AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY IN JEWISH LEADERSHIP: THE CASE OF LUCIEN WOLF (1857-1930)

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The traditional leadership of Anglo-Jewry came increasingly into question in the early 1900s. A burgeoning agenda associated with an influx of East European immigrants and a rising tide of anti-Semitism provided ammunition for Zionists and workers' organizations to mount a challenge to its hegemony. The challenge was sharpest in the area of foreign affairs where the part-time amateur conduct of a self-selecting, self-perpetuating oligarchy in the Conjoint Foreign Committee appeared most keenly out of touch, out of date, and lacking in democratic accountability.

The challenge was met and defeated, less, however, on account of the old order's adaptability and more due to its good fortune in acquiring the services of the foreign affairs expert, Lucien Wolf. His expertise, however, ensured for himself an indispensable niche within the Anglo-Jewish establishment and a hegemony in the field of Anglo-Jewish foreign affairs which despite serious challenge was upheld and ultimately consolidated. As foreign affairs secretary to the Conjoint Foreign Committee, a post specifically designed for him, Wolf became the critical exponent of Jewish minority rights, both at the Paris Peace Conference and at the League of Nations.

The Background

The transformation of European Jewry which the twin processes of emancipation and social integration heralded, also posed problematic questions about the nature and exercise of authority in diaspora Jewish life. Whereas, according to the pre-emancipation model, authority had been vested in a rabbinic and lay leadership whose legitimacy to run a community's affairs was conferred and confirmed through statute or charter supplied by the sovereign state, the abolition of corporate self-management, which emancipation implied, divested them of any such state-sponsorship.

On the continent, in Germany and France, a continuity of authority and legitimacy was, in part, assured by the state's need for communal

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taxation and, in part, the need to define and control the Jewish element of its population. Britain, by contrast, since the readmission of Jews in 1656, had no political, fiscal, or legal framework of this sort. Jews were not required to register qua Jews, and as such, Anglo-Jewry was in effect an amalgam of individuals who had chosen, like any other religious denomination outside of the established Church of England, to voluntarily join together for religious and related purposes.

If, then, there was no obvious basis for authority in Anglo-Jewish life, not even an officially recognized chief rabbinate, the community did, nevertheless, in the late eighteenth and more particularly the mid-nineteenth centuries, establish a series of institutions which reflected its growing political, religious and social welfare agendas: notably, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the United Synagogue and Board of Guardians. These were, however, almost exclusively controlled and managed by a tiny tier of closely interrelated, metropolitan-based families. V.D. Lipman has estimated that no more than 200 households were involved in this “Cousinhood,” who also had in common a background associated with banking or related mercantile activity. Authority, in other words, was vested in a tightly knit aristocracy of wealth, which ran the community’s institutions literally as a private domain. Nor was their legitimacy to do so questioned. Rather, as a microcosm of the wider Victorian political and social scene, this Jewish elite’s assumed right to rule was matched by its constituency’s willingness to defer to what they took to be a form of no-blesse oblige.

If the Cousinhood’s plutocratic, hereditary and paternalistic management of Anglo-Jewish institutions tells us as much about its accommodation to British social and political norms as anything peculiarly Jewish, there was, however, a dynamic involved which had more than simply domestic consequences for issues of authority and legitimacy. Mid- and late Victorian Britain was also reaching the zenith of its commercial and, later, imperial power, a trajectory which led the Cousinhood to aspire to a role, specifically as British Jews, on the wider world stage. Shtadianut, the concept of Jews interceding on behalf of other Jews, was, of course, nothing new, and in the venerable Sir Moses Montefiore, Victorian Anglo-Jewry had a high-profile exponent of this tradition in the foreign domain. However, the Anglo-Jewish Association, founded in 1871, sought to protect and foster Jewish rights abroad on an entirely novel basis. In the wake of a domestic emancipation in which Jewish rights had been argued for not as a sectarian interest but as part of the wider cause of liberalism, the Association conceived of a British foreign policy which was an extension of this principle and, therefore, had the same interests as itself. When at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, it was able to petition, and ostensibly achieve, through the British foreign minister, guarantees for Jewish
civil and political rights in newly recognized Balkan states, not only was its analysis apparently confirmed but also its modus operandi.3 Armed with a method for making world Jewry citizens on the British model and stimulated by the success of its actions in the international arena, the Association sought to concretise its achievement by proposing, to the senior and technically more representative Board of Deputies, the formation of a permanent foreign affairs body. The resulting arrangement between the two organizations in the form of the Conjoint Foreign Committee of British Jews4 not only provided for an official Anglo-Jewish mouthpiece on foreign affairs but also the apex of the Cousinhood’s institutional monopoly.

The paradox, of course, was that this crowning glory was realized in a period when the gains and certainties of the emancipation era were being jeopardized by new political and social developments. The questioning of laissez-faire liberalism and the rise of a militant mass democracy in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain coincided not simply with an impasse on the Jewish foreign affairs front, but with the real prospect that the emancipatory vision would be forced into head-long retreat. The failure of the Great Powers to have the Berlin protocols implemented in relation to Romania was thus only part of a wider political and economic crisis affecting Eastern Jewry which, amongst other things, led to an accelerating rate of immigration to Britain and the West. The inability of the Conjoint Foreign Committee, or other Anglo-Jewish institutions, to do anything about this influx certainly helped foster a new domestic opposition which increasingly challenged both its policy and organization.5 More seriously, a growing politicization of its purported constituency in Eastern Europe itself,6 implicitly undermined the logic of having wealthy Western intercessionaries act on their behalf, while the direction that this politicization took, towards socialism, Zionism or a mixture of the two, represented a rejection of its emancipatory ground rules.

The challenge to the Conjoint’s leadership, which all this implied, only finally came to a head in June 1917 when it found itself publicly arraigned at the Board of Deputies for attempting to sabotage the closing gap between the British government and the Zionist movement, represented, at this juncture, in the person of Chaim Weizmann. The causes and consequences of this dénouement, leading amongst other things to the dissolution of the Conjoint, have been fully scrutinized and interpreted in Stuart Cohen’s English Zionists and British Jews7 and do not directly concern us here. However, the opprobrium particularly reserved for Lucien Wolf, the director of the Conjoint Foreign Committee and Weizmann’s chief opponent, does concern us, as it is his role as a Jewish leader that this article wishes to examine.
If, moreover, according to the conventional wisdom, the Board censure marked a “Zionist revolution” in communal affairs, it also, in Simon Schama’s words, consigned Wolf and his committee “to the dismal oblivion reserved for losing sides.” Wolf’s leadership role was thus more or less written out of modern Jewish history and where it did appear at all it was often with wholly negative connotations. Wrote Isaiah Friedman in The Question of Palestine: “Wolf’s intellectual abilities were outweighed by serious shortcomings in public life. Conceited and suspicious he failed to inspire confidence. Search for a compromise was not his habit...equally self-defeating was his opposition to Zionism.”

