world sphere, the symbol of the trinity: the Father — Being; the Son — the recognizable order; the Spirit — the process of being in history). To these pre-givens belongs further the being of God beyond time (in the just characterized dimensions of creation, order, and dynamic); and the human knowledge of this being through “revelation.” Within this knowledge pre-given by sapiencia stirs the philosophic episteme.35

Strauss remains adamant, however, in seeing this as a problem traditionally comprehensible in terms of faith and knowledge, and not of universal faith but as a particularly Christian, and by extension, a Jewish, problem. Hence, the problem is not a universal-human one but “presupposes a specific faith, which philosophy as philosophy does not and cannot do. Here and here alone it seems to me lies the divergence between us — also in the mere historical.”34 The richness and subtlety of the debate does not lend itself to adequate summary. The prefiguration of the outcome is Strauss’s early reaction: “What you wrote about Plato and Aristotle, naturally interests me quite directly....I do not hold this interpretation to be correct. But it is toweringly superior to all that one gets to read about Plato and Aristotle.”35

The gentleness and civility of Strauss himself, it must be said, is not always emulated by all who identify with his cause. The silence we have noticed as descending on our correspondents after publication of the initial volumes of Order and History was briefly if stridently shattered by Stanley Rosen’s long essay in The Review of Metaphysics in which Voegelin’s whole interpretation of Hellenic philosophy was resoundingly rejected (among other reasons) as existentialist, theologico-historicist, Christian, faith and not science, empiricist, mystical, Toynbeean, Thomistic, too concerned with experience and too little concerned with reason, theological, neglectful of the political, egalitarian, Liberal, reductionist in seeing Plato’s myths as revelation, oblivious to the tension between theory and practice, inverting the classic philosophic theory of the relationship between being and history (historicism, again), blocking instead of fostering access to Greek philosophy because of Christian assumptions in quasi-Hegelian dress. “Voegelin is forced by his commitments both to reject Hellenism and at the same time to preserve it in unrecognizable form.” “He excludes the possibility of a non-empiricist and non-mystical philosophy.” “It is not easy,” the author patronizingly sighs, “to make such a judgment of
what may well be a devout man's life work."36 After this blast, there was little more that could usefully be said. Silence reigned.

IV

In modern philosophy the hard line drawn between religion and philosophy is exemplified in Spinoza’s attitude as expressed in Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670) where the principle is laid down as follows:

Between faith or theology, and philosophy, there is no connection, nor affinity. I think no one will dispute the fact who has knowledge of the aim and foundations of the two subjects, for they are as wide apart as the poles.

Philosophy has no end in view save truth; faith...looks for nothing but obedience and piety. Again, philosophy is based on axioms which must be sought from nature alone.37

"The core of Strauss’s thought is the famous ‘theological-political problem,’ a problem which he would say ‘remained the theme of my studies from a very early time.’"38 Strauss’s gloss on the quoted Spinoza passage suggests that the philosopher who knows truth must refrain from expressing it out of both convenience and, more so, duty. If truth requires one not to accommodate opinions to the Bible, piety requires the opposite, ‘i.e., that one should give one’s own opinions a Biblical appearance. If true religion or faith, which according to him requires not so much true dogmas as pious ones, were endangered by his Biblical criticism, Spinoza would have decided to be absolutely silent about this subject.” But, of course, to thicken this tangle, the rule of speaking “ad captam vulgi” means so as to satisfy the dominant opinion of the multitude, which in Spinoza’s situation was that of a secularist Jew speaking to a Protestant Christian community.39 It was Spinoza’s intention to emancipate philosophy from its position as mere handmaid of scripture. “In his effort to emancipate philosophy from its ancillary position, he goes to the very root of the problem — the belief in revelation. By denying revelation, he reduces scripture to the status of the works of the Greek poets and as a result of this he revives the classical conception of Greek philosophers as to the relation between popular beliefs and philosophic thought."40

