What if Bush Invited Sharon and Abu Mazen to Camp David? The Prospects for Negotiations in the Post-Arafat Era

and , January 2, 2005

No. 526     21 Tevet-6 Shevat 5765 / 2-16 January 2005

  • At President Clinton’s failed Camp David peace summit in mid-2000, Barak offered more than any Israeli prime minister in history. Yet the talks exposed vast remaining disparities between Israel and many of today’s post-Arafat Palestinian leaders on key issues that must be considered before the Bush administration dispatches a “presidential envoy” or risks convening yet another peace summit in the period ahead:

  • Refugees: Several months after Camp David, Abu Mazen wrote: “The right of return means a return to Israel, not to the Palestinian state.” As recently as January 1, 2005, Abu Mazen reiterated: “We won’t forget the right of return of refugees who have been exiled from their land for more than half a century.” “The right of return means a return to Israel, not to the Palestinian state,” Abu Mazen wrote in the London Arabic daily al-Hayat several months after Camp David. Palestinian officials were, in fact, dismayed by President George W. Bush’s statements about preserving Israel as a Jewish state, since they hoped that by flooding Israel with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians they would be able to demographically overwhelm its Jewish majority.

  • Borders: The Palestinians insisted that the June 1967 line be the recognized international boundary and even demanded the Latrun salient, which includes a section of the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway. Additionally, the Palestinians rejected any Israeli sovereignty over national consensus suburban areas just beyond the municipal borders of Jerusalem, such as Maale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev. According to the notes of EU Special Representative to the Peace Process Miguel Moratinos from the Taba talks, the Palestinians “did not accept proposals to annex (settlement) blocs” to Israel.

  • Jerusalem: Former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami noted that Abu Mazen, who had a reputation for moderation, suddenly became energized at Camp David and rejected U.S. proposals for compromise on Jerusalem. At the end of the Taba talks, even the status of the Western Wall remained contested. According to Moratinos, the Palestinians acknowledged Israel’s request for an “affiliation” with the Western Wall, but did not explicitly accept Israeli sovereignty over it.

  • Security Arrangements: Israel requested early warning stations in the West Bank for security purposes and the right to deploy forces in the event of an Arab coalition attack from the east. The Palestinians insisted that no Israeli soldier be on any of their territory and also rejected Israeli control of air space. Mohammed Dahlan explained in Taba that the Arab world would not accept Israeli force deployments inside a Palestinian state that were aimed at other Arab states. Furthermore, the Palestinians made clear at Taba that they would not accept a demilitarized Palestinian state, either.

  • In 2001, Abu Mazen admitted, “Had the Camp David summit been convened again, we would have taken the same position” on the permanent status issues. Abu Ala, too, expressed no regret at any missed opportunity, asserting that he would not agree to what was offered at Camp David “even if it were to be proposed in another 100 years from today.”

  • During the Oslo years, the explicit declarations of Palestinian leaders were often ignored and treated as statements for internal consumption alone. Wishful thinking was frequently substituted for hard analysis. This does not mean that in 2005 no “window of opportunity” exists; rather, its actual size must be accurately measured. Indeed, in the present context, a partial cease-fire or other limited arrangements are more realistic than significant progress on any of the substantive issues raised at Camp David in 2000. What emerges from the following analysis is that a full-blown, final status peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians is probably more remote today than five years ago.

 

Revisiting Past Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations

Arafat’s death has been heralded as marking the dawn of a new age and a golden opportunity to revive negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Since Arafat was the main obstacle to peace, the thinking goes, the Arab-Israeli peace process can finally be put “back on track.” Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote in the New York Times on December 30, 2004: “Arafat’s death makes a comprehensive settlement feasible once again.”1 Thus, a renewed call for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians has been placed at the forefront of today’s political debate.

But is this assessment really correct? It assumes that Arafat stifled his more moderate advisors, who are now rising to positions of authority from which they will shake off his hard-line legacy. It is certainly true that Arafat’s departure from the political scene was fortuitous, yet the likelihood of productive negotiations today remains in serious question. Many analyses of past Israeli-Palestinian negotiating failures have focused on Arafat’s negative role. It may therefore be instructive to revisit the past negotiating history and examine the positions of other key Palestinian players who are now likely to play a leading political role in determining future Palestinian policies on peace.