Yet this sort of blanket character assassination is unfortunate on two important scores. Firstly it obscures the true chronology of the “Zionist revolution.” If the Board of Deputies vote marked a major watershed in this process we then have to ask why Wolf’s leadership, with certain provisos, was in fact consolidated and strengthened as a result, the culmination of his communal career coming two years later, at the Peace Paris Conference. More importantly, by focusing exclusively on that part of his biography associated with his opposition to Zionism, this historiography omits to ask key questions about the exact nature of Wolf’s relationship to his Anglo-Jewish and wider Jewish constituency, to say nothing of his actual foreign policy procedures, strategies and goals.

This article’s starting point, therefore, is to propose that Wolf is a highly significant Anglo-Jewish figure, whose communal career spanning the period of the early 1880s to 1930, may, in its totality, tell us much about the problems associated with pre-state Jewish leadership. This does not mean, however, that Wolf can be easily pigeon-holed. On the contrary, the considerable range of political options he considered and postures he adopted suggests a career which could well have taken him in a variety of quite distinct directions. However, in exploring some of the motivations and circumstances which ultimately propelled him to the position of shadow foreign secretary and indeed his tenacity for survival in that position until his death in 1930, we may nevertheless be able to arrive at some comparative insights on the role and efficacy of Jewish leadership in this period.

In Search of a Role

Wolf’s communal involvements suggest three, albeit overlapping, phases. In the first, from the early 1880s to around 1896, communal politics was largely peripheral to his activities, though not necessarily vision. In the second, ranging through the following decade, Wolf was often associated with political projects at odds with the conventional
wisdom of the communal establishment. In the third, from around 1906, his ascendency and finally hegemony in Anglo-Jewish foreign affairs was consolidated and, despite challenge, upheld.

This indirect route to the top may itself be an indicator both of Wolf’s social position in the community and the seen and unseen obstacles to the emergence of a genuine meritocracy. For instance, far from being a product of the old Anglo-Jewish peerage, as Weizmann mistakenly believed, 10 Wolf came from a Central European business family. His father, Edward Wolf, had only recently arrived in London in 1857, a Moravian Jewish political refugee from the ill-fated revolutions of 1848, when Lucien was born. This in itself did not disadvantage his educational or occupational advancement. The family was moderately comfortable and well connected, the young Wolf receiving a thoroughly cosmopolitan, language-orientated, education in Paris and Brussels. 11 This in turn was to be a substantial asset in Wolf’s subsequent and highly specialized journalistic career. From the outset, however, Wolf’s social and economic position vis-a-vis the tightly interrelated plutocracy at the metropolitan center of Anglo-Jewry, while close, excluded him from full communal participation.

In this Wolf was not alone. Privilege ensured that contemporaries from the Cousinhood of Goldsmids, Cohens, Rothschilds and Montefiores, would naturally progress into already well-defined roles as chairpersons and committee members of the various communal institutions. However, by the end of the Victorian era there is evidence that a new tier of highly acculturated, educated professionals, literati and businessmen were articulating considerable frustration with this monopoly. The group included Joseph Prag, Israel Zangwill, Herbert Bentwich, Leopold Greenberg and Joseph Cowen. Contemporaries or near-contemporaries of Wolf and often like him the sons of continental immigrants, these were to be, over the forthcoming key decades, by degrees, Wolf’s associates, colleagues and sparring partners in both old and new variants of Anglo-Jewish politics. 12

This does not necessarily mean that any of them rejected the basic liberal integrationist premise of Victorian Anglo-Jewish life nor the essentially optimistic values which went with it. 13 Their exclusion from the political center, moreover, concentrated their relatively youthful energies on the creation of cultural and literary innovations which up to this point had been notable by their absence from the Anglo-Jewish scene. Wolf was well to the fore in this process, being closely associated with the debating club, the Maccabees, the Union of Jewish Literary Societies, and above all the Jewish Historical Society of England which he co-founded in 1893, with Israel Abrahams, another figure marginal to the communal establishment. It may be overdoing an argument to suggest that this involvement was entirely due to the blocking off of other institutional options. Wolf did have a
political voice of sorts, on the Board of Deputies and as a member of the Anglo-Jewish Association. On the other hand, it is of note how long it took for his particular expertise in the foreign affairs field to be fully welcomed by the communal establishment, especially at a time when its need was becoming both apparent and critically urgent.

This expertise was developed in Wolf’s full-time professional career as a diplomatic correspondent. Initially writing for the *Jewish World* from 1873 onwards, Wolf had by the mid-1890s moved purposefully into the national and international arena, writing regular articles for *Le Journal* of Paris, the *Fortnightly Review* and the *Daily Graphic*. Assiduously cultivating contacts in the Foreign Office, London embassies and Reuters, the decade saw Wolf build up a formidable reputation as the expert on the behind-the-scenes maneuvers in the European chancelleries. In this capacity his influence often went beyond mere journalism. As “Diplomaticus” for the *Fortnightly Review* he was later to be described by a French diplomat as spokesman for the then-Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury.14 His articles in the *Daily Graphic*, later under the title of “Foreign Office Bag,” were said to be read by the kaiser. It was Wolf’s own frequent conceit, borne out in fact by archival evidence, that on more than one occasion, he instigated rather than simply observed foreign policy.15

Despite this background, there is no record of a Wolf relationship to the Conjoint Foreign Committee, save for a brief period in 1889, until 1902.16 It may be that he did not desire it or that his commitments as a journalist prevented it. Wolf’s correspondence and diaries suggest the opposite, however; that his appetite for more direct involvement in the world of diplomacy had simply been whetted through journalism.17 In 1917 he went so far as to petition the Foreign Office for a full-time post.18 Given Wolf’s commitment and record of service to Anglo-Jewry, the only natural communal outlet for his talents was the Conjoint. The fact is that the route there was circumlocutory. Even after 1902, when Wolf was brought in to draft letters to the Foreign Office on the Romanian Jewish persecution,19 following a large influx of Jews from Romania into Britain, his relationship to it remained highly irregular, it taking another 16 years, a communal bust-up and a subsequent reformulation of the committee to fully clarify his paid, permanent position within it.

