The Idea of the Democratic Peace
The idea of the democratic peace, although not explicitly named, was an essential element of the Oslo Accords. The term “democratic peace” is generally understood to have two components: the assertion that democracies are inherently peaceful, and that they do not, as a rule, wage war against other democracies. This ideal would have represented the most desirable type of final arrangement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because it predicates an environment of shared values, of political, social, and economic stability. The issue of the democratic peace is also one of security, because the presence or absence of its main components may ultimately represent the essence of success or failure, peace or war.
The functional definition of a democracy is a government whose leaders are elected through free and fair elections.1 Additional benefits of life in a modern democracy may include a free civil society, competitive politics, fiscal transparency, equality under law, cultural pluralism, and respect for human rights — particularly those of women.2 Recent scholarship affirms that the concept of equality would also imply some equality of material conditions, and recognizes a link between income and political stability.3
A related but widely held modern assumption is that under democracy there should be a steady rise in the general standard of living. Winston Churchill, for example, firmly believed that all ranks of society should increasingly share such material benefits. His private secretary, John Colville, recalled that “He [Churchill] shared Disraeli’s belief in the gradual increase of amenities for an ever larger number of people who should enjoy the benefits previously reserved for the few. The future depended not on political doctrines, but first on every man having sufficient and then on the heart and soul of the individual.”4
As a policy idea, promoting peace by fostering new democracies has been advocated for some time. After World War I, Woodrow Wilson envisioned the spread of democracy as a substitute for balance-of-power politics.5 More recently, between 1974 and 1990, the vision of the democratic peace regained currency when some thirty countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America made the transition from non-democratic to democratic political systems. Samuel P. Huntington, who studied this process, called it the “Third Wave,” and noted that “the movement toward democracy seemed to take on the character of an almost irresistible global tide moving from one triumph to the next.”6 James Baker III described what the term “democratic peace” meant to him at the time:
We believed that the defeat of communism and the rise of the democrats created an unprecedented opportunity. We hoped to build our relations with Russia, Ukraine, and the other new independent states on the basis of democracy and free markets: what we came to call a “democratic peace,” the type of peace we enjoyed with Germany and Japan. This peace would be based on shared democratic values, not just converging interests. While the democratic impulse in Russia and in most of the new independent states of the Commonwealth was genuine, these nations had little in the way of democratic traditions, and we were far from certain that democracy would take root. But we did not want to create a self-fulfilling prophecy by pursuing a pure balance-of-power policy that assumed from the outset that these states would eventually return to authoritarianism.7
What is noteworthy about Baker’s vision is that he named Germany and Japan as examples of outstanding democracies. It should not be forgotten that the United States and its allies decisively defeated both at war. During the period of their military occupation, both received new civil and governmental structures that would support the democratic form of government.
The early 1990s were optimistic and hopeful years. In the flush of good feeling, many believed in and hoped to make a new beginning and bridge serious cultural incompatibilities between Israel and the Palestinians. The Oslo negotiations took place at the end of the “Third Wave” at a moment when the influence of the Soviet Union was in decline and after the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War (1991). Western countries (and Japan) recognized their special interest in fostering a global environment congenial to democracy and invested in joint economic and social projects to help found the new peace. Not the least, an expanding economy would bring the material benefits of peace to the region.
The new Palestinian entity was expected to become the first Arab democracy in the region possessing some of the features of modern Western society. In his study, Ivory Towers on Sand,8 Martin Kramer pointed out that the “Palestinian exception” was one of the paradigms prevailing in American academic circles. The Palestinians “were believed to have a vibrant ‘civil society,’ both inside and outside Palestine. They had representative institutions, unions, and associations. Their leaders were accountable. Allow them self-rule, and the Palestinians would prove that the Arab world could sustain democracy.”9
An examination of the democratic peace and its components raises the fundamental issue of the quality of peace the Oslo Accords intended to bring about and what became of it. As a benchmark of medium and long-term developments, the state of democracy in the Palestinian Authority may be far more informative than day-to-day events. The hypothesis of this study is that the Palestinian Authority, which was nominally committed to democracy, and which many had hoped would be a good neighbor, has become an authoritarian Middle Eastern regime which plunged its own population into war and distress, and created serious strains on the democratic system of Israel. By examining the material environment, particularly the structural reorientation which has taken place within the PA, one may understand how far we have departed from the original objective of building a peace between two healthy democracies.