Behind Spinoza and Strauss stand the great Spanish Islamic philosophers of the medieval period who insisted upon philosophy as a purely rational enterprise based on Aristotle and steering a middle way, one infected neither by dogmatic religion nor by traditional mysticism — to take the case of Averroes, the great twelfth century falsuf Ibn Rushd. It may be useful to recall that Thomas Aquinas’ Summa
Contra Gentiles is the Western Christian “comprehensive systematic work against the Arabic-Aristotelian philosophy. In 1270, thirteen Averroistic propositions were condemned by Etienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris, and the year 1277 brought the sweeping condemnation of 219 propositions, including besides the Averroistic proper, several of Thomas Aquinas which seemed equally dangerous.”

By the Averroist tradition, philosophy is considered to be “the systematic application of demonstrative reasoning to the world.” Such philosophy starts from indubitable first principles and cannot be empirical, since philosophy is conceived as a demonstrative science and there can be no indubitable premises about any part of the world as experienced, much less about the whole cosmos. Philosophers are capable of arriving at truth directly and, thus, at the highest level, have no need of scripture or revelation — a teaching that necessitates discretion in communication. As a thoroughly rationalistic enterprise, not mysticism but only philosophy allows union with the divine, since that requires knowledge of the theoretical sciences.

There are levels of human nature and levels of discourse and truth to match.

For the natures of men are on different levels with respect to [their paths to] assent. One of them comes to assent through demonstration; another comes to assent through dialectical arguments, just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstration, since his nature does not contain any greater capacity; while another comes to assent through rhetorical arguments, again just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstrative arguments.

Ibn Rushd identifies the elite (philosophers) as those who are taught by demonstrative argument, the theologians (a mere subclass of the masses) as those suitable for dialectic, and the masses themselves who can understand only through imaginative and persuasive language. Farabi names only two classes, the elite and the masses. This view, of course, requires secret or artful teaching and caution of philosophers. Thus, Farabi endorses Plato’s techniques of concealment and Aristotle’s methods. They “used different methods but had the same purpose of concealment; there is much abbreviation and omission in Aristotle’s scientific works, and this is deliberate....Different expressions of truth suit different levels of understanding....Zeno said: ‘My teacher Aristotle reported a saying of his teacher Plato: “The summit of knowledge is too lofty for every bird to fly to’”. Finally, there is the agreement of the greatest Jewish philosopher Maimonides who writes of Genesis 1:1, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” “It has been treated in metaphors in order that the uneducated may comprehend it according to the measure of their faculties and the feebleness of their apprehension, while educated persons may take it in a different sense.” Strauss’s embrace of this paradigm of
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Philosophy is stated in many ways, such as the following from his 1962 Preface to the English translation of Spinoza's Critique of Religion: "I began...to wonder whether the self-destruction of reason was not the inevitable outcome of modern rationalism as distinguished from premodern rationalism, especially Jewish-medieval rationalism and its classical (Aristotelian and Platonic) foundation."

Voegelin's attitude toward its model of philosophizing — and hence toward the Straussian approach to philosophy in the degree to which it is indebted to this model, a matter to be more fully ascertained than we have attempted here — is suggested by his study of Siger de Brabant, a Latin Averroist. The notions of the grades of human nature and levels of communication just noticed, Voegelin finds, show "the inclination to treat the non-philosophical man as an inferior brand and even to compare him to animals, an attitude which seems to crop up as soon as the Christian insight into the equal spiritual dignity of all men is abandoned." Along with the elitist idea, which may be confined to "the intellectual sphere of the vita philosophi...[comes also] the liberal idea of the educated man as a social type superior to the uneducated common man, the vitis homo....The bourgeois implications are obvious, for the ideal of intellectual life is coupled with the idea that the man of substance is morally superior to the poor man." 49

More generally, then, Voegelin remarks of the falasifa that "philosophy had become in the Arab environment, more so than it was with Aristotle, a form of life for an intellectual elite." 50