Various factors may be of note here. The first is that in the early 1900s, without any financial base or hence secretariat, it was considered inconceivable that Wolf, or anybody else, might work for the Conjoint in a full-time paid capacity. The committee, like all other Anglo-Jewish institutions, was run by well-meaning amateurs. It was in this respect a microcosm of the wider British scene, where MPs, at least until the new-fangled emoluments post-1911, were assumed to discharge their public responsibilities on the basis of private means.
Secondly, the actual composition of the committee reinforced this reality. Fourteen individuals, seven each from the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association, an unusual arrangement renewed by an annual treaty, the Conjoint remained at the turn of the century the most glaringly obvious communal case of plutocratic hegemony. Individuals outside this immediate charmed circle might be invited in for consultation. Wolf, Bentwich and Isidore Spielmann were together attendant at a meeting on the Romanian question in January 1903. But this only underscored the self-perpetuating exclusivity of a committee whose essential modus operandi was not directly through the Foreign Office at all but rather through knowing, (preferably through having been to the right public school with) and getting the ear of, people with connections: government ministers, their wives, titled ladies and gentlemen, the sort of person one might encounter at court, London clubs, or country shoot parties. Action on behalf of Romanian or Russian Jews was thus dependent on a tiny strata of British Jews being part of the right set, in colloquial parlance, a matter of “not what you know but who you know.” This informal, unofficial networking had no particular need for the likes of a Wolf so long as it could be shown to be efficacious. In the 1880s and 1890s this may well have been the case. Nor was Wolf himself necessarily at odds with its utility. He himself used it with alacrity in later emergencies, Leopold de Rothschild being, via the Court, his main back-door intermediary.

The problem was that the new crisis conditions which buffeted European Jewry in the new century seemed to make rather a mockery of polite pressure group politicking. For Wolf and his peer group, potential discord thus lay not in the essential aims of Conjoint policy. All were agreed on the necessity for Jewish emancipation in the Russian empire and Romania and even more so on the requirement to prevent a full-scale influx of Jews into Britain from those parts. Similarly, the essential consensus of Jewish and British interests at home and abroad, and which Wolf had done so much to foster in the Jewish Historical Society, was not in dispute. The issue, rather, was whether some other more practical and effective response to the crisis, most particularly engendered by the “alien invasion,” could be found. And if the traditional leadership of the community was not going to “lead” in this direction, the “new men” would have to take it upon themselves to do so. In practice, it took Wolf, at least initially, down the same path as the others — Zionism or some variant of it.

It is not difficult to see why, on a personal level, Herzl’s program, placed before the Maccabees in 1895 and 1896, appealed to Wolf. Not only was it, in his words, a perfectly “practicable” proposition, but the emphasis on getting British diplomatic assistance seemed to demand an intermediary role which Wolf would certainly have wished to provide. In fact his enthusiasm was rather short-lived. Possibly
jockeyed out of position vis-a-vis Herzl by Leopold Greenberg, another ambitious Jewish newspaper man who from 1907 was both publisher and editor of the *Jewish Chronicle*, Wolf soon decided that the nationalist creed was not only seriously flawed but highly dangerous. Appalled in particular by statements emanating from Max Nordau and Zionei Zionists at the Sixth Zionist Congress in 1903, on the unassimilability of all, including emancipated Western Jews, Wolf used his journalist position to publicly pronounce anathema upon the movement.23

His outburst won him applause from an establishment which had held Herzl at arms length from the outset. In so doing it gave Wolf his first big opportunity, a commission, in 1903, from the Anglo-Jewish Association, in cooperation with ICA — the Jewish Colonization Association — to travel to Russia as their emissary to the Interior Minister, von Plehve, and persuade him of the advantages of Jewish settlement in Manchuria, at a time when Russian foreign policy was tilting markedly eastwards.24 The assassination of Plehve and the Russo-Japanese War ruined that embryonic scheme. Nevertheless, having established close rapport with Claude Montefiore, the Association’s patrician president, and thereby co-chief of the Conjoint, Wolf had seemingly opened the door to communal patronage and potential participation.

With the immigration crisis still unresolved, however, Wolf’s next political venture again showed both his skepticism about the establishment’s abilities and his readiness, if necessary, to incur its displeasure. Returning to the Herzlian project in a slightly different guise, he cooperated in 1905 with Israel Zangwill in the formation of ITO, the Jewish Territorial Organization.25 ITO’s purported non-ideological intent was to pursue a mass Jewish colonization program anywhere in the empire the British government might wish to offer. In effect picking up the Uganda scheme, initially proffered to Herzl by the British Colonial Office, Wolf’s involvement not surprisingly caused outrage amongst British Zionists, particularly Greenberg and Cowen who accused him of undermining their platform and stealing their members.26 It also, however, caused consternation amongst Montefiore and others in the establishment who felt that Wolf’s failure to consult with them first challenged their hegemony in these matters and in particular the gradualist methods which they sponsored through ICA.27

If Wolf by 1905, therefore, had nailed his colors to the mast of anti-nationalism, setting him clearly apart from some of the key troublemakers, a non-conformist, independent streak ensured that his loyalty to the communal chiefs remained suspect. Not only had he, in ITO, aligned himself with the self-consciously maverick, avowedly nationalist Zangwill, but in his enthusiastic support in that year of the armed self-defense activities of the Russian Jewish Socialist Bund, in
the abortive Russian revolution, he invited the suspicion of more left-
ward leanings. Wolf's epistles on the Bund had come in the Russian
Correspondence, a weekly paper which he ran for the duration of the
revolution, receiving discreet establishment funding from, amongst
others, Lord Rothschild. This now came to an end, silencing the ven-
ture.28

All this suggested, however, that Wolf was too dangerous an indi-
vidual to have working against the establishment. Far better to har-
ness his journalistic skills and Foreign Office contacts in its favor. Ne-
cessity, moreover, seemed to demand this. The growing rapprochement
between Britain and Russia leading to an entente in 1907, suggested
that traditional expectations about an ongoing foreign policy consensus
between the Conjoint Committee and the British government were com-
ing to an end. Wolf was quite literally the only person in the commu-
nity who could halt the slide into oblivion. Failing that, his foreign
affairs journalism could be put to good use, fighting a camouflaged
rearguard action against the entente. From 1912 to the outbreak of war,
Darkest Russia, edited by Wolf and subsidized by ICA,29 provided an
informed focus for all dissenting voices, Jewish and non-Jewish, against
any political, commercial or military relationship with reactionary
tsarism.

At the Conjoint itself, Wolf, from around 1908 onwards, sought to
utilize the worsening international climate strategically. Ongoing
Balkan and other crises, and the flurry of diplomatic exchanges which
accompanied them, encouraged him to see in potential international
conferences which might ensue, a window of opportunity with which to
remind the Great Powers of their Romanian and other obligations.30
This marked a major new shift in the thinking of the Conjoint and in-
deep sister organizations on the continent such as the Alliance Israélite
Universelle and Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden who took Wolf's lead
— an acknowledgment that emancipation in Russia or Romania would
not, in all likelihood, be achieved in one hammer blow, but might ul-
timately arise by a series of considered, probing, diplomatic initia-
tives. If this became a hallmark of Wolf's leadership at the Conjoint,
so too was his insistence that it operate as an authentic shadow foreign
office, quite consciously imitating Whitehall's methods and proce-
dures.31

If Wolf's arrival at the Conjoint therefore implicitly represented a
new lease on life and professionalization of its workings, his actual re-
relationship to it, however, remained anything but professional. Un-
doubtedly as the European crisis intensified into one of near perma-
nence, so did Wolf's neo-consultancy role develop into an executive un-
dertaking. Indeed, well before the outbreak of war his control of the
operation had become so total that the committee acted as little more
than cypher for his proposals and directives. The domestic
implications of this ascendancy did not please everybody. Greenberg at the Jewish Chronicle charged that the man most responsible for its work was by dint of his working in an “honorary capacity...least amenable to either of the bodies that elect the committee.”