The “El-Aqsa Intifada” and the New Reality
The pivotal event in this process was Chairman Arafat’s strategic decision to launch the armed uprising of September 2000, popularly known as the “El-Aqsa Intifada,” both in its own territories and the State of Israel.10 This followed the breakdown of the Camp David talks of July 2000, and signified Yasser Arafat’s rejection of a negotiated settlement. Even before this event, disturbing facts began to surface indicating that the leadership of the PLO had made a policy decision against the creation of a democratic society and to stop the development of economic ties with Israel, one of the main pillars of the Oslo Accords. The European model pioneered by Jean Monnet (1888-1979), of “transforming the mutual hatred of France and Germany into a web of interdependent economic relationships,”11 was one of the central elements of the intended peace.
The second Intifada had serious political and economic consequences, one of which was the ruin of joint investment projects designed to provide a livelihood for Palestinian wage earners. On his retirement, Major General Yaakov Orr, the IDF Coordinator for the Territories, stated that tremendous capital, good-will, and trust, which may never be recovered, were destroyed when the PA launched an armed uprising. He declared that Arafat not only betrayed Israel but his own people as well.12 Certainly the Palestinian middle class, which most likely would have favored an open democratic society and which could have contributed to the general stability — if only for business reasons, lost out in this process.
Should one evaluate the evidence, which first became apparent as isolated bits of information, the PA has become an authoritarian regime (influenced by Islamist doctrines) possessing such well-known characteristics as large-scale corruption,13 disregard for the rights of individuals, distortion of the legal system and state-sponsored crime, general arbitrariness, and intimidation. This has entailed a reorientation of public life and the erosion of civil society.14 In a healthy civil society the government does not monopolize all aspects of public life. Because of the dramatic nature of day-to-day events, the real significance of this process and the reality of structural changes taking place in the PA may have escaped scrutiny and documentation.
The PA’s strategic decision to launch the “El-Aqsa Intifada” has had economic and political consequences which changed the orientation of its own society. By describing the new economic reality — although the statistics may be slightly dated — one may immediately grasp the very considerable hardship which the PA brought upon its own population. Some relevant facts are drawn from the report of the Economist Intelligence Unit of October 2001:
The unemployment rate has stabilized at 23.7 percent, but this does not account for the many Palestinians that have been looking for a job15….When the discouraged workers are added to the official number of the unemployed, the unemployment rate jumps to 35.3 percent in the second quarter of 2001.16
The poverty rate is forecast to reach 50 percent by the end of 2001….The World Bank estimates that 35 percent of the Palestinian population survives below the level of US$2.10/day that it considers the threshold for the poverty line — a 50 percent increase in the number of Palestinians in poverty since the uprising began, although poverty rates vary in different parts of the Territories.17
The World Bank estimates that the per capita real gross national product (GNP) in 2001 will be 30 percent lower than it was in 1994, at the beginning of the Oslo peace process….In 2001 the World Bank projects an additional 10 percent decline in the real GDP. The estimated decline of GDP is larger, at 14 percent, since the volume of worker activity abroad is expected to be over 30 percent lower than in 2000.18
The Economist further estimates the potential loss to the Palestinian economy to be US$2.4-3.2 billion from 1 October 2000 to 30 September 2001, compared with a GDP of around US$4.3 billion in 1999.19 These data give a bleak and unsentimental picture of a major social and economic setback.