Prior to the outbreak of the Palestinian violence in 2000, there were several sets of negotiations that are worthy of review, including pre-negotiations in Stockholm and the 2000 Camp David summit. Even after the violence began there were the Taba talks in 2001. Some revisionist historians have placed the blame for the failure of each of these talks on tactical mistakes made by the parties involved: if only the Palestinians were given more time to prepare for Camp David; if only Barak had treated Arafat with more respect; if only the negotiators had convened twenty-two times in Stockholm instead of twenty. In fact, at that time, the gaps between the two parties on nearly every major issue, from borders to Jerusalem to refugees to security, were simply too wide to bridge.

Since the Camp David talks, the political landscape has changed dramatically. Bush, Sharon, and Abu Mazen have replaced Clinton, Barak, and Arafat. The Palestinian violence has resulted in the deaths of thousands. The 9/11 attacks have occurred, and the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes have been destroyed.

Negotiations are often risky ventures. Positions need to be soberly assessed, the timing must be right, and all the parties must be primed to reach a peaceful endgame. So what would happen if Bush invited Sharon and Abu Mazen to Camp David today? Are the gaps still unbridgeable?

 

Clinton’s Camp David Peace Summit

At President Clinton’s failed Camp David peace summit in mid-2000, Barak offered more than any Israeli prime minister in history. Yet the talks exposed vast remaining disparities between Israel and many of today’s post-Arafat Palestinian leaders on key issues that must be considered before the Bush administration dispatches a “presidential envoy” or risks convening yet another peace summit in the period ahead:

Refugees:

  • Israel agreed to the complete resettlement of Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state but not in Israel itself. Proposals for accepting a minimal number of dispossessed Palestinians into Israel on “humanitarian grounds” over a period of years were also discussed. The Palestinians rejected this and demanded the unlimited return of all refugees into Israel. Nabil Shaath told Clinton at Camp David that the Palestinians anticipated that 400,000-800,000 Palestinian refugees would be expected to go to Israel.2

    In an article in the London Arabic daily al-Hayat, written several months after Camp David, Abu Mazen clarified: “The right of return means a return to Israel, not to the Palestinian state.”3 As recently as January 1, 2005, Abu Mazen reiterated in Rafiah: “We won’t forget the right of return of refugees who have been exiled from their land for more than half a century.”4 Two days later, he repeated this point, adding, “the day will come when the refugees return home.”5 Both Abu Mazen and Abu Ala explicitly reiterated their commitment to the “right of return” when they presented their respective governments to the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2003.6

Borders:

  • Israel offered to withdraw from over 94 percent of the West Bank and all of Gaza, conceding the long-standing principle of “defensible borders” and instead accepting international forces in the Jordan Valley. The Palestinians insisted that the June 1967 line be the recognized international boundary and even demanded the Latrun salient, which includes a section of the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway. Additionally, the Palestinians rejected any Israeli sovereignty over national consensus suburban areas just beyond the municipal borders of Jerusalem, such as Maale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev.7 According to the notes of EU Special Representative to the Peace Process Miguel Moratinos from the Taba talks, the Palestinians “did not accept proposals to annex (settlement) blocs” to Israel.8

Jerusalem:

  • Israel proposed making eastern Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state. Yet the Palestinians rejected any territorial compromise over the city; Palestinian spokesmen, such as Abu Ala, even laid claim to the western half of Jerusalem as well. Former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami noted that Abu Mazen, who had a reputation for moderation, suddenly became energized at Camp David and rejected U.S. proposals for compromise on Jerusalem.9 At the end of the Taba talks, even the status of the Western Wall remained contested.10 According to Moratinos, the Palestinians acknowledged Israel’s request for an “affiliation” with the Western Wall, but did not explicitly accept Israeli sovereignty over it.