Philosophy did not mean for them a branch of science, but signified an integral attitude towards the world based on a "book," much as the integral attitude of the orthodox Muslim would be based on the Koran. The sectarian implication is beyond doubt; the falasifa represent a religious movement, differing in its social structure and content of doctrine from other Islamic sects, but substantially of the same type....The Great Arabic philosophical discussions did not center in the Organon or Physics of Aristotle, but were concerned with the twelfth book of Metaphysics and the third book of De Anima as transmitted by the Commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias....The keystone of the canon was the so-called Theology of Aristotle, an abridged paraphrase of the last three books of the Enneads of Plotinus. The Neo-Platonic mysticism and the Commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias to De Anima were the dynamic center of Arabic philosophy, furnishing the principles of interpretation for the comments on Aristotelian works proper. They made possible the evolution of the idea of the Active Intellect as an emanation from God arousing to activity the passive intellect of man. The aim of human life is in this system the achievement of
the complete union, the ıtsal, of the human intellect with the Active Intellect. Behind the dry technical formula of the oneness of the Active Intellect in all human beings, lies a mystical experience and a well-developed religious attitude giving their meaning to the theoretical issues. The clash between Faith and Reason in the thirteenth century is at bottom a clash between two religions, between Christianity and the intellectual mysticism of the falasifa.

...It was this mythical Aristotle who dominated the falasifa and through their mediation became known to the West. It was not primarily the content of his work that created the disturbance; the Aristotelian results could be assimilated, as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas have demonstrated. The danger was the mythical Aristotle as a new spiritual authority of equal rank with the Christian revelation and tradition. The Aristotle who was a regula in natura et exemplar could be a model requiring the conformance of man in the same sense in which the Christ of St. Francis could be the standard of conformance for the Christian.51

The gulf that separates Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss and some of the possible reasons for it will by now have become more evident, even if the heart of their rival modes of philosophy remains to be explored. That is a task the reader must undertake for himself, if he is drawn to pursue the quest for Truth in the loving search of the Ground called Philosophy.

Notes

1. As the Rev. Ernest L. Fortin puts it: "What do we learn from the correspondence that we did not already know or could not know from other sources about Strauss’s or Voegelin’s thought? Not much, I suspect. Both authors have written extensively elsewhere on the subjects with which they deal here. There is nevertheless in the letters a certain bluntness or candor that would have been out of place in a piece written for publication....Not surprisingly, neither one appears to have learned much from the other or to have budged in any way from his position." Fortin, "Men of Letters: The Little-Known Correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin," Crisis (March 1991), 33-36 at 36.

2. There is mention by Voegelin in his Letter of June 10, 1953, that he is “working on the Israelite chapter in [his] History” and “greatly regretted that we have no opportunity to speak occasionally.” Strauss in his Letter of June 23, 1953, responds that “the problem of history in the Old Testament” is “one of the most complex problems in intellectual history. I think perhaps the utopian plan would be to devote about ten years to the solution of this problem.” He says not a word in subsequent correspondence about the long book on the subject.
published in 1956 as *Israel and Revelation*. Voegelin's lamentation about his command of Hebrew in the June 10 letter seems to have been partly modesty, since W.F. Albright in reviewing *Israel and Revelation* makes a point of noting that "his use of Hebrew is almost impeccable" (*Theological Studies*, XXII [1961], 275); see also the review by James B. Pritchard in *The American Historical Review*, LXIII (1957-1958), 640-41.