In addition, the PA retains 115,000 employees. Payments for their salaries accounted for 55 percent of PA expenditures in 1999. (Since October 2000, however, the PA has added at least 5,000 civil servants to its payroll).20 According to Patrick Clawson, Research Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former economist at the International Monetary Fund, “the monthly disbursement of emergency aid is ‘coincidentally the same’ as the salary budget for government employees. Employees working in the security services are ‘a whole lot better off than the Palestinians,’ because Arafat needs to keep them loyal.”21
The Correlation between the Economic Crisis and Political Radicalization
These economic data depict a society at war (of its own volition, it must be emphasized),22 a society whose regime has effectively monopolized its economic resources. Beyond the issue of the form of government, it is highly unlikely that any population enduring such adversity could live in peace with a neighboring population having a relatively higher standard of living — and this is exactly what was intended. In the most basic sense, the theft along the “green line” proves this point. Effectively, the political result of such a condition is a degree of radicalization in which relations approach an “ultimate situation,” where nuances disappear, as well as the elementary civility between individuals that makes daily life possible.
One analyst, Yezid Sayigh, has concluded that the economic and political consequences of the “Al-Aqsa Intifada” may well mean that Arafat has ruined the opportunity to found a Palestinian state.23 It must be noted that the phenomenon of the government becoming nearly the sole source of support in a failed economy and the absence of a developed civil society is one of the traditional characteristics of the “sterile authoritarianism that characterizes much of the Arab world.”24 Mohamed Talbi, a Tunisian historian, describes the traditional relationships belonging to this culture:
Corruption and dictatorship go hand in hand. Not that corruption is always necessary, by the way. All it takes is to offer promotions and best paid positions, foreign diplomatic posts, cars, honors, awards, even taxi licenses, to the most deserving and unconditionally devoted — all the privileges that can be withheld or withdrawn from the rest for their lack of zeal and then redistributed. All the Arab authors of the Nasihat al-Muluk (Counsel for Kings)25 insisted on the perpetual need for the king to have something to give, to withdraw, or, if need be, to confiscate, in order to keep a tight reign on his world.26
Khaled Abu Toameh described how Chairman Arafat personally administered this traditional system of patronage:
Arafat holds all the reins of power. He takes even the smallest decisions independently, refusing to delegate and thereby empower a subordinate. For example, a Palestinian from east Jerusalem who seeks financial assistance to pay a debt to the Israeli municipality must apply to the rais in person. Arafat also makes most of the important appointments in the PA; he rotates officials frequently in order to reward followers, to keep appointees from becoming too powerful, or to demonstrate his own authority. In one case, he was even asked to “appoint” a receptionist at one of the ministries.27
David Schenker offers an additional example of how the relationship described above, of extending and withholding of favors, helped undermine the effectiveness of the Palestinian Legislative Council. His description does not provide much evidence of checks and balances in action:
Arafat’s influence over the top echelons of the council has served to limit the PLC’s independence. Case in point is the speaker, Abu Ala [Ahmed Qari’]. The primary role of the speaker is to stand up for the PLC in its relations with the executive, but Abu Ala’s main loyalties lie with Arafat, not with the legislature; he knows Arafat could dismiss him at any time. Furthermore, Abu Ala has hopes to succeed Arafat, which gives him an interest in seeing a powerful executive relative to the PLC.28
One of the most significant facts relating to the state of democracy in the PA is an event that did not happen: free and fair elections. Chairman Arafat’s term of office expired three years ago (on 4 May 1999), and he has not stood for reelection.29 According to Samuel Huntington’s definition, the PA is not a functioning democracy,30 and Arafat is just not the democratically elected president of the PA, as former President Carter and others have claimed. Those who would lower the bar for the PA, such as former President Carter, not only apply a double standard but turn their back on those Palestinians who have been deprived of their right to choose their government democratically. (Who will benefit if a disenfranchised Palestinian middle-class, many of whom are Christian, relocates to Orlando, Florida or Santiago de Chile?) They also deny the inconvenient reality that the PA broke its promise not only to Israel but especially to its own people. Contrary to the high hopes of many, the PA failed to become the first democracy in the Arab world, and there is no “Palestinian exception.”31
Khalil Shikaki, an expert on Palestinian public opinion, has identified a correlation between the advancement of democracy and support for the peace process among the mainstream Palestinian community. His analysis may be somewhat dated, but it is still of interest because it shows what the Palestinian elite may have thought at one time (and may again in the future):
Within the Palestinian community, one of the reasons for supporting the peace process within the mainstream nationalist camp is because of the hope the peace process will lead to a democratic Palestinian state. In the greater Arab world, poll data shows that the more educated segments of the population are less supportive of the peace process because they feel that the peace process encourages authoritarianism. But if it begins to appear that the peace process leads to more democracy, the support among Arab educated elites may rise. On the other hand, if the perception of democracy in the PA declines and corruption increases, the support for the peace process may subsequently decline and support for violence may increase.32
Although civil society in the PA has been dislocated, the current state of affairs may not be permanent, and the status of democracy could, once again, become a matter of great importance. This is an issue of significance in the political dimension of its reality and also of our own, because what goes on in our backyard affects us directly.