Security Arrangements:

  • Israel requested early warning stations in the West Bank for security purposes and the right to deploy forces in the event of an Arab coalition attack from the east. The Palestinians insisted that no Israeli soldier be on any of their territory and also rejected Israeli control of air space. As will be clarified later, Mohammed Dahlan explained in Taba that the Arab world would not accept Israeli force deployments inside a Palestinian state that were aimed at other Arab states. Furthermore, the Palestinians made clear at Taba that they would not accept a demilitarized Palestinian state, either.

While Barak came to Camp David to negotiate, Arafat failed to present a single idea or serious comment.11 No amount of skillful diplomacy could have brought the parties together at that time; despite a historic opportunity and heavy U.S. pressure, the Palestinians could not be compelled to moderate their demands. Shlomo Ben-Ami commented that no rational Israeli leader could have concluded a deal at Camp David.12 From the outset, the Palestinians knew that they would not budge regarding key issues. Feisal Husseini, who held the PA’s Jerusalem portfolio, and Assad Rahman, who held the refugee portfolio on the PLO Executive Committee, did not even attend Camp David.13

President Clinton wrote that he believed Abu Mazen and Abu Ala would have accepted his ideas for peace but didn’t want to be at odds with Arafat.14 Unfortunately, Arafat’s successors have pledged to maintain his main ideological goals. Mohammed Dahlan has warned, “I would caution against the illusion that when there is a sharp transition from Arafat to post-Arafat, the (Palestinian) mythological rules will be broken. For there to be legitimacy, there needs to be continuity. Those who come after Arafat will want to build their positions on the basis of their being his successors.”15

 

A Moderate Abu Mazen?

Abu Mazen succeeded Arafat as chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and is the Fatah faction’s candidate to become the next Palestinian Authority chairman. Abu Mazen has become known for his conclusion that the Palestinian reliance on violence as a political tool was a tactical mistake. However, on issues of policy he is extremely close to Arafat. He categorically demands the full right of return for all Palestinian refugees, despite the clear danger this would pose to the future of the Jewish state. He has rejected any limitation on the number of refugees allowed to return to Israel, “even if they [the Israelis] offered us the return of three million refugees.”16

As recently as November 2004, Abu Mazen said, “We promise you [Arafat] that our heart will not rest until we achieve the right of return for our people and end the tragic refugee issue.”17 He also rejected proposals to moderate Palestinian goals in exchange for formal recognition of their state by the U.S. and a financial support package of billions of dollars, saying, “we rejected these [offers] and said that our rights are not for sale.”18

Regarding borders, Abu Mazen has said, “I will cut off my hand if it signs an agreement in which even one centimeter of Palestinian territory conquered in 1967 is missing.”19 This language contradicts the very deliberate wording of UN Resolution 242, which calls for negotiations to determine future borders, and it ignores Israel’s right to “defensible borders.” He even said in September 2000 that Israel should not have sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem or over the Western Wall.20

On the pre-Camp David preparations, Abu Mazen stated, “We made clear to the American and Israeli sides several times that the Palestinian side is unable to make concessions on anything” (authors’ emphasis).21 Thus, it should have come as no surprise when, after the most generous offer in Israeli history, Abu Mazen claimed that Camp David was “a trap, from beginning to end….We did not miss an opportunity at all, but rather survived a trap that was set for us.”22 Abu Mazen’s explanation for turning down the Israeli offer was that it “never reached the level of our aspirations.”23 Furthermore, he concluded, “I don’t feel any sense of regret. What we did was the right thing to do.”24

Where, then, did Abu Mazen’s reputation for political moderation come from? Part of this emanated from the mythology of the Oslo peace process, with the famous Beilin-Abu Mazen document of October 31, 1995, which many observers felt proved that Israeli-Palestinian differences were indeed bridgeable. Yet Abu Mazen personally told one of the authors of this Jerusalem Viewpoints back in 1996 that there never was a Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement, for Abu Mazen never signed the document. Arafat called the document “a basis for further negotiations,” which only meant that he hoped to lock in the Israeli concessions that were made and continue the discussions to achieve further concessions. The myth that Yossi Beilin and Abu Mazen struck a detailed understanding, nevertheless, served as critical background for the efforts of Israeli and U.S. negotiators to keep working at the failed Camp David summit.