Greenberg’s comment was astute. There was a serious anomaly in Wolf’s position. As he had not been elected to the committee, he had no de jure standing on it. Rather, it had come about through a private arrangement, his co-option coming at the instance of the Conjoint’s official chiefs, Claude Montefiore, for the Association, his co-president David Alexander, for the Board, and the venerable Leopold de Rothschild, in his role as vice-president for both parent bodies. The ability of this “inner camarilla” to act thus, clearly demonstrated the continuing hold of patronage and traditional authority within Anglo-Jewry. On the other hand, at a time when this authority was being vociferously challenged, the Conjoint itself being a particular target of attack, it could not help but expose the extreme fragility of Wolf’s new-found mandate.

Underlying and underscoring this weakness, however, was a fundamental issue of financial and administrative provision. Wolf was being asked to act in an extraordinary role for the community. Yet in order to accomplish this, he remained dependent on his salary and fees as a journalist. In other words, work on the Conjoint could only be pursued in a part-time, secondary capacity. There was a further paradox here. Wolf’s special usefulness had come through his professional experience and in particular his ability, in that capacity, to prise open the corridors of power. Yet his ascendancy at the Conjoint came at the very time when as a result of his journalistic work this was on the wane.

The Anglo-Russian entente had translated Wolf, almost overnight, into a sharp and sometimes vitriolic opponent of British foreign policy. He could hardly therefore expect the Foreign Office, in response, to make a distinction between his day-time attacks on the foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and his night-time supplications on behalf of his committee. The ensuing obstacles placed in Wolf’s path to the Foreign Office door highlighted the wider dilemma of what a specifically Anglo-Jewish foreign policy could achieve, when at variance with that of the British government.

Ironically, Wolf’s unsatisfactory working relationship to the committee was unexpectedly, in part, resolved by this very conundrum. The outbreak of war in August 1914 and the climate of jingoist xenophobia which accompanied it marked out peacetime detractors of the entente and those with alleged Germanophile tendencies as targets for attack. The Jewish community as a whole came under suspicion, while Wolf in person found himself hounded to the point where his journalistic commitments were unedifyingly terminated. Given that the turn of
international events, however, now demanded that the Conjoint should actively prepare itself for the presentation of the Jewish question at the inevitable peace conference, Wolf's expertise was still very much in demand. In January 1915, he was appointed as full-time, paid director of the Conjoint Foreign Committee.37

In Search of a Constituency

The new wartime organization of the committee represented a recognition by the communal chiefs that a proper and effective pursuit of their aims required a secretariat. Wolf's promotion, in this sense, marked a major new stage in its professionalization. However, the manner in which this took place, again by private consultation between Wolf himself and the "inner camarilla," simply posed its peacetime problems in starker form.

Was Wolf a civil servant doing the bidding of a communal body, or was he in fact its executive director disguised in bureaucratic clothing? To whom were his actions on behalf of the committee accountable? Whom, moreover, did Anglo-Jewish foreign policy represent: British Jews, all Jews living in Britain including the sizeable proportion who as yet remained unnaturalized, not to mention those now classed as enemy aliens, or Jews in foreign countries on behalf of whom the committee petitioned the British government?

While the Conjoint's day-to-day running was not rendered inoperable by these core issues, the tensions associated with them remained serious and only partially resolved. Thus the legitimacy of the committee, and therefore Wolf's actions within it, rested on it being "the only responsible body authorized by the Jewish community to represent Jewish interests in regard to His Majesty's Government."38 Yet this very formulation, proffered by Wolf to a senior Foreign Office member in December 1914, invited further speculation. As the Haham, Moses Gaster, a Zionist and inveterate communal troublemaker, noted in an important debate at the Anglo-Jewish Association in April 1916, there were some 10 million Jews outside Britain as compared with only 250,000 in it. The Conjoint, therefore, being "charged with seeing that justice was done to Jews throughout the world...had to consider what suited them not as English Jews but what suited the great majority....They could not view those questions solely from the point of view of English predilections."39

Gaster clearly had a point. However, to go "national," as he was proposing, would have been to dismantle the whole ideological edifice upon which the Conjoint had been built, to deny in effect that there was any special reason why the Conjoint should represent Jewish interests to the government, specifically as British Jews. But if the
committee publicly stated that there existed a contradiction between Jewish and British interests, not only would that entail winding up its operation, but leaving the field to those like Gaster who, thought Wolf, were liable "to do all sorts of imprudent and compromising things."  

Wolf's pragmatic response to this implicit challenge was, on the one hand, to keep interference from the outside to an absolute minimum, while, on the other, making a tentative bridge to a wider spectrum of Anglo-Jewish and immigrant opinion just sufficient to dampen the arguments of the communal critics. Simultaneously, Wolf attempted to steal some of the critics' thunder by, unsolicited, pursuing elements of their programs directly with the Foreign Office.

If these tactics sat rather uneasily together, highlighting the inherent weakness of Wolf's position, the fact that by 1918 his authority of the foreign affairs portfolio had been fully confirmed suggests either that they were quite sufficient to requirements or alternatively that the communal challenge was less severe than has been given credit. One might, for instance, wish to compare Wolf's complete latitude to speak on behalf of Anglo-Jewry at the Paris Peace Conference with that of Louis Marshall, the American Jewish patrician, whose independent voice formerly channeled through the American Jewish Committee was, in Paris, at least officially dictated by the requirements of a democratic, popularly elected and Zionist orientated American Jewish Congress.

Certainly, in Britain, neither the co-option of three additional Anglo-Jewish grandees to the Conjoint, nor two further representatives from East End friendly societies in 1916, suggested any significant break with the past, nor diminution of Wolf's authority. On the contrary, the wartime decision to hold its meetings in camera, on the justification that openness might jeopardize its negotiations with the Foreign Office, gave it immunity from either Board or Association accountability while giving Wolf carte blanche with which to pursue a highly distinctive and flexible policy completely outside of the communal gaze.

