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Jewish Political Studies Review Abstracts
Volume 4, Number 1 (Nos.1-2) (Spring 5752/1992)
This article has the dual purpose of indicating how
contemporary political science can approach the study of an
ancient constitutional text and the examination of Deuteronomy as
such a constitution. Ancient constitutions are distinguished
from modern ones by devoting as much or more attention to the
moral and socio-economic bases of the polity as to the frame of
government. Deuteronomy is a classical example of that kind of
ancient constitution, designed to adapt the Torah-as-constitution
presented in the first four books of the Pentateuch to the Jewish
polity once the people are established in Eretz Israel. As such
it is both a repetition of what has been presented before and a
modification of earlier constitutional teachings. The article
begins by discussing the character of Deuteronomy and the
structure of the constitutional elements within it. It raises
the question as to whether or not Deuteronomy was actually in
force as a constitution, and why Deuteronomy was necessary to
complete the classic constitution of ancient Israel. The article
includes a schematic presentation of the Deuteronomic
constitution, divided by order, section and topic. It then
procedes to discuss how to read the text in its various parts --
the preamble, the body of the constitution, its enactment and
promulgation through a covenant renewal ceremony involving curses
and blessings, its provisions for future covenant renewal
ceremonies, a final word from Moses describing the constitution,
and an epilogue describing Moses' passing of his authority and
powers to Joshua. Each section of the constitution is discussed
in some detail in light of general principles of
constitution-making and those of the Jewish political tradition.
The whole document is presented as a covenant in the spirit and
format of Israelite constitutions.
The graphic description of God holding Mt. Sinai over the
Israelites' heads, threatening to bury them under it unless they
accepted His Torah, is familiar to many. Whatever the
existential import of this tale, its literal sense is that the
Jewish people were coerced into receiving the Torah. This essay
analyzes other traditions about the Sinai covenant and indicates
that these, in contrast, assert the consensual nature of the
receiving of the Torah.
Louis Marshall, one of American Jewry's most influential
communal leaders between the mid-1890s and his death in 1929, was
a life-long Republican whose support for the Republican Party
never wavered. More than any other Jewish leader of the
1896-1928 era, Marshall endorsed Republican candidates for
election, took an active part in intraparty squabbles, and worked
closely with Republican congressmen and state legislators.
During this era, moreover, during which most Republican
politicians thought in terms of a Jewish vote, and developed
their electoral strategies accordingly, Marshall's political
advice and endorsement was often sought by political leaders
hoping to appeal to Jewish voters. This essay analyzes
Marshall's influential role in American politics generally, and
in Republican Party affairs in particular, a subject long
neglected by American Jewish scholarship. In so doing, it
critically examines his often-noted commitment to the doctrine of
Jewish political neutrality, of which he was the best known and
most articulate proponent. In theory at least, Marshall
continuously opposed the idea of a Jewish vote and the assumption
that a Jewish candidate automatically was entitled to the support
of Jewish voters. As this essay documents, however, Marshall's
commitment to the ideal of Jewish political neutrality was much
greater in theory than in practice.
The traditional leadership of Anglo-Jewry came increasingly
into question in the early 1900s. A burgeoning agenda associated
with an influx of East European immigrants and a rising tide of
anti-Semitism provideed ammunition for Zionists and workers'
organizations to mount a challenge to its hegemony. The
challenge was sharpest in the area of foreign affairs where the
part-time amateur conduct of a self-selecting, self-perpetuating
oligarchy in the Conjoint Foreign Committee appeared most keenly
out of touch, out of date, and lacking in democratic
accountability.
The challenge was met and defeated, less, however, on
account of the old order's adaptability and more due to its good
fortune in acquiring the services of the foreign affairs expert,
Lucien Wolf. His early relationship to the committee highlighted
many of the problems of legitimacy and authority within the
community as well as of the lack of a career structure
indispensable to the provision of a coherent, professional body.
Wolf's expertise, however, ensured for himself an indispensable
niche within the Anglo-Jewish establishment and a hegemony in the
field of Anglo-Jewish foreign affairs which despite serious
challenge was upheld and ultimately consolidated. As foreign
affairs secretary to the Joint Foreign Committee, a post
specifically designed for him, Wolf became the critical exponent
of Jewish minority rights, both at the Paris Peace Conference and
at the League of Nations.
The correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin
covered three decades down to the mid-1960s and touched on many
of the most urgent problems in modern political philosophy. At
bottom the key question they debated is whether the true paradigm
of philosophy is a purely naturalistic rationalism of the kind
fashioned by the thirteenty century Arab and Jewish thinkers in
their revival of Aristotelianism and exemplified, later on, by
Spinoza; or whether the true paradigm is grounded in the Reason
(nous) of Plato and Aristotle as it symbolizes a range of
experiential meaning from intellection to faith, thus
comprehending analysis, intuition, and revelation. Strauss
contends for the former, Voegelin for the latter view; one in the
name of demonstrative knowledge, the other in the name of mystic
philosophy. Despite their substantial disagreements, both
writers stand severely at odds with contemporary ideologies and,
generally, join in preferring the ancients to the moderns.
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