 

Arafat’s Sordid Legacy and the Question of Jerusalem

Arafat’s political legacy endures. Arafat had told an amazed Clinton at Camp David that the ancient Jewish Temple never stood in Jerusalem but rather in Nablus. Clinton understood, as Dennis Ross has noted, that a formula for peace that denies the very foundation of the Jewish religion is no solution at all, and only sows the seeds of further hated and conflict.

Yet this isn’t just Arafat’s contention. PA Minister for International Planning and Cooperation Nabil Sha’ath has said, “Israel demands control of the Temple Mount based on its claim that its fictitious temple stood there.”25 PA negotiator Saeb Erekat also claimed there is no proof that the Jewish Temple is at the site of the Temple Mount.26 PA Prime Minister Abu Ala noted, “The Israelis claimed that under the Mosques there is something that belongs to them.”27 Even so-called moderate Abu Mazen stated that the Jews “claim that 2000 years ago they had a temple. I challenge the claim that this is so.”28

This denial of the core of Jewish history reflects a potent xenophobia that permeates throughout Palestinian society. For example, the PA minister for culture and information was infuriated at the idea of allowing Jews to even pray on the Temple Mount, arguing that the reaction from the Arab and Muslim world would be “a thousand times worse” than the 1996 riots.29 Can one imagine a similar proposal that denied Christians the right to pray at the Vatican, or Muslims the right to pray at the Kaaba in Mecca?

Palestinian negotiator Hasan Asfour, who was a part of the Oslo process since its inception, viewed allowing Jews to pray at the Western Wall as “a Palestinian concession. They [Jews] should not view this as a right.”30 Abu Ala dismissed any discussion of Israeli rights to the Western Wall. “It is pointless to discuss [these] details before Israel recognizes Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem.”31 And he did not say “east Jerusalem.” This is classic Arafat. In Ramallah in 2000, Arafat said that the demand for sovereignty in Jerusalem “does not only refer to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Temple Mount Mosques, and the Armenian quarter, but it is Jerusalem in its entirety, entirety, entirety” (authors’ emphasis).32

Abu Ala’s position on Jerusalem is clear: “We want complete Palestinian sovereignty on the Mount of Olives, on the tombs of the prophets and on all that you call ‘The Holy Basin.'”33 Similarly, Abu Mazen stated that “Jerusalem must return to our sovereignty, and we will establish our capital in it.”34

These statements are fueled and inspired by Palestinian religious leaders with positions of great influence. For example, the mufti of Jerusalem asserted that “no stone of the Al-Buraq [Western] Wall has any relation to Judaism. The Jews began praying at this wall only in the nineteenth century.”35

Former Arafat advisor Akram Haniya, who also participated in the Camp David summit, warned that “[the Americans] are making a grave mistake [if they] believe that Arafat can sign an agreement that does not answer to their minimum national rights” (authors’ emphasis).36 The demand for total sovereignty over Jerusalem is a maximalist position disguised as a minimalist one that completely disregards the centrality of Jerusalem to the Jewish people. Only by shedding this facade of minimalism – a myth that was powerfully exposed at Camp David – can negotiations progress.

The European Union as well bears a measure of responsibility for fueling Palestinian irredentism. On March 1, 1999, the German ambassador to Israel, whose country was serving as the rotating president of the European Union, sent a Note Verbale to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs reviving the UN General Assembly’s outdated proposal for internationalizing Jerusalem. After seven Arab armies invaded the nascent State of Israel and the UN did nothing to protect Jerusalem, Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, declared the old UN proposal “null and void.” Still, the Germans were prepared to state in 1999: “The European Union reaffirms its known position concerning the specific status of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum. Abu Ala seized this opportunity to challenge Israeli sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem, stating, “The [EU’s] letter asserts that Jerusalem in both its parts – the western and the eastern – is a land under occupation.37