If this immunity certainly distanced Wolf from his wider, including immigrant, constituency, he nevertheless remained alert to the danger that others would seek to harness it for their own agendas. This accounts for Wolf's regular reminders to the Foreign Office that it was he, not the Zionists' Gaster, Greenberg, or Zangwill, who were entitled to speak for the community on foreign affairs. So, too, for his alarm at the emergence and initial dynamism of the grass-roots Workers League for Jewish Emancipation, founded in the East End in 1915, which, noted Wolf to Alexander, "is virtually intended to do the work of the Conjoint Committee." If the fear of usurpation was, therefore, one motivation behind Wolf's decision in the winter of 1915-1916 to attempt to
mobilize the immigrant constituency in the Conjoint’s favor, there was also an awareness that the Workers League might have a case. Proposing an enlargement of the committee which would secure for it “the confidence and support of all sections of the community,” Wolf wrote to Montefiore and Alexander as follows:

There is a large section of the Anglo-Jewish population who do not feel that they are represented by the Board of Deputies or the Anglo-Jewish Association or the Conjoint Committee. To them they seem to represent what they call the West End rather than the East End of Anglo-Jewry. The very personnel of the Conjoint Committee seem to confirm their view of it....The agitation of these bodies is not astonishing when it is remembered that they are for the most part composed of Russian and Polish Jews of recent immigration and of their children in the first generation who, through their own persons or through their near kindred in Eastern Europe, are in close and anxious touch with the deplorable conditions which will be affected by the negotiation of peace. These people are indirectly if not at all represented by the Conjoint Committee. It is not unnatural that they should wish to make their voices heard and that they should be a little doubtful as to whether their West End co-religionists, however eminent they may be, will be as deeply penetrated as they are with the gravity of the questions to be discussed or as fully alive to all the factors of the question.

The memorandum is revealing on a number of scores. The fact that it had to be written at all suggests the ongoing reluctance of Wolf’s communal superiors to come to terms with Anglo-Jewish realities of the day. That Wolf’s answer to the problem was to seek an understanding with the East End without Montefiore or Alexander’s prior knowledge or authorization suggests, moreover, that Wolf’s earlier reservations about the nature of communal authority had not been entirely extinguished.

Indeed, that Wolf chose Israel Zangwill as his interlocutor in these negotiations suggest a return to the 1905 ITO model, Wolf’s elevation to the presidency of the National Union of Jewish Rights, a newly formed East End organization, presenting his Conjoint chiefs with a fait accompli. Moreover, the National Union’s three point program, in calling for emancipation in Russia and Romania, national autonomy in Eastern Europe and Jewish colonization in Palestine, reflected his own emerging wartime agenda. The Conjoint chiefs, along with other communal figures, including leading Zionists, were duly invited to its public launch on 12 March 1916, where Wolf hoped to deliver a government declaration endorsing its Palestine goals.

Had it been, it might well have represented the apotheosis of a communal career. Based on a “formula” which, wearing his Conjoint
hat, Wolf had drafted for the Foreign Office, and which, leaving out its national elements, was not dissimilar to the final version of the Balfour Declaration, Wolf’s clear intention was to capture the Jewish grass-roots by pilfering a major element of the Zionist program. With the Zionists thus emasculated, the likelihood of an American-type Congress challenge scotched, and the two halves of the community united behind his personal leadership, Wolf could look forward to a triumphant consolidation of Anglo-Jewish foreign affairs.

The memorandum to the Conjoint chiefs reveals, however, the inherent limitations of this populist vision. The various East End organizations, said Wolf, would be invited to agree with the National Union program and elect two members from amongst them to participate in the Conjoint Committee.58 If this was Wolf’s idea of representation, it was clearly no more than a tokenry one. Given, moreover, that his intended Palestine coup was defeated by Foreign Office prevarication, the response of the groups involved in the National Union, with the exception of the friendly societies, was almost inevitable — a rejection of Wolf’s terms, and a demand that he should be accountable to them,59 not vice-versa. Wolf’s superficially bold attempt at bridging the gap between authority and legitimacy ended with accusation, recrimination and a new Union president, in the person of Gaster, who proceeded to take it down the road of his own nationalist inclinations.52

The whole episode was to have one further dramatic, if albeit delayed, reaction: the demise of the Conjoint Committee. The Palestine “formula” had been intended as a means to an end, a way, amongst other things, of avoiding the necessity of working with the Zionists in the community, and indeed a subterfuge by which the whole Zionist agenda could be by-passed in favor of the Conjoint’s primary Eastern European emancipatory focus. This intent became the subject of discussion, in communal political circles and on the pages of the Jewish Chronicle,53 at the same time as it was becoming clear that it was Weizmann who was by-passing the Conjoint and consolidating his own independent relationship with the Foreign Office. The tables had been turned and the Conjoint’s communal monopoly of the Foreign Office brought seriously into doubt. It drove Wolf and his communal chiefs into desperate and unilateral retaliatory action. Without fully consulting the committee, or either parent body, a statement to The Times questioning the wisdom of British government relations with Zionists or Zionism was drafted by Wolf and appeared in the paper on May 24, 1917.54

The famous Board of Deputies debate ensued, a motion of censure passed, and the Conjoint treaty between elected Board and elitist Association rescinded. Resignations followed, Wolf’s included. However, the communal “revolution,” did not materialize. Far from being
banished to the wings, Wolf was back in his job in months, this time as the officially appointed foreign secretary of a newly reconstituted Joint Foreign Committee.

A Mandate in Foreign Affairs?

The debacle at the Board ended Wolf's cursory efforts to be a leader in the populist mold. Henceforth, his communal activities were conducted almost wholly behind closed doors, with ever increasing success. The period after the demise of the Conjoint enabled him to develop, under the sole auspices of the Anglo-Jewish Association, a substantially new approach to foreign affairs, consequent on the foreseeable collapse of both the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. In turn this provided Wolf with the essential framework for his peace diplomacy in Paris, conducted on behalf of the Joint Foreign Committee.

This entailed almost daily negotiations with the relevant parties. Contact with the Foreign Office increased, reaching its culmination in the summer of 1919, where Wolf became sufficiently close to the British delegation representatives on the New States Committee for him to become a co-author of the Minorities Treaties. Concurrently, the recognition of new states by the victorious Allies, being made conditional on the acceptance of international obligations including guarantees pertaining to Jewish and other minorities, ensured that Wolf was sought out by their delegations as much as he sought them out. Wolf's negotiations with Polish leaders and the Rumanian opposition, with Greek premiers and White Russian delegates, with Paderewski, Zaleski, Take Jonescu, Venizelos, Count Sazonov and a host of lesser luminaries, attest both to his expertise in diplomacy and his ability to translate that expertise into a weighty factor on behalf of Jewish rights in the international arena.

For all this Wolf had been given a clear mandate by the Joint Foreign Committee. There was no longer an issue of looking over his shoulder at the communal stage, or of being constrained in the way Louis Marshall and Judge Mack found themselves on behalf of the American Jewish delegation in Paris. Nevertheless, the issue of mandate implicitly pertained. In particular, on what grounds could Wolf claim to negotiate on behalf of East European communities when his mandate came from a British Jewish committee? The issue was regularly raised in Paris by East European Jews, organized into a Comité des Delegations Juives. These representatives claimed a legitimacy based on democratic election in their native lands, which they took every opportunity to contrast with the self-appointed nature of "the grand dukes" in the Alliance and at the Joint Foreign Committee. Their message was in fact quite explicit. Not only were Wolf and his coterie
out of touch but their position, in terms of modern Jewish politics, was anachronistic and hence redundant.