3. I say this on the basis of Voegelin's careful habit of retaining carbon copies of his own letters and dutifully keeping a file of letters received. It is nearly inconceivable that an exchange with Strauss on *Order and History*, or any part of it, would have escaped this methodical practice. On the other hand, there appears to be no extant letter from Voegelin regarding Strauss's own Walgreen Lectures of 1949, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953), after publication, despite a series of eager queries scattered through his earlier letters about when the book would appear. These materials now are organized in the Eric Voegelin Archive at the Hoover Institution Library (Box 38:34; on microfilm reel 37.1), the source of forty of the fifty-one letters to be published in the Emberly and Cooper collection referenced in the headnote, viz.: Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, edited and translated by Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, forthcoming; hereinafter referenced as Emberly and Cooper). The two men continued to exchange publications, as can be seen from the very last letter (that of September 7, 1964) in which Voegelin thanks Strauss for his apparently having had his publisher send him a copy of *The City and Man* (Chicago, 1964).

4. Thomas L. Pangle, ed., *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss: Essays and Lectures by Leo Strauss* (Chicago, 1989), ix. Voegelin's name does not appear in the index to the volume. The only reference to Voegelin made by Strauss in print that I can think of is his comment that the former's 1949 review of the latter's study of Xenophon's *Hiero* was one of only two critiques from which "one could learn anything," the other being by Kojeve. Voegelin then is identified as "one of the leading contemporary historians of political thought" — *not* as a political philosopher, a matter of consequence in the world of esoteric communication inhabited by such a careful writer as Strauss. Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's *Hiero*," in *Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), 96-103 on Voegelin at 96; cf. Voegelin to Strauss, January 14, 1949, Letter 20; Strauss to Voegelin, April 15, 1949, Letter 24; Strauss to Voegelin, August 8, 1950, Letter 30; and Voegelin to Strauss, August 21, 1950, Letter 31, in Emberly and Cooper.

On exoteric and esoteric writing see Leo Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952); see also Leo Strauss, "Exoteric Teaching," *Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy*, XIV (1986), 51-59: reprinted in *The Rebirth of Classical Politi-
cal Rationalism, ed., Pangle, 63-71. Receipt of Persecution and the Art of Writing is acknowledged by Voegelin in his Letter of August 5, 1952, and the subject matter is referred to subsequently; the article from which the book grew, published in Social Research in 1941, was called to Voegelin's attention in Strauss's Letter of February 13, 1943. There is no direct suggestion by Voegelin that Strauss himself engages in esoteric writing, but he shows interest in the subject and understands its ramifications, as hyperbolic remarks about John Locke intimate in his Letter of April 15, 1953 (apparently never sent) and the letter of April 20, 1953, covering the same ground more circumspectly (see the Editors' note to Letter 40, in Emberley and Cooper). Strauss responds by commending Voegelin for his acuity regarding types of esotericism (Letter of April 29, 1953, penultimate paragraph).

An evenhanded discussion of Strauss's own employment of this technique in his writing is given in Bernard Susser, "Leo Strauss: the Ancient as Modern," Political Studies, XXXVI (1988), 497-514 at 509; contrast the scathing denunciation of Strauss's "secret art of writing" (among other things) by Stephen Holmes, in "Truths for Philosophers Alone?", Times Literary Supplement (December 1-7, 1989), 1319-20, 1322-24, ending in his declaration that Strauss "was no philosopher." Cf. the response by Thomas L. Pangle, ibid. (January 5-11, 1990), 11.


6. Emberley and Cooper, MS p. 58.

7. Ibid., MS p. 68. The essay in question is Voegelin's "The Philosophy of Existence," Review of Politics, XI (1949), 477-98; it is included in revised form in Order and History, III, chap. 2.

8. Emberley and Cooper, MS p. 70.

9. Ibid., MS p. 75.

10. Ibid., MS p. 10.

11. Ibid., MS p. 91.

13. Emberley and Cooper, MS pp. 88f.

14. Ibid., MS p. 86.

15. Ibid., MS pp. 94-99, passim.

16. Ibid., MS p. 98.

17. On the point, see the instructive discussion of the transformation of the "living order of Israel" into "the 'religion of the book'" in Voegelin, Order and History, I, 376-79; also 120, 288, 381; cf. ibid., II, 218-19. On nous and pists in Plato's Republic see ibid., III, 113-14.