In 2002, the head of Israeli military intelligence, Major General Aharon Ze’evi (Farkash), noted: “According to the assessment of the Intelligence Branch, it is impossible to reach an agreement with Arafat on the ‘end of conflict,’ even if Israel would agree to the implementation of the right of return, withdrawal to the ’67 borders, division of Jerusalem, and handing over the Holy Places to Palestinian rule.”38 Former Prime Minister Barak said IDF intelligence gave the Camp David talks a less than 50 percent chance of succeeding.39

After Camp David, Abu Ala stated that “in order for an additional summit to be convened, the Israeli position must come closer to the Palestinian position, rather than the other way around.”40 Abu Ala’s position regarding borders is that the Palestinian “state has internationally recognized borders, which are the borders set in the [1947] partition resolution.”41 Ironically, it was the Palestinians who rejected the 1947 UN partition plan.

Some in the Arab world understood the enormity of Barak’s offer at Camp David and the lengths to which Israel was willing to go for peace. Prince Bandar, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington, placed the blame squarely on Arafat, saying, “Clinton…really tried his best…and Barak’s position was so avant-garde that it was equal to Prime Minister Rabin…it broke my heart that Arafat did not take that offer.”42 The long-serving Saudi ambassador believed Barak’s offer indeed met the Palestinians’ “minimum national rights.”

 

The Questions of Security and Land

The need for an Israeli security presence in the West Bank, especially the right to deploy in an emergency, is a security imperative founded on the historical reality of repeated attacks by surrounding countries and cross-border incursions. Nevertheless, Palestinian security chief Mohammed Dahlan categorically rejected any such arrangement. Dennis Ross writes, “Mohammed Dahlan was dead set against any Israeli or foreign presence in the border crossing and rejected the idea that the Israelis should have guaranteed access routes into the West Bank.”43 Ross seems genuinely surprised that Dahlan was most resistant on security – the issue on which he expected the least difficulty in reaching a compromise.44

Dahlan’s hard line on security was additionally surprising because he came from the younger generation of Palestinian leaders who were expected to be more pragmatic than the old PLO ideologues. But that clearly was not the case. In fact, the main security issues were not resolved at Camp David, including early warning stations, control of air space, demilitarization, Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley, and management of border crossings. Even on the issue of Israeli emergency access to the West Bank, Ross writes that the parties faced “basic disagreements.”45

During the Taba talks, Gilead Sher noted that on security issues, “the main disputes remained.”46 Similarly, Shlomo Ben-Ami wrote, “Regarding security the Palestinians opposed the fundamental assumptions of the [Clinton] outline, and practically are retreating from what was conceded at Camp David….’You have no need,’ [Dahlan] says, ‘for emergency deployment areas; the Arab world will not accept this kind of deployment in the territory of the Palestinian state against another Arab state.'”47

Regarding Israel’s territorial offers as well, the gaps were unbridgeable. In discussing the Israeli offer of 3 percent of Israeli territory in exchange for annexing 6 percent of the West Bank, Ben-Ami concluded: “we reached the end of our ability to show further flexibility.”48 Yet Abu Ala viewed this formula as unacceptable.49 At Taba, Abu Ala expressed dismay at an Israeli map that showed the annexation of the Latrun salient. He continued, “we have a problem with Gush Etzion and there is no chance that we can accept the annexation of [Jerusalem suburbs] Maale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, and Har Homa [within municipal Jerusalem] to Israel.”50

 

“Only Arafat”

Chief U.S. negotiator Dennis Ross, in his 840-page account of Camp David and the peace process, The Missing Peace, wrote: “Whenever my exasperation with Arafat was reaching its limits, Abu Mazen, Abu Ala, or Mohammed Dahlan (or Yossi Ginossar) would remind me that only Arafat had the moral authority among Palestinians to compromise on Jerusalem, refugees, and borders….Often Abu Mazen or Abu Ala or other Palestinian negotiators would tell me ‘You prefer dealing with us because you see us as more moderate, but we cannot deliver, only he can.'”51 Thus, even if Abu Mazen or Abu Ala were moderate and willing to compromise on primary issues, by their own account, they would not be able to carry out such agreements. It is vital to recognize the inherent limitations of the PA.