This in itself raised quite serious problems for Wolf, forcing him into a series of lengthy negotiations for democratic union with the Comité, in which ultimately neither party was satisfied and which, as a by-product, delayed Wolf’s memorials, previously agreed with the Alliance, to the Peace Secretariat. He was, of course, perfectly aware of the importance of the Jews in Paris speaking to the Conference with one voice. The problem was that there was no one voice. Thus, the Comité des Delegations was primarily a Zionist body and its agenda, on the question of the Jewish national autonomy, maximalist in its approach. However, other delegations also began appearing in Paris whose desiderata were quite different. There was, for instance, an orthodox Polish Jewish delegation, which similarly claimed democratic election, as well as one from the “assimilationist” Circle of Polish-Jewish Patriots, who put forward a minimalist program which, they hoped, would meet the approval of the new Polish state. Wolf was fully alive to this lack of consensus and its implications for his role. As he had already acknowledged a year earlier to David Mowschowitch, his chief adviser on Polish and Russian affairs:

The difficulty is to obtain some authentic expression of the Polish Jews as a whole. If they wish us to stand out for national autonomy we will do so but if there are serious differences of opinion among them I am afraid we shall have to leave them to fight it out among themselves and limit ourselves to a demand for equal rights.

For Wolf to support national autonomy at all disturbed the traditional assumptions and inclinations of his own committee, not to mention its Polonizing or Russifying allies, most notably, in the latter case, Baron Gunzburg. Mowschowitch had already convinced Wolf in 1917 that the revolutionary process in Russia had given a major impetus to a democratic autonomist movement and that Gunzburg-style assimilationism now only represented the political aspirations of a displaced plutocracy. Interestingly, Wolf understood and accepted this analysis, leading him to more or less dispense with the services of Reuben Blank, Gunzburg and the Petrograd community’s appointed Russian Jewish emissary to the West, in favor of the younger and considerably more radical Mowschowitch.

To Mowschowitch’s influence can perhaps be traced some of Wolf’s more determined openings to left of center forces on the East European scene and his impassioned 1918 memorandum, primarily directed at his communal chiefs, on the centrality of Yiddish in the Eastern European milieu, which “cannot be altered in the least by the disapproval of foreign Jewish communities whose historical, social and political lines have fallen in pleasanter places.” If this essentially positive view of
Eastern European Jewry contrasts markedly with some of Wolf’s negative statements on immigrant Jewry in Britain, suggesting a complex amalgam of attitudes, it nevertheless holds that whomever Wolf was consulting for information and advice, ultimate Joint Foreign Committee decision-making at the Peace Conference remained firmly in his own hands.

This monopoly surely illustrates a critical tension between authority and legitimacy in pre-state Jewish leadership. All the Eastern European Jewish delegations, regardless of whether their individual agendas were legitimate or not, were too far removed from center-stage of the Peace Conference to have any real impact on it. Even had they been closer, the evidence suggests they would have continued to make unrealistic demands reflecting their lack of cognizance of the art of diplomacy and its relationship to international power politics. This reality thereby not only threw the championship of Jewish rights in Paris back firmly into the court of Wolf and his American Jewish colleagues, Louis Marshall and Judge Mack — who had the ear of President Wilson — but conferred on them a disproportionately onerous responsibility to get it right.

In terms of legitimacy, the Americans’ albeit fractious association with the Comité des Delegations gave them a somewhat broader base than Wolf to act out this championship role. Consistent, too, to their American Jewish Congress mandate, they persisted to urge national autonomy to the New States Committee long after it had been excluded from the terms of reference of the Peace Conference. Wolf, by contrast, seems to have ensured a more successful partnership with the Peace Conference makers by seemingly abandoning this most contentious element in the East European Jewish desiderata, suggesting, it might be argued, both a dereliction of duty and indeed the bankruptcy of his credentials as a Jewish leader. However, the evidence does not point to this conclusion. Wolf, for instance, continued to support the basic principles of minority rights but, recognizing the adamant opposition of the Big Three to the term “national autonomy,” struggled for them under the banner of cultural and educational rights. Certainly, he did not achieve all that he set out to do, but as A.J.P. Taylor has cogently noted: “Agreement by diplomacy implies compromise and compromise implies that you will get less than you think right. The alternative, however, is not to reach agreement, that is, to get nothing at all.”

It was the recognition of this reality which set Wolf apart from the other Jewish leaders in Paris, enabling him to work with the Conference along the lines of its own agenda rather than attempting to hijack it. Wolf’s special qualities of leadership, in other words, rested, in part, on his awareness of the limitations of the Jewish position and in his exploitation of the diplomatic tool in order to maximize his bargaining position in favor of the best deal available. Moreover, he did
this neither to perpetuate his own authority nor in order to turn Eastern Jews into long-term supplicants to Western Jewish organizations. The Russian Revolution in 1917 had encouraged him to predict that a much strengthened Russian Jewry would take the initiative on behalf of Romanian and Polish Jewish rights, enabling the Joint Foreign Committee to wind down its operation.74 The same long-term strategy seems clear from his consistent focus in Paris on the inclusion of a clause in the Minorities Treaties which would enable Jewish communities in the new states to appeal directly to the International Court of Justice, set up under the auspices of the League of Nations, in cases of treaty violations.75

These aspirations were frustrated both by events in Russia following the Bolshevik coup and the failure of the Peace Conference to properly implement the guarantee of direct minorities access to the League. Certainly, after the Minorities Treaties were enacted there could be no exact replication of the post-1878 situation in which Eastern European Jewish rights could only be effectively defended by their Western co-religionists. On the other hand, the ultimate paradox of Wolf’s post-Paris foreign affairs career is that its continuation was determined by this crucial omission from the Minorities Treaties. From 1919 to his death in 1930, the struggle for the protection and preservation of the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe in the international arena, including the struggle for the right of appeal, was conducted primarily by Wolf at the League Council meetings in Geneva.76 His aspirations for the ultimate redundancy of himself and his committee thus collapsed under the weight of increasing treaty infractions and the corresponding need for a permanent and professional secretariat which was adroit, capable and diplomatic in the defense of Jewish rights.

Conclusion

Bureaucracies have a habit of appearing as remote, onerous bodies, out of touch with, and disinterested in, the constituencies which they are intended to serve. This sense of detachment is often at its most extreme in the field of foreign affairs where usually elite hereditary castes entrust to themselves the management of the “national interest.” In theory, these tensions should be obviated or entirely removed in democratic societies by the provision of elected representatives who are responsible for the legislative and executive functions. Legitimate, open and accountable government is predicated on the notion that decision-making rests with this group, while the role of the administrative class is to carry out its decisions.
Authority and Legitimacy in Jewish Leadership

In practice, government rarely follows such clear demarcation lines. In Anglo-Jewish government at the turn of century it was further complicated by two important factors, in part replicating the situation on the wider British scene. Firstly, it was very far from being democratic. Synagogal election through the Board of Deputies disguised both the oligarchic nature of local caucuses and the overwhelming centralization of the Board's offices in the hands of a London-based, family-interrelated, aristocracy of wealth. Most of the immigrant community, being unattached to the established synagogal framework, remained excluded. In the field of foreign affairs, moreover, the issue of democratic accountability was further exacerbated by the fact that the Board shared responsibility with the non-elected and thoroughly patrician Anglo-Jewish Association. If the resultant Conjoint Foreign Committee spoke with authority, it was neither because of its accountability nor its legitimacy.