Beyond issues of nationalism, the endemic structural instability and violence built into the Palestinian Authority has harmed Israel’s domestic situation, resulting in inflation, the prospect of negative growth, a decline in exports and increase of the trade deficit, loss of investment from abroad, a rise in unemployment, failed businesses, a decline of tax revenues, debt resulting from the direct cost of war, added security costs of doing business, and new taxes. It is necessary to recognize and respond to the new situation, because the crisis resulting from the radical reorientation of Palestinian society is not temporary but endemic.
The Effect of Social and Political Structure on Events
Although our subject is the democratic peace, the underlying environment of social and political structure must be appreciated, if not as a direct cause, then definitely as a central factor in the new reality confronting policy-makers. Let us look at two sets of parallel examples in order to view these issues from a wider perspective.
The French political scientist Jean-Francois Revel pointed out that in dealing with totalitarian systems, the West attaches too much importance to the leader of the moment.33 There is certainly a distinction between an authoritarian and totalitarian regime. Although the situation Revel describes is not exactly analogous to the circumstances of our region, his consideration of the elements of continuity in communist regimes may have some relevance:
What must continue, what must not change, are the system’s two pillars: its ideology and structure. What does change? Men. Sooner or later, the men in power must be replaced. Unfortunately, the West looks exclusively to the men; the decisive importance of personality in a democratic politician’s career leads us into the error of carrying the standard over to totalitarian systems, where men reach the top not through the impact of their personalities on the public but via the machine, that is, via the state’s structure and ideology.34
Closer to our present situation are the transcending elements of stability and continuity in this region, which Robert B. Satloff described in an essay devoted to the future of Palestinian politics after Arafat:
As for succession in the Arab world, traditionally, Arab states have had coups and assassinations but not revolutions, and when faced with the prospect of radical change that could bring down an entire ruling system, elites have more often than not found a way to produce suitable (or at least sustainable) successors rather than risk exposing themselves and their class to wholesale political change. Such has been the case in republics, like Egypt, as well as in monarchies, like Saudi Arabia. The counter case does not exist — there is no example of an Arab state disintegrating when the leader, even the paramount leader, leaves the scene.35
From the point of view of the standing historical debate, the issue of the Great Man as a moving force in history does not apply. The matter of elites and the structure of Palestinian society, as elements of continuity, deserve thorough and sustained attention.