Furthermore, it remains an open question whether Abu Mazen will act to disarm the radical groups. On January 1, 2005, he told a campaign rally in Rafiah in Gaza that the Palestinian leadership had a duty to protect militants wanted by Israel and indicated that he did not intend to crack down on them.52 This view is shared by Abu Mujahed, one of the local commanders of the Aksa Martyrs Brigades in Balata near Nablus, who said, “We don’t believe that Abu Mazen will allow anyone to confiscate our weapons.”53

This would be in line with Abu Mazen’s previous record when he was PA prime minister during the short-lived hudna (temporary cease-fire) in the summer of 2003, when he stated, “Cracking down on Hamas, Jihad, and the Palestinian organizations is not an option at all.”54

 

Israel’s Post-Arafat Position

For more than four years, Israel has been subject to a relentless barrage of suicide bombings, sniping attacks, and Kassam rockets. Over 1,000 Israelis have been killed and thousands more have been injured. Throughout this period the Palestinian Authority either explicitly aided terrorism or did nothing to curb it. Israel cannot disregard the record of the past four years and cede its very real security needs for defensible borders, early warning stations, intelligence-gathering capabilities, and freedom of movement.

Were Israel to withdraw from the Jordan Valley, for example, then many of the armaments today being used by insurgents in western Iraq and Saudi Arabia could be diverted to the hills of the West Bank. During the Oslo years, Israel was prepared to take risks based on the hope that Palestinian intentions had changed. This time Israel will not take the same risks, but will instead preserve its defensive capabilities, particularly those pertaining to territory.

Israel’s claim has been bolstered by President Bush’s April 14, 2004, letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon recognizing Israel’s right to “defensible borders” that would enhance Israel’s own self-defense capabilities instead of using the kinds of international forces envisioned in President Clinton’s post-Camp David proposals. In short, today, after four years of bloodshed and painful losses, Israel has more robust requirements for its defense compared to what was being considered in 2000.

 

Camp David III: Slim Chance for Success

In 2001, Abu Mazen admitted, “Had the Camp David summit been convened again, we would have taken the same position” on the permanent status issues.55 Abu Ala, too, expressed no regret at any missed opportunity, asserting that he would not agree to what was offered at Camp David “even if it were to be proposed in another 100 years from today.”56 He also insists that all Palestinian refugees should return to their homes in Israel, saying, “the principle of the right of return is sacred.”57

True, Abu Mazen does not wear Arafat’s military uniform; he has openly stated that violence does not serve the Palestinian interest; whether he will crack down on armed groups still remains extremely doubtful. Nevertheless, even his most forthcoming statements do not indicate that Abu Mazen has rejected Arafat’s political legacy in any way, and that he is more prepared to show flexibility on key issues that separate Israel from the Palestinians.

Moreover, Palestinian leaders such as Abu Ala have yet to overcome their fundamental rejection of Israel’s right to maintain its Jewish character. After President Bush referred to Israel as a Jewish state at the 2003 Aqaba summit, Abu Ala said Bush’s words “aroused great concern among us. These words should not have been said….These are definitions that will bring the region into turmoil.”58 Abu Ala has even voiced interest in “starting new negotiations on Haifa, Jaffa, and Safed.”59

Diplomatic initiatives must be preceded by a very careful assessment of the real positions of the parties in order to first ascertain whether bridgeable differences actually exist. Unfortunately, during the Oslo years, the explicit declarations of Palestinian leaders were often ignored and treated as statements for internal consumption alone. Wishful thinking was frequently substituted for hard analysis. This does not mean that in 2005 no “window of opportunity” exists; rather, its actual size must be accurately measured. Indeed, in the present context, a partial cease-fire is more realistic than significant progress on any of the substantive issues raised at Camp David in 2000. What emerges from the foregoing analysis is that a full-blown, final status peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians is probably more remote today than five years ago.