Secondly, this essentially amateur, part-time, laissez-faire governance hardly had administrative support. Paradoxically, this had the effect of its making those who were available in a professional capacity rather powerful. This was particularly the case at the Conjoint Committee once it became apparent, with the amount of paperwork engendered by ongoing crises and the specialization required in order to effect a convincing response, that this would defeat any amateur, however well-meaning. Wolf's resultant concentration of power came, as we have suggested, by default rather than by design. This indeed was part of the problem. There was no defined "career structure" in which he could legitimately become foreign secretary to Anglo-Jewry. Even had he been able to do so, the pre-1917 blur between his role as a bureaucrat and his executive directorship would not have been obviously resolvable.

This issue was brought into sharp relief by the events leading up to the Board of Deputies vote of censure against the Conjoint Committee on June 17, 1917, a vote as much about the conduct as the content of Anglo-Jewish foreign affairs. Yet, if it represented the best chance for the critics to do away with Wolf and the discredited system within which he operated, and replace both with something and somebody more responsive to the purported needs of the community, the question must be asked why they opted for an almost complete return to the status quo ante. Indeed, as we have noted elsewhere, Wolf's foreign affairs hegemony was ultimately confirmed and greatly strengthened by the episode.

The answer is that the objectors had no genuine alternative. As Joseph Prag, a former Conjoint Committee member, though one who had dissented from its statement on Palestine, had cogently noted at a Board meeting in autumn 1917, it would lead to those with experience in Jewish foreign affairs being overruled by those with none.
Certainly, the community could have chosen to circumvent the issue altogether by dispensing with diplomacy and concentrating on a much more open approach to foreign affairs in the form of public meetings, protest marches and petitions. This, indeed, was the preference of many grass-roots activists in the National Union for Jewish Rights and the Workers League for Jewish Emancipation. Putting aside the reticence of communal leaders, both establishment and in opposition, to be seen by wider British society to be doing anything which might be construed as radical or subversive, the problem, however, remained as to how effective such an approach, on its own, could be. Wolf, after all, in 1916 had attempted to put himself at the head of this tendency, not in opposition to diplomacy but in order to provide a ready-made constituency for it. In effect, he was, on a more limited scale, treading exactly the same path as Herzl had done in his efforts to marry a grass-roots base, in the form of the World Zionist Organization, of which he was president, with his intention to resolve the Jewish question through high-level political negotiation.

The parallel with Herzl deserves a little further attention. Both were among a new breed of journalists operating on the widest European stage who recognized the ways, mass newspaper circulation being one of them, by which ordinary people could be mobilized to influence those in power. Zionist and non-Zionist alike, Wolf and Herzl were similarly part of a new category of modern Jew who were able to project the confidence they had imbued from their occupational roles in the non-Jewish world into agendas and programs for the resolution of the specifically Jewish question. In this they saw for themselves leading roles. In this, too, they had to reckon with the displeasure or downright opposition of traditional leaderships. Herzl, through his charisma and presence, resolved the problem by creating his own alternative leadership. Wolf, perhaps lacking the self-assurance of Herzl or his own maverick friend, Zangwill, opted instead for the role of eminence grise within the communal establishment. Temperament and persuasion surely played their part in this development as perhaps too did the realization that it was in this role that he could fulfill his ultimate ambition to play at diplomacy.

The great paradox of the situation is that the international diplomatic arena provided the exact context in which a Wolf, a Herzl, a Zangwill or a Weizmann could play this game. In an age when the collective power of Jewry was believed in and exaggerated beyond all reason, the opportunities for those with sufficient chutzpah, insight or both, were correspondingly great. The need for diplomacy and the diplomatist were, therefore, recognized and respected by Zionist and non-Zionist alike. Nor, when successful, was its method disputed. Wolf's wartime conduct in the pursuit of an all-embracing Jewish foreign policy was, after all, little different from that employed by his
arch-competitor, Weizmann, in the pursuit of Zionism. Both were intent on working outside of the communal gaze or clamor, Weizmann's dislike of "interference from people who act like amateurs and who, not thoroughly conversant with the situation, may do a great deal of harm," voicing accurately Wolf's own sentiments on the subject. Potentially indeed, the two made rather good partners, Weizmann's early wartime canvassing of Wolf suggesting that he recognized that access to the Foreign Office might be best achieved through the latter's auspices. Ideology, not method, wrecked this convergence; the national elements in Zionism, in part, precipitating Wolf on his unilateral course to achieve Palestine for the British before Weizmann could set his foot firmly in the Foreign Office door. If Wolf's defeat marked him down for approbation and the questioning of his mandate, Weizmann's success ensured that the methods by which he gained it, combined with his disregard for the need for a mandate, would not be too closely scrutinized.

Wolf's defeat over Zionism, however, should not obscure the success of his overall diplomatic track record. It was a record which enabled Anglo-Jewish foreign affairs to survive the contradiction between its loyalty to Britain and its implicit opposition to a British policy aligned to tsarist Russia, which, in the upshot, led to a highly successful defense of Jewish rights at the Paris Peace Conference. The communal critics might object to the person of Lucien Wolf, to the backstairs maneuvers which brought him to office, and indeed to the backstairs maneuvers he conducted in office. What they could not object to was the need for a resourceful diplomacy on behalf of Eastern Jewry. That need provided the community with a consultant expert who became a full-time professional, and a policy in foreign affairs which for more than twenty years represented a highly distinctive and very individual facet of the Anglo-Jewish scene.

Notes


3. On the AJA, see Eugene Black, The Social Politics of Anglo-Jewry 1880-1920 (Oxford, 1988), pp. 44-50. The AJA was not alone at Berlin but cooperated with other Western Jewish organisations. What was not, however, officially acknowledged, was that behind-the-scenes maneuvers, particularly by the German Jewish financier, Gerson Bleichröder, played a not inconsiderable role in the achievement of the guarantees. See Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the German Empire (London, 1977), pp. 351-93.

4. See YIVO, New York, Mowschowitch Collection, (hereafter MWS), 23534-42, David Mowschowitch, the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association, 7 September 1943.


11. For Wolf’s family background and additional biographical details, see the introductory essays in Cecil Roth, ed., Essays in Jewish History (London, 1934).

12. On social background and attitudes to communal establishment of some of this group, see Cohen, English Zionists, pp. 64-70.