18. Emberley and Cooper, MS p. 104.


20. Emberley and Cooper, MS p. 105.


22. Emberley and Cooper, MS p. 110.

23. See the works cited in Note 21, especially Voegelin, "The Beginning and the Beyond," in Collected Works, XXVIII, 210-211, for the present point. The relationship of noesis and pistis is analyzed in ibid., XII, 273-274. That, and in what respects, Voegelin's position leaves him vulnerable on multiple grounds to being charged with the so-called "Modernist" heresy condemned by Roman Catholicism is observed and discussed by the Rev. Fortin, "Men of Letters," Crisis, 34-35. Voegelin long ago understood this problem quite clearly himself.
as is explicit in his letter to Alfred Schutz, January 1, 1953: "All that I have said about the problem of ‘essential Christianity’ is... untenable from the Catholic standpoint and would have to be classified as a variant of that Modernism which has been condemned as a heresy." Letter reprinted in Opitz and Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order, 449-457 at 457. On the meaning and extent of the heresy "Modernism" see Richard P. McBrien, Catholicism: Study Edition (Minneapolis, 1981), 55-56, 218-223, 644-655. On his concern for Christian orthodoxy, on the other hand, see Voegelin, “Response to Professor Altizer’s ‘A New History and a New but Ancient God’,” in Collected Works, XII, 292-295; also Quod Deus Dicitur, ibid., 376-383.


26. Emberley and Cooper, MS p. 122.


29. Voegelin, Israel and Revelation, xiv. For the express statement that transcendence is the “decisive problem of philosophy” see Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik (Munich, 1966), 36, 46-48; the first page references a line in Voegelin’s letter to Alfred Schutz of September 17-20, 1943, which Voegelin invites Strauss to get from Schutz and read if he is interested and Strauss, then, reads and reacts to (Letters 10 and 11, in Emberley and Cooper).


31. Voegelin to Strauss, February 21, 1951, Letter 35, in Emberley and Cooper. It should be noted that, as early as 1957, Voegelin flatly stated regarding the meaning of Nous: “...even in Aristotle it still has an amplitude of meaning from intellection to faith” (Order and History, II, 208).

32. Strauss to Voegelin on February 25, 1951, Letter 36 in Emberley and Cooper. The primacy of law in Strauss’s thought and its medieval roots are carefully explored in Hillel Fradkin, “Philosophy and Law: Leo
34. Voegelin to Strauss on April 22, 1951, Letter 37 in Emberley and Cooper.
35. Strauss to Voegelin on June 4, 1951, Letter 38 in Emberley and Cooper. For “mere historical” see Letter 34.
38. Steven B. Smith, “Leo Strauss: Between Athens and Jerusalem,” Review of Politics, LIII (Winter 1991), 75-99 at 78. The early book by Strauss was the study of Spinoza’s Tractatus written in 1925-1928 and published as Die Religionskritik Spinozas als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft: Untersuchungen zu Spinozas Theologisch-Politischem Traktat (Berlin, 1930; English translation 1965). As he remarks to Voegelin, “Hula was telling me that you are interested in Arabic political philosophy. That was once my specialty” (February 20, 1943, Letter 7). Strauss recurs to a comparison by Voegelin of Averroes with Husserl’s treatment of Aristotle’s De Anima, Bk. III, and to his medieval studies, including Maimonides and his “Essay on the Law of the Cuzari” on October 11, 1943, Letter 11.
43. Ibid., 27-28.
44. The Decisive Treatise, 6.17-21, ibid., 49, cf. p. 92. In this work the judge and philosopher Averroes defends philosophy on the basis of Law, which is to say politically. Thus, “If teleological study of the world is philosophy, and if the Law commands such a study, then the Law commands philosophy,” a sentence that stands as the summary of Chapter One, ibid., 44; cf. p. 83n7.
45. Ibid., 92.
46. Hourani, Averroes, 106.
50. Ibid., 512.
51. Ibid., 514-516.