Looking at the current situation, one may also take a longer and broader view of events. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s foreign policy advisor, Robert Cooper, a senior British diplomat, writing in his personal capacity, has proposed some original but somewhat politically incorrect ideas. In a recent article entitled “The New Liberal Imperialism,”36 Cooper argued that the well-developed countries need a new form of liberal imperialism in order to maintain world order and protect themselves, “because the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world.” He identified three categories of states: pre-modern, which were often former colonies such as Somalia and Afghanistan; post-imperial, post-modern states which “no longer think of security in terms of conquest” such as the members of the EU; and traditional “modern” states “such as India, Pakistan or China which behave as states always have, following interest, power and raison d’Etat.” He saw a threat to the security of the post-modern states from the modern and pre-modern groups:
The challenge posed by the pre-modern world is a new one. The pre-modern world is a world of failed states. Here the state no longer fulfils Weber’s criterion of having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Either it has lost the legitimacy or it has lost the monopoly of the use of force; often the two go together….In such areas chaos is the norm and war is a way of life. In so far as there is a government it operates in a way similar to an organised crime syndicate.
Cooper identified a legitimate interest of the post-modern states to act in self-defense, because instability in one’s neighborhood poses threats that no state can ignore: “It is dangerous if a neighbouring state is taken over in some way by organised or disorganised crime — which is what state collapse usually amounts to. But Usama bin Laden has now demonstrated for those who have not already realised, that today all the world is, potentially at least, our neighbour.”
One need not be in complete agreement with all of Cooper’s doctrines or examples. However, the idea of having a recognized security interest in what goes on in adjacent countries constitutes a valuable affirmation of an old principle. According to his scheme, although he did not say so explicitly, the PA would fall in the category of a failed state and for the good of all concerned be placed under some form of receivership, perhaps a protectorate, although it might be given a different name today. Having lost its legitimacy, it would certainly not be a candidate for statehood.
While Robert Cooper has made the case for a new liberal imperialism, there have been some aspects of classical colonialism which have been humane and have brought considerable benefits to the populations involved. The French doctrine of colonialism, as seen by its early practitioners, was part of a building process. At the beginning of his career, the great Marshal Lyauty (Louis-Hubert-Gonzalve-Lyautey, 1854-1934), who later gained fame for his success in colonizing Morocco, advanced such views in his classical article, “The Colonial Role of the Army,” which appeared in 1900.37 He cited an 1895 report of General Duchemin (Auguste-Paul-Albert, 1837-1907), Commander in Chief of the Occupation Forces, to the Governor General of Indo-China, where he described the best means of putting down “pirates,” a generic term which referred to outlaws and bandits:
There are no pirates in countries that are completely developed. On the contrary, there are [pirates], although called by other names, even in Europe, in countries such as Turkey, Greece, and Southern Italy that have an incomplete system of roads, a rudimentary administrative organization, or a population which is thinly distributed. If I dare continue my comparison, I would say that, when it is a matter of cultivating part of a land invaded by weeds, it is not sufficient to uproot them, because there is a danger of having to begin again the next day. After having plowed, it is necessary to isolate the conquered soil, to fence it in, and then sow the good grain that will make it inhospitable for the weeds. It is the same thing with land that has been delivered from piracy. [There must be] armed occupation, with or without combat, plowing it over, establishing military encirclement enclosing and isolating it, and finally the reconstitution of the population, its armament, the establishment of new markets and small scale farming, the penetration of roads, planting good grain there and making the conquered region inhospitable to the pirate, if it is not the last who, transformed, cooperates in this evolution.38
The above analogies would not represent specific recommendations. They do show how other thinkers have related to analogous problems, particularly those where social and political structure was an important factor.
More than ever, the challenge for the present is to formulate a sound, long-term policy suited to the new reality of living at close quarters with a hostile, politically radicalized, authoritarian regime. Knowing what the Palestinian Authority has become gives a reasonable idea of what may be expected from it in the future, if no appropriate remedy can be found. Because the problem is structural, its remedy must also be structural. At present, bringing about the democratic peace implies defending the democracy of Israel by every means possible. Israel is now a democracy at war. In this perspective, such issues as personal chemistry, techniques of negotiation, cease-fires, and even an imposed settlement become secondary. Accordingly, one must start from the type of peace one may wish to achieve ultimately, namely, the democratic peace, which still holds the promise of long-term stability, and then reason backward. If this can be done, it may be possible to develop the decisive advantage that will enable Israel to assure its security, safeguard its own democracy, and benefit those of our neighbors who are in good faith.