19. CJC Minutes Book, 1 December 1902.

20. Ibid., 11 January 1903.

21. See, for example, CJC Minutes, 7 June 1910.


25. See ITO Manifesto and Correspondence, Pamphlet No. 1, (London, 1905).

26. See Jewish Chronicle, 22 April and 4 May 1904, reporting Cowen EZF speech, 28 April 1906.

27. For ITO-ICA relations, see Cohen, English Zionists, pp. 100-102.

28. For Wolf’s Bundist leanings and his activities on their behalf, see House of Lords, London, David Soskice papers, Wo1-13 and Zosa Szajkowski, “Nathan, Wolf, Schiff and the Jewish Revolutionary Movement in Eastern Europe 1903-1917,” Jewish Social Studies, 29 (1967): 3-26, 75-91; MWS 3518, Wolf to Lord Rothschild, 23 February 1906, on the suspension of the Russian Correspondence.

29. Darkest Russia, A Weekly Record of the Struggle for Freedom, January 1912-August 1914; MWS 10852-3, Lemarduchen to Wolf, 9 July 1914, for ICA’s subsidy of the paper.

30. See P.R.O. FO 371/511/11608, Wolf to Hardinge, 27 November 1908.

31. See MWS 2956-8, Wolf to Montefiore, 8 December 1913, which reveals Wolf’s differences with the Alliance President Narcisse Leven on combined Western Jewish strategy. See also ibid., 25293-302, Wolf, “Notes on Conjoint Committee” (n.d.), for his views on the Committee’s operation.


33. The term was Greenberg’s. See Jewish Chronicle, “Mentor,” 14 March 1913.

34. See P.R.O. FO 372/381/8978 for the especially revealing minutes by Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Louis Mallet on this score, 11 March 1912. See also Max Beloff, Lucien Wolf and the Anglo-Russian Entente 1907-1914 (London, 1951), and John A. Murray, “Foreign Policy Debated, Sir Edward Grey and his Critics 1911-12,” in L.P. Wallace and W.C.


36. See MWS 2805-6, H.G. Charvel (*Daily Graphic and Graphic* editor) to Wolf, 28 October 1914.

37. See MWS 7475-8, Wolf letters to Montefiore and Alexander, 7 January 1915.

38. See Board of Deputies, London, CJC files C11/2/5, Wolf to Tyrrell, 18 December 1915.


40. C11/2/7, Wolf to CJC presidents, 7 January 1915.


42. CJC Minutes Book, 17 May 1916. The three grandees were Leonard Lionel Cohen, Sir Matthew Nathan and Lord Swaythling. A fourth grandee, Lord Reading, declined co-option on grounds of his government work. Only the friendly societies responded to the CJC’s invitation to East End organisations to select two further members.

43. C11/2/5, Wolf to Tyrrell, 18 December 1915.

44. C11/2/6, Wolf to Alexander, 18 June 1915.


46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., Wolf to Dywien, (secretary NUJR), 14 January 1916 and to Zangwill, 17 January 1916. “We are not going to be Nationalists, or Zionists, or Territorialists but simply Jews claiming equal rights for Jews everywhere.”

48. Ibid., letter of invitation 3 March 1916. The invitees included Chief Rabbi Hertz, Weizmann, Sokolow, Cowen, Bentwich, Dr. Kruk (Workers League for Jewish Emancipation), Lord Swaythling, Stuart Samuel, the Rev. M.A. Green and all of the CJC.

49. Fo 371/2817/42608, Wolf to Oliphant, encl. draft formula, 3 March 1916.


51. Ibid., Wolf to Dywien, 4 April 1916.

53. See Mocatta Library, Gaster Papers, Conjoint Foreign Committee file, for a fairly full record of the correspondence and accusations following the discovery of the formula's submission in the summer of 1916. *Jewish Chronicle*, leaders, 27 October 1916, 20 April 1917.


56. See Mocatta Library, Lucien Wolf, Diary of the Peace Conference, Paris, 1919 (unpublished), which reveals Wolf's growing rapport with the British members of the New States Committee and his “insider” knowledge of the Minorities Treaties formulation. See also Mark Levene, “Jewish Diplomacy at War and Peace; A Study of Lucien Wolf 1914-1919” (Oxford University, unpublished D. Phil, 1981), Chapter 18, New States Committee and Peace Settlement.

57. Wolf, Peace Conference Diary, 9 April 1919, p. 172 et seq.


59. See Archives of the American Jewish Committee, New York, Marshall Papers, Peace Conference Correspondence, Box 1, 1919-23, Marshall to Adler, 26 June 1923. See also Janowsky, *Jews and Minority Rights*, p. 264.

60. “Grand dukes” was a favorite term of derision used by Zionists and others in respect of the traditional Western Jewish leadership. See, for instance, Wolf, Peace Conference Diary, 18 February 1919, p. 69, reporting Nahum Sokolow's tirade on this theme at the Alliance Paris headquarters.

61. Wolf, Peace Conference Diary, 16 February 1919, et seq.


64. MWS 10467-8, Wolf to Mowschowitch, 25 February 1918.


66. David Mowschowitch had been secretary to the Jewish Petrograd Political Bureau before coming to London in 1915 to deal with Russian Jewish relief questions. See MWS 2976, Wolf to Montefiore, 21 December 1916, and MWS 10672, Wolf to Mowschowitch, 20 December 1918, on the decline of Blank and the parallel ascendancy of Mowschowitch.
68. See, for instance, Wolf, “The Queen’s Jews,” in Roth, ed., Essays, p. 359. See also Jewish Chronicle, 27 October 1916, reporting Wolf’s speech at the Board of Deputies, 22 October 1916.
70. See Marshall Papers, Peace Conference Correspondence, Box 1, 1919-23, Marshall to Adler, 6 June 1923, and Janowsky, Jews and Minority Rights, pp. 284-310.
71. Marshall Papers, Peace Conference Correspondence, Box 1, 1919-23, Marshall to Adler, 6 June 1923, where he wrote that he fought for national minority rights “long after everybody else in the (Congress) delegation recognised that fact that it would be impossible to secure them.” See also David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (New York, 1924) 1:281, 2 April 1919, for the efforts of the U.S. delegate on the New States Committee to tone down the national minority aspects of the Mack/ Marshall proposals.
74. See MWS 10460-63, Mowschowitz to Wolf, 10 October 1917, where Mowschowitz refers to this prospect.
76. See The League of Nations, Geneva, Report of the Secretary and Special Delegate of the Joint Foreign Committee on Jewish Questions Dealt with by the League 1920-29, (London, 1921 et seq.).
77. Jewish Chronicle, Prag letter, 1 June 1917.
80. Thus Weizmann’s charge that Wolf was a “self-appointed” leader could equally be applied to Weizmann himself. See Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, vol. 7, Weizmann to Sacher and Simon, 28 December 1914, pp. 57-60.