*     *     *

Notes

1. Warren Christopher, “Diplomacy That Can’t Be Delegated,” New York Times, December 30, 2004.
2. Shlomo Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard: A Voyage to the Boundaries of the Peace Process (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot Books, 2004) (Hebrew), p. 215.
3. Al-Hayat (London), November 23, 2003, cited by Yael Yehoshua, “Abu Mazen: A Political Profile,” MEMRI Special Report No. 15, April 29, 2003.
4. Arnon Regular, “‘We Won’t Forget the Right of Return,’ Abu Mazen Says and Earned Praise in Rafiah,” Ha’aretz, January 2, 2005.
5. Ibrahim Barzak, “Abbas Pledges Palestinian Refugees Will Return to Homes in Israel, Endorsing Stand That Has Torpedoed Peace Efforts, AP/San Diego Union Tribune, January 3, 2005; http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20050103-1430-israel-palestinians.html
6. http://www.pna.gov.ps/Arabic/details.asp?DocId=124; and “Yasser Arafat and Ahmad Qurei (Abu ‘Alaa) Speeches to PA Legislative Council Prior to Vote on New Government,” MEMRI, January 15, 2004.
7. Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002 (New York: Other Press 2002), p. 353.
8. Ha’aretz, February 17, 2002.
9. Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard, p. 190.
10. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 354.
11. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), p. 705.
12. Itamar Rabinovich, Waging Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 163.
13. Uri Horowitz, “Camp David 2 and President Clinton’s Bridging Proposals – The Palestinian View,” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, January 2001; http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v3n4p5.html
14. Bill Clinton, My Life (London: Hutchison, 2004), p. 944.
15. Maariv, April 6, 2001; Dore Gold, Jerusalem in International Diplomacy, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, May 2001, p. 53.
16. Yigal Carmon and Aluma Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final Settlement,” MEMRI, August 4, 2000, quoting Al-Ayyam, July 30, 2000; http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=ia&ID=IA3500
17. Ewen MacAskill, “Blair May Visit Israel to Revive Peace Process,” Guardian, November 24, 2004; http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1358070,00.html
18. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final Settlement,” quoting Al-Ayyam, July 30, 2000.
19. Yotam Feldner, “The (Revised) Palestinian Account of Camp David, Part II: Jerusalem and Territorial Withdrawal,” MEMRI, September 7, 2001, quoting Al-Quds, November 11, 1998; http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=conflict&ID=IA6901
20. Abu Mazen’s speech at the meeting of the PLO’s Palestinian Central Council, September 9, 2000; http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/172d1a3302dc903b85256e37005bd90f?OpenDocument
21. “Abu Mazen: Had Camp David Convened Again, We Would Take the Same Positions, Part I,” MEMRI, August 1, 2001, quoting Al-Ayyam, July 28, 2001; http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=middleeast&ID=SP24901
22. Saul Singer, “Who’s Fault Was the Failure of Camp David,” Jerusalem Viewpoints no. 474, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 15, 2002; http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp474.htm
23. “Abu Mazen: Had Camp David Convened Again, We Would Take the Same Positions, Part I.”
24. Palestinian National Authority, August 2, 2001, quoting Al-Ayyam, July 28, 2001; http://www.pna.gov.ps/subject_details2.asp?DocId=245
25. Ricki Hollander, “CNN.com Mangles Facts in Jerusalem Feature,” September 1, 2003, quoting Al-Ayyam, July 27, 2000; http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_article=576&x_context=3
26. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final Settlement,” quoting Ha’aretz, July 27, 2000.
27. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final Settlement,” quoting Al-Ayyam, July 30, 2000.
28. Yael Yehoshua, “Abu Mazen: A Political Profile,” MEMRI, April 29, 2003, quoting Kul Al-Arab, August 25, 2000; http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sr&ID=SR01503
29. Amnon Kapeliouk, “Camp David Dialogues,” Le Monde Diplomatique, September 2000; http://mondediplo.com/2000/09/08campdavid
30. Gold, Jerusalem in International Diplomacy, p. 52, quoting Voice of Palestine, September 17, 2000.
31. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final Settlement,” quoting Al-Quds, July 25, 2000.
32. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final Settlement,” quoting Al-Hayat Al-Jadida.