The Broken Promise as a Public Affairs Issue
Several practical consequences derive from the failure of democracy in the PA. Because the promise of the democratic peace has not been honored, the State of Israel has a strong moral claim which it must place before the world. From the point of view of information policy, it is important to press this claim vigorously, both from the educational point of view to get the facts before the media, and to prevent Israel’s case from being considered the moral equivalent of that of the PA. By insisting that these claims be honored, it should be made clear that Israel is a self-respecting state, and this is similar to deterrence. It is crucial for Israel to present its case accurately and forcefully in order to provide its friends good reasons for lending their support and to prevent ideology from becoming confused with knowledge. Conversely, passivity leaves a vacuum which the ignorant, counterfeiters, and charlatans — both Jewish and non-Jewish — will happily fill.
One recent success of Israel’s information policy was Prime Minister Sharon’s “Czechoslovakia Speech” of 4 October 2001, a principled and brutally forceful refutation of the fallacious distinction between “good terrorism” and “bad terrorism.” His assertion gained currency because of its basic truth.39 Its credibility and simple logic was able to shatter the double standard and put the advocates of other positions on weak ground. A number of similar points, founded on simple truth, may also come into consideration:
Israel, a state ruled by law, is entitled to the consideration and respect deriving from this fact.
Because it is the only democracy in the Near East, Israel is the exception in the region.
The PA has committed a gross breach of faith.
Because the PA did not conduct elections on 4 May 1999, it cannot be considered a functioning democracy and Yasser Arafat does not have the legitimacy of an elected leader.
Israel, a democracy, has a legal and moral right to defend itself.
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* The author wishes to acknowledge the kind help and advice of Ralph Amelan, Research Librarian of the American Center in Jerusalem, and Mich?le Ben-Ami, Librarian of the American Jewish Committee, Jerusalem. Shammai Fishman assisted in the research.
1. “The central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern.” Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave; Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991):6.
2. See Emmanuel Sivan, “Illusions of Change,” Journal of Democracy 11:3 (July 2000):78-82.
3. Seymour Martin Lipset, among others, emphasized the importance of this correlation:
From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could there be a situation in which the mass of the population intelligently participate in politics and develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues.
Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), quoted in Henry S. Rowen, “The Tide Underneath the ‘Third Wave’,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (January 1996):53.
4. John Colville, in Action This Day; Working with Churchill, ed. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett (London: Macmillan, 1968):74.
5. See Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
6. Huntington, 21.
7. James A. Baker, III, with Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy; Revolution, War, and Peace (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995):654.
8. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001.
9. Ibid., 70.
10. For overwhelming evidence that the Intifada was planned in advance and was not a spontaneous popular response to the Sharon visit to the Temple Mount, see “One Year of Yasser Arafat’s Intifada: How It Started and How It Might End,” Jerusalem Issue Brief 1:4 (1 October 2001).
11. David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO; The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996):15.
12. Amos Harel, “Major General Yaakov Orr,” Haaretz, 13 July 2001.
13. The PLC corruption report of 1998 implicated several cabinet ministers in top-level PA corruption, including the disappearance of over $300 million from PA coffers. David Schenker, “Democracy and the Palestinian Authority; Is Good Governance Essential for Peace?” in Peacewatch Policywatch; Scattered Pieces, Scattered Peace (Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001):27.
14. The term “civil society” refers to that part of public life that exists in the area between the private sphere of the family, on the one hand, and the official sphere of the state, on the other. New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, 3rd ed., s.v. “Civil Society,” by Krishan Kumar.
15. Economist Intelligence Unit, Israel, Palestinian Territories (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, October, 2001):47.
16. Ibid., 58.
17. Ibid., 47, 55.
18. Ibid., 52.
19. Ibid., 54.
20. Ibid., 56. According to Yezid Sayigh, “An important element of the PA’s success in maintaining cohesion has been its continued ability to pay salaries to well over 120,000 public sector employees, including 40,000 police personnel, and to provide indirect subventions to thousands of Fatah activists.” “Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt,” Survival 43:3 (Autumn 2001):57.
21. Julie Ziegler, “Palestinian Economy Shrinks 40% Since Violence Broke Out, Costing Some 2.46 B, Says World Bank,” Jerusalem Post, 21 December 2001, A11.
22. See note 10.
23. Yezid Sayigh, 57.
24. See William Harris, “The Crisis of Democracy in Twentieth-Century Syria and Lebanon,” Princeton Papers; Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 5 (Fall 1996):19.
25. For further information on this genre of literature, consult C.E. Bosworth, “Nasihat al-Muluk,” EI2 [CD-ROM] Edition v.1.0, and particularly the principles of Siyasat-nama (CE 1091-2) by Nizam al-Mulk.
26. Mohamad Talbi, “A Record of Failure,” Journal of Democracy 11:3 (July 2000):60.
27. Khaled Abu Toameh, “Stepping into Giant Shoes,” in After Arafat? The Future of Palestinian Politics, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), 25. Also, Arafat’s method may also be observed in his detailed payment instructions for the “El Aqsa Martyrs’ Invoice,” Corinna de Fonseca-Wollheim and Herb Keinon, “IDF: Documents Show Arafat Approved Payments to Terrorists,” Jerusalem Post, 5 April 2002.
28. David Schenker, “Democracy and the Palestinian Authority; Is Good Governance Essential for Peace?” in Peacewatch, 28.
29. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed in Washington on September 28, 1995, specifies in Chapter I, Article III, Paragraph 4: “The Council and the Ra’ees [President] of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be elected for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994.” See also Kramer, 75.
30. See footnote 1.
31. The failure of democracy in the Palestinian Authority and its significance belongs to the wider debate of whether democracy as a form of government is compatible with the political culture of the Arab world. This question is the subject of an extensive literature, because a considerable number of Arab intellectuals — not only Palestinians — would like to have the benefits of democracy and an open, modern society in their own respective countries. See, for example: Saliba Sarsar, “Arab Politics; Can Democracy Prevail?” Middle East Quarterly 5:1 (March 2000):39-47; Liath Kubba, “Arabs and Democracy; The Awakening of Civil Society,” Journal of Democracy 11:3 (July 2000):84-90; Mohamed Talbi, “A Record Failure,” Journal of Democracy 11:3 (July 2000):84-90.
32. Khalil Shikaki, “Democracy and the Palestinian Authority: Is Good Governance Essential for Peace?” in Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Peace Watch, 29.
33. Jean Francois-Revel, How Democracies Perish, tr. William Byron (Garden City: Doubleday, 1983):281.
34. Ibid., 282.
35. Robert B. Satloff, “Introduction,” The Future of Palestinian Politics, 2.
36. Observer, 7 April 2002.
37. Lieutenant-Colonel Lyautey, “Du role colonial de l’Armee,” Revue des deux Mondes, CLVII (February 15, 1900):308-328.
38. Ibid., 313. See Jean Gottmann, “Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earl (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943; reprint, 1973), 234-259.
39. Representative Tom De Lay, the House Majority Whip, used Sharon’s argument in his speech of 2 May 2002. The author thanks Mr. Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto for making this text available.
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Dr. Joel S. Fishman received his doctorate in modern European history from Columbia University. He was a Fulbright Scholar at the Institute for History of the State University of Utrecht and carried out post-doctoral research at the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation in Amsterdam. His book Diplomacy and Revolution: The London Conference of 1830 and the Belgian Revolt examines the operation of a European peace conference. Dr. Fishman served as Chairman of the Foundation of the Institute for Research on Dutch Jewry and publishes on topics of contemporary historical interest.