33. Gilead Sher, Just Beyond Reach: The Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1999-2001 (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2001) (Hebrew), p. 410.
34. Yehoshua, “Abu Mazen: A Political Profile.”
35. “East Jerusalem and the Holy Places at the Camp David Summit,” MEMRI, August 28, 2000, quoting Kul Al-Arab, August 18, 2000; http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=conflict&ID=SP12100
36. Carmon and Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final Settlement,” quoting Al-Ayyam, July 29, 2000.
37. Gold, Jerusalem in International Diplomacy, p. 33.
38. Singer, “Who’s Fault Was the Failure of Camp David,” quoting Maariv, January 23, 2002.
39. Benny Morris, “Camp David and After: An Exchange – 1. An Interview with Ehud Barak,” New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002; http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15501
40. Yigal Carmon and Aluma Solnik, “Camp David and the Prospects for a Final Settlement, Part II: Reactions and Implications,” MEMRI, August 7, 2000, quoting Al-Ayyam, July 30, 2000; http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=ia&ID=IA3600
41. “Abu Ala: ‘The Borders of the Palestinian State Are Those Set By the 1947 UN Partition Plan,'” MEMRI, December 21, 1998, quoting Al-Hayyat Al-Jadida, December 21, 1998; http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=conflict&ID=SP1898
42. Rabinovich, Waging Peace, p. 166.
43. Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 703.
44. Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 725.
45. Ross, The Missing Peace, pp. 702-703.
46. Sher, Just Beyond Reach, p. 406.
47. Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard, p. 432.
48. Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard, p. 435.
49. Ben-Ami, A Front Without a Rearguard, p. 432.
50. Sher, Just Beyond Reach, pp. 404-405.
51. Ross, The Missing Peace.
52. Greg Myre, “Abbas Sees Duty to Shield the Militants,” New York Times, January 2, 2005; http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/02/international/middleeast/02mideast.html
53. Khaled Abu Toameh, “Interview with a Gunman,” Jerusalem Post, January 3, 2005; http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1104643912526
54. Nadia Abou El-Magd, “Defiant Abbas Rules Out Crackdown on Militants,” Associated Press, July 24, 2003; http://www.smh.com.au/text/articles/2003/07/23/1058853137567.htm
55. Yehoshua, “Abu Mazen: A Political Profile,” quoting Al-Ayyam, July 28, 2001.
56. Y. Yehoshua and B. Chernitsky, “Ahmad Qurei’- Abu ‘Alaa: A Brief Political Profile of the Nominated Palestinian Prime Minister,” MEMRI, September 18, 2003, quoting Al-Watan, July 25, 2001; http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=conflict&ID=IA14703
57. Yehoshua and Chernitsky, “Ahmad Qurei’- Abu ‘Alaa,” quoting Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, December 20, 2000.
58. “Interview with PLC Head Ahmad Qurei (Abu Alaa),” MEMRI, July 3, 2003, quoting Al-Nahar, June 12, 2003; http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP53403#_edn1
59. Yehoshua and Chernitsky, “Ahmad Qurei’- Abu ‘Alaa,” quoting Al-Nahar (Jerusalem), June 28, 1996.

 

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Dore Gold is President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Previously, he served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations (1997-1999), Foreign Policy Advisor to former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and advisor to Prime Minster Ariel Sharon. He was involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations between 1996 and 1998 in both the Hebron Protocol and the Wye Plantation Conference. He is the author of Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Regnery, 2003), and Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos (Crown Forum 2004).

David Keyes is specializing on terrorism at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and is assisting Dr. Dore Gold. His most recent Jerusalem Viewpoints, “Will a Gaza ‘Hamas-stan’ Become a Future al-Qaeda Sanctuary?” (November 2004), was co-authored with Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror.

About Amb. Dore Gold

Ambassador Dore Gold has served as President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs since 2000. From June 2015 until October 2016 he served as Director-General of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previously he served as Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Ambassador to the UN (1997-1999), and as an advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

About David Keyes

David Keyes, an expert on terrorism, is executive director of Advancing Human